Filed 9/3/26 York v. Emmarex CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
SCOTT YORK, B348995
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STCV04279)
EMMAREX, LLC, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, H. Jay Ford III, Judge. Affirmed.
Scott York, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff Scott York (plaintiff) moved to certify a class of
defendants allegedly involved in using “directed energy
technologies/weapons” to manipulate his thoughts and actions.1
We consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the motion for class certification.
I. BACKGROUND2
A. The Operative Complaint
The operative second amended complaint, filed in October
2023, alleges 21 causes of action that repeat many of the same
factual allegations throughout. The complaint alleges plaintiff’s
thoughts and actions have been manipulated by directed energy
weapons and this manipulation had various adverse effects. In
addition to naming individual defendants, the complaint alleges
putative defendant classes of attorneys, judges, and other
community members are involved in this manipulation.
1
Although “[t]he most familiar kind of representative
suit . . . is the plaintiffs’ class action[,] [a]ctions against a class of
defendants are also authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section
382, which provides, in pertinent part: ‘[W]hen the question is
one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when
the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them
all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit
of all.’” (Simons v. Horowitz (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 834, 844.)
2
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of plaintiff’s
second amended complaint filed October 5, 2023, his motion for
class certification filed January 3, 2025, his declaration in
support of class certification filed January 3, 2025, and his
amended declaration in support of class certification filed June 4,
2025. (Cal. Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d); 459, subd. (a).)
2
Soon after plaintiff filed his second amended complaint, he
filed a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. The
trial court denied plaintiff’s motion in February 2024.3
B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Defendant-Class Certification
Plaintiff filed a motion “for certification of defendant class
action” in January 2025. The motion identifies three subclasses
of defendants, which include attorneys, judges, and “‘community
members’” allegedly involved in the use of directed energy
weapons. Plaintiff’s definitions of these subclasses run multiple
pages and are expansive in scope. They include, for example, all
“licensed attorneys who have participated in and/or continue
participating in” the alleged manipulation of plaintiff’s thoughts
and actions, judges “who coordinated their conduct/actions” with
the alleged manipulation, and countless others (including former
colleagues, mental health professionals, members of 12-step
programs, and neighbors) cooperating with those allegedly
manipulating plaintiff and his environment.
Plaintiff argued the proposed defendant-class includes
individuals named in a concurrently filed declaration and
additional, unnamed individuals who “already know exactly what
is happening with this instant litigation as they are working to
actively coordinate and control it.” Plaintiff further argued the
proposed defendant-class represents a well-defined community of
interest because all members are part of the same alleged scheme
3
Although plaintiff argues in his opening brief that he “must
be permitted to further amend the currently operative
[c]omplaint,” the order denying his motion for leave to file a third
amended complaint is not at issue in this appeal.
3
and certain attorney class members would assert common
defenses.
C. The Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for defendant-class
certification in June 2025. The trial court observed it had
“already found” plaintiff’s class allegations failed to state a cause
of action as a matter of law in its ruling on a demurrer filed by
one of the named defendants. Moreover, the court found, plaintiff
did not “allege or show how any individual class representative
(named or unnamed) could be a proper class representative,”
“that there is an ascertainable class,” or “that there is a well-
defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact
involved affecting the defendants to be represented.” Plaintiff
therefore “failed to meet his burden to obtain certification of any
class.”
In addition to denying plaintiff’s motion for defendant-class
certification, the trial court found defendant’s filings conceded
“the individual defendants he sued as ‘tentative class
representatives’ were ‘not named and/or served as an individual,
but as a representative of the [d]efendant [c]lass . . . .’”
Accordingly, the trial court ordered certain “class claims” stricken
without leave to amend. The trial court also ordered various
“named and unnamed ‘class representatives’” dismissed with
prejudice.
II. DISCUSSION
We review a class certification order for abuse of discretion
(Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 955, 967-968), and
4
the trial court rightly concluded plaintiff did not demonstrate the
existence of an ascertainable class.4
Like any party arguing for class treatment, a plaintiff
seeking to certify a class of defendants “‘must demonstrate the
existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a
well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from
certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the
alternatives. [Citations.] “In turn, the ‘community of interest
requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common
questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or
defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who
can adequately represent the class.’”’ [Citation.]” (City of San
Diego v. Haas (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 472, 500; Brinker
Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021
[discussing class certification requirements generally].)
4
We invited the parties to submit supplemental letter briefs
addressing whether any exception to the one final judgment rule
permits this appeal taken from the order denying the motion to
certify a defendant-class. Plaintiff submitted a letter brief
arguing the death knell doctrine, which generally permits an
appeal from an order denying certification of a plaintiff-class,
also applies to an order denying certification of a defendant-class.
There is authority to the contrary (Farwell v. Sunset Mesa
Property Owners Assn., Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1552
[holding that an order “amount[ing] to the death knell of [the]
action as a defendant class action” did not present “an
appropriate case for the death knell doctrine”]), but we shall
resolve this appeal on the merits as akin to a multi-party action
in which a judgment leaves no issues as to some but not all
parties (Ram v. OneWest Bank, FSB (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1, 9
[one final judgment rule does not apply in such circumstances]).
5
Plaintiff has not satisfied the ascertainability requirement
(and that makes it unnecessary to discuss the other certification
requirements). A class is ascertainable “when it is defined ‘in
terms of objective characteristics and common transactional facts’
that make ‘the ultimate identification of class members possible
when that identification becomes necessary.’ [Citation.]” (Noel,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at 980.) This focus on objective characteristics
“promotes due process” by, among other things, “supplying a
concrete basis for determining who will and will not be bound by
(or benefit from) any judgment.” (Ibid.) Here, plaintiff proposes
class definitions that encompass individuals who he claims are
secretly cooperating in a project to manipulate him. Plaintiff’s
suggestion that it is sufficient these individuals themselves know
they are involved in the alleged scheme does not solve the
problem that, at some point, courts need objective criteria by
which to identify class members. (Id. at 981, fn. 12 [explaining
that “a class defined by its putative members’ subjective states of
mind, as opposed to objective facts,” is “problematic”].) Because
nothing in the record reveals such criteria, the trial court
correctly denied plaintiff’s motion to certify a defendant class for
lack of ascertainability.
6
DISPOSITION
The order denying plaintiff’s motion for defendant-class
certification is affirmed. All parties are to bear their own costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
MOOR, J.
7