CA Unpub Decisions

Immediately after the juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction over nine-year-old Nathan W. (Nathan) based on allegations that I.W. (mother) and her new boyfriend had subjected Nathan to physical and emotional abuse, the court issued an order awarding Kevin W. (father) sole legal and physical custody. Mother appeals this order. The juvenile court’s order was correct, and we affirm.

Alfred W. (father) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) as to his now five-year-old son H.W., and three-year-old daughter R.W. After reviewing the juvenile court record, father’s court-appointed counsel informed this court she could find no arguable issues to raise on father’s behalf. This court granted father leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)
Father submitted a letter which we conclude failed to address the termination findings, or orders, or set forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error arose from the section 366.26 hearing. (Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant and appellant Cynthia V. is the maternal cousin of minor half brothers, C.P. and M.M. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) had placed both boys in Cynthia’s care after they were detained from their parents. In September 2015, the minors were removed from Cynthia’s care. Cynthia appeals from the denial of her petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 (hereafter section 388) in which she sought the return of the boys.
We affirm.

Appellant, James C. Hilliard, now 78 years of age, filed a complaint making the sole claim that Kevin R. Harbour (Harbour) and Wells Fargo Capital Finance, LLC, (Wells Fargo or the Bank) took or assisted in taking his property for wrongful use, with intent to defraud, or by undue influence, in violation of section 15610.30, subd. (a)(1)(2) of the Welfare and Institutions Code section, a provision of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (the Act). (§§ 15600 et seq.)
On January 26, 2015, Wells Fargo demurred to the first amended complaint. The demurrer was sustained without leave to amend on the grounds that Hilliard lacked standing to sue for the alleged harm to his ownership interest in the property assertedly taken from him by Wells Fargo, and that his complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

This dispute relates to a fiscal relief mechanism for four cities in Riverside County that was included in a 2015 state budget bill, specifically, section 28 of Senate Bill No. 107 (2015 Reg. Sess.) (Sen. Bill 107, § 28), which became law on September 22, 2015. (Stats. 2015, ch. 325, §§ 28, 31) Three of the cities—defendants and respondents City of Jurupa Valley (Jurupa Valley), City of Menifee (Menifee), and City of Wildomar (Wildomar)—had certain debts forgiven by defendant and respondent County of Riverside (the County) pursuant to that mechanism. The fourth, plaintiff and appellant City of Eastvale (Eastvale), did not.
Eastvale seeks to compel the County to forgive certain debts. Eastvale appeals from the trial court’s order denying its petition for a writ of mandate and entry of judgment in favor of defendants. The County, Jurupa Valley, Menifee, and Wildomar ask that we dismiss the appeal as moot or, in the alternative, affirm the trial court’s ruling. Defendant

This dispute relates to a fiscal relief mechanism for four cities in Riverside County that was included in a 2015 state budget bill, specifically, section 28 of Senate Bill No. 107 (2015 Reg. Sess.) (Sen. Bill 107, § 28), which became law on September 22, 2015. (Stats. 2015, ch. 325, §§ 28, 31) Three of the cities—defendants and respondents City of Jurupa Valley (Jurupa Valley), City of Menifee (Menifee), and City of Wildomar (Wildomar)—had certain debts forgiven by defendant and respondent County of Riverside (the County) pursuant to that mechanism. The fourth, plaintiff and appellant City of Eastvale (Eastvale), did not.
Eastvale seeks to compel the County to forgive certain debts. Eastvale appeals from the trial court’s order denying its petition for a writ of mandate and entry of judgment in favor of defendants. The County, Jurupa Valley, Menifee, and Wildomar ask that we dismiss the appeal as moot or, in the alternative, affirm the trial court’s ruling. Defendant

A motorcyclist slid in a patch of dirt and gravel as he turned into an alleyway. He sued one of the three companies with active construction sites abutting the alley. The trial court granted summary judgment to the construction company and the jobsite’s owner, finding no triable issue of material fact as to whether the company was responsible for dropping the dirt at the alley’s mouth. The motorcyclist now appeals two of the trial court’s predicate evidentiary rulings as well as its grant of summary judgment. We conclude that the trial court erred in excluding photographs of the accident scene, and conclude that those photographs raise a triable issue of fact regarding causation. Accordingly, we reverse.

Appellant Heather Abrew appeals from an order terminating spousal support, arguing the trial court erred (1) in finding there was a change of circumstances between the last support order and a request for modification of that order, and (2) in its ultimate conclusion to terminate support. She also argues that the trial court should have awarded full attorney’s fees for the proceedings below. We find no error and therefore affirm.

On February 13, 2014, the Contra Costa District Attorney charged appellant, Dylan Michael Wilson, with two felony counts of reckless driving (Veh. Code, §§ 23103, subd. (a), 23105), alleging that in the commission of those offenses he personally inflicted great bodily injury upon John Dunbar and Joanna Klasa. (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a).) The second count was charged as a strike offense. The offenses arose from an automobile collision on October 21, 2013. Dunbar was the driver of the vehicle appellant collided with, Klasa was a passenger in appellant’s car.
On October 23, 2014, the day set for the preliminary hearing, appellant entered a conditional plea pursuant to a negotiated disposition. In return for his plea of no contest to the first count, the prosecution agreed to dismiss the second count, subject to a Harvey waiver, and also the associated strike allegation and great bodily injury enhancements pertaining to both counts. The indicated sentence, which was i

Defendant, cross-complainant and appellant O’Neil & Matusek, LLP (O&M) appeals a judgment following a court trial. The judgment awarded plaintiff and respondent Linda Maybee Weinberg (Weinberg) $20,000 on her complaint against O&M, Weinberg’s former attorneys, for breach of fiduciary duty, and also awarded O&M the sum of $5,000 on its cross-complaint against Weinberg for quantum meruit.

This is an appeal after a jury verdict of approximately $814,000 and a court order to quiet title in favor of plaintiff Tony Van Lam against defendants Kevin Quoc Tran and Tom Tran, his father. The essence of Tony’s principal claim, fraud, was based on the assertion that Kevin tricked him into conveying a majority interest in a commercial real estate building Tony owned in exchange for a minority interest in a limited liability company owning undeveloped land in Riverside County. Tony argued at trial that Kevin’s entire scheme was fraudulent. The jury found in his favor, awarding damages, and the court quieted title to Tony’s building.
On appeal, the Trans raise numerous purported errors with regard to a lack of substantial evidence, jury instructions, the conduct of Tony’s counsel, the admissibility and presentation of evidence, the court’s decision to deny a bench trial, and alleged error with respect to the amount of the judgment. To the extent we can consider the m

Appellant Nichole Shavonne Ross contends that the trial court erroneously dismissed her action. The judgment of dismissal was filed on July 30, 2015, and signed by the judge and entered by the clerk on the same date. Appellant did not file this appeal until February 22, 2016—207 days after the judgment was entered—well beyond any deadline for appealing a judgment. Her appeal, therefore, is untimely; we do not have jurisdiction to consider it. Accordingly, we dismiss it.

This is an appeal from judgment in an action for quiet title over a parcel of real property in San Francisco. Below, the trial court sustained a demurrer to the first amended complaint filed by appellants Patrick Partners, LLC, and Patrick Connolly (collectively, Patrick Partners) against respondents 744 Union Investors, LLC (Investors), and Philips Developments, LLC (collectively, respondents) after rejecting Patrick Partners’ contention that respondents were barred from transferring title to this property by an automatic stay obtained in Patrick Partners’ federal bankruptcy proceedings. We affirm.

Defendant Leonard Lee Warford was charged with criminal offenses in three separate cases filed between 2011 and 2013. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 10 years 8 months in all three cases in 2014.
On appeal, he contends that his conviction for transporting a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) must be reversed because the statute under which he was convicted was amended before he was sentenced to provide that a defendant must transport the controlled substances for purposes of sale. He claims the stipulated factual basis for his plea did not include any facts indicating he had an intent to sell the drug he was transporting. He also argues that his conviction for possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) must be reversed because he was tried by the court without expressly waiving his right to a jury trial. Finally, he urges that he cannot be convicted of, or punished for, both battery and assault by means of