CA Unpub Decisions

A modification decision.

In July 2013, defendant was charged by information with one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) with an allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).

According to the probation report, at the time of the offense defendant was committed to Napa State Hospital after being found not guilty by reason of insanity of a previous murder. (§ 1026.) In May 2013, defendant assaulted another Napa State Hospital inmate, causing several fractures.

Defendant E.N., a minor, appeals from convictions of two counts of second degree robbery and one count of assault with a deadly weapon. Both robbery counts were enhanced by findings that the minor personally used a gun during the commission of the crimes. The court committed defendant to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). Defendant raises only one issue on appeal, arguing the court erred by imposing conditions of probation. The Attorney General agrees, as do we, that the court lacked authority to impose conditions of probation. We, therefore, modify the dispositional order to strike probation conditions that would apply to defendant’s commitment to DJJ and the period following his release. The judgment, as modified, is affirmed.

In November 2013, appellant Yong Feng He filed a notice of appeal from an order entered in June 2013 and the denial of her motion for reconsideration of that order in August 2013. Because we conclude the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we dismiss the appeal.

In this matter we are asked to review the trial court’s ruling on the admission of statements made by defendant to police. Defendant challenges the statements based on violations of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) and voluntariness. We have reviewed the challenged interrogation in this instance and, like the trial court, we find no violation of defendant’s rights under either principle. We therefore affirm.

Contra Costa County Bureau of Children and Family Services (the bureau) filed an amended petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c), [1] alleging, among other things, that Felicity S. was at substantial risk of harm due to the failure of Elizabeth V. (mother) to provide for the child’s medical and emotional needs. Felicity had been hospitalized for uncontrolled diabetes and for attempting to commit suicide. The juvenile court sustained jurisdiction and, at a later dispositional hearing, found by clear and convincing evidence that Felicity could not safely be returned to mother’s home, and ordered reunification services. Mother appealed and filed a habeas petition. In our decision filed on October 31, 2013, as amended upon denial of a petition for rehearing on November 26, 2013, we concluded that substantial evidence supported both orders. By separate order we denied the habeas petition.

M.V., a minor, appeals from an order of the juvenile court dismissing dependency jurisdiction underWelfare and Institutions Code section 300, [1] declaring her to be a ward of the court pursuant to section 602, and placing her in out-of-home care. Specifically, M.V. identifies numerous bases for error in the juvenile court’s decision under section 241.1 to make her a ward of the court rather than continuing her as a juvenile court dependent. M.V. also advances several reasons why the negotiated plea agreement on which her declaration of wardship was based should be set aside. We affirm.

Trade secret protection “ ‘promotes the sharing of knowledge, and the efficient operation of industry,’ ” by “ ‘permit[ting] the individual inventor to reap the rewards of his labor by contracting with a company large enough to develop and exploit it.’ [Citation.]” ( DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner (2003) 31 Cal.4th 864, 878 (DVD Copy Control).) Trade secret law allows the inventor to disclose an idea in confidential commercial negotiations certain that the other side will not appropriate it without compensation. “[T]he holder of the secret, [may] disclose information he would otherwise have been unwilling to share, and [this] permits business negotiations that can lead to commercialization of the invention or sale of the idea, serving both the disclosure and incentive functions of [intellectual property] law.” (Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights (2008) 61 Stan. L.Rev. 311, 336-337, fns. omitted.)

E.N., now eight months old, tested positive for narcotics when he was born. The juvenile court exercised its jurisdiction over E.N., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). The court vested custody of E.N. with the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA), and approved a case plan that, in relevant part, ordered E.N.’s father, S.R. (Father), to complete a substance abuse treatment program, participate in random drug testing, and attend 12-step meetings. Father challenges the disposition order.

We affirm. Given Father’s history of substance abuse, the lack of evidence that he had ever completed a program designed to address that history, and the social worker’s testimony that E.N.’s mother, S.N. (Mother), took drugs with Father while she was pregnant, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in entering the disposition order.

Defendant Mohammad Reza Karimi was convicted of attempted robbery. He was sentenced to three years’ formal probation, plus 364 days in county jail. Defendant timely appealed from the judgment. Appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), setting forth the facts of the case and requesting that we review the entire record. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), appointed counsel provided a list of potential issues to assist us in our independent review. Defendant was granted 30 days to file written arguments in his own behalf, but did not do so.

We have examined the entire record and counsel’s Wende/Anders brief. After considering the entire record, we have found no reasonably arguable issue. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) We therefore affirm.

evine Carmelle appeals from the order dismissing her complaint against the Law Offices of Manuel H. Miller and Michael Coletti (Defendants) after

the trial court granted a special motion to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP motion) (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16). [1] Carmelle argues the trial court erred in granting the anti-SLAPP motion because Coletti’s acts were not taken in furtherance of his right of free speech because his speech was illegal and there was a probability she would prevail on her claims because the litigation privilege did not apply. Defendants contend Coletti’s statements arose from protected activity because they were connected to and related with the underlying litigation and his statements were not illegal as a matter of law.

We ordered the parties to submit supplemental letter briefs on issues raised at oral argument, including a discovery matter in the underlying litigation, Estrada v. Coastal Neurological Medical Center, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County 2012,

No. BC478328) (the Estrada litigation), and whether Coletti’s statements were made in connection with an issue under consideration by a judicial body. The parties submitted briefs, and Defendants filed a motion to augment the record with and request for judicial notice of documents in the Estrada litigation. Those motions are denied. As we explain below, we conclude Coletti’s statements were in furtherance of his right to petition and Carmelle did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing. The order is affirmed.

A jury found defendant Martin Leif Buseth guilty of one count of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under 14 years old. The trial court found Buseth had suffered a prior conviction in the State of Michigan for assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving sexual penetration. The court concluded that offense constituted both a serious and violent felony.

We affirm. The trial court did not err by admitting evidence, under Evidence Code section 1108, showing Buseth previously committed other sexual offenses. The court properly exercised its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 before admitting that evidence. Buseth’s trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to object to the portions of the prosecutor’s closing argument in which the prosecutor referred to Buseth’s prior sexual offenses.

This appeal involves challenges to a trust and a subsequent conservatorship petition. Mary Virginia Melanson (Melanson) and her husband Martin formed the Martin A. Melanson and Mary V. Melanson revocable trust in 1994 (1994 trust). Melanson and Martin were the trustees. Catholic Church Extension Society of the United States (Extension Society), an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, was the beneficiary. Martin died in 2005. Melanson subsequently amended the trust making Extension Society cotrustee. On March 7, 2012, Melanson revoked the 1994 trust and created a new trust (2012 trust). Melanson named herself as trustee in the 2012 trust and named her nephew, Ralph Zehner, as the first successor trustee. The 2012 trust left all real property and 30 percent of the remaining assets in the trust to Zehner in the event of Melanson’s death. The remaining 70 percent would go to Extension Society. Melanson subsequently amended the 2012 trust to make Zehner the sole beneficiary. Extension Society challenged Melanson’s revocation of the 1994 trust.

A jury convicted defendant Eloy Joan Saavedra of assault with a deadly weapon, i.e., a bat (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1), as amended by Stats. 2011, ch. 183,

§ 1; all further statutory references are to this code; count 1), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (former § 245, subd. (a)(1), now § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 2), and battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d); count 3). As to the assault charges, the jury also found defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on a non-accomplice. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).)

The court suspended execution of a five-year sentence on count 1 and placed defendant on probation with conditions including 180 days in jail. It also imposed, then stayed under section 654, two-year sentences on counts 2 and 3, but ordered fines and fees for each count.

Defendant contends one of the two assault convictions must be stricken because they are based on one act. We disagree and affirm the judgment.