CA Unpub Decisions

In this variant of what has come to be known as road rage, the victims and defendant told the jury very different accounts of what transpired on the night of June 29, 2015. The jury was confronted with a classic credibility contest; either the victims or defendant lied when testifying at trial. Defendant Kenneth Allan Acquah III contends the judgment finding him guilty of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon must be reversed because the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument improperly diluted the prosecution’s burden of proof by misrepresenting the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree and affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Rodrigo Gabriel Garcia of attempted murder and found true allegations for personal use of a knife and infliction of great bodily injury. He contends the trial court erred by failing to give an instruction on imperfect self-defense. We agree, and reverse the judgment.

S.G. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order selecting guardianship as the permanent plan for her son, Alexander W. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (b)(5).) Despite her previous admission that Alexander had no Indian ancestry, Mother contends the juvenile court failed to ensure compliance with the notice and inquiry provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We disagree and affirm.

The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer to plaintiff’s in propria persona second amended complaint alleging wrongful initiation of foreclosure, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, without leave to amend. We affirm the ensuing judgment.

In December 2011, the Border Coast Regional Airport Authority (Airport Authority) certified an environmental impact report (EIR) for the Del Norte County Regional Airport Runway Safety Area Project (the airport project). In March 2014, Pacific Shores Property Owners Association (Property Owners) filed a petition for writ of mandate to prevent Airport Authority from implementing a “mitigation” plan for the airport project on property located within the Pacific Shores subdivision of Del Norte County on the ground that Airport Authority failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21000 et seq.). The trial court denied the petition. We affirm.

Defendant John Jason Thomas threatened a correctional officer while in custody in the Santa Cruz County jail. He was charged with resisting an executive officer and making criminal threats. Nine months later, defendant assaulted a fellow jail inmate and was charged in a new case with assault by force likely to cause great bodily injury. The trial court consolidated the cases for trial, and a jury convicted defendant of assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury, making criminal threats, and misdemeanor resisting a public officer. Because consolidation in the circumstances of this case denied defendant a fair trial on the threats and resistance charges, we will reverse the judgment.

Eric J. Rodriguez appeals a postjudgment order revoking probation and sentencing him to two years state prison for attempted second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 654, 211.) Appellant contends that the trial court erred in not imposing a 16-month low term sentence. We affirm.
In 2014, appellant tried to rob a 52-year-old man. Appellant demanded that the victim hand over his cell phone and repeatedly punched him in the face and head, causing the victim to suffer a blowout fracture of the left eye orbit, a bilateral nasal bone fracture, and a possible facture of the nasal septum. The victim called the police on his cell phone and tried to ward off the attack with a knife, stabbing appellant in the back and arms before losing consciousness.

Defendant Duewa Abeana Lee physically abused her incarcerated boyfriend’s 12-year-old daughter, C., over the span of two months. The abuse ranged in severity from striking the child’s hands with a spatula, to repeatedly hitting her with an extension cord, to burning her with various objects, including a pan defendant heated on the stove. As we describe in greater detail later in this opinion, these acts are merely a sampling of the torture the child endured.
Defendant was convicted by jury of one count of torture, two counts of mayhem, six counts of infliction of cruel or inhuman corporal injury to a child, and two counts of child abuse. With respect to each count of cruel or inhuman corporal injury, the jury also found defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the child; with respect to four of those counts, the jury further found defendant personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon in committing the offense. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for

Defendant appeals from an order revoking and reinstating supervised release following a no contest plea. Appointed counsel filed an opening brief summarizing the case but raising no issues. We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf. Defendant has not done so.
Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have reviewed the entire record and find no arguable issue on appeal. Following the California Supreme Court’s direction in Kelly, we provide “a brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case, the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, and the punishment imposed.” (Id. at p. 110.)

The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged defendant Luis Alonso Hernandez Amaya (defendant) with one count of sexual intercourse with a child 10 years old or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7(a)), one count of sexual penetration with a child 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7(b)), one count of oral copulation with a child 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7(b)), and two counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288(a)). The People further alleged defendant committed the lewd act offenses against more than one victim, thereby subjecting him to an enhanced sentence. (§ 667.61(b), (c)(8) & (e)(4).)

At a contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing, A.M. was declared a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) and placed in foster care. Lucille C., the child’s maternal great grandmother and legal guardian (great grandmother or legal guardian), appeals. We affirm.

In two separate cases, Larry Darnell Monroe pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) In both cases, he admitted three prior drug-related felony convictions. (Id., § 11370.2, subd. (c).) In one case (case No. SCN352174), he also admitted a prison prior. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).) In the other (case No. SCN352205), he admitted he committed the charged offense while released on bail. (Id., § 12022.1, subd. (b).)

Vicki F. Van Fleet appeals from an October 2015 order directing her former husband, respondent Donald L. Kingery, to pay child support in the amount of $411. In making the challenged order, the trial court relied on an order it issued in April 2015, imputing income to Van Fleet. Van Fleet did not appeal from that order.
Van Fleet now contends the imputation of income to her was contrary to law and unsupported by the evidence. As we explain, her failure to appeal from the April 2015 order prevents us from reviewing the correctness of the trial court’s original decision on the imputation issue. As for the matters embraced by the October 2015 order, from which Van Fleet has appealed, we conclude: (1) she has failed to show the evidence compelled a finding in her favor; and (2) her failure to appeal from the April 2015 order forecloses her from raising legal issues she might have raised in an appeal from that order. Accordingly, we will affirm the October 2015 order from which th

A petition filed December 30, 2015, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleged that the minor I.G. possessed methamphetamine, a misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count one), and possessed hydrocodone (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a); count two). After the minor’s motion to suppress the evidence (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700.1) was denied, he entered a negotiated admission to count one and count two was dismissed in the interests of justice. The minor was placed on probation for six months subject to certain conditions including 21 days of community service with a maximum confinement term of one year.