CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Ron Weaver was a senior producer for the television show the Bold and the Beautiful, and he published and distributed a memorandum critical of plaintiff Carlos Pelz’s job performance as a “key” hair stylist for the television show.[1] The memorandum contains statements such as Pelz “has a negative attitude, is perceived as a slacker, and is not carrying an adequate work load,” and his “hair styling does not match the emotional and contextual requirements of the script.” Pelz filed a defamation action against Weaver, and the production company that Weaver works for, Bell-Phillip Television Productions, Inc. (BPP). Based upon information obtained during discovery, Pelz amended his complaint to name his employer CBS Broadcasting, Inc. (CBS) and Jody Lawrence-Miller, his supervisor at CBS, alleging slander arising from Lawrence-Miller’s statements to Weaver regarding Pelz’s job performance.
The BPP defendants (Weaver and BPP) and the CBS defendants (Lawrence-Miller and CBS) filed separate summary judgment motions, asserting the common-interest privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c), applicable to defamatory statements made without malice to one who is interested, barred this action as a matter of law. We conclude the BPP defendants and the CBS defendants met their burden to show the allegedly defamatory statements were made on a privileged occasion, and Pelz has not raised a triable issue of fact to show malice to overcome the privilege. Thus, the trial court correctly granted the summary judgment motions on this ground. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments.

M.C. (Mother), the mother of B.D. and Z.L., appeals from dispositional orders declaring her two daughters to be dependent children within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 300 and removing them from her custody. Mother claims there was insufficient evidence to support jurisdiction based on Mother’s alcohol abuse. We affirm.

K.T. appeals from the orders of the juvenile court declaring him a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) as he had committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and ordering him into the Camp Community Placement Program with a maximum term of confinement of 4 years 8 months.

Daniel E. Engel appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court sustained the demurrer of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) to Engel’s second amended complaint (SAC) for quiet title and declaratory relief. Engel obtained a home loan secured by a deed of trust. Although the deed of trust designated a beneficiary and a nominee of the lender (this was MERS in both cases), it did not designate a trustee. Engel argues that the omission from the deed of trust of a designated trustee will prevent anyone ever from foreclosing on his home loan. He also claims a security interest was not created because of the absence of a designated trustee. By his actions for quiet title and declaratory relief, he seeks assurances that he may in the future default on his loan payments with impunity.
We decline to provide those assurances because an initial failure to designate a trustee can be cured by designating a trustee when and if foreclosure becomes necessary. Similarly, the absence of a designated trustee does not preclude a security interest from vesting. We conclude the court did not err in sustaining MERS’s demurrer without leave to amend and affirm the judgment.

Ann Walnum (appellant) appeals from a judgment denying her verified petition for writ of mandate and declaratory and injunctive relief against respondents the City of Los Angeles (the City) and its Board of Recreation and Park Commissioners (the Board) for alleged violations of the Ralph M. Brown Act (Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq.)[1] and the City’s City Charter. The petition challenged, among other things, a special meeting conducted by the Board in which respondent the Autry National Center of the American West (Autry Center) was granted approval to renovate spaces within its Museum of the American West (museum). We affirm the judgment in its entirety.

An employee and her employer agreed to resolve all employment-related disputes through binding arbitration. Notwithstanding that agreement, the employee filed this action against her former employer, alleging statutory causes of action under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, §§ 12900–12996) and related common law causes of action. The employer filed a petition to compel arbitration. In response, plaintiff filed a statement of non-opposition. The trial court granted the petition.
In the arbitration, the employer demurred to plaintiff’s claims on the ground they were time-barred. The arbitrator issued an order sustaining the demurrer. The employee filed a motion in the trial court, seeking to vacate the arbitrator’s decision. The trial court denied the motion. The employee appealed.

During a dissolution action, the wife executed a trust deed, without her husband’s knowledge or consent, purporting to convey a jointly owned condominium to her brother-in-law. The brother-in-law recorded the trust deed. When the condominium was sold to a third party, the brother-in-law received in excess of $150,000 from the proceeds.
The husband filed this action against the brother-in-law, alleging several causes of action arising out of the creation and recordation of the trust deed. The brother-in-law responded with a special motion to strike, contending this action was a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16).[1] The brother-in-law argued that the creation or recordation of the trust deed was in connection with an issue under consideration by a judicial body. The trial court denied the motion. This appeal followed.
We conclude the trial court properly found that the creation or recordation of the trust deed was not done in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body or before such a body. (See § 425.16, subds. (e)(1), (2).) Therefore, we affirm.

Appellant A.T.J. seeks review of family law orders governing custody of and his visitation with his and respondent L.A.W.’s children. The orders were issued by the trial court in February 2008, February 2011, and June 2012. We conclude the time is long past for appellate review of the 2008 and 2011 orders. We further conclude the contentions appellant makes with respect to the 2012 order lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm.

The sole question on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying probation to defendant and appellant Jesus G. Renteria. Defendant argues the court erred in failing to consider a grant of probation in the interests of justice. We conclude defendant has failed to establish reversible error in the court’s sentencing choices, and therefore affirm.

Michael Newell appeals a judgment following conviction of second degree robbery, and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, with findings that he personally inflicted great bodily injury upon his victim, suffered five prior strike convictions, suffered four prior serious felony convictions, and served one prior prison term. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a), 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (b).)[1] We affirm.

Lucious Wilson appeals from the judgment entered following his convictions by jury on count 1 – assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and count 2 – exhibiting a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 417.8, subd. (a)), with admissions he suffered a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (d)) and a prior serious felony conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)), and served two prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).[1] The court sentenced appellant to prison for 13 years. We affirm the judgment.

Eduardo Herrera (Eduardo) and Edward Herrera (Edward), father and son, each appeal from their convictions for two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, arising from a series of drunken confrontations with a nightclub security guard. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Eduardo Lalo Flores appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his convictions for three counts of custodial possession of a weapon. He was sentenced to a term of 10 years in prison.
Flores contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to sua sponte order a third competency hearing prior to sentencing; evidence suggested he may have been incompetent during trial; he was deprived of a trial on various prior conviction allegations; and his custody credits were improperly calculated. Flores also requests that we review the sealed record of the trial court’s Pitchess[1] examination of police personnel records to determine whether the court abused its discretion by failing to order disclosure. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216.) We affirm the judgment of conviction, but vacate Flores’s sentence and remand for a trial on the prior conviction allegations and for resentencing.

Defendant and appellant Dontae Jamar Perry appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his convictions for inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant and multiple counts of disobeying a domestic relations court order. The trial court sentenced Perry to 15 years in prison. Perry contends his trial counsel performed ineffectively, leading to the loss of a favorable plea deal, and seeks reversal of the judgment. In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which we consider concurrently with his appeal, Perry reiterates his ineffective assistance of counsel argument. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment and deny the writ petition.