Filed 9/21/26 Walkine v. Bromberg CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
ZACHARY WALKINE, B348516
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25STCV04518)
v.
JASON S. BROMBERG et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jon R. Takasugi, Judge. Affirmed.
Park, Daniel E. Park, Wil J. Rios and Jason H. Holtman for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law + Brandmeyer, Kent T. Brandmeyer and Jacob S.
Rosenberg for Defendants and Respondents.
________________________
Plaintiff Zachary Walkine alleges that, in the midst of a
dispute with his ex-wife Melissa Rowland over child custody,
Rowland prevailed upon a pediatrician to make a report of
suspected child abuse by Walkine to governmental authorities.
Walkine alleges that as a result, he lost custody for several
months while the unfounded allegation was investigated.
Claiming the pediatrician, Dr. Jason S. Bromberg, had no
reasonable basis for reporting potential child abuse, Walkine
sued Bromberg for defamation and other torts. Bromberg filed
an anti-SLAPP1 motion to strike the complaint. He argued that
his report of suspected child abuse to governmental authorities
was protected activity, and that Walkine could not demonstrate a
probability of prevailing on the merits because Bromberg (as a
mandated reporter) had absolute immunity for making the report
he did. The trial court agreed, granted the anti-SLAPP motion,
and struck Walkine’s complaint.
Walkine now appeals. He does not dispute that his claims
arise from protected activity. He contends that he has
demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the merits because
Bromberg’s immunity does not extend to mandated reporters who
lack reasonable suspicion of the abuse they report, and because
he adduced sufficient evidence that Bromberg had no such
reasonable suspicion. Both the immunity provision of the Child
1 SLAPP is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public
participation.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57.) For clarity, we also refer to a “SLAPP”
or “anti-SLAPP” motion as “a special motion to strike”—the
language used in the statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd.
(b)(1)). Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
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Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Act; Pen. Code, § 11164 et seq.)
and decades of precedent interpreting it foreclose Walkine’s
argument. We affirm the trial court’s order striking the
complaint.
BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Allegations in the Complaint
Walkine’s complaint alleges the following: On
November 28, 2023, Rowland took one of their children to
Bromberg’s office at Agoura-West Valley Pediatric Medical Group
(Agoura-West). While there, Rowland misrepresented that
redness on the child’s skin was the result of abuse and asked
Bromberg to report the abuse to “Child Protective Services
(‘CPS’).” The complaint does not state who Rowland accused of
committing the abuse. Bromberg diagnosed the redness as dry
skin, but notwithstanding this diagnosis, submitted a report to
CPS alleging suspected child abuse “despite having no medical
evidence to support such a claim.” At some point, Bromberg
admitted to Walkine that Bromberg had filed the report “under
duress,” and dismissed Walkine’s concerns about it by stating,
“ ‘Have fun in court.’ ” As a result of Bromberg’s report,
Walkine’s children were removed from his custody for seven
months before “the case was dismissed.”
Based on these allegations, Walkine asserted claims
against Bromberg and Agoura-West for defamation (libel per se),
medical malpractice, and both intentional and negligent infliction
of emotional distress.
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B. Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion and the Court’s
Ruling
1. Defendants’ Motion
Bromberg and Agoura-West filed a special motion to strike
the complaint under section 425.16. They argued that each cause
of action arose out of Bromberg’s right of petition and free speech
in connection with an issue under consideration by an executive
body or another official proceeding authorized by law. (§ 425.16,
subd. (e)(2).) As relevant to this appeal, they further argued that
Walkine had no probability of prevailing on his claims because
Penal Code section 11172, subdivision (a) gives mandated
reporters such as Bromberg unqualified and absolute immunity
from civil liability for reporting suspected child abuse.
2. Walkine’s Opposition
Walkine opposed the special motion to strike. He first
asserted that his claims did not arise from protected activity; as
Walkine has abandoned this position on appeal we do not discuss
it further. Walkine also submitted declarations from himself and
his attorney with attached exhibits, and argued that this
evidence showed he had the requisite probability of prevailing on
his claims.2
Walkine declared that he requested medical records from
the November 28, 2023 appointment. Agoura-West initially
provided only a note dated November 29, 2023, which stated the
2 Bromberg and Agoura-West filed objections to this
evidence along with their reply to Walkine’s opposition. The
court did not find it necessary to rule on these objections given its
conclusion that Bromberg and Agoura-West were immune from
liability.
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visit was a routine “well-child” exam, and omitted any mention of
the CPS report or Rowland’s request regarding it. Walkine made
repeated requests for additional information, and was eventually
provided a November 28, 2023 report about the visit. That report
indicates that during the visit the child was “happy,” “smiling,”
and in “no distress.” It further states that during Bromberg’s
evaluation, Rowland asked the child “if father hits him, [the
child] said ‘yes’ ” and pointed to part of his body to indicate
where. Bromberg was “[u]nsure as to origination” of the skin
discoloration because “it was evaluated over a week after [the]
possible incident.” Rowland “requested . . . a report be filed,” and
Bromberg’s medical notes state that although he was “[u]nsure as
to [the] origination of [the] lesion as it’s been over a week,” he
“will file [a] report.”
Walkine asserted this evidence was sufficient to show the
report to CPS was filed at Rowland’s request and was not based
on Bromberg ’s own medical findings. Walkine averred he spoke
to Bromberg after the CPS investigation began. Walkine asked
Bromberg why the report was made, and Bromberg responded,
“the mother had pressured him to file it.” Walkine “pushed
back,” and Bromberg “dismissed [Walkine] with the comment:
‘Have fun in court.’ ”
3. The Trial Court’s Ruling
On May 21, 2025, the trial court issued a written ruling
granting the anti-SLAPP motion. Relying on Dwight R. v.
Christy B. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 697 and other authority, the
court held that a report of suspected child abuse to a child
protective services agency by a mandated reporter is protected by
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) as an act preparatory to or in
anticipation of official proceedings, namely an investigation into
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the abuse allegations. (Dwight R., at p. 711.) The court further
found that Walkine had not demonstrated a probability of
prevailing on his claims because Bromberg was “absolutely
immune from liability for having made the child abuse report,
even if that report lacked adequate foundation, as [Walkine]
alleges.”
DISCUSSION
A. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
The Legislature enacted section 425.16 “[t]o combat
lawsuits designed to chill the exercise of free speech and petition
rights.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060 (Park).) Thus, “[a] cause of action
against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under
the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion
to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
When considering whether to strike a claim, courts
undertake a two-prong analysis. “First, the defendant must
establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected
by section 425.16.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.)
In Park, our Supreme Court set forth how to determine whether
a defendant has made a prima facie showing of speech or
petitioning rights for purposes of section 425.16: “A claim arises
from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the
basis for the claim.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1062.)
“If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by
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establishing a probability of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1
Cal.5th at p. 384.) At this second stage, the court “ ‘ “accepts the
plaintiff’s evidence as true and evaluates the defendant’s showing
only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of
law.” ’ ” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th
871, 891.)
We review de novo the trial court’s grant or denial of a
special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. (Park,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.)
B. First Prong: Arising from Protected Activity
On appeal, Walkine does not dispute that his claims arise
from protected conduct. Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2)
identifies protected conduct to include “any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial
body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.” That
provision applies to reports of suspected child abuse by mandated
reporters.
California requires that “[r]eports of suspected child abuse
or neglect shall be made by mandated reporters” to appropriate
government officials. (Pen. Code, § 11165.9.) As a medical
professional, Bromberg is such a mandated reporter. (Id.,
§ 11165.7, subd. (a)(21).) This obligation exists “whenever the
mandated reporter, in the mandated reporter’s professional
capacity or within the scope of the mandated reporter’s
employment, has knowledge of or observes a child whom the
mandated reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been the
victim of child abuse or neglect.” (Id., § 11166, subd. (a).)
Mandated reporters that fail to make these required reports are
subject to criminal prosecution. (Id., subd. (c).)
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Government authorities use these required reports to
discharge their legal obligations to protect children. (See B.H. v.
County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 191.)
Bromberg’s report of suspected child abuse was thus protected
activity, because it was an “act[] preparatory to or in anticipation
of official proceedings, namely, an investigation by child
protective services of [suspected abuse], and possible juvenile
dependency proceedings . . . . (. . . § 425.16, subd. (e)(2).)”
(Dwight R. v. Christy B., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 711.)
C. Prong Two: Probability of Success
Whether Walkine demonstrated a probability that he will
prevail turns on whether Penal Code section 11172, subdivision
(a) immunizes Bromberg from liability.3 Bromberg claims the
immunity afforded to a mandated reporter such as himself is
absolute. Walkine claims the immunity is not absolute but
qualified. Asserting that a mandated reporter must report
“whenever [he or she] has knowledge of or observes a child whom
the mandated reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been
the victim of child abuse or neglect” (id., § 11166, subd. (a)),
Walkine argues that “where there is no reasonable suspicion [of
abuse], there is no duty to report, and where there is no duty to
report, there is no immunity.”
Storch v. Silverman (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 671 rejected this
argument 40 years ago. In Storch, a parent and other plaintiffs
sued a hospital and certain of its staff physicians for
“ ‘negligently, carelessly and recklessly’ ” reporting a minor child
3 Walkine asserts only a vicarious liability theory against
Agoura-West based on Bromberg’s conduct. Thus, if Bromberg is
immune from liability, so is Agoura-West.
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was a victim of child abuse. (Id. at p. 674.) Like Walkine, the
Storch plaintiffs contended that the Act requires a doctor “to
report only those instances of child abuse which he or she ‘knows
or reasonably suspects’ may have occurred ([Pen. Code, ]§ 11166,
subd. (a)), [such] that immunity exists only for reports that meet
those criteria,” and thus, “there is no immunity for negligent or
knowingly false reports.” (Storch, at p. 678.)
Storch unequivocally rebuffed this assertion and held Penal
Code section 11172, subdivision (a) grants “medical practitioners
absolute immunity from civil liability for reporting an instance of
suspected child abuse to a child protective agency.” (Storch v.
Silverman, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 675, fn. omitted.)
Analyzing both the statutory scheme and its legislative history,
Storch explained that the interpretation advanced by the plaintiff
there (and repeated by Walkine in this appeal) “renders the
immunity statute virtually meaningless. There is no need for
immunity when there can be no liability, as in the case of reports
that are true or based upon objectively reasonable suspicion. . . .
[¶] The legislative scheme is designed to encourage the reporting
of child abuse to the greatest extent possible to prevent further
abuse. Reporters are required to report child abuse promptly and
they are subject to criminal prosecution if they fail to report as
required. Accordingly, absolute immunity from liability for all
reports is consistent with that scheme.” (Id. at pp. 678-679, fn.
omitted.)
Walkine attempts to distinguish Storch by asserting the
doctors in that case had independent clinical involvement with
the child, whereas Walkine alleges Bromberg did not report
based on his clinical judgment but instead at Rowland’s behest.
Walker claims that Storch stands only for the proposition that
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“[t]he Legislature extended absolute immunity to mandatory
reporters to protect objective professionals from the chilling effect
of civil liability for good-faith clinical misjudgment—not to
protect a reporter who had no independent clinical judgment to
chill” because Bromberg was acting only at the behest of
Rowland.
We do not agree with this cramped reading of Storch, nor
have other cases that have come after Storch. In discussing the
breadth of the immunity provided by Penal Code section 11172,
subdivision (a) to mandatory reporters, Storch went so far as to
say that the legislative history indicates such absolute immunity
applies even when “a medical practitioner maliciously and
knowingly submits a false report of child abuse with the intent to
vex, annoy and harass an innocent party.” (Storch v. Silverman,
supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 681.) Later cases have held the
same. (E.g., Arce v. Childrens Hospital Los Angeles (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 1455, 1485 [Pen. Code, § 11172, subd. (a) immunity
for mandatory reporters “extends even to negligent, knowingly
false, or malicious reports of abuse”]; Stecks v. Young (1995) 38
Cal.App.4th 365, 373 [“The appellate courts of this state . . . have
previously evaluated the Act’s immunity provision and, in each
case, soundly rejected the argument that immunity does not
attach unless ‘reasonable suspicion’ existed”].) A mandatory
reporter who makes a knowingly false and malicious report of
abuse has immunity. Someone who acts less egregiously, as
Walkine alleges Bromberg did by making a report without a
proper clinical basis, gets that same immunity.
As aptly summarized by Stecks, “our appellate courts have
concluded that immunity is a key ingredient in maintaining the
Act’s integrity and thus have rejected efforts aimed at narrowing
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its protection. While we recognize that unfounded reports can
lead to serious, sometimes devastating consequences, and we
have great sympathy for those who are wrongfully accused, as we
noted in [a prior opinion], ‘[i]n this war on child abuse the
Legislature selected absolute immunity as part of its arsenal.
This value choice is clearly within the province of the Legislature.
We cannot defuse this chosen weapon on the ground that its
effect is sometimes ill when its general purpose is good.’ ” (Stecks
v. Young, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 375.)
DISPOSITION
The order granting respondents’ anti-SLAPP motion is
affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
M. KIM, J.
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