Filed 9/30/26 Vo v. Dang CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
TRI MINH VO, D086333
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. CIVSB2129030)
MAY DANG et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Khymberli S. Apaloo, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Zulu Ali & Associates and Zulu Abdullah Ali for
Defendants and Appellants.
Law Offices of Lan Quoc Nguyen & Associates, Lan Quoc Nguyen and
Edward Stephen Beneville for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Following a bench trial for fraud alleged by respondent Tri Minh Vo,
the trial court found that appellant May Dang, Vo’s estranged wife, violated
her spousal fiduciary duty to Vo when she induced Vo to sign deeds conveying
title of his house to her brother, appellant Quan Dang.1 Based on its finding,
the court entered a judgment cancelling the deeds in favor of Quan and
restoring title to Vo.
May and Quan contend the court deprived them of due process when it
permitted Vo to amend the complaint after the close of evidence to introduce
an “unpleaded interspousal fiduciary-duty/constructive-fraud theory.”
(Capitalization & boldface omitted.) May and Quan did not preserve this
issue for appeal. But even assuming they did and that the court amended the
complaint, we conclude there was no due process violation because the
amendment did not raise a new or substantially different issue than the facts
originally alleged in Vo’s complaint.
Additionally, May and Quan assert the trial court’s judgment must be
reversed because May and Vo’s marital dissolution action remained pending
in family court and the family court had priority of jurisdiction, which
precluded any adverse order by the trial court. They are incorrect. The trial
court had priority of jurisdiction because this civil matter was already
pending in the trial court before the marital dissolution action began.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Background
In 2017, before his marriage to May, Vo purchased a house located in
San Bernardino County. Vo paid for the down payment using his own money
and money borrowed from May’s family. After they married in 2018, May
and Vo together paid the mortgage for the house and repaid the money from
1 Since both appellants have the same last name, we use their first
names for convenience where appropriate. No disrespect is intended.
2
May’s family. Then in 2019, Vo executed multiple grant deeds giving sole
title of the house to Quan, though he continued living in the house and
paying the mortgage and property taxes. Two years later, on November 10,
2021, Vo filed a civil complaint in San Bernardino County against May and
Quan. Later that month, on November 23, 2021, May filed for divorce from
Vo in Orange County.
B. Vo’s Complaint
In his complaint, Vo alleged fraud under Civil Code sections 1709 and
1710, explaining he was not told that the documents he signed would give
away the title to the house and that he executed them because he trusted his
wife and, by extension, her brother. He also alleged causes of action
regarding the relief he requested: cancellation of instruments, quiet title,
slander of title, and declaratory relief. Vo’s complaint detailed that his only
intent was to pull equity from the house to help purchase an additional
property and he believed Quan was helping him to do that. Vo alleged that
he did not read or speak English well but trusted May and Quan when they
asked him to sign various documents because he was married to May. Vo
contended May and Quan led him to believe the documents that they asked
him to sign would help him to obtain financing. But they did not tell Vo, that
through his endorsement, he would be giving the house to Quan. Vo alleged
May and Quan knew or reasonably should have known that Vo never
intended to convey the house out of his name or give up ownership of the
house.
C. Pretrial
Before proceeding with trial, the trial court suggested the title issue
should be heard within May and Vo’s then-pending dissolution of marriage
action, but all parties insisted that the family court in Orange County had
3
deferred to the trial court to resolve the title issue due to the house’s location
in San Bernardino County.
D. Trial
1. Vo’s Testimony
At trial, Vo testified he had been in a romantic relationship with May
for more than ten years, he was married to her, and he shared three children
with her. Together, May and Vo operated a trucking business, and he had
trusted her to handle their finances and paperwork both at home and for the
business.
In January 2019, May and Vo wanted to purchase a new house. That
month, Vo signed a grant deed, conveying title of the house to Quan. Vo did
this because May asked him to do it. May told him that it would help them to
purchase another house, and he trusted her. Vo believed May thought of
“good things for both of us.” When May and Vo had not found a new house
after several months, Vo asked May to put his name back on the title for the
house. Vo did not speak with Quan about the request directly nor do
anything in exchange for his putting his name back on the title, and his name
was added to the title as a joint tenant with Quan.
Vo and Quan then refinanced the house. Vo explained he did not
understand or fill out the mortgage refinancing application because it was in
English but signed his name because May asked him to sign it, and he
trusted her. He testified, “I believe[d] she would do this to make our family
better so I follow[ed] her advice.”
Then Vo transferred title to the house solely to Quan again. Quan did
not give anything in exchange for the transfer. Instead, Vo explained he
transferred the title because May again said it would help them as they
continued to look for a new house. Vo explained, “I love my wife and I trust
4
her, and I know that she tried to do the best thing for our family. So
whatever she advises, I just follow her advice.”
Vo and Quan did not speak about the transfers of title, rather all
communication went through May. Each time, Vo understood that he was
transferring the title to the house to Quan’s name, but he also continued
making mortgage payments and paying property taxes for the house because
he believed it was still his house. After conveying the title to Quan for the
second time, Vo asked May multiple times for the title to be returned to him,
but May did not facilitate the return because May and Vo were having “some
problems.”
2. Court’s Ruling on Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
After Vo rested his case, May and Quan moved for judgment as a
matter of law arguing there was no evidence of fraud because Vo admitted
that he intended to sign the transfer of deed to the house. Vo opposed the
motion, arguing the evidence demonstrated Vo believed the reason for the
title changes had to do with facilitating the purchase of another property and
that Vo had “faith in his wife to look out for his best interests.” Vo further
argued his belief was supported by the fact that he was returned to the title
after he transferred it to Quan the first time.
The court denied the motion, finding Vo introduced evidence on the
issue of fraud he alleged and that there was the issue of “fiduciary duties
between these parties, being married at the time.”
3. May and Quan’s Testimony
May and Quan both testified, asserting Quan and Vo had an agreement
to give title to the house to Quan, which did not include an agreement to
return it. According to May and Quan, Vo gave the house to Quan because
Quan helped May to pay the couple’s bills in 2018 when Vo was detained
5
during immigration proceedings. They testified the house was only
temporarily returned to Vo as a joint tenant to obtain a better refinancing
rate.
4. Motion to Amend the Complaint
During closing arguments, Vo argued that he went along with what his
wife asked him to do because he trusted her and did not understand that
Quan was going to maintain that he owned the property. May and Quan
argued Vo did not show that any material misrepresentation was made to
him. Vo rebutted their argument, asserting “what we are dealing here with
is just a species of constructive fraud.” Vo argued that May owed a fiduciary
duty as his spouse “to truthfully advise [him] as to why he was signing the
grant deeds and the consequences,” and asked the court, to the extent it was
necessary, to amend the complaint according to the proof to include a claim
for constructive fraud.
May and Quan did not argue whether the court should or should not
amend the complaint. But they asked for the opportunity to provide
argument if the court was inclined to amend the complaint with constructive
fraud. The court inquired if May and Quan wanted to introduce any
additional testimony. They declined. They also did not ask for a
continuance. When granted the opportunity for further argument, they
argued there was no evidence of constructive fraud. They asserted it would
be speculative to assume that transferring the deed to Quan was detrimental
to the community and conversely, that the community had benefitted from
the transfer.
After argument, the court explained it did not think there had been
“any argument on how the parties’ responsibility for community property
plays on to this case. [¶] I think we have all of the evidence, the facts, what
6
happened . . . . But I think there’s some legal arguments to be made about
the parties’ responsibilities to [one] another—with respect to property and
their fiduciary duties.” The trial court requested the parties provide their
positions in writing regarding May and Vo’s fiduciary duty to each other as
spouses.
The parties submitted briefs to the trial court. Both parties explained
the marital relationship is a fiduciary relationship, citing Family Code
section 721, subdivision (b). May and Quan argued that May did not breach
any fiduciary duty to the community and “the claim against May would be
more properly adjudicated in the family court” because there was a pending
family court matter for dissolution of marriage between May and Vo.
5. Trial Court’s Tentative Statement of Decision
After receiving the parties’ briefing, the court found Vo’s belief that he
still owned the house was supported by multiple facts, including that when
he gave title to Quan the first time, he was able to get it back. Meanwhile,
the court found there was no evidence to support May and Quan’s testimony
that Vo gave the house to Quan in exchange for helping May, finding that
testimony “suspect.” The court determined it was “clear” that Quan and Vo
did not talk and conducted all their transactions through May.
The court then addressed May and Vo’s fiduciary relationship under
the heading “Fraud and Violation of Fiduciary Duties Between Spouses.”
The court explained fraud can occur by concealment or suppression of the
facts between parties who have a fiduciary duty between them. The court
noted under Family Code section 721, subdivision (b), “spouses are
fiduciaries” and “occupy a confidential relationship, which imposes a duty of
the highest good faith and fair dealing,” including giving “true and full
information of all things affecting any transaction that concerns the
7
community property.” It also noted that breach of this duty can give rise to a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
The court found there was a “breach of fiduciary duty” by May towards
Vo with respect to the transfer of the house. The court explained that for
purposes of this ruling, it found there was a community interest in the house
but did not make any determinations as to what percentage of the house was
community property versus separate property, leaving that determination to
the family court. The court determined Vo had a right to rely on “May’s
honesty and her representations at each stage of the transactions involving
the [house].” It found May was involved in every aspect of the transactions
and did not give Vo true and full information when she asked him to transfer
the house to Quan. Specifically, May let Vo believe the house would be
returned to him and misdirected him when he asked for its return. The court
concluded “[i]f May were honest with [Vo] about her intentions initially, it
does not appear she meant to maintain those same intentions in the end
when he sought her help.” The court concluded that “[Vo] had a right to full
and true information, and the full truth of it was concealed from him.”
The court entered judgment in accordance with its tentative statement
of decision.
DISCUSSION
A. Due Process
May and Quan argue the court erred by amending the complaint to
include constructive fraud based on a fiduciary duty between May and Vo.
May and Quan assert Vo’s complaint pleaded civil claims, not a “Family Code
fiduciary-duty claim.” They assert the court nevertheless grounded its
analysis in Family Code section 721. They argue this was a new, unpleaded
8
basis for liability and contend this change violated their right to due process
under article I, section 7 of the California Constitution. We disagree.
1. Forfeiture
First, May and Quan did not preserve their due process argument for
appellate review. A party generally must raise constitutional claims in the
trial court to preserve them for appellate review. (Bettencourt v. City and
County of San Francisco (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1101.) Here, when Vo
moved to amend the complaint to include constructive fraud, May and Quan
did not object. Instead, seemingly assuming the court would grant the
amendment, they argued the merits of the issue. They argued there was no
evidence that May’s actions were detrimental to the community and therefore
there was no evidence of constructive fraud. When the court requested that
the parties provide additional written argument as to May and Vo’s fiduciary
duties, May and Quan argued among other things that the issue belonged in
family court, but they made no argument to suggest that they were objecting
to the amendment on constitutional due process grounds. No formulaic
incantation was required but they needed to alert the court to their due
process objection in some fashion, and they did not do that. Thus, May and
Quan did not preserve this issue for appeal.
We also need not address appellate arguments that have not been
adequately developed and therefore preserved. (Niko v. Foreman (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 344, 368; Kuperman v. San Diego County Assessment
Appeals Bd. No. 1 (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 918, 931.) We question whether
May and Quan sufficiently developed their argument on appeal with relevant
legal authority and analysis as their three-paragraph argument in their
opening brief cites only to article I, section 7 of the California Constitution
and two cases in a cursory fashion.
9
2. No New or Substantially Different Issue
Assuming May and Quan preserved this issue, their argument fails on
the merits because the issue alleged remained substantially the same.
Generally, we will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on a motion for
leave to amend a complaint absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.
(McMillin v. Eare (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 893, 909 (McMillin).) But whether
May and Quan were deprived of due process is a question of law that we
review de novo. (In re Marriage of Siegel (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 944, 953.)
“ ‘It is a fundamental concept of due process that a judgment against a
defendant cannot be entered unless [he or she] was given proper notice and
an opportunity to defend.’ [Citation.]” “ ‘ “Due process requires that all
parties be notified of the facts and issues in dispute, that each party be
afforded a fair opportunity to present evidence in open court, and that
judgment be rendered based on an evaluation of the evidence on each side,
findings of fact and conclusions of law.” ’ [Citation.]” (McMillin, supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 913.)
An amendment may occur during trial so long as it does not raise “ ‘new
and substantially different issues’ ” against which the opposing party has had
no opportunity to defend. (Trafton v. Youngblood (1968) 69 Cal.2d 17, 31,
italics omitted.) “[T]rial courts should be guided by two general principles
[when ruling on a motion to amend the pleadings during trial]: (1) whether
facts or legal theories are being changed and (2) whether the opposing party
will be prejudiced by the proposed amendment. Frequently, each principle
represents a different side of the same coin: If new facts are being alleged,
prejudice may easily result because of the inability of the other party to
investigate the validity of the factual allegations while engaged in trial or to
call rebuttal witnesses. If the same set of facts supports merely a different
10
theory -- for example, an easement as opposed to a fee -- no prejudice can
result. . . . ‘[The] amended pleading must be based upon the same general set
of facts as those upon which the cause of action . . . as originally pleaded was
grounded.’ ” (City of Stanton v. Cox (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1563 (Cox);
Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761 [“ ‘[I]t is irrelevant
that new legal theories are introduced as long as the proposed amendments
“relate to the same general set of facts.” ’ ”].)
Here, it is arguable whether the court amended the complaint to rely
on constructive fraud. It appears the court’s analysis is rooted in fraud by
concealment, a theory of fraud under Civil Code sections 1709 and 1710.2
But whether the court relied on fraud by concealment or constructive fraud,
the court found that May owed a fiduciary duty to Vo under Family Code
section 721, subdivision (b). Under that section, “spouses are subject to the
general rules governing fiduciary relationships that control the actions of
persons occupying confidential relations with each other. This confidential
2 The court detailed that fraud can occur by concealment when there is a
failure to disclose within a fiduciary relationship. The court also discussed
May’s intent, which is relevant to a finding of fraud but not constructive
fraud because the latter requires no proof of fraudulent intent. (Graham v.
Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 606 [the elements of fraud
by concealment are: “(1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by
a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant
intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing
the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as
he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and
(5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression
of the fact.”]; Civ. Code, § 1573 [constructive fraud requires no fraudulent
intent]; Assilzadeh v. California Federal Bank (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 399, 415
[the elements of constructive fraud are: (1) a fiduciary or confidential
relationship; (2) an act, omission or concealment involving a breach of duty
within that relationship; (3) reliance; and (4) resulting damage].)
11
relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each
spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other.” (Fam.
Code, § 721, subd. (b).)
May and Quan contend they did not have notice the court would apply
this fiduciary duty between May and Vo but the facts giving rise to her
fiduciary duty were alleged in Vo’s complaint. Vo alleged: he was married to
May and therefore trusted her, he executed the documents transferring the
house in reliance on her representations that it would help them purchase
other property and she did not tell him that the house would become Quan’s.
Because the amendment was grounded in the same facts alleged in Vo’s
complaint, no prejudice can result. (Cox, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1563.)
Rather, the facts in Vo’s complaint reasonably put May and Quan on notice
that Vo’s claim was based on Vo and May’s fiduciary relationship. Further,
Vo’s theory was litigated during trial as Vo testified that each time he
transferred the house, he trusted that May was acting in the best interest of
their family.
May and Quan assert they were prejudiced by the amendment because
there was no reopening of evidence but they fail to mention that they had
notice of the issue from the court before their case began and were asked if
they wanted to provide further evidence when the motion to amend was
made. Before their case, the court explained there was evidence of fraud,
highlighting the “fiduciary duties between these parties, being married at the
time.” And when the court heard the parties on Vo’s motion to amend, May
and Quan specifically declined any desire to introduce further evidence.
Similarly, while May and Quan contend that “[n]o continuance was
granted so appellants could develop a defense,” May and Quan also never
requested a continuance when Vo moved for the amendment.
12
Accordingly, we conclude that May and Quan were not deprived of
notice or the opportunity to be heard.
B. Priority of Jurisdiction
May and Quan further assert that the court should not have decided
this matter because the Orange County Family Court had priority over the
dispute while Vo and his wife were pending marital dissolution. May and
Quan are incorrect.
May and Quan rely on the doctrine of priority of jurisdiction. Under
that doctrine, “the first superior court to assume and exercise jurisdiction in
the case acquires exclusive jurisdiction until the matter is disposed of.”
(Levine v. Smith (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1135.) This “avoids the risk of
simultaneous proceedings or conflicting decisions.” (Ibid.) For example, in
Askew v. Askew (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 942, 947, a wife filed for divorce from
her husband before he filed a civil lawsuit against her alleging fraud. The
Court of Appeal determined that because the family court already had
jurisdiction to divide the couple’s community property, the civil trial court
had no jurisdiction to “make an order adversely affecting that division.” (Id.
at p. 961; In re Marriage of Schenck (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1474, 1482–1483
[finding the family court had priority of jurisdiction where the family court
assumed jurisdiction prior to the civil trial court].)
Here, the court found the issue had been deferred to it by the family
court. But the court had priority of jurisdiction over the family court all
along because Vo filed his complaint on November 10, 2021, before May filed
for divorce on November 23, 2021. Accordingly, the court had jurisdiction to
decide this matter and its order did not improperly interfere with the family
court’s jurisdiction.
13
DISPOSITION
We affirm. Respondent is entitled to his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.278(a).)
O’ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
14