Filed 6/30/26 Zhao v. Lin CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
QING ZHAO, B344081
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant (Los Angeles County
and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 19STCV42782)
v.
PAI SUNG LIN,
Defendant, Cross-complainant
and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Teresa A. Beaudet, Judge. Affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
Wolfe & Wyman and Kelly Andrew Beall for Defendant,
Cross-complainant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and
Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Qing Zhao and her husband Chen Wang
purchased a condominium together. They took title as husband
and wife as joint tenants. Wang later obtained a loan from
defendant Pai Sung Lin by forging Zhao’s signature on loan
documents, including a deed of trust secured by the couple’s
home. Soon after, Zhao filed for divorce, and she and Wang
reached a marital settlement agreement (MSA) upon which the
family law court entered judgment. That judgment awarded the
home to Zhao as her separate property based in part on the
MSA’s statement that “the source of funds for” its purchase “was
derived from [her] sole and separate property.” Pursuant to the
MSA, the family law judgment also assigned the loan debt on the
condominium to Wang as his sole obligation and required him to
cooperate in a future lawsuit seeking to void the deed of trust
securing that debt.
After the family law judgment was entered, Zhao filed the
underlying action against Lin, Wang, and others for declaratory
relief, and to quiet title and cancel the deed of trust, among other
claims. Lin cross-claimed, also seeking declaratory relief, to quiet
title, and an equitable lien. After a bench trial, the court found
that the condominium was Zhao’s separate property at the time
of Lin’s loan based solely on the family court judgment; Zhao
introduced no other evidence substantiating the claim that she
used her separate funds to purchase the property. The trial court
also found that under Family Code1 section 1102, even if the
home was community property, Zhao was entitled to avoid the
deed of trust in its entirety.
1 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Family Code.
2
Lin argues the court erred in finding the condominium was
Zhao’s separate property when he recorded his deed of trust. To
the extent the home was community property, Lin argues Zhao
cannot avoid the entire deed of trust under section 1102 because
she did not challenge the encumbrance prior to the division of
community assets. Lin asserts the applicable law limits Zhao to
avoiding only part of the lien, namely any security based on her
one-half community interest, and not also the security based on
Wang’s one-half community interest.
We conclude no substantial evidence supports the court’s
separate property finding and that Lin carried his burden on his
cross-claims to show the property was community property at the
time of the encumbrance. We therefore reverse the court’s
judgment as to the claims that depend on that finding and which
Lin appealed—quiet title, declaratory relief, and the cancellation
of the deed of trust in its entirety. We direct that the court enter
judgment in Lin’s favor as to Zhao’s claims for declaratory relief
and quiet title. (See McCoy v. Hearst Corp. (1991) 227
Cal.App.3d 1657, 1661.) We further direct the court to cancel the
deed of trust only to the extent of Zhao’s community property
interest.
Lin did not include his cross-complaint in the record. The
court found that Lin was not entitled to relief on his equitable
lien claim, and Lin’s appellate brief does not raise this ruling as
an issue for our review. His brief also contains no cogent
argument regarding his own quiet title and declaratory relief
claims. We therefore deem forfeited any challenge to the court’s
judgment as to Lin’s cross-claim for equitable lien, and, to the
extent they are not the opposite side of the coin to Zhao’s claims,
Lin’s cross-claims for declaratory relief and to quiet title.
3
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Summary
We derive the following factual summary from Zhao and
Lin’s stipulated facts and the evidence adduced at trial.2
In 2015, Zhao and Wang married. In 2016, they purchased
a condominium in Covina as husband and wife/joint tenants
using a $200,000 loan from Sterling Bank & Trust FSB (Sterling
Bank). According to Zhao, “[she] borrow[ed] money for the
purpose of buying a house.” When asked if Sterling Bank was
the lender with whom “[she] purchased” the property, she
responded, “Probably yes.” She acknowledged Wang was also “on
[the] loan” and that she had been a student during the marriage
while Wang had been employed. It appears the bank loan was
repaid no later than August 2019; there was no evidence at trial
regarding the source of funds used to pay off that loan.3
On April 17, 2019, Wang obtained a $230,000 loan from
Lin, secured by the property. Lin recorded the deed of trust on
April 19, 2019. Zhao and Lin stipulated that Wang and an
accomplice forged Zhao’s signature on the note and deed of trust.
Zhao testified that she did not learn of Lin’s loan until around the
time she and Wang separated; according to the MSA, the couple
2 On June 15, 2026, Lin filed a motion to augment the
record with trial exhibits. Many of the exhibits are already
included in the clerk’s transcript. We grant Lin’s motion to
augment the record to the extent it contains trial exhibits not
already included in the clerk’s transcript.
3 The MSA did not assign the 2016 bank loan as an
obligation to either party. Also, the court’s statement of decision
explained that the testimony at trial did not establish “who paid
off the Sterling Bank . . . loan.”
4
separated on or about July 26, 2019. She did not agree that
Wang could use the property as security for a loan.
On August 5, 2019, Zhao filed a petition for dissolution of
marriage (case No. 19PSFL01462). Zhao and Wang executed the
MSA on August 8, 2019. The MSA stated it was effective as of
the date of its execution and binding independent of the family
court’s approval. On October 28, 2019, the family court entered a
dissolution judgment that incorporated the MSA. In accord with
section 2339, subdivision (a), the judgment of dissolution became
final on February 7, 2020 (six months after Wang first appeared
in the dissolution action).
The dissolution judgment awarded the property to Zhao as
her sole and separate property. The MSA listed the
condominium under assets “jointly and/or separately owned by
the [p]arties, which may constitute as community propert[y].” It
awarded the property “to [Zhao] as her sole and separate
property, as the source of funds for the purchase of the . . .
[p]roperty was derived from [Zhao]’s sole and separate property”
without further explanation of that source. The MSA directed
Wang to execute a quitclaim deed within 90 days after the MSA’s
execution, stated Wang was “solely responsible” for the 2019 deed
of trust, and required Wang to cooperate “in voiding the [d]eed of
[t]rust, including the need to bring a civil action.” The MSA
acknowledged that an assignment of a debt to one spouse did not
restrict a creditor’s right to seek payment from the other. Zhao
and Wang agreed that if a creditor sought to enforce a debt
against the party not responsible for it, the debtor would fully
indemnify the other former spouse for any payment or costs and
fees incurred in defending against the creditor’s claim.
5
B. Procedural Summary
1. Complaint and Cross-complaint
On November 26, 2019, after entry of judgment in the
dissolution action, Zhao filed a verified complaint against Lin,
Wang, and others. The complaint alleged several claims,
including quiet title, declaratory relief, and requests for recission
and cancellation of the deed of trust. It alleged the $230,000 loan
had been obtained without Zhao’s knowledge and that Lin had
provided the full $230,000 to Wang and others.
In June 2020, Lin cross-complained against Zhao, Wang,
and others.4 The cross-complaint is not in the record, but other
record documents indicate Lin sought to quiet title, declaratory
relief, and an equitable lien on the property.
2. Trial
On February 28 and 29, 2024, the court held a bench trial
on the parties’ claims. The parties submitted briefs in advance of
trial and in lieu of closing arguments. Zhao and Lin offered brief
testimony at trial, the relevant portions of which we have already
summarized above.
a. Lin’s Arguments
Lin argued that real property acquired during a marriage
in a joint form is presumptively community property. (§§ 760,
4 In January 2020, Wang filed for bankruptcy. The record
does not disclose the length of the automatic stay, but in
November 2020, the court entered Wang’s default on the cross-
complaint. In September 2024, the court ordered that default
judgment packages be provided to the court for the defaulted
defendants, except those who received a discharge in bankruptcy
as to Zhao’s or Lin’s causes of action.
6
2581.) He argued that under section 1102, a spouse who did not
consent to an encumbrance on community property could only set
it aside in its entirety if that spouse challenged the encumbrance
during the existence of the community. Because Zhao did not file
the lawsuit against Lin until after the dissolution judgment was
entered, Zhao could invalidate the deed of trust only to the extent
of her community property interest. Lin further argued that the
remedy of recission or cancellation of a voidable instrument
required Zhao to return the loan proceeds to Lin, which she had
not done.
b. Zhao’s Arguments
Zhao argued the condominium was not community property
but her separate property that her then-husband could not have
encumbered during the marriage. She pointed to the dissolution
judgment’s statement that “the source of the funds for the
purchase of the . . . [p]roperty was derived from [. . . Zhao’s] sole
and separate property.” She argued Lin did not present evidence
that Wang paid any portion of the Sterling Bank loan or any
other evidence contradicting the family court findings. Zhao also
argued that even if the condominium was community property,
she timely challenged the deed of trust. She claimed the deed of
trust was void because it was forged and section 1102 required
both spouses to sign an instrument encumbering community
property. Zhao further argued she could rescind the deed of trust
without repaying the loan proceeds as there was no evidence she
received any portion of the loan proceeds, and the deed of trust
had been obtained through fraud.
3. The Trial Court’s Ruling
On September 16, 2024, the court issued a tentative
statement of decision.
7
The court “adopt[ed]” the family court’s finding that the
condominium was Zhao’s separate property and not subject to the
deed of trust. The court cited Zhao’s trial testimony consistent
with that finding—namely that Zhao took out a loan to purchase
the property and that she purchased the property with a loan
from Sterling Bank. Zhao acknowledged Wang was on the loan
but did not acknowledge that he paid off the loan, and the court
found Lin’s suggestion that Zhao could not have paid off the loan
on her own because she was a student was speculative. Based on
the court’s finding that the condominium was separate property
and that Zhao’s signature had been forged, the court concluded
the deed of trust was void and that Lin was not entitled to an
equitable lien against the real property.
The court also found that even if the condominium had
been community property, under section 1102, both spouses had
to sign an encumbrance for it to have any effect, which did not
occur here as Zhao’s signature was forged. The court found that
Zhao’s lawsuit was sufficiently timely under section 1102 to seek
invalidation of the entire encumbrance as opposed to just the
encumbrance of Zhao’s 50 percent community interest.5
Lin objected to the tentative statement of decision. Those
objections included that Lin was not a party to the dissolution
proceeding, and, thus, could not be bound by the MSA and
resulting judgment’s recitation that the condominium was Zhao’s
sole and separate property. The court overruled Lin’s objections
5 The court found Zhao failed to prove Lin’s foreclosure
(which he rescinded) caused her any damages.
8
and adopted its proposed statement of decision as the final
statement of decision.6
4. Judgment
The court entered judgment on November 25, 2024. It
found the parties had litigated claims for quiet title, declaratory
relief, cancellation of Lin’s deed of trust, equitable lien, and
wrongful foreclosure. It entered judgment in Zhao’s favor and
against Lin for quiet title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of
the deed of trust. It did not require any portion of the loan
proceeds returned to Lin in exchange for cancellation of the deed
of trust. The court found in Lin’s favor on Zhao’s claim for
wrongful foreclosure and in Zhao’s favor on Lin’s claim for an
equitable lien.
DISCUSSION
Lin raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues that
substantial evidence did not support the court’s finding that the
condominium was Zhao’s separate property at the time he
recorded his deed of trust. Second, he argues Zhao’s challenge to
the deed of trust was untimely under section 1102, and, thus,
Zhao could not set aside the deed of trust in its entirety. Third,
he argues that the court should have ordered Zhao to return to
him the benefits of the loan she received in connection with any
cancellation of the deed of trust.
6 On our own motion, we augment the record to include the
court’s November 6 and 7, 2024 orders overruling Lin’s objections
to the proposed statement of decision and issuing the final
statement of decision. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)
9
A. No Substantial Evidence Supports the Separate
Property Finding
Lin argues that no substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that the condominium was Zhao’s separate
property at the time of the loan. We agree.
1. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“Except as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real
or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person
during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community
property.” (§ 760.) Between them, married persons can
transmute the character of their property by agreement or
transfer. (§ 850.) “A transmutation of real . . . property is not
valid unless made in writing by an express declaration that is
made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose
interest in the property is adversely affected.” (§ 852, subd. (a).)
“A transmutation of real property is not effective as to third
parties without notice thereof unless recorded.” (§ 852, subd. (b).)
“The party contesting community property status . . . bears
the burden of producing sufficient rebuttal evidence . . . showing
different ownership interests; the contestant’s burden of proof is
by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Hogoboom & King, Cal.
Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2026) § 8:423.)
“As a general rule, factual findings that underpin the
characterization determination are reviewed for substantial
evidence. ‘Appellate review of a trial court’s finding that a
particular item is separate or community property is limited to a
determination of whether any substantial evidence supports the
finding.’ [Citations.] [¶] But de novo review is appropriate
where resolution of ‘the issue of the characterization to be given
(as separate or community property) . . . requires a critical
10
consideration, in a factual context, of legal principles and their
underlying values, the determination in question amounts to the
resolution of a mixed question of law and fact that is
predominantly one of law.’ ” (In re Marriage of Rossin (2009) 172
Cal.App.4th 725, 734.)
2. Analysis
The trial court adopted the statement in the family court
judgment/MSA that the source of funds to purchase the
condominium was Zhao’s separate property, and it treated that
finding as a presumption for Lin to rebut. This was error.
Lin was not a party to the dissolution proceeding and was
not bound by Zhao and Wang’s characterization of that property
in the MSA and resulting judgment. Although dissolution
judgments can bind some creditors who are not parties to the
dissolution case, in that “separate property owned by a married
person at the time of the division and the property received by
the person in the division is not liable for a debt incurred by the
person’s spouse . . . during marriage,” this rule does not “affect[]
the liability of property for the satisfaction of a lien on the
property.” (§ 916, subd. (a)(2).) Nor did issue preclusion prevent
Lin from litigating the characterization of the property. Under
that doctrine, a “prior judgment conclusively resolves an issue
actually litigated and determined in the first action.” (DKN
Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824.) But “[i]n
accordance with due process, it can be asserted only against a
party to the first lawsuit, or one in privity with a party.” (Ibid.)
Lin does not fall into either category. The trial court accordingly
erred in relying on the MSA/family law judgment.
The undisputed evidence at trial showed that Zhao and
Wang acquired the condominium during marriage in joint form
11
as joint tenants. The presumption set forth in section 760 that
the condominium was community property therefore applied.
(See In re Brace (2020) 9 Cal.5th 903, 911-912.) As the one
claiming the condominium was separate property, it was Zhao
and not Lin who had the burden to overcome that presumption.
(In re Marriage of Simonis (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1129, 1142.)
Zhao testified that “she” borrowed money from Sterling Bank for
the purpose of purchasing the condominium, but acknowledged
her husband was also on the loan and that he was employed and
she was a student. There is no testimony that Zhao paid off the
Sterling Bank loan with her separate funds or that Wang did not
contribute to repaying the loan; there was only her conclusory
assertion in the MSA that this was the case. Nor is there any
evidence that there was a transmutation of the property or notice
to Lin of transmutation prior to the loan and the recording of his
deed of trust or prior to the MSA. (§ 852, subds. (a), (b);
Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law, supra,
§ 8:471 [stating spouses may agree to change the status of their
property “before and during marriage” “but before
commencement of a dissolution action”].)
Because the record lacks substantial evidence that rebutted
the presumption that the condominium was community property,
the court erred in characterizing the condominium as Zhao’s
separate property for purposes of Lin’s deed of trust.
B. Zhao Was Not Entitled to Invalidate the Entirety of
the Deed of Trust
The trial court concluded that even if the condominium was
not separate property, section 1102 permitted it to cancel the
deed of trust in its entirety. This was also error.
12
1. General Legal Principles
Under section 1102, subdivision (a), “both spouses, either
personally or by a duly authorized agent, are required to join in
executing an instrument by which . . . community real property
or an interest therein is leased for a longer period than one year,
or is sold, conveyed, or encumbered.” (§ 1102, subd. (a).)
Depending on when the nonconsenting spouse challenges it, a
deed of trust such as Lin’s that does not comply with this
mandate is voidable either entirely or to the extent of the
nonconsenting spouse’s community interest. (See Droeger v.
Friedman, Sloan & Ross (1991) 54 Cal.3d 26, 30 [interpreting
Civ. Code, § 5127, the predecessor to § 1102]7.) If challenged
during the marriage, it is entirely voidable. If challenged after
dissolution and the division of community property, it is voidable
only as to the nonconsenting spouse’s 50 percent community
interest. (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law,
supra, §§ 8:682, 8:683.)
2. Analysis
Relying on Droeger v. Friedman, Sloan & Ross, supra, 54
Cal.3d 26 and Hyatt v. Mabie (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 541, Lin
argues that because Zhao filed the underlying quiet title action
after the division of community property and the dissolution of
7 Civil Code former section 5127 was continued in section
1102 without substantive change. (§ 1102, Cal. Law Revision
Com. com.; Stats. 1992, ch. 162, § 10; In re Marriage of Turkanis
& Price (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 332, 347, fn. 5.)
13
marriage, Zhao could avoid the encumbrance only to the extent of
her one-half community interest. We agree.8
In Droeger, a wife filed for dissolution. (Droeger v.
Friedman, Sloan & Ross, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 30.) Before the
completion of the dissolution proceedings, the wife executed a
deed of trust encumbering community real property without her
husband’s consent, and the husband filed an action to quiet title.
(Ibid.) Our high court determined that the husband had, “during
the marriage, timely challenge[d] a transfer made in violation of
[the predecessor to section 1102],” and, thus, “he [was] entitled to
invalidate the encumbrance in its entirety” not just the
encumbrance as to his one-half community interest. (Droeger v.
Friedman, Sloan & Ross, supra, at pp. 30, 35-36.) Droeger
approved a line of cases consistent with Andrade Development
Co. v. Martin (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 330. (See Droeger v.
Friedman, Sloan & Ross, supra, at pp. 36-37.) Andrade
explained that, while the marriage exists, the “[d]isposal of
community property or partition of the spouses’ interests should
be allowed only where the spouse consents or where a court
sitting in equity can provide an equitable result as in dissolution
or probate proceedings.” (Andrade Development Co. v. Martin,
supra, at p. 334.)
In Hyatt, a husband obtained a loan secured by the couple’s
residence, which was community property. (Hyatt v. Mabie,
supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 543.) The wife discovered the
encumbrance after the entry of the dissolution judgment and
8 Contrary to Lin’s contentions, however, neither Droeger
nor Hyatt requires a court to adjudicate a quiet title claim prior
to entry of a dissolution judgment.
14
after the family court had already divided the assets and
obligations between the spouses. (Id. at p. 544.) The wife filed
an action to cancel the deed of trust. (Ibid.) The trial court found
in favor of the trust deed beneficiaries. (Id. at p. 545.) The
appellate court affirmed, and explained that at the time of the
wife’s lawsuit, “the reasons supporting the remedy of entire
voidability no longer [existed]” because the marriage had
dissolved and the community no longer existed. (Id. at p. 546.)
The trial court here found it was “significant” that the
spouses were not returned to their status of single persons until
February 7, 2020. But notwithstanding the delay mandated by
section 2339, subdivision (a) with regard to marital status, the
family court had already adjudicated the division of the
community property and entered judgment on that division
before Zhao filed an action against Lin challenging the deed of
trust. Further, Zhao and Wang’s MSA stated that the property
division was binding and effective as of August 8, 2019, the date
of its execution, which was also before Zhao challenged the deed
of trust. Thus, as in Hyatt, the conditions for entire voidability of
the deed of trust no longer existed (Hyatt v. Mabie, supra, 24
Cal.App.4th at p. 546), and Zhao could seek only to void the deed
of trust reaching her one-half community interest. Lin is
therefore limited to enforcing the deed of trust only to the extent
of Wang’s community interest in the property, which is valued as
of the date of the MSA. (See § 2552, subd. (a).)
C. Lin Is Not Entitled to Restoration of “Benefits” in
Exchange for Cancelling the Deed of Trust to the
Extent of Zhao’s Community Interest
“A written instrument, in respect to which there is a
reasonable apprehension that if left outstanding it may cause
15
serious injury to a person against whom it is void or voidable,
may, upon his application, be so adjudged, and ordered to be
delivered up or canceled.” (Civ. Code, § 3412.) “In obtaining
rescission or cancellation, the rule is that the complainant is
required to do equity, as a condition to his obtaining relief, by
restoring to the defendant everything of value which the plaintiff
has received in the transaction.” (Fleming v. Kagan (1961) 189
Cal.App.2d 791, 796.)
Lin argues that in exchange for cancellation of the deed of
trust, which we have concluded above is appropriate only as to it
not extending to Zhao’s community interest in the property, the
trial court should order Zhao to return “[t]he [b]enefits [o]f [t]he
[l]oan” to him.9 Lin argues the testimony at trial established
Zhao never repaid any part of the loan taken out in secret by her
9 Lin argues rescission of a contract requires the parties to
restore to each other everything of value received under the
contract. The trial court did not rescind the deed of trust; it
cancelled it. Nor does Lin provide any record citation indicating
he sought rescission in the trial court, or that the court
ultimately ruled on Zhao’s request for recission in her original
complaint. We therefore do not address these arguments. Lin
also argues that under Lezine v. Security Pacific Fin. Services,
Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 56, Zhao remains liable to Lin in his
capacity as an unsecured creditor and Lin may recover from Zhao
any portion of the loan that remains outstanding if Wang’s 50
percent interest is insufficient to repay the entire loan. Lin did
not make these arguments in the trial court and therefore has
forfeited them. Even if Lin had not forfeited these arguments,
Lezine is distinguishable as the creditor there obtained a
monetary judgment against the husband and recorded a
judgment lien against the community property before the
community dissolved. (Id. at pp. 59, 60.)
16
ex-husband. But Lin does not cite any evidence or finding by the
trial court that Zhao received any benefit from the loan.
It is not clear who bore the burden of proof at trial to show
whether Zhao received any benefit from the loan. (See McCoy v.
West (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 295, 302 [“[I]t has been stated that a
vendee seeking rescission should account for the value of the use
of the subject matter during the time he was in possession,” but
“it also has been said that such an issue is a matter to be raised
by the vendor in his pleadings [citation] and that the burden of
proof as to such value is upon the vendor”].) It makes no
difference here. If Lin had the burden of proof, as the party
seeking the return of funds from Zhao, he entirely failed to carry
it. He adduced no evidence demonstrating Zhao received any
benefit from the loan proceeds secretly obtained by Wang. If
Zhao had the burden, she adduced evidence giving rise to a
reasonable inference that she received no benefit. It was
undisputed Wang forged her signature, and she testified that she
had no knowledge of the loan until she viewed Wang’s separate
bank account online, which occurred near the time of her
separation from Wang. The MSA established the couple
separated in July 2019; Wang had obtained the loan only shortly
before this time, in April 2019. Accordingly, the trial court did
not err in declining to order Zhao to restore any benefit she
received under the loan in exchange for any cancellation of the
deed of trust because there was no evidence she received such a
benefit.
DISPOSITION
We reverse the court’s judgment as to Zhao’s claims for
quiet title, declaratory relief, and the cancellation of the deed.
We direct the trial court to enter judgment quieting title, and
17
declaring that Zhao is the sole owner of the property and that
Lin’s encumbrance survives as to Wang’s half of the property’s
equity as of August 8, 2019. We remand the matter for the court
to calculate the value of Wang’s one-half community property
interest in the condominium as of August 8, 2019. We otherwise
affirm the judgment. Lin is awarded his costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
18