CA Unpub Decisions

Baghdo Hayrapetyan was convicted of killing his wife, Anahit[1] Hayrapetyan, and sentenced to 15 years to life in state prison. He contends on appeal the trial court should have instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter because there is no conceivable reason a man would kill his wife of 40 years “unless she had done something that was sufficient to provoke him to react in a homicidal rage.” We find this argument is nothing more than speculation and no substantial evidence supported an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

Tony Castaneda Borjas appeals a judgment and claims sentencing error. In 2014, he was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1))[1] and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) with a jury finding that he inflicted great bodily injury. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) The trial court found he fell within the purview of the "Three Strikes" law and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 16 years. Borjas had a prior 2010 felony conviction for inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (§ 273.5) with a great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The court in the 2010 case struck the enhancement "in the interest of justice."
We conclude that the trial court did not err by finding that the 2010 prior conviction and enhancement constituted a prior serious felony strike conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (b)-(i); 1170.12, subd. (a)-(d).) Court affirm.

Jack Rutigliano appeals his conviction by jury for dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (b)(1))[1], corporal injury on a girlfriend resulting in traumatic condition (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4).) Appellant admitted suffering two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)- (i); 1170.12, subds. (a) - (d)) and two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and was sentenced to 43 years to life. Appellant contends that a pattern instruction on witness out-of-court statements (CALCRIM 318) violated his due process rights and the trial court erred in calculating presentence credits. We modify the judgment to reflect that appellant was awarded 300 days actual custody plus 150 conduct credits, and affirm the judgment as modified.

Appellant Johnny Murillo appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to possession of a controlled substance for sale, following the denial of his suppression motion. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; Pen. Code, § 1538.5.) The court sentenced him to 16 months in the county jail. Appellants Sylvia Murillo and Richard Galindo appeal from the judgments entered following their respective pleas of no contest to manufacturing a controlled substance other than phencyclidine, following the denial of their suppression motions. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.6, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 1538.5.) The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed them on probation for 36 months. the Court affirm.

Vicky Reese appeals contending that 1) her $538,000 judgment against Sergio Mingramm (respondent)was not discharged in a Chapter 7 no-asset bankruptcy and 2) her claim for attorney fees, costs and interest based on respondent's post-petition conduct was not subject to the bankruptcy discharge. (11 U.S.C.S. section 524(a)(1).) We conclude otherwise and affirm the trial court's rulings.

Adam Christopher Dykes appeals his conviction, by jury, of assault with a deadly weapon against a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c)),[1] and forcibly resisting peace officers. (§ 69.) The trial court sentenced appellant to a total term in state prison of 11 years, with 1133 days credit. He contends the trial court erred when 1) it allowed the prosecution to violate a stipulation describing the circumstances of his arrest, 2) it denied appellant's motion for new trial, and 3) it allowed the prosecutor to commit misconduct in closing argument. We affirm.

Dominique Zafir Casey appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime (count 1 - Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (b)(1));[1] two counts of second degree robbery (counts 2 and 5 - § 211.); possession for sale of cocaine base (count 7 - Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5); transportation of a controlled substance (count 8 - Id., § 11352, subd. (a)); and felony vandalism (defacement with graffiti - count 9 - § 594, subds. (a)(1), (b)(1)). As to the vandalism count, the jury found true an allegation that appellant had committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) Appellant admitted that he had been convicted of a prior serious felony within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1) and a prior "strike" within the meaning of California's "Three Strikes" law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) The court reduce appellant's aggregate

Defendants and appellants Harold Patrick Favors and Derrick Jay Jackson were convicted by jury of two counts of robbery. The jury also found true several special allegations, including that the robberies were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang within the meaning of Penal Code section 186.22.
He joins Jackson’s contention regarding the lack of evidence supporting the gang enhancement.
The court affirm the convictions as to both defendants, but correct the clerical errors in Jackson’s abstract of judgment.

A law firm and its clients entered into an agreement that the clients' obligation to pay the firm for past and future legal services was secured by a trust deed on the clients' real property. The law firm's complaint alleged that it was induced to enter into the agreement by the clients' misrepresentation as to the value of the property, and that it did not learn the property's true value was much less until after it made a full credit bid at the foreclosure sale. The complaint prayed for damages arising from intentional and negligent misrepresentation.
The full credit bid rule does not preclude the law firm from maintaining its action. We reverse the summary judgment in favor of the clients.

On December 5, 2013, around 10:30 p.m., Eusebio Garcia (Garcia) drove to Lancaster to meet Latisha Wong (Wong) in order to collect money she owed him. When Garcia picked Wong up, she told him that she first wanted him to drive her to a nearby store in order to purchase cigarettes. After Garcia agreed, Wong directed him to follow a particular route, ostensibly to the store. When they drove past two pedestrians, she convinced him to stop the car in order for her to talk with them. As Garcia stopped the car, the two pedestrians, D’andray Lee Townsend (Townsend) and Jeffrey Lamont Johnson (Johnson), were walking on the sidewalk. Townsend and Johnson, each armed with firearms, then entered the car; Wong immediately exited the car and ran away. Townsend and Johnson then robbed Garcia of $300 cash, his wallet containing his bank card, and his phone. Townsend and Johnson next forced Garcia out of his car and drove away. Subsequently, using the stolen bank card, they withdrew $200 fro

Alesha K. (mother) seeks review by extraordinary writ of a juvenile court order setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26,[1] to consider termination of parental rights and to select a permanent plan for her nine-year-old daughter, A.K. Mother contends the juvenile court erred by terminating her family reunification services at the 12-month status review hearing pursuant to a finding that there was no substantial probability that A.K. could be returned home within 18 months after her initial removal. We reject this contention and deny mother’s petition on the merits.

Attorney Joseph Baxter and his former clients Michael and Lorie Bock, participated in an arbitration under the Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6200 et seq.; MFAA), after stipulating to be bound by the result. In his decision, the arbitrator concluded the legal services provided by Baxter should be valued at the amount already paid by the Bocks and awarded Baxter nothing.
In the trial court, Baxter argued unsuccessfully that the arbitration award should be vacated, among other reasons, because the arbitrator erred in stating the amount paid by the Bocks and failed to disclose matters relating to bias. He repeats those arguments on appeal. In turn, the Bocks contend the trial court failed to award them sufficient legal fees in connection with the confirmation proceeding.
The Court reject Baxter’s arguments and affirm the trial court’s confirmation of the arbitration award. With respect to the attorney fees award, we find no error in the amount of

This is an appeal from final judgment after a jury convicted defendant Charles Robertson of first degree murder, enhanced for use of a deadly weapon (to wit, a knife). Defendant challenges his conviction on multiple grounds, including that the prosecutor’s excusal for cause of an African-American male prospective juror violated his right to a fair and impartial jury, that the trial court prejudicially erred when ruling on the admissibility of character evidence, and that the evidence was insufficient to support conviction for first-degree murder. The Court affirm.

Following an administrative hearing regarding various municipal code violations,
appellants Harvey Ottovich and Mark Ottovich were ordered to remedy the nuisances on two adjacent real properties[1] they owned in the City of Fremont (“City”). Appellants then petitioned for writ of administrative mandate against the City. The City demurred on the ground the petition was barred by the statute of limitations set out in Code of Civil Procedure[2] section 1094.6 and the demurrer was sustained without leave to amend.
On appeal, appellants contend section 1094.6 is not a jurisdictional bar to their petition as that section does not specifically preclude tolling or estoppel. They claim they alleged facts, namely the “unclean hands” of the City, which constituted grounds for either tolling the statute of limitations or estopping the City from asserting a statute of limitations defense. The Court affirm.