Filed 6/17/26 Wong v. City of Victorville CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
CHI WAH WONG, D087800
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. CIVVS2400383)
CITY OF VICTORVILLE,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Winston Keh, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Law Offices of Andres Bustamante and Andres Bustamante for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Green de Bortnowsky and Robert V. Lyle for Defendant and
Respondent.
Chi Wah Wong was cited by the City of Victorville for excess marijuana
cultivation at a property he owns. The citation was upheld following an
administrative hearing, and Wong appealed to the superior court. Wong
contends the court prejudicially erred in construing his appeal as a petition
for writ of administrative mandamus rather than a de novo appeal under
Government Code section 53069.4. We agree with Wong. We therefore
reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
Wong co-owns a parcel of real property in Victorville, California. In
June 2024, a search warrant issued for suspected illegal marijuana
cultivation at the property. The same day, the San Bernardino Sheriff
Department executed the search warrant and seized 851 marijuana plants.
The City of Victorville issued Wong a citation for violating Municipal
Code section 13.150.060. The total penalty was $84,500: $100 for each plant
exceeding the six plants legally allowed. A Notice of Violation and
Enforcement Action was posted on the front door of the property and mailed
to Wong at his primary mailing address.
Wong appealed the citation. Following a video conference
administrative hearing, the citation was upheld.
Wong filed a Notice of Appeal (Code Enforcement) with the superior
court and served a copy on the Victorville City Attorney. The notice of the
appeal “[p]ursuant to G[overnment ]Code [section] 53069.4(b)(2)” was
stamped “RECEIVED” by the City Clerk’s Office. City opposed the action,
noting, “This is a Petition for administrative writ of mandamus.”
In advance of the hearing, Wong sought, over City’s objection, to admit
new evidence not included within the administrative record.
Following an unreported hearing, the superior court took the matter
under submission. In a written ruling on August 26, 2025, the court upheld
the citation. It treated the appeal as “an administrative mandamus action”
and reviewed the hearing officer’s determination for substantial evidence and
abuse of discretion. The court sustained City’s objections to Wong’s new
evidence “because [Wong]’s counsel did not discuss the issues relating to the
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proffered evidence during the administrative hearing.” On September 8,
2025, judgment was entered in favor of City.1
II.
Wong argues the superior court’s ruling must be reversed and the
matter remanded for a new proceeding because the court erroneously
construed his appeal as an administrative mandamus action rather than a
section 53069.4 appeal. We agree.
“The legislative body of a local agency . . . may by ordinance make any
violation of any ordinance enacted by the local agency subject to an
administrative fine or penalty.” (Gov. Code, § 53069.4, subd. (a)(1).)
“Notwithstanding Section 1094.5 or 1094.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
within 20 days after service of the final administrative order or decision of
the local agency is made . . . , a person contesting that final administrative
order or decision may seek review by filing an appeal to be heard by the
superior court.” (§ 53069.4(b)(1).) That appeal “shall be heard de novo,
except that the contents of the local agency’s file in the case shall be received
in evidence . . . and imposition of the administrative fine or penalty shall be
admitted into evidence as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.”
(Ibid.)
Although “[t]he fine or penalty can alternatively be reviewed through a
writ of administrative mandamus under [Code of Civil Procedure
section] 1094.5,” “[g]iven the choice, it seems likely that a person subject to a
fine or penalty would prefer de novo review by the superior court rather than
1 The court takes judicial notice of the judgment in favor of City and
construes the notice of appeal as being from that judgment. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.104(d); Vitkievicz v. Valverde (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1306,
1310, fn. 2.)
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substantial evidence review under [Code of Civil Procedure section] 1094.5.”
(Asimow et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Administrative Law (The Rutter Group
2025 update) ¶ 13:24.)
City claims that Wong waived any right to de novo review by failing to
raise that issue before the superior court. In reply, Wong contends he “did
raise the issue by the very act of filing the ‘De Novo Appeal of Administrative
Penalty Pursuant to California Government Code section 53069.4,’” which
statute is expressly cited in the notice of appeal. Wong also contends his
“attempt to introduce new evidence [wa]s an assertion of the de novo
standard.”
We agree with Wong. He elected, as was his prerogative, to file an
appeal under section 53069.4. The phrase “shall be heard de novo” in
section 53069.4 contemplates trial de novo, similar to a small claims appeal,
including the right to introduce evidence regardless of whether it was offered
below. (See Martin v. Riverside County Dept. of Code Enforcement (2008)
166 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1411 [“Although Government Code section 53069.4
uses the word ‘appeal’ to describe the limited civil proceeding, what seems to
be meant is a de novo hearing by a single judge or, as also described in the
statute, by a subordinate judicial officer.”]) City’s mis-designation of the
appeal as a petition for administrative writ of mandamus in its brief did not
make it so. Accordingly, the court erred in resolving Wong’s appeal under
section 1094.5.
“We cannot affirm the judgment . . . on the basis that plaintiff[] ha[s]
failed to show the trial court’s error was sufficiently prejudicial to justify
reversal,” as “[t]he trial court entirely foreclosed the de novo appeal that
plaintiff[] w[as] entitled to by law.” (Wang v. City of Sacramento Police Dept.
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 372, 381.) Given the court applied the wrong standard
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of review, as Wong argues, “the trial court refused to consider [his] testimony
and exhibits regarding his lack of knowledge of the violation.” Because it is
reasonably probable a more favorable result may have been reached under de
novo rather than substantial evidence review (People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836), we reverse.
III.
We reverse the superior court’s August 26, 2025 ruling and
September 8, 2025 judgment in City’s favor and remand to the superior court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Wong is entitled to his
costs on appeal.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
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