Filed 8/20/26 Wright v. Kokayi CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
DUSTAN WRIGHT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A174297
v.
TYEHIMBA KOKAYI et al., (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. 25CV112257)
Defendants and Respondents.
This is the third appeal by self-represented appellant Dustan Wright in
an extremely litigious dispute with the administrator of the estate of Mary
Esther Bates and her heirs over Wright’s continued occupancy of Bates’s
home located in Oakland, California for more than a decade following her
death (hereafter, the Bates residence).
We previously affirmed a judgment of dismissal in a civil action for
damages and foreclosure of a mechanics lien that Wright brought against the
estate (Karewicz v. Wright (Jan. 28, 2025, A170145) [nonpub. opn.]), and we
have recently affirmed a June 5, 2025 order by the probate court declaring
that Wright has no interest in the property and requiring him to surrender
possession (Estate of Bates (Aug. 19, 2026, A174159) [nonpub. opn.].). In that
second appeal (hereafter, the probate appeal), we ruled the probate court did
not err in adjudicating the estate’s ownership of the property
notwithstanding Wright’s contention those proceedings in probate court
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should have been abated pending the conclusion of a separate civil lawsuit
Wright had already filed to quiet title to the Bates residence in his name by
adverse possession.
This is Wright’s civil action to quiet title, the lawsuit that Wright
argued in the probate appeal should have been decided first.
Here, Wright appeals from a minute order entered in the quiet title
case on June 17, 2025, 12 days after the court ruled against him in the
probate case. The appealed minute order grants a motion to strike his quiet
title complaint and sustains a demurrer to that complaint without leave to
amend. Given the procedural complexities of these proceedings, the
somewhat confusing briefing the parties have filed, as well as some omissions
in this record, we let that minute order speak for itself. It states in relevant
part:
“The Court, having taken the matter under submission on 06/13/2025,
now rules as follows: [¶] The Motion to Strike (not initial pleading) Complaint
filed by Tyehimba Kokayi, Administrator to the Estate of Mary Esther Bates
on 05/15/2025 is Granted. [¶] The Demurrer filed by Tyehimba Kokayi,
Administrator to the Estate of Mary Esther Bates on 05/15/2025 is Granted.
[¶] The Demurrer and Motion of Defendant Tyehimba Kokayi, Administrator
to Estate of Mary Esther Bates (‘Defendant’) to Strike is GRANTED
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND in light of the ruling by the probate court in
the related case # RP21094469. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10[, subd.] (c).)
“In Estate of Mary Esther Bates, the Court granted Defendant’s
Petition for Recovery of Possession of Real Property of an Estate and for
Order of Ejectment, confirming that ‘Dustan Wright has no rights of
ownership and/or possession to 846 Athens Avenue, Oakland, California
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94607-3428, APN: 3-11-3.’ (June 5, 2025 Order.) This squarely addresses
Plaintiff Dustan Wright’s claims in this quiet title case and this defect cannot
be cured on amendment as the only cure for this defect would be dismissal of
the first-filed action with prejudice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c).)”
Wright now challenges the court’s ruling striking his complaint and
sustaining the demurrer on several grounds. For the reasons below, he has
not met his burden to show reversible error.1
DISCUSSION
As we explained in the prior two appeals, we presume that the trial
court’s ruling is correct, and it is an appellant’s burden to persuade us of an
error. (See Grappo v. McMills (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1006 [calling such
1 Orders sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend are not
appealable; we may review such rulings only on appeal from a subsequently
entered judgment. (Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale (2024) 16 Cal.5th 643,
653.) And while “[a]n order granting a motion to strike is appealable as a
final judgment if it removes the only cause of action alleged and leaves no
issues to be determined” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals
and Writs (The Rutter Group 2026) ¶ 2:246.2), we have some doubt as to
whether that principle applies here because the June 17, 2025 minute order
also directs the administrator to file a request for dismissal. Yet the record
contains no actual judgment of dismissal.
We are nonetheless satisfied that we may decide this appeal. First, the
register of actions reflects that a request for dismissal was subsequently filed,
following which the court entered a judgment of dismissal. We will not
prolong this appeal by directing the parties to procure a copy of the judgment.
We are satisfied based upon the register of actions that we have appellate
jurisdiction and will proceed to the merits. Alternatively, even if no such
judgment exists, we have the power to deem the court’s nonappealable order
to incorporate a judgment of dismissal and treat the notice of appeal as
applying to the dismissal (Bullock v. City of Antioch (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
407, 411, fn. 1), and we would do so here.
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framework “[t]he most fundamental principle of appellate review”].) To do
this, “ ‘an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent
argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.’ ” (United
Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146
(United Grand Corp.).) “Mere suggestions of error without supporting
argument or authority other than general abstract principles do not properly
present grounds for appellate review.” (Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th
1066, 1078.) We are not required to develop an appellant’s argument for him
and thus disregard conclusory arguments that either lack citation to any
relevant legal authority or fail to spell out the appellant’s reasoning (or both).
(United Grand Corp., at p. 153.) In short, when an appellant fails to
“convince us, by developing his arguments, stating the law, and calling out
relevant portions of the record, that the trial court committed reversible
error,” the appellant’s argument is insufficient to demonstrate error. (See
Bishop v. The Bishop’s School (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 893, 910.) Furthermore,
the only issues we are required to consider are those clearly identified in an
argument heading. If there are other arguments for reversal buried
somewhere in the appellant’s opening brief they are forfeited because we
aren’t required to ferret them out (even if, without any appropriately
informative headings, we could). (See United Grand Corp., at p. 153;
Tsakopoulos Investments, LLC v. County of Sacramento (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 280, 310.)
As in the two prior appeals, Wright’s briefing is difficult to understand.
His fundamental position, as we understand him, is that the trial court erred
in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and striking his
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complaint because this quiet title case “should have [taken] precedence over
[the administrator’s] Probate Petition concerning the same subject-matter.”
The first problem with his argument is that we do not have a complete
record of the proceedings. It is an appellant’s burden to “ ‘ “ ‘ “affirmatively
show error by an adequate record” ’ ” ’ ” and “ ‘[w]e cannot presume error from
an incomplete record.’ ” (Gonzalez v. Rebollo (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 969,
976, 977.) “The appellate court is limited to considering matters in the record
of the trial proceedings; matters not presented by the record cannot be
considered on the suggestion of the parties in their briefs.” (Id. at p. 976.)
“Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be
resolved against [the appellant].” (Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical
Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498, 502.) In this case, the record does not
contain any filings relating to the administrator’s motion to strike the quiet
title complaint which the court granted, not even the motion itself. In
addition, the record does not include several filings relating to the demurrer:
a request for judicial notice the administrator filed, a request for judicial
notice Wright filed, and the administrator’s reply in support of its demurrer.
In addition, the entire matter was heard on June 13, 2025, and taken under
submission but there is no record of the hearing.2 Lacking these many filings
and a record of the hearing, the record is inadequate to review the court’s
rulings. We can and do affirm on this basis alone. (See, e.g., Hernandez, at
p. 502 [record that includes only a notice of court’s ruling on motion to strike
but omits court’s order, defendant’s motion to strike and plaintiff’s opposition
held inadequate]; Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 570, 574 [“In
2 It is unclear from the register of actions whether the hearing was
reported, but no reporter’s transcript was designated, and no settled
statement of the hearing was prepared (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137).
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the absence of a proper record, which would include either a reporter’s
transcript or settled statement (neither of which we have in this case), we
must presume the trial court acted properly. Therefore, the judgment is
correct and must be affirmed”].)
A second and related problem is that the record does not show that
Wright opposed or objected on any ground whatsoever to the motion to strike
his complaint, which was an alternative and independent basis for the court’s
judgment of dismissal. No opposition to the motion to strike is in the record,
and moreover the register of actions does not even list any opposition to the
motion to strike. On the contrary, the register of actions indicates that on
June 5, 2025, a “notice of non-opposition to motion to strike complaint” was
filed by a party whose identity is unclear, but that filing is not in the record.3
A party cannot challenge a ruling to which they raised no objection.
“ ‘Otherwise, opposing parties and trial courts would be deprived of
opportunities to correct alleged errors, and parties and appellate courts
would be required to deplete costly resources “to address purported errors
which could have been rectified in the trial court had an objection been
made.” ’ ” (Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 800.)
Without a record showing that Wright opposed the motion to strike his
complaint or in any way objected to an order striking his complaint (as
distinct from opposing the demurrer), not even at the hearing, we presume
that he did not oppose that motion. (See Elena S. v. Kroutik, supra,
247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 575-576 [where record contains no reporter’s
transcript of hearing, appellate court presumes that at hearing appellant
3As noted, the record also does not include the motion itself or the
supporting memorandum of points and authorities, both filed on May 15,
2025.
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consented to procedure he asserts as error on appeal].) We thus deem any
and all objections to the order granting the motion to strike his quiet title
complaint forfeited. And because the motion to strike is an independent and
alternative basis for the judgment of dismissal, our affirmance of it on this
basis completely disposes of this appeal. We need not address any of the
issues Wright attempts to raise in his brief.
Third, Wright’s legal argument on its face is unpersuasive. Citing the
common law rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, he argues that “the
trial court’s jurisdictions over [his] complaint should have [taken] precedence
over the Probate Court’s later jurisdiction over [the administrator’s] probate
petition concerning the same subject-matter.” Under that common law
doctrine, as stated in the authority he cites, “even when two superior courts
have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties involved in
litigation, the first to assume jurisdiction has exclusive and continuing
jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved until such time
as all necessarily related matters have been resolved.” (Halpin v. Superior
Court (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 530, 545 (Halpin).)
But “ ‘[j]urisdiction’ ” in this context refers to a mandatory procedural
rule, not to authority over the subject matter or parties in a fundamental
sense.” (Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp. (2008)
168 Cal.App.4th 675, 682.) “ ‘The rule is established and enforced not “so
much to protect the rights of parties as to protect the rights of Courts of co-
ordinate jurisdiction to avoid conflict of jurisdiction, confusion and delay in
the administration of justice.” ’ [Citation.] Furthermore, when a court has
fundamental jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties, but acts in
excess of a jurisdictional rule, its judgment should be challenged directly and
is generally not subject to collateral attack.” (Id. at p. 683, italics added.) We
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have reviewed and affirmed the probate court’s order determining the rights
of the parties on direct appeal of that order, and Wright’s arguments in this
case now invite us to collaterally review that ruling again, which is improper.
(See ibid.)
In addition, the authority Wright cites concerning the doctrine of
exclusive concurrent jurisdiction (Halpin) did not involve a probate
proceeding. Wright has made no attempt to reconcile application of that
common law doctrine with Probate Code section 854. As discussed more fully
in the prior probate appeal, that section requires the probate court to abate
any petition if there is “a civil action . . . pending with respect to the subject
matter of a petition filed pursuant to this chapter this part and jurisdiction
has been obtained in the court where the civil action is pending prior to the
filing of the petition,” unless the probate court “finds that the civil action was
filed for the purpose of delay.” On its face, the statute thus appears to codify
the common law doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction Wright relies
upon here yet also carves out an exception for lawsuits filed for delay
purposes. And, as explained more fully in the prior probate appeal, the
probate court made a finding that this quiet title action was filed for the
purposes of delay and therefore ruled it was not required to abate the probate
proceedings while this case proceeded. And, as noted, we have now affirmed
that ruling on appeal. Yet Wright does not cite or address Probate Code
section 854.
A statute will be deemed to alter the common law if “ ‘ “ ‘its language
“ ‘clearly and unequivocally discloses an intention to depart from, alter, or
abrogate the common-law rule concerning the particular subject
matter . . . .’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Shaw v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 245, 258.) Without a developed legal argument attempting to
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explain why the “filed for purposes of delay” exception set forth in Probate
Code section 854 does not displace the common law doctrine of exclusive
concurrent jurisdiction, and thus is not dispositive of the jurisdictional
conflict, Wright fails to demonstrate the trial court erred in basically ceding
jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute to the probate court.
Finally, Wright argues the court erred in sustaining the demurrer
under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (c), which
authorizes a demurrer on the ground that “[t]here is another action pending
between the same parties on the same cause of action.” Wright argues that
the probate case itself was not an “action” within the meaning of this statute,
and the authority he cites supports this position. (See In re Raymond’s Estate
(1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 305, 307 [“Proceedings for the settlement of estates not
civil actions; they are special proceedings in rem and are covered by the
provisions of the Probate Code rather than by the rules applicable to civil
actions generally”].) But Wright has failed to show that any error in
sustaining the demurrer has caused him a miscarriage of justice. And we
conclude that it has not done so, for at least two reasons. First, as already
explained, the court’s ruling striking his complaint is an independent and
sufficient basis to affirm the judgment of dismissal irrespective of the
demurrer ruling. And second, because the probate court has now definitively
ruled against Wright on his claimed right to ownership of the Bates residence
and we have affirmed that ruling, he would appear to be collaterally estopped
from relitigating that issue all over again.4 Reversing the demurrer ruling
would be pointless.
4 That doctrine “ ‘precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in
prior proceedings’ ” when the issue is “ ‘identical to that decided in a former
proceeding,’ ” the issue was “ ‘actually litigated in the former proceeding’ ”
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DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their
costs.
and “ ‘necessarily decided,’ ” the prior decision was “ ‘final and on the
merits,’ ” and the party to be collaterally estopped is “ ‘the same as, or in
privity with, the party to the former proceeding.’ ” (Hernandez v. City of
Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, 511.) All of those elements appear to be met
here.
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STEWART, P. J.
We concur.
RICHMAN, J.
MILLER, J.
Wright v. Kokayi (A174297)
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