CA Unpub Decisions

By power of eminent domain, the Sacramento Area Flood Control Agency (SAFCA) acquired approximately two acres of land on Sacramento’s Garden Highway from Martin D. Souza, as trustee of the Martin D. and Janet M. Souza Family Revocable Trust (Souza). In a trial to determine just compensation for the acquisition, a jury determined the property taken had a fair market value of $455,000. The trial court entered judgment in that amount and awarded Souza his litigation expenses.

Plaintiff and appellant David C. Patkins sued defendant and respondent Rebecca Piantini, M.D. Patkins brought causes of action for (1) fraud; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (3) violations of the Business and Professions Code (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 2230.5, subd. (c), 2234, subds. (d) & (e), 2262). Patkins sought entry of a default judgment against Piantini. (Code Civ. Proc., § 585.) The trial court denied Patkins’s request for a default judgment and dismissed Patkins’s case with prejudice. Patkins contends the trial court erred. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Joseph Sullivan was tried and convicted, by a jury, of kidnapping to commit a sex crime (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1); count one), forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); count two), and forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)(A); count three). The jury also found true allegations that Sullivan kidnapped his victim within the meaning of the “One Strike” law (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(2)). At a bifurcated trial on prior convictions, Sullivan admitted having suffered one prior serious or violent felony conviction (§§ 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), and having served three prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Thus, pursuant to the One Strike law and the “Three Strikes” law, the trial court sentenced Sullivan to a determinate term of 18 years, plus a consecutive indeterminate term of 114 years to life in state prison. Sullivan appeals, contending his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by promising the jury Sullivan

On February 23, 2017, a complaint charged defendant and appellant Artis Lee Mercer, Jr., with willfully and unlawfully entering a building with intent to commit a theft and a felony (Pen. Code, § 459), a felony (count 1); willfully and unlawfully possessing instruments and tools with intent to break and enter into a building, aircraft, railroad car, trailer coach, vessel, and vehicle (Pen. Code, § 466), a misdemeanor (count 2); and willfully and unlawfully possessing a controlled substance, to wit, cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subdivision (a)), a misdemeanor (count 3). The complaint also alleged that defendant had served one prior separate prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).

Defendant Jorge Casarez Mendoza molested two young sisters when they spent the night at his house while their mother worked and defendant’s wife took care of the girls. A jury convicted defendant of one count of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years old (§ 288, subd. (a); count 1), and four counts of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years old by force, duress, or fear of immediate injury (§ 288, subd. (b)(l); counts 2-5). The jury also found true the allegation that defendant committed an offense against multiple victims, within the meaning of section 667.61, subdivision (e)(4). The trial court sentenced defendant to five indeterminate terms of 15 years to life, a total of 75 years to life in prison. (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4).)

Steven Daniel Force appeals an order denying his petition for release from his civil commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP). He contends the trial court erred in applying a statutory amendment that became effective while his petition was pending, and the amendment is unconstitutional. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Romel Edward Davis appeals from an order terminating his probation and sentencing him to five years in state prison. He contends the trial court violated his right to due process by summarily revoking his probation and executing a previously imposed five-year sentence without granting him a formal probation revocation hearing. He contends further that the trial court erroneously believed the it lacked authority to reinstate probation rather than execute the five-year term. We find no error and affirm.

Justin Andrew Cuen appeals from an order denying his Proposition 47 petition to recall and resentence as misdemeanors (Pen. Code, § 1170.18, subds. (a), (b); all further statutory references are to this code) his two felony convictions for theft of access card information (§ 484e, subd. (d) (§ 484e(d)).
This is our second opinion in this case. Our first opinion held the trial court properly denied the petition, as both a matter of law and fact, and we affirmed. (People v. Cuen (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1227, review granted Jan. 20, 2016, S231107 (Cuen I).).
After the California Supreme Court granted Cuen’s petition for review in Cuen I, that court transferred the case back to this court for reconsideration in light of People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 (Romanowski).
Upon reconsideration, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

A jury convicted Rene Lavell Coleman, Jr. of second degree robbery. On appeal, he claims the trial court neglected a sua sponte duty to clarify or expand upon CALCRIM No. 1600, i.e., the standard instruction on the elements of robbery. In the alternative, he alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial attorney’s failure to request additional instructions. Coleman also contends that the prosecutor misstated the reasonable doubt standard during closing argument. We affirm the judgment.

Rineson Curtis Adams appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was found sane and convicted of the first degree murder of Jai L. in count 1 (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), and child abuse of Giordan L. in count 2 (§ 273a, subd. (a)). The jury found true the special allegations that appellant used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and that he had previously suffered a conviction for a serious and/or violent felony (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(j) & 1170.12, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced appellant to 56 years to life on count 1, and imposed and stayed a concurrent 8-year term on count 2. Appellant received 1,699 days’ custody credit, consisting of 989 actual days in custody plus 710 days of conduct credit.

When this case was on the eve of trial, the plaintiffs — including plaintiff Terry R. Mathis — entered into a settlement agreement with defendants Pacific Mortgage Exchange, Inc. (PME), PME Mortgage Fund, Inc. (PMEMF), and Gregory Schick (collectively defendants). It called for defendants to sell certain real property to Mathis and his wife for one million dollars, with escrow to close within 120 days. The escrow opened, but various problems prevented it from closing on time.

This appeal arises from the four-year marriage of Dr. Kathryn Bracken and Brian Gibson. Gibson appeals from the family court’s order of dissolution entered after a six-day trial that took place over two years. Gibson contests the family court’s valuation of Bracken’s stock options, the reimbursements to Bracken for money spent on Gibson’s home in Andover, Massachusetts (the Andover house), and the award of attorney fees and sanctions against Gibson. Other than the failure to award attorney fees under Family Code section 1101, subdivision (g) to Gibson on Bracken’s sale of stock options in 2014, we affirm the family court’s order.

Father appeals from one of several jurisdictional findings declaring his 10-year-old daughter, Mia, and four-year-old son, Andrew, dependent children as described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. Father contends the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that his past domestic violence against mother caused serious nonaccidental physical harm to the children. However, father does not challenge any other grounds for jurisdiction, which include findings that (1) he physically abused Andrew by striking him with a belt; (2) his past domestic violence against mother indicated a risk of serious physical harm due to his failure to protect the children; and (3) his history of substance abuse rendered him incapable of providing regular care and supervision of the children. In view of these unchallenged findings, there is no effective relief that this court could order for father, even if we agreed the challenged finding was erroneous. We therefore conclude father’s

I.V. appeals from a dispositional order in juvenile delinquency proceedings declaring him a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), and placing him on probation with various conditions. The initial wardship petition, alleging a violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a), for inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a spouse, cohabitant, or co-parent, did not specifically allege that I.V. and his girlfriend, E.D., were in a “dating relationship” at the time he committed acts of alleged domestic violence against her. The primary issue here is whether I.V.—charged in an amended petition and found to have committed the lesser included offense of violating section 243, subdivision (e)(1) for battering a former or current spouse, cohabitant, co-parent, fiancée, or dating partner—received notice adequate to satisfy due process. Concluding that there was no due process violation and that the trial co