CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Anthony Sanders challenges as excessive his restitution fine of $10,000 “as to each count.” We agree that the restitution fine exceeds the statutory maximum, and thus we modify the judgment by reducing the restitution fine to $10,000. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

This appeal from an order denying a petition for writ of mandate must be dismissed because no final judgment was entered. The denial of a petition for writ of mandate may not be challenged on appeal when, as here, other causes of action remain pending between the parties. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 697 (Griset).) In the words of our Supreme Court: “A trial court’s order is appealable when it is made so by statute. [Citations.] There is no statute that makes an order denying a writ of administrative mandate petition separately appealable when, as here, the petition has been joined with other causes of action that remain unresolved.” (Id. at pp. 696-697.) “In addition, allowing an appeal in that situation would be contrary to the ‘one final judgment’ rule, a fundamental principle of appellate practice that prohibits review of intermediate rulings by appeal until final resolution of the case.” (Id. at p. 697.)

Appellant Taro Hart appeals from a five year prison sentence following his conviction for grand theft of personal property. Appellant contends his sentence, which was enhanced as a result of a prior conviction and prison term, was unauthorized because no evidence was submitted to prove the prior conviction. Respondent concedes the sentence was unauthorized, and requests this court remand the matter for a new trial on the prior conviction allegations. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the sentence was unauthorized and that remand is the appropriate remedy. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction, vacate the sentence, and remand for further proceedings.

Following a preliminary hearing, the Solano County District Attorney filed an information charging defendant Ventor Leroy Bracy with the felony offense of second-degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). Defendant pleaded not guilty.

Defendant Destry Beargrease Girard appeals from a judgment of conviction for the felony offense of resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69), and the misdemeanor offenses of driving under the influence of alcohol with two prior convictions (Veh. Code., §§ 23152, subd. (a), 23540, 23546), possessing a device used for smoking a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)), driving with a suspended or revoked license with a prior conviction (Veh. Code, §§ 13353, 13353.1, 13353.2, 14601.5, subd. (a)), and resisting, obstructing, and delaying a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). He was sentenced to a five-year probationary term and 278 days in county jail with credit for time served of 278 days. On appeal defendant challenges the judgment on one ground, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his driving convictions. We affirm.

Defendant Javier Eduardo Sanchez appeals a judgment entered upon his plea of no contest to assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4).) His counsel has filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking this court for an independent review of the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant has been apprised of his right to personally file a supplemental brief, but he has not done so.

Defendant R.O. was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court after pleading no contest to attempted premediated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a)) and second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)) and admitting various enhancements, including that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The juvenile court committed defendant to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for a maximum term of life plus 19 years and eight months.

Following a preliminary hearing in February 2012, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed an information charging defendant Jon Nicholson with the felony offenses of attempted kidnapping (Pen. Code, §§ 207, subd. (a), 664) (count one); attempted carjacking (§§ 215, subd. (a), 664) (count two), and attempted second-degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c), 664) (count three), with related allegations (as to each count) that in the commission of the offenses defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (knife) (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The information also alleged that defendant had suffered three prior convictions that qualified as prior prison convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and a fourth prior conviction that qualified as a strike under the Three Strikes Law, a serious conviction, and a prior prison conviction (§ 667, subds. (a), (b)-(i), 667.5, subd. (b), 1170.12). Defendant pleaded not guilty and denied the allegations.

Defendant Eric C. Daviesson appeals from judgments filed in three consolidated cases, in which the court revoked his probation on 10 felony convictions and resentenced him to an aggregate state prison term of 19 years and four months (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)). He contends the trial court erred when it revoked his probation and refused to reinstate him to probation at the conclusion of the resentencing hearing. In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed concurrently with this appeal, defendant petitions this court to set aside the judgments on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We conclude defendant’s arguments do not warrant reversal of the orders revoking probation. However, we remand the matters for resentencing due to an unauthorized sentence imposed in Case No. SCR622762. We summarily deny defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Defendant Anthony Winnfield Stevens appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition to redesignate his 2003 felony conviction for unlawful possession of access card information (Pen. Code, § 484e, subd. (d)) as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18, subd. (f)).
On appeal, Stevens argues the trial court erred in denying his petition on the ground that his offense was not eligible for redesignation under Proposition 47. We agree and will reverse the order, remanding the matter to the trial court to permit Stevens to file an amended petition setting forth evidence showing the reasonable and fair market value of the stolen access card information.

Defendant Joseph Anton Loris was convicted by jury trial of felony assault with a caustic chemical (Pen. Code, § 244), felony vandalism with a noxious or caustic chemical (§ 594.4, subd. (a)), and felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court granted him probation. On appeal, he contends that (1) his assault with a caustic chemical conviction is not supported by substantial evidence, (2) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct, (3) a probation condition barring him from possessing “weapons or things that could be used as a chemical-type weapon” is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and (4) a stay-away order is unconstitutionally vague because it does not identify how far away he must stay from the location of the assault and vandalism. We modify the probation condition and the stay-away order, but we reject defendant’s other contentions.

This case concerns a 340-home residential project (Project) in the hills adjacent to a state park and the City of Yorba Linda. The County of Orange (County) reviewed the Project pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act, Public Resources Code section 21000 et seq. (CEQA). The environmental impact report concluded most potential impacts could be mitigated to a less than significant level.
Protect Our Homes and Hills and others (collectively, Protect) appeal from a partial denial of their petition for writ of mandate. They claim the County violated CEQA by failing to recognize the entire state park, failing to properly analyze and/or mitigate certain impacts, including those related to biological resources, fire hazards, and water supply, and failing to recirculate the final document prior to certifying it.

Appellant Larnette Coltar Davis appeals from the trial court’s denial of her petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon (Pen. Code, § 4852.01 et seq.). Following an independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

Appellants Victoria Scott Yeager (Mrs. Yeager) and Charles E. Yeager (General Yeager; collectively, the Yeagers) appeal a judgment to enforce a settlement agreement with respondents Wild, Carter, & Tipton (WCT). The Yeagers claim the trial court erred in granting WCT’s motion to enforce the agreement. They specifically contend (1) the trial court violated General Yeager’s civil rights, (2) the Yeagers did not understand the material terms of the settlement agreement, (3) the trial court lacks jurisdiction to enforce the agreement, (4) a valid contract was not formed because there was no meeting of the minds, (5) the record is incomplete, (6) the agreement was based on fraud, (7) the court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering a nonparty to comply with the settlement agreement, (8) WCT violated the confidentiality agreement, and (9) the agreement was executed under duress. The Yeagers also claim certain records ordered sealed by the trial court should not remain under seal.