Filed 8/31/26 Weston v. Dept. of Transportation CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
CARYL LYNN WESTON, C102683
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 19CV00855)
v.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff Caryl Lynn Weston appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered in favor
of defendants, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and Caltrans
employee Mark Allen Lawson, after the trial court sustained without leave to amend
defendants’ demurrer to Weston’s second amended complaint. The judgment was based
on the court’s conclusion that the allegations in the second amended complaint varied
from the facts stated in her government claim and thus failed to comply with the claim
presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act. (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.)1
We agree that the trial court correctly dismissed Weston’s suit because her government
claim alleged as the basis of defendants’ liability facts not fairly reflected in Weston’s
written claim presented to and rejected by the State. We find no merit to Weston’s
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.
1
contentions that at least one of her causes of action was not subject to the Government
Claims Act and that defendants waived or were estopped from asserting their variance
defense. We therefore affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Because we are reviewing this matter on demurrer, we take the facts from the
operative complaint and deem its allegations to be true for the purpose of determining
whether it states a viable cause of action. (Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th
880, 885.) We may also consider facts of which the trial court properly took judicial
notice. (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 877; see also Evid.
Code, § 459, subd. (a).)
Weston’s operative complaint alleged that, one morning in April 2018, Weston
was driving on a state highway in Butte County when she came upon a Caltrans vehicle
being driven in the same direction by defendant Lawson. As she “lawfully began to
pass” the Caltrans vehicle, it “made an abrupt and/or illegal left turn or movement,”
forcing Weston to veer and lose control of her own car. Weston’s car struck the back of
the Caltrans vehicle and then drove into a guardrail, causing her to suffer injuries,
including a broken knee.
In May 2018, Weston submitted a claim to the State Department of General
Services for damages arising from this incident. Using the standard government claim
form, Weston (through her attorney) provided her name, address, and the date and
location of the incident; she also stated that her claim was against Caltrans and would
exceed $25,000 in damages. In answer to the form’s prompts for a description of the
specific damage or injury, an explanation of the precipitating circumstances, and an
explanation of why the State was responsible, Weston wrote: “See Attachment A.”
Attachment A was a 13-page Traffic Collision Report prepared by a California
Highway Patrol (CHP) officer who responded to the incident shortly after it occurred. In
addition to documenting the physical evidence of the collision, the report summarized the
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narrative statements given by both drivers at the scene. According to the report, Weston
stated that she was driving at 67 miles per hour while in or approaching a construction
zone marked with signs and a “cone pattern.” (Capitalization omitted.) She came upon
the Caltrans vehicle, which “seemed to be driving very slowly.” (Capitalization omitted.)
“She said that she thought it was safe enough to pass the vehicle and began that
procedure. She said that as she started to go around the truck to its left, the truck
suddenly turned left in front of her.” (Capitalization omitted.) She turned quickly and
thought she stepped on her brakes but ran into the back of the Caltrans truck and then into
the guardrail.
For his part, Lawson was reported as having stated that he was slowing his
Caltrans truck to make a left turn off the highway onto a private driveway. He activated
his left turn signal and began making the turn when he was suddenly hit from behind.
His truck was pushed in a half-circle and wound up on the other side of the two-lane
highway.
The report also contained a summary of the officer’s opinions and conclusions
regarding the incident. The officer described how Lawson was driving a heavy dump
truck in the performance of his Caltrans duties and approaching the private driveway at a
very slow rate of speed when Weston came from behind and attempted to pass him.
Lawson signaled to make the left turn into the driveway and was already driving slowly
enough to make the turn safely. As Weston got into position to pass Lawson on the left,
Lawson initiated his left turn. Weston tried to veer out of Lawson’s path but was unable
to slow in time and struck Lawson’s truck at almost the full speed of travel before sliding
into the guardrail on the right shoulder.
The officer concluded that Weston “was the cause” of the collision.
(Capitalization omitted.) He said that she was making an unsafe pass, in violation of
Vehicle Code section 21750, subdivision (a), and that an associated factor in the collision
was Weston driving at a speed unsafe for the existing conditions, in violation of Vehicle
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Code section 22350. The officer recommended that Weston be prosecuted for the
“primary collision factor” of violating Vehicle Code section 21750, subdivision (a).
(Capitalization omitted.)
In October 2018, the State notified Weston by letter that, after an investigation, her
claim was being rejected because “[t]he State does not appear liable for the claimed
damages.”
In March 2019, Weston filed suit against defendants, alleging negligence;
negligent hiring, training, and supervision; and negligent entrustment. Defendants filed
an answer two months later, and litigation proceeded for the next five years, with
repeated stipulations to continue the trial date.
In May 2024, the trial court ruled on a motion by defendants for judgment on the
pleadings, which is not included in the appellate record but appears to have challenged
the sufficiency of the complaint’s factual allegations. The court denied the motion as to
the negligence cause of action and granted the motion with leave to amend as to the
causes of action for negligent hiring, training, and supervision and for negligent
entrustment.
Weston filed an amended complaint in June 2024, realleging the same three causes
of action. Defendants filed a demurrer, asserting for the first time that all causes of action
were barred for failure to comply with the Government Claims Act. Specifically,
defendants argued that each cause of action was barred because it premised liability on
facts that “fundamentally differ[ed]” from those set forth in Weston’s government claim,
of which they requested judicial notice. Defendants argued that, as to the negligence
cause of action, Weston had given notice of a claim “that premised liability on an
accident for which [Weston] was found completely at fault for violating two sections of
the Vehicle Code.” The complaint, in contrast, entirely shifted the basis of liability from
Weston to Lawson.
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In opposition, Weston argued, among other things, that defendants had forfeited
their variance defense by failing to timely notify her of the insufficiency of her claim
under section 911. She further maintained that they were estopped from pressing that
defense because they failed to assert it at the earliest opportunity, in response to the
original complaint.
In July 2024, the trial court granted defendants’ request for judicial notice and
sustained their demurrer as to all causes of action. Over Weston’s opposition, the court
took notice of the contents of Weston’s government claim to determine whether the claim
was consistent with the allegations of the amended complaint and found a material
variance between the two documents. Describing the case as presenting an “unusual
situation” where “certain content” in the claim was omitted from the amended complaint,
the court nevertheless found that “a variance is a variance” and that the omission here
was material. The court reasoned that Weston’s claim did not meaningfully notify
defendants as to why they were liable, finding it was impossible for the State to evaluate
the claim when the CHP report concluded that Weston was at fault and she had not
explained in the claim why the conclusions of the officer were incorrect. The court
rejected Weston’s contention that defendants had waived their variance argument under
section 911, which it found inapplicable. It granted Weston leave to again amend the
complaint to allege facts supporting her estoppel theory.
At the end of July 2024, Weston filed a second amended complaint, again
realleging the same three causes of action but adding allegations of estoppel arising from
her communications with the State regarding her government claim. The first cause of
action, for negligence against both defendants, alleged that Lawson breached his duty of
care by violating Vehicle Code section 22107 (making an unsafe turn), failing to control
the speed of his vehicle, and failing to determine there were no oncoming vehicles close
enough to be a hazard when attempting to make the turn. The second cause of action, for
negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention, and the third cause of action, for
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negligent entrustment, alleged that Lawson was under the influence of a prescription
opioid at the time of the incident, that the responsible Caltrans supervisors were or should
have been aware of the risk this posed to the public, and that they failed to test for or
inquire about their drivers’ medication or substance use. The complaint alleged that
defendants were liable under sections 815.2, 815.6, and 820 and Vehicle Code
section 17001.
Defendants again demurred, asserting the same variance argument they made in
response to the first amended complaint and again requesting judicial notice of Weston’s
government claim. After a hearing, the transcript of which was not designated for
inclusion in the appellate record, the trial court sustained the demurrer as to all causes of
action and denied leave to further amend. In sustaining the demurrer, the court
reincorporated much of its July 2024 ruling on defendants’ previous demurrer.
Specifically, the court reincorporated its ruling of an impermissible variance between the
government claim and the pleadings—after again taking judicial notice of Weston’s
government claim—and its conclusion that section 911 did not apply. In addition, the
court determined that Weston could not establish her claim of estoppel and rejected
Weston’s argument that her claims under Vehicle Code section 17001 were exempt from
the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirements.
The trial court subsequently issued its judgment dismissing the action with
prejudice, and Weston timely appealed. This court dismissed the appeal after Weston
failed to file a timely designation of record but later reinstated it on Weston’s motion.
DISCUSSION
“A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations of a complaint to
state a cause of action.” (Thornton v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2012)
204 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1411.) “ ‘ “In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we
examine the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it” ’ ” contains sufficient
facts “ ‘ “to state a cause of action under any legal theory.” ’ ” (Silva v. Langford (2022)
6
79 Cal.App.5th 710, 715.) In evaluating the complaint, we assume the truth of all
material facts that are properly pleaded. (Balikov v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (2001)
94 Cal.App.4th 816, 819.) We also accept as true facts that are reasonably implied or
may be inferred from the complaint’s express allegations. (Ibid.) We may “consider
matters subject to judicial notice.” (State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 346.)
I.
The Government Claims Act “is a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the
liabilities and immunities of public entities and public employees for torts.” (Quigley v.
Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 803.) As a precondition to the
filing of a covered suit “for money or damages” against a public entity or employee
acting within the scope of employment, the Government Claims Act requires the timely
presentation of a written claim to the public entity. (§§ 905.2, 911.2, 945.4, 950.2, 950.6;
see generally Tesoro Refining & Marketing Co. LLC v. City of Carson (August 10, 2026,
S289952) __Cal.5th__ [2026 Cal. Lexis 4134] [pp. 10-11].) Section 945.4 provides that
“no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of
action for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with Chapter 1
(commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) of Part 3
of this division until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and
has been acted upon … or has been deemed to have been rejected … .” “Generally, this
claim presentation requirement is an element of a valid cause of action against a public
entity.” (Campbell v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 151,
153.) “Failing to present a timely claim, or to seek leave to file a late claim, bars the
suit.” (Ibid.) And even if a claim is timely filed, “the complaint is vulnerable to a
demurrer if it alleges a factual basis for recovery which is not fairly reflected in the
written claim.” (Nelson v. State of California (1982) 139 Cal.App.3d 72, 79.)
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II.
Weston first argues that the demurrer was improperly sustained at least as to her
first cause of action, which was premised in part on Vehicle Code section 17001,
because, she maintains, that statute provides an independent basis for public entity
liability to which the Government Claims Act’s presentation requirement does not apply.
Under Vehicle Code section 17001, “[a] public entity is liable for death or injury to
person or property proximately caused by a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the
operation of any motor vehicle by an employee of the public entity acting within the
scope of his [or her] employment.” As defendants acknowledge, Vehicle Code
section 17001 provides for liability against a public entity distinct from the provision of
the Government Claims Act that sets forth the vicarious liability of a public entity for any
“injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity
within the scope of his [or her] employment if the act or omission would, apart from this
section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his [or her] personal
representative.” (§ 815.2, subd. (a); see Silva v. Langford, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at
p. 721 [Veh. Code, § 17001 “provides a separate statutory basis for [public entity]
liability”].) That distinction is important in cases where a public entity might otherwise
enjoy derivative immunity, under section 815.2, subdivision (b), as a result of its
employee’s immunity. (See City of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1982)
131 Cal.App.3d 395, 400 [“The specific provision for public entity liability in Vehicle
Code section 17001 overrides the general derivative immunity provided by Government
Code section 815.2”]; Brummett v. County of Sacramento (1978) 21 Cal.3d 880, 883-885
[while officers were immune from liability under Veh. Code, § 17004, county was not
immune due to Veh. Code, § 17001].)
Weston argues that the California Supreme Court’s decisions in Brummett v.
County of Sacramento, supra, 21 Cal.3d 880 and Thomas v. City of Richmond (1995)
9 Cal.4th 1154, treated Vehicle Code section 17001 as a statutory source of liability
8
existing outside of the Government Claims Act. We do not disagree, but the interaction
between Vehicle Code section 17001 and the Government Claims Act’s immunity and
liability provisions does not resolve whether the Act’s claims presentation requirements
apply to causes of action under Vehicle Code section 17001. (See County of Santa
Clara v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1034, 1049 [“the claims presentation
requirements of the Government Claims Act are broader in scope than the Act’s public
entity immunity or liability provisions”]; City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007)
42 Cal.4th 730, 741 [“Prior notice of claims serves the purpose of facilitating
investigation and possible settlement, whether or not the public entity would otherwise be
immune from liability”].) Nor does Weston’s reliance on Lawson v. Superior Court
(2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1372 close the gap, as that case also turned on questions of
public entity immunity and did not involve the Government Claims Act’s presentation
requirements.
While Weston does not dispute that her suit is one “for money or damages,” she
maintains that her cause of action under Vehicle Code section 17001 is not one “for
which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing
with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) of Part 3” of the
relevant division of the Government Code. (§ 945.4.) But section 905.2, found within
Chapter 1 of Part 3, states that “[t]here shall be presented … all claims for money or
damages against the state … [¶] for an injury for which the state is liable.” (§ 905.2,
subd. (b)(3).) And while limited exceptions have been recognized, Weston identifies
none that would apply to claims under Vehicle Code section 17001. (See Williams v.
Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 842 [state claim presentation requirements do not apply to
federal civil rights claims]; Cornejo v. Lightbourne (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 932, 936,
939 [Government Claims Act presentation requirements not applicable to claims under
Whistleblower Protection Act given whistleblower law’s “ ‘functionally equivalent claim
process’ ”]; Gatto v. County of Sonoma (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 764 [“Exceptions to
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the filing requirement not specifically enumerated in the Government Claims Act have
occasionally been allowed, but only where the claim is based on a statute or statutory
scheme that includes a functionally equivalent claim process”].)
III.
As all of Weston’s causes of action were subject to the Government Claims Act’s
presentation requirements, we next consider whether Weston complied with those
requirements.
Defendants do not dispute (and did not dispute below) that Weston’s claim
satisfied section 910, which prescribes the information a facially sufficient claim must
contain. (§ 910 [requiring showing of claimant’s name and address, circumstances of
occurrence, and description of injury]; Phillips v. Desert Hospital Dist. (1989) 49 Cal.3d
699, 706.) Instead, defendants argued, and the trial court held, that Weston’s second
amended complaint materially varied from the government claim she filed.
“When a civil action is filed following the rejection of a government claim, it is
acceptable for the complaint to elaborate or add further details to a government claim, but
the complaint may not completely ‘ “shift [the] allegations” ’ and premise liability on
facts that fundamentally differ from those specified in the government claim.”
(Hernandez v. City of Stockton (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1222, 1231, quoting Stockett v.
Association of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Authority (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441,
447 (Stockett).) “In other words, the factual basis for recovery in the complaint must be
‘fairly reflected’ in the government claim.” (Hernandez, at p. 1231, quoting Stockett, at
p. 447.) “In comparing claim and complaint, ‘we are mindful that “[s]o long as the
policies of the claims statutes are effectuated, [the statutes] should be given a liberal
construction to permit full adjudication on the merits.” ’ ” (Stockett, at p. 449, brackets in
original; see id. at p. 446 [purpose of claims presentation statutes is “ ‘to provide the
public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to
settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation’ ”].)
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In comparing the government claim and complaint in this case, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of the contents of Weston’s government
claim, as Weston now maintains. (Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of
Conservation, etc. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 210, 227 [standard of review].) “If a plaintiff
alleges compliance with the claims presentation requirement, but the public records do
not reflect compliance, the governmental entity can request the court to take judicial
notice under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c) that the entity’s records do not
show compliance.” (Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 363, 376.)
Weston contends that the trial court wrongfully credited the truth of the collision
report’s conclusions to contradict the well-pleaded factual allegations of her complaint,
but the record does not support this assertion. The court explicitly stated that the issue
was “not whether the police report is true or accurate” but “whether the contents of the
claim, whether true or not, are consistent” with the complaint’s allegations. And while
the court considered the officer’s conclusion that Weston was at fault for the accident, it
did so because that conclusion was part of Weston’s government claim itself. As we
have noted, Weston herself cited and presented the collision report as the sole factual
basis for her government claim. In reviewing the contents of that claim, the court was not
crediting the report’s conclusions over Weston’s contrary allegations in the second
amended complaint; it was simply observing the difference between the two.
The trial court also did not err in concluding that Weston’s second amended
complaint materially varied from her government claim. The complaint alleges that
Weston was “lawfully” passing Lawson and that Lawson acted negligently by turning left
in violation of Vehicle Code section 22107. Looking at the government claim as a whole
(Connelly v. County of Fresno (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 29, 40), including the narrative
Weston provided to the reporting officer, the claim said that the incident involved
instead: Weston speeding in a construction zone, trying to pass Lawson illegally, and
causing the accident while Lawson drove slowly and made a legal left turn. Those facts
11
“do not correspond with the facts alleged in the amended complaint.” (Nelson v. State of
California, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 80.) While Weston now highlights the portion of
her reported narrative that the Caltrans truck “suddenly turned left in front of her,” that
fact appears alongside a trove of other details described in the report, unaccompanied by
an assertion that she believed that act was the main cause of her injury or any assertion
that the act of turning was wrongful. We thus reject Weston’s contention that both
documents describe Lawson’s left turn as the “core mechanism of injury.” To the
contrary, the report attached to and incorporated in the claim described the mechanism of
injury as Weston’s speeding and seeking to pass Lawson in an unsafe manner. In
attempting to investigate its liability for the incident described in the claim (see Stockett,
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 446 [purpose of claims presentation statutes]), the State would
reasonably have understood Weston’s claim to be premised on a collision for which she
was found to be solely at fault. The claim conveyed no readily discernible theory of the
State’s liability, much less the sorts of wrongdoing alleged against Lawson in the second
amended complaint. Put another way, “[t]he claim does not recite that [Weston’s] injury
was the result of [Lawson’s negligent driving], but was the ‘result of [Weston’s own
actions].’ ” (Nelson, at p. 80.) As a result, Weston’s government claim did not fairly
notify the State of the factual basis on which her claim rested. While we recognize the
general policy of liberally construing the claims presentation requirements, here the State
was not given sufficient notice that Weston believed the State to be at fault for its
employee’s left turn so as to permit adequate investigation and assessment of that claim
pre-litigation. (See Stockett, at pp. 446, 449.)
Because Weston’s government claim gave inadequate notice of the facts
underlying the State’s alleged fault in general, we likewise conclude that the claim failed
to notify the State of facts that would give rise to the derivative theories of liability
alleged in the second and third causes of action (for negligent hiring, training, and
supervision and for negligent entrustment). We are not persuaded by the reasoning
12
Weston cites in White v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1505, which viewed
similar derivative liability causes of action as fairly reflected in the government claim
presented there. (Id. at pp. 1508, 1511.) In that case, both the government claim and the
complaint were predicated on a public employee’s fully described “mistreatment of [the]
plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 1511; see id. at p. 1507 [quoting claim’s description of officer
beating the plaintiff and denying her medical assistance].) Here, as we have explained,
Weston’s government claim failed to adequately notify the State of whether and what
employee misconduct occurred.
We also reject Weston’s contention that any variance should have been saved by
the doctrine of substantial compliance. By presenting a claim that asserted no clear basis
for the State’s liability, Weston “thwarted the purpose of the claims act.” (Donohue v.
State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795, 805; see Santee v. Santa Clara County
Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 713 [“doctrine is based on the premise
that substantial compliance fulfills the purpose of the claims statutes, namely, to give the
public entity timely notice of the nature of the claim so that it may investigate and settle
those having merit without litigation”].) Accordingly, there is no basis for application of
the doctrine of substantial compliance in this case. (Donohue, at p. 804.)
IV.
Finally, we reject Weston’s contentions that defendants either forfeited or were
estopped from asserting their variance defense. Weston argues that defendants forfeited
any presentation defect by not timely issuing written notice of the insufficiency of her
claim under sections 910.8 and 911. These “notice and defense-waiver provisions” of the
Government Claims Act “(1) require a public entity to notify a claimant of any
insufficiencies of content or timeliness that prevent a claim as presented from satisfying
the requirements of the act and (2) provide that failure to give such notice waives any
defenses based on those insufficiencies.” (Phillips v. Desert Hospital Dist., supra,
49 Cal.3d at pp. 701-702.) “If the public entity determines a ‘claim as presented’ fails to
13
comply substantially with sections 910 and 910.2, and is therefore defective, the public
entity may either ‘give written notice of [the claim’s] insufficiency, stating with
particularity the defects or omissions therein’ within 20 days (§ 910.8; …), or waive any
defense ‘as to the sufficiency of the claim based upon a defect or omission in the claim as
presented. …’ (§ 911; … .)” (Phillips, at p. 705.)
Here, the defense-waiver provisions do not apply to defendants’ variance defense
because defendants were not asserting that Weston’s claim was defective for failure “to
comply substantially with sections 910 and 910.2,” which prescribe the contents of a
claim (§ 910.8); nor were they asserting a “defense as to the sufficiency of the claim
based upon a defect or omission in the claim as presented” (§ 911, italics added). Rather,
defendants asserted in their demurrers to the first and second amended complaints that
those pleadings materially varied from Weston’s government claim. As in Donohue v.
State of California, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at page 805, which rejected a similar waiver
argument, “[t]he insufficiency of [Weston]’s claim lies in its failure to set forth the
factual basis for recovery alleged in the complaint; defendant[s] could not have
discovered such defect until [Weston] filed [her] complaint.” At the time of the
government claim’s filing, the State could not have known that Weston’s future
complaints would not fairly reflect the same factual basis as the claim. Thus, defendants’
failure to assert that defect within 20 days of the claim’s filing did not waive it.
Weston argues that, unlike in Donohue v. State of California, supra,
178 Cal.App.3d at page 805, defendants did not raise their variance defense “at the
earliest opportunity.” While it is true that defendants did not assert a variance defect until
more than five years into the litigation, when they did raise that defense it was in
response to Weston’s choice to amend her complaint at that late stage. The filing of each
amended pleading was defendants’ earliest opportunity to assert a variance between that
pleading and the original claim. Moreover, the statutory defense-waiver provisions on
which Weston’s arguments rely are intended to facilitate the pre-litigation administrative
14
resolution of claims and do not address when a variance defect must be raised once a
claim has been rejected and litigation has commenced. (Cf. City of Stockton v. Superior
Court, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 746 & fn. 13 [no waiver where public entity first raised
presentation defense in third demurrer].)
Weston’s estoppel argument fails for similar reasons. She argues that Caltrans is
estopped from asserting any presentation deficiency because the State’s silence and
processing of her claim induced her to believe there was no defect. “A public entity may
be estopped from asserting noncompliance with the claims statutes where its agents or
employees prevented or deterred the filing of a timely claim by some affirmative
conduct.” (Johnson v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 692, 700;
see City of Oakland v. Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th
210, 240 [equitable estoppel is question of law where facts are undisputed].) Weston has
identified no affirmative conduct by defendants or their agents that caused her to file her
government claim in the manner that she did. That makes this case different from the
principal case on which she relies, Cruise v. City & County of San Francisco (1951)
101 Cal.App.2d 558, in which the governmental entity expressly advised the plaintiff that
all she needed to do to preserve her claim was to produce certain documents and
information but then later faulted her for failing to take an additional step of filing a
formal claim. (Id. at pp. 564-565.) Moreover, we do not see how the State’s silence as to
the facial sufficiency of the claim at the time it was filed could reasonably have lulled
Weston into believing that any litigation she might later file would not be subject to the
well-established rule precluding a plaintiff from proceeding with a complaint that
materially varies from the preceding government claim. (See Johnson, at pp. 700-701
[elements of estoppel include plaintiff’s ignorance of facts and reliance on public entity’s
conduct].)
As the second amended complaint failed to comply with the Government Claims
Act’s claim presentation requirements, the trial court properly sustained defendants’
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demurrer without leave to amend. Weston’s appellate briefing does not argue that any
amendment could cure the fatal variance between claim and complaint.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
We concur:
/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
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