Filed 8/19/26 Williams v. Mastro’s Restaurants CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
NATHAN WILLIAMS, B350593
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24LBCV01542)
v.
MASTRO’S RESTAURANTS, LLC,
et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mark C. Kim, Judge. Affirmed.
Cliff Dean Schneider for Plaintiff and Appellant.
John S. Williamson and Connie L. Benson for Defendants
and Respondents.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Plaintiff Nathan Williams appeals from grants of summary
judgment for defendants Mastro’s Restaurant, LLC (Mastro’s)
and The Irvine Company LLC (Irvine Company). We conclude
that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate reversible error, and thus
we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action for negligence, negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, battery,
conspiracy, and failure to warn against Mastro’s, the Irvine
Company, and other defendants in July 2024. The complaint
alleged that several men attacked plaintiff in July 2022 after he
left a restaurant operated by Mastro’s and on property owned by
the Irvine Company. Plaintiff suffered a broken leg and ankle
during the attack. The complaint alleged that defendants were
responsible for plaintiff’s injuries because they failed to provide
reasonable security and employee training to protect customers
from foreseeable risks from third parties.
Mastro’s and the Irvine Company both filed motions for
summary judgment, which plaintiff opposed. The trial court
granted the motions, concluding that there was no evidence that
the risk to plaintiff of third party criminal conduct was
reasonably foreseeable. Judgments for defendants were entered
on September 16, 2025. Plaintiff timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal principles.
A motion for summary judgment “ ‘should be granted if no
triable issue exists as to any material fact and the defendant is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ” (Helm v. City of
Los Angeles (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1225; Kahn v.
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East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1002–
1003, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “On appeal after a
motion for summary judgment has been granted, we review the
record de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the
moving and opposition papers except that to which objections
have been made and sustained.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334.)
“Though summary judgment review is de novo, review is
limited to issues adequately raised and supported in the
appellant’s brief. (Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466,
fn. 6; see also Byars v. SCME Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (2003)
109 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1140 [even on review of a summary
judgment, the appellant has the burden of showing error];
Frank and Freedus v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 461,
474.) ‘As with an appeal from any judgment, it is the appellant’s
responsibility to affirmatively demonstrate error and, therefore,
to point out the triable issues the appellant claims are present by
citation to the record and any supporting authority. In other
words, review is limited to issues which have been adequately
raised and briefed.’ (Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001)
93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116.)” (Christoff v. Union Pacific Railroad
Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 118, 125–126.)
II. Analysis.
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred by granting
summary judgment for defendants because the attack on him
was reasonably foreseeable based on the circumstances known to
defendants—namely, that there had been four previous incidents
in or immediately outside the restaurant, including one in
January 2022. In support, he cites Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 229 (Delgado) for the proposition that a
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business owner or landlord has an affirmative duty to protect
customers or patrons from the criminal acts of third parties. But
Delgado recognized a duty to employ security guards to protect
patrons from criminal conduct by third parties only in limited
circumstances—that is, where there is a “ ‘high degree of
foreseeability’ ” shown by prior similar incidents or based on a
special relationship between proprietor and patron. (Id. at
p. 238, italics omitted.) The requisite degree of foreseeability
“ ‘rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar
incidents of violent crime on the landowner’s premises.’ ” (Ibid.,
italics added.)
Our Supreme Court has held that evidence of other
criminal incidents on property, without more, is insufficient to
create a duty to employ security guards. In Ann M. v. Pacific
Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 680 (Ann M.),
disapproved of on other grounds in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010)
50 Cal.4th 512, 527, fn. 5, the court held that previous assaults
and robberies in the shopping center where the plaintiff was
raped were not sufficiently similar to the attack on plaintiff to
require the landlord to provide security guards in the shopping
center’s common areas. The court similarly concluded in
Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1181, disapproved of
on other grounds in Reid, at p. 527, fn. 5, where the plaintiff was
raped at gunpoint in a commercial parking garage. The court
held that the garage’s owner did not have a duty to provide
security guards in the garage because prior incidents of violent
crime in the building—armed robberies in the bank on the
building’s first floor—were “not sufficiently similar to the sexual
assault inflicted upon plaintiff to establish a high degree of
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foreseeability that would justify the imposition of such an
obligation.” (Sharon P., at p. 1191.)
In the present case, plaintiff identifies just two pages of the
appellate record that he contends raise a triable issue of material
fact as to defendants’ duty to provide a security guard. The first
is general manager Dale Rohde’s declaration that between 2009
and 2025, he was aware of “4 incidents aside from the present
matter, that involved guests fighting with one another and police
being called to the location as a result. Two of those took place
inside the restaurant, and two took place outside the restaurant.”
The second is a report of an incident in January 2022 in which a
guest reportedly was “exhibiting erratic behavior,” “harassing
numerous guests,” and “attempting to solicit [a woman] as a
prostitute [for] his friends.” The woman’s friend confronted the
guest, and the two men began punching one another.
Plaintiff’s citations to the record do not raise a triable issue
of material fact that the attack on plaintiff was foreseeable. The
two pages to which plaintiff directs our attention contain little
detail about the circumstances of the prior incidents. Even more
significantly, plaintiff’s brief does not identify any evidence of the
circumstances of the attack on him from which we could conclude
that the fights described in the prior paragraph were “ ‘prior
similar incidents of violent crime’ ” (Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at
p. 238, italics added) within the meaning of Ann M. and
Sharon P. Indeed, the only “evidence” plaintiff cites concerning
his attack and injuries is a paragraph from Mastro’s motion for
summary judgment summarizing the complaint’s allegations.
But allegations of a complaint are not evidence and cannot give
rise to a triable issue of material fact. (See, e.g., Roman v. BRE
Properties, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1054 [“It is
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fundamental that to defeat summary judgment a plaintiff must
show ‘specific facts’ and cannot rely on allegations of the
complaint”], italics added; Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011)
202 Cal.App.4th 89, 96, fn. 2 [allegations of complaint “are not
evidence”]; Zavala v. Board of Trustees (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th
1755, 1761, fn. 2 [same].) Finally, other than addressing Delgado
in a single paragraph, plaintiff provides no discussion of the
extensive body of case law concerning a landowner’s or
proprietor’s liability for torts committed by third parties.
“ ‘In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply
the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by
legal analysis and citation to the record. Rather than scour the
record unguided, we may decide that the appellant has waived a
point urged on appeal when it is not supported by accurate
citations to the record. [Citations.] Similarly, we may disregard
conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal
authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant
reached the conclusions [it] wants us to adopt.’ ” (De Meo v.
Cooley LLP (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 17, 41, quoting City of Santa
Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286–287; see also
Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino
(2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 866, 899 [“It is not our job to comb
through the record in search of grounds to upset the order”].) We
apply these principles here, concluding that plaintiff’s appellate
briefing is insufficient to show error. We therefore affirm the
summary judgments for defendants.
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DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed. Defendants are awarded their
appellate costs.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ASHWORTH, J.*
We concur:
ADAMS, Acting P. J.
HANASONO, J.
* Retired Judge of the El Dorado County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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