WILSON v. BROWN Part-I
<script src="http://www.google-analytics.com/urchin.js" type="text/javascript"> </script> <script type="text/javascript"> _uacct = "UA-1698443-1"; urchinTracker(); </script> <html ><br /> <head><br /> <title>WILSON v</title><br /> </head><br /> <body><br /> <div><br /> <br/><b >WILSON</b><b<br /> > v.</b><b<br /> > BROWN</b><b ></b><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>Filed 8/10/10<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/><b ><u>CERTIFIED<br /> FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*</u></b><b<br /> ></b><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>IN<br /> THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>SECOND<br /> APPELLATE DISTRICT<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>DIVISION<br /> THREE<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <table class=MsoNormalTable border=1 cellspacing=0 cellpadding=0<br /> ><br /> <tr ><br /> <td width=319 valign=top ><br /> <br/>ESTATE OF DOROTHY MANUEL,<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> Deceased.<br /> <br/>___________________________________<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>TERRI WILSON,<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> Petitioner<br /> and Respondent,<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> v.<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>NANCY L. BROWN,<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> Contestant<br /> and Appellant;<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>DAWN CLARK-JOHNSON et al.,<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> Objectors<br /> and Appellants.<br /> <br/> <br /> </td><br /> <td width=319 valign=top ><br /> <br/> B210701<br /> c/w B215380<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> (Los<br /> Angeles County<br /> <br/> Super. Ct.<br /> No. BP095813)<br /> <br/> <br /> </td><br /> </tr><br /> </table><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> Appeal<br /> from an order of the Superior<br /> Court<br /> of<br /> Los<br /> Angeles County, Reva Goetz, Judge. <br /> Reversed and remanded with directions.<br /> <br/> Law Offices of Larry D. Lewellyn and<br /> Larry D. Lewellyn; Mazur & Mazur, Janice R. Mazur and William E.<br /> Mazur, Jr., for Contestant and Appellant and Objector and Appellant<br /> Larry Lewellyn.<br /> <br/> Tredway, Lumsdaine & Doyle,<br /> Joseph A. Lumsdaine and Min N. Thai; Law Offices of Robert G. Splinter and<br /> Min N. Thai for Petitioner and Respondent. <br /> <br/> Law Offices of Efrem A. Clark and<br /> Efrem A. Clark for Contestant and Appellant Dawn Clark-Johnson. <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/><b ><u>_______________________________________</u></b><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/><b<br /> ><i >INTRODUCTION</i></b><br /> <br/> Under<br /> Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420, a party who unreasonably denies a<br /> request for admission may be required to pay the requesting party its<br /> reasonable expenses (including reasonable attorney's fees) incurred in proving<br /> the truth of the matter at trial. In<br /> this case, a will contestant, Nancy Brown, denied requests for admission which,<br /> if admitted, would have resolved the entire case in favor of the executor,<br /> Terri Wilson. When Wilson<br /> then prevailed at trial, she sought an award of costs of proof in the amount of<br /> all of her legal fees incurred after the date of the denial of the requests for<br /> admission. The trial court granted the<br /> motion, ordering Brown, and her counsel, Attorney Larry Lewellyn and Attorney<br /> Dawn Clark-Johnson, to pay Wilson<br /> the full amount of her legal fees.<br /> <br/> In<br /> this appeal, we consider whether a costs of proof order may be directed to the<br /> denying party's counsel, as well as the denying party. We conclude that costs of proof may be<br /> imposed only against a party, not the party's counsel. We therefore reverse that portion of the<br /> trial court's order requiring Brown's attorneys to pay a share of the costs of<br /> proof in this case. In the unpublished<br /> portion of this opinion, we consider whether the trial court properly awarded<br /> costs of proof with respect to requests for admission pertaining to <i<br /> >every theory</i> on which Brown challenged the<br /> will, and, therefore, whether the trial court properly calculated the costs of<br /> proof as Wilson's entire attorney<br /> fee bill. We conclude that the trial<br /> court abused its discretion, and remand for a recalculation of the costs of<br /> proof pertaining only to those requests for admission for which Brown lacked a<br /> reasonable ground to believe that she would prevail at trial.<br /> <br/><b ><i<br /> >FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND</i></b><br /> <br/> As the determination of whether<br /> costs of proof were appropriate involves a consideration of whether Brown had<br /> a reasonable ground to believe that she would prevail on the matters denied, we<br /> must set forth the facts of the underlying dispute in some detail. This case centers around the validity of the July 24, 2003 will of the decedent,<br /> Dorothy Manuel. In that will, the<br /> decedent left all of her property to Wilson, whom she also named as<br /> executor. The contestant of the will is<br /> Brown, who was decedent's second cousin. <br /> Wilson is married to Brown's<br /> son.<b ><b >[1]</b></b><br /> <br/> Decedent<br /> died on October 14, 2005,<br /> at the age of 99. She was survived by no<br /> children, grandchildren, or siblings. <br /> Decedent's estate consisted largely of her home; the property also<br /> contained two rental units. <br /> <br/> 1. <i >Decedent's<br /> Stroke and 1999 Mental Examinations</i><br /> <br/> Decedent,<br /> who lived alone, suffered a stroke in 1999.<b<br /> ><b >[2]</b></b> She was referred for a neurological evaluation. On June<br /> 10, 1999, a Mini-Mental State Examination was performed. Decedent scored 12 points out of 30.<b ><b >[3]</b></b> Decedent could not identify the year, season,<br /> date, day, or month, apparently believing it was November of 1977. When asked to spell the word â€