CA Unpub Decisions

Patrick Juan Matthews (defendant) stands convicted of carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle. On appeal, he argues that his conviction must be overturned because the firearm should have been suppressed under the Fourth Amendment. We conclude the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress, and affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Raymond Leland Lloyd, Jr., has requested that this court review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We modify the judgment as described herein, affirm as modified, and direct preparation of an amended and corrected abstract of judgment.

A jury convicted Labrone Carlos Harris of the crimes of corporal injury to spouse, with infliction of great bodily injury, and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, with infliction of great bodily injury. (Penal Code, §§ 273.5, subd. (a), 245, subd.(a)(4), 12022.7, subd. (e).) Harris admitted a serious felony prior and a strike prior. (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (b)-(i), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c), 1170.12.) The court sentenced Harris to a total term of 13 years in prison.
Harris argues the court violated Evidence Code section 356 when it excluded a portion of a recorded jailhouse telephone call Harris made to his wife while admitting another portion of their conversation. He contends the court's evidentiary ruling resulted in prejudicial error, requiring reversal. We affirm.

Defendant stands convicted of the following offenses: (1) first degree burglary with another person present (Pen. Code, §§ 459 & 460) ; (2) grand theft of personal property (§ 487, subd. (a)); (3) unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); (4) evading an officer in a vehicle with willful disregard (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)); (5) resisting executive officers (§ 69); and (6) hit and run driving, as a misdemeanor (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)). The jury also found true various enhancement allegations, including that defendant’s 2010 first degree burglary conviction constituted a strike under our Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i) & 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and that defendant had suffered four additional prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

Hector Joaquin Rocha, Jr., Philip Lopez, Jr., and Angel Delvillar (together appellants) were all charged with first degree murder of Julio Jimenez (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1), robbery of an inhabited dwelling (§ 212.5, subd. (a); count 2), and robbery of Corina Vargas (§ 211; count 3). It was alleged the murder was committed during the course of a robbery and that all appellants were principals in the robbery (§ 189). It was further alleged that Lopez was at least 16 years old at the time of the offense. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (d)(1).) As to the robberies, it was alleged that they were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)); and that a principal in the robberies personally discharged a firearm causing the death of Jimenez (§§ 12022.7, 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)). On February 8, 2013, a jury convicted appellants as charged.

A jury found defendant Daniel Thomas Bush guilty of pimping (Pen. Code, § 266h, subd. (a)) and pandering (§ 266i, subd. (a)(1)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations defendant served one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), had one prior strike (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)), and committed the underlying offenses while released from custody on a primary offense (§ 12022.1). The trial court sentenced defendant to 13 years in state prison, consisting of 12 years (the upper term, doubled for the strike) for pimping, plus one year for the prior prison term enhancement. The trial court stayed defendant’s sentence for pandering pursuant to section 654.

Defendant Albert Fletcher Brown pleaded guilty to five counts of second degree robbery stemming from an armed robbery of a retail store. At sentencing, the trial court denied application of Penal Code Section 654 and sentenced Brown to consecutive sentences for each robbery count. Brown claims the court improperly denied application of section 654 to four of the five robbery sentences and abused its discretion by imposing consecutive rather than concurrent sentences.

Defendant Michael Ray Babineaux appeals following his conviction for multiple offenses related to two robberies. He contends: (1) there was not substantial evidence to support one of his convictions for receiving stolen property; (2) his two felony convictions for receiving stolen property (counts thirteen and fourteen) must be reduced to misdemeanors as there was no evidence the value of the stolen property exceeded $950; (3) the imposition of three one-year enhancements for a single prior prison term enhancement was an unauthorized sentence; and (4) the restitution and parole revocation fines must be reduced from $280 to $240. The People properly concede that the receiving stolen property convictions must be reduced to misdemeanors and that the restitution and parole revocation fines must be reduced to $240. We will order counts thirteen and fourteen reduced to misdemeanors and order the trial court to correct the restitution and parole revocation fines.

This dispute, between siblings Stephen Christopher Nifong and Aimee Caroline Nozzi, concerns a missing coin collection. Stephen claimed that Aimee converted the coins, his inheritance from a grandparent. The trial court declined to find a conversion of Stephen’s property, but found Aimee liable for breach of an oral trust or for gross negligence in handling a bailment.

M.D. appeals from a disposition order declaring her a ward of the juvenile court and placing her on probation in an ACT program. M.D.’s sole contention is that her probation conditions are unconstitutionally vague because they do not contain express “knowledge” requirements. This claim fails in light of our Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494 (Hall).

In this dependency appeal, mother argues that the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights because there was a beneficial parent-child relationship between her and her minor child. We conclude there was no error, and affirm.

Christian M. purports to appeal from a May 2016 order denying his motion for reconsideration of a February 2016 dispositional order adjudging him a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) and placing him on probation after he admitted to committing assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code § 245, subd. (a)(4)) in furtherance of a criminal street gang in violation of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1). He challenges two electronic surveillance conditions of his probation: that he submit to a warrantless search of any electronic device that he uses or to which he has access including "any remote storage of any files or data which [he] knowingly uses or to which [he] has access" and that he "provide [the government with] all passwords or pass phrases to any internet sites or social media sites . . . used by [him]." The People respond that Christian has not appealed from an appealable order, and the appeal must be dis

15-year-old A.M. (appellant) appeals from the juvenile court’s order continuing him on probation based on a finding that he committed possession of a firearm in a school zone (Pen. Code § 626.9, subd. (b) ) and possession of a firearm by a minor (§ 29610). Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and requests that we conduct an independent review of the record. Appellant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief and did not do so. Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude there are no issues that require further briefing, and shall affirm the judgment.

Jacqueline Thornborrow (Jackie) appeals from a judgment on reserved issues following the dissolution of her marriage with Frederick Thornborrow (Fred). The trial court found that Fred breached his fiduciary duty to Jackie by cashing in his 401k retirement plan without advising her beforehand, and awarded Jackie one-half of the penalties and additional taxes incurred as a result of the withdrawal of the 401k plan. The court further found that Jackie received one-half of the benefit of the proceeds of the 401k plan prior to the dissolution of the marriage, and declined to order any additional monetary award for Fred’s breach of duty. Jackie contends she is entitled to an award equal to one-half of the withdrawn funds as a penalty for Fred’s breach regardless whether she already benefited from the proceeds during the marriage.