IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT
ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF
VENTURA COUNTY et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
S283978
Second Appellate District, Division Six
B325277
Santa Barbara County Superior Court
VENCI00546574
July 27, 2026
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Justices Corrigan, Liu, Groban, Evans, and Boulware
Eurie*concurred.
Chief Justice Guerrero filed a concurring opinion.
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT
ASSOCIATION v. CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS
ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA COUNTY
S283978
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
In the California Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act of
2013 (PEPRA; Stats. 2012, ch. 296, § 28; Gov. Code, § 7522 et
seq.),1 the Legislature imposed new limits on the types and
amounts of employee compensation that county retirement
systems may use as a basis to calculate retirement benefits of
covered public employees. (Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
pp. 1059–1063; Gov. Code, § 31461, subd. (b) (section 31461).)
The purpose of these limits was to reduce the practice of
“pension spiking” — that is, “the manipulation of an employee’s
pattern of work and pay to produce inflated compensation
earnable during the final compensation period” which, in turn,
1
We use the acronym “PEPRA” to refer generally to
Assembly Bill No. 340 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No.
340), which enacted the amendment at issue in this case. (Stats.
2012, ch. 296, § 28 [adding § 31461, subd. (b)]; see Stats. 2012,
ch. 297, § 2 [Assem. Bill No. 197; companion bill making
technical changes to Assem. Bill No. 340 and PEPRA].)
Assembly Bill No. 340, however, gave the formal title “California
Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act of 2013” only to newly
added article 4 of chapter 21 of division 7 of title 1 of the
Government Code, which covers sections 7522 to 7522.74 (Stats.
2012, ch. 296, § 15) governing new employees. (Alameda County
Deputy Sheriff’s Assn. v. Alameda County Employees’
Retirement Assn. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1032, 1052, fn. 1 (Alameda
County).)
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VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA
COUNTY
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
results in greater pension obligations for participating counties.
(Alameda County, at p. 1061.)
This case concerns one of these limits: Under PEPRA, the
pension calculation for certain public employees now must
exclude payments an employee receives for unused vacation or
other leave “in an amount that exceeds that which may be
earned and payable in each 12-month period during the final
average salary period, regardless of when reported or paid.”
(§ 31461, subd. (b)(2) (section 31461(b)(2)).) In Alameda County,
we described one function of this provision as preventing
employees from effectively doubling the amount of cashed out
leave time they would ordinarily be able to receive in a single
calendar year, under annual limits set by the terms of
employment, by designating a final compensation year that
straddles two calendar years. (Alameda County, supra,
9 Cal.5th at pp. 1062–1063.) This description was not essential
to our holding in Alameda County, which primarily concerned
PEPRA’s constitutionality. Nonetheless, the retirement system
in Ventura County proposed to implement the law as Alameda
County described it. Now, facing opposition from county
employees, the retirement system seeks confirmation that the
opinion’s understanding of section 31461(b)(2) is correct.
Reading the relevant statutory text in light of the
purposes it was meant to achieve, we now confirm what we said
about section 31461(b)(2) in Alameda County: Under PEPRA, a
public employee’s retirement benefit calculation may not
include cashed out leave time in excess of the applicable annual
limit set by the terms of employment, even though the employee
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VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA
COUNTY
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
has designated a final compensation period that straddles two
or more calendar years.
I.
Our opinion in Alameda County contains a comprehensive
overview of the legal background to this appeal. (See Alameda
County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1055–1063.) In brief: This case,
like Alameda County, concerns PEPRA’s changes to the County
Employees Retirement Law of 1937. (CERL; Gov. Code, § 31450
et seq.) CERL establishes an optional county employee pension
system that has been adopted by some 20 of California’s 58
counties. (Alameda County, at pp. 1055, 1066–1067.)2 Under
CERL, a retiring employee’s pension benefit is calculated at the
end of the employee’s career, based on three variables: (1) age
at retirement; (2) years of service; and (3) final compensation.
(See Gov. Code, §§ 31676.01–31676.19; Alameda County, at p.
1056.) In this calculation, the employee’s final compensation is
“a critical factor”: “All other things being equal, the greater an
employee’s final compensation, the greater will be the monthly
pension benefit.” (Alameda County, at p. 1057.)
The Legislature enacted PEPRA in 2012 as a
“ ‘comprehensive’ reform of California’s public pension systems.”
(Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1059.) “Its centerpiece
was a new pension plan applicable only to newly hired public
employees” and designed to be less costly than pre-existing
plans. (Ibid.) “But PEPRA also modified some statutes
2
The other counties “either operate an independent
retirement system or contract with the state’s pension plan, the
Public Employees’ Retirement System (CALPERS; [Gov. Code,]
§ 20000 et seq.).” (Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1055.)
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
governing the pensions of existing employees” to achieve similar
cost-saving ends. (Ibid.) Among other things, PEPRA changed
how final compensation is calculated for so-called “legacy” plan
members — i.e., persons who were hired before PEPRA took
effect on January 1, 2013. (Alameda County, at p. 1051.) Those
changes are the provisions at issue here.
For legacy members, the post-PEPRA version of the
statute defines final compensation as an employee’s annual
“compensation earnable” received during a specified time
period.3 That time period may consist of either one year
(§ 31462.1) or three years (id., § 31462), depending on the
election of the county board of supervisors. 4 When employees
3
The provisions discussed in this paragraph do not apply
to those hired after PEPRA’s effective date, generally referred
to as “PEPRA members.” (See Gov. Code, §§ 31462, subd. (b)
[stating that the section does not apply to members subject to
PEPRA]; 31462.1, subd. (b) [same]; see Alameda County, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 1055 [“Employees hired post-PEPRA are often
subject to alternate statutory provisions”].) PEPRA members
are instead subject to Government Code section 7522.34, which
defines “pensionable compensation” as excluding all leave
cashouts. (Id., § 7522.34, subd. (c)(5) [“Pensionable
Compensation” excludes “[p]ayments for unused vacation,
annual leave, personal leave, sick leave, or compensatory time
off, however denominated, whether paid in a lump sum or
otherwise, regardless of when reported or paid”]; see id.,
§ 7522.48 [“Final Compensation”].)
4
The default period is three years, but the county board of
supervisors may instead elect the single-year alternative. (Gov.
Code, §§ 31462, 31462.1, subd. (a)(2).) If the period is three
years, then an employee’s compensation earnable is averaged
across the three years. (Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p.
1057.)
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VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
retire, they may designate which one- or three-year period to use
in calculating their “compensation earnable.” (Gov. Code,
§§ 31462, 31462.1; see Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p.
1057, fn. 6; see ibid. [if the employee fails to choose, the final
compensation period will include the year or years immediately
preceding the employee’s retirement].)
CERL defines “ ‘[c]ompensation earnable’ ” as the
employee’s “average compensation . . . for the period under
consideration upon the basis of the average number of days
ordinarily worked by persons in the same grade or class of
positions during the period, and at the same rate of pay.”
(§ 31461, subd. (a); see id., subd. (b) [listing exclusions].) This
general concept of compensation earnable “is intended to reflect
pay for work ordinarily performed during the course of a year,”
such that “[a]n employee becomes entitled to a greater pension
benefit than his or her peers by being compensated at a higher
rate” during the final compensation period used to calculate the
amount of pension benefit. (Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th
at pp. 1063, 1096.) For purposes of this definition,
“compensation” refers to the employee’s “remuneration paid in
cash out of county or district funds,” including wages deducted
for participation in a deferred compensation plan, “but does not
include the monetary value of board, lodging, fuel, laundry, or
other advantages furnished to a member.” (Gov. Code, § 31460.)
Before PEPRA, CERL contained no express limits on what
“remuneration paid in cash” was to be counted as the
“compensation earnable” for purposes of determining an
employee’s pension benefit. We thus interpreted the statute to
mean that, “[w]ith the exception of overtime pay, items of
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VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA
COUNTY
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
‘compensation’ paid in cash, even if not earned by all employees
in the same grade or class, must be included in the
‘compensation earnable’ and ‘final compensation’ on which an
employee’s pension is based.” (Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs’
Assn. v. Board of Retirement (1997) 16 Cal.4th 483, 487 (Ventura
County); see id. at pp. 493–494 [addressing the meaning of the
pre-PEPRA definition of “compensation earnable”]; see also
Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1085–1086, 1090
[reading Ventura County as adopting a “broadly inclusive
definition” (italics omitted)].)
CERL’s “ ‘very broad and general definition of’ ”
compensation earnable (Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p.
1095) allowed room for employees to manipulate their pattern
of work to increase the amount of compensation earnable during
the final compensation period. (Id. at p. 1061.) An employee
might “considerably increase his or her pension benefit” by, for
instance, “volunteering for a large quantity of on-call duty or by
accumulating and cashing out a large quantity of unused leave
time during the final compensation period. Because such
enhancements are arguably inconsistent with the underlying
concept of compensation earnable, which is intended to reflect
pay for work ordinarily performed during the course of a year,
these types of enhancement have been characterized as pension
spiking.” (Id. at p. 1063.)
To close perceived “loopholes” and to “bring the definition
of ‘compensation earnable’ into closer alignment with the
preexisting theory underlying CERL’s determination of pension
benefits,” PEPRA amended section 31461 to exclude certain
types of payments from the calculation of compensation
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VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
earnable. (Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1095.)
Specifically, PEPRA added subdivision (b) to exclude “any
compensation determined by the local retirement board to have
been paid to enhance a member’s retirement benefit ([§ 31461],
subd. (b)(1)) and any compensation for services rendered outside
normal working hours (id., subd. (b)(3)). In addition,
compensation for the surrender of unused paid time off, such as
vacation and sick leave, and payments made at termination of
employment, which often also constitute compensation for
unused leave time, can be included in compensation earnable
only to the extent the leave time was ‘earned and payable’ in any
12-month period during a final compensation year. [Fn.
omitted.] (§ 31461, subd. (b)(2) & (4).)” (Alameda County, at p.
1060.)
The issue in this case concerns the latter set of changes to
calculations based on unused leave time. Typically, “[w]hen
annual leave is taken as time off, the employee simply continues
to receive regular salary or wages without the necessity of
performing services.” (Ventura County, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p.
497; see id. at p. 489, fn. 11.) When an employee accumulates
leave time without taking time off, counties may allow
employees to surrender the unused time for its value in cash.
(See Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1062.) Counties
may, however, limit the amount of accumulated leave time that
employees may convert to cash in a single year. (See ibid.)
Under CERL, “[w]hen an employee elects to receive cash in lieu
of accrued vacation and the wages or salary the employee would
receive during the vacation period, the cash, like the
vacation pay the employee would otherwise receive, is part of
the employee’s ‘remuneration’ for past services” and is
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VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
considered “compensation” for purposes of calculating pension
benefits. (Ventura County, at pp. 497–498.) For legacy
members, however, PEPRA now limits the amount of cashed out
leave time that may be included as compensation earnable to
that which is “earned and payable in each 12-month period
during the final average salary period, regardless of when
reported or paid.” (§ 31461(b)(2), added by Stats. 2012, ch. 296,
§ 28.)
In Alameda County, legacy members of county pension
plans filed suit challenging these and other provisions of PEPRA
as, inter alia, an impermissible impairment of their
constitutionally protected pension rights. (See Alameda County,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1052–1053, 1063–1065.) In evaluating
the argument, we began by agreeing with plaintiffs’ premise
that PEPRA’s amendment of section 31461 imposed new
disadvantages relative to pre-existing law. (Alameda County, at
pp. 1084–1092.) As particularly relevant here, in evaluating
plaintiffs’ claim of impaired pension rights, our opinion
described the changes made by PEPRA to final compensation
calculations based on cashed out leave time. We observed that,
by adding subdivision (b)(2) and (b)(4) to section 31461, “the
Legislature appears to have intended to prevent retiring
employees from, in effect, including remuneration earned
during prior years in the final compensation calculation,” as
they might have done under prior law. (Alameda County, at p.
1062, italics added.) We went on to observe that, as the state
had pointed out in that case, the provisions serve the “additional
function” (ibid.) of addressing the situation we now confront in
this case, namely, when employees designate a final
compensation year that straddles two calendar years, thereby
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
potentially doubling the amount of cashed out leave time that
may be included as compensation earnable (id. at pp. 1062–
1063).
Alameda County held that these and other impairments
were constitutionally permissible, notwithstanding the
Legislature’s failure to provide offsetting benefits, because they
were enacted for the constitutionally permissible purpose of
closing loopholes and curbing perceived pension abuses, and
because that purpose would have been undermined by requiring
the State to provide benefits that make up for the losses.
(Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1101–1102.) With
PEPRA’s constitutionality affirmed, county retirement systems
proceeded to implement the new statute, giving rise to the
controversy now before us.
II.
The Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Association
(VCERA) is a public county retirement system established
under CERL, which is administered by a board of retirement
(Board). Before our Alameda County decision, the Board
allowed retiring employees to engage in a certain amount of
leave cashout straddling: that is to say, if an employee’s final
compensation period included portions of multiple calendar
years, that employee could include cashouts of unused leave
time in excess of their annual allowance, subject to other limits
not directly relevant here. But in October 2020, in response to
Alameda County, the Board adopted a resolution to “comply
with Alameda [County]’s directives regarding mandatorily
excluded pay items, which includes the PEPRA Exclusions.”
Tracking section 31461’s language, the resolution expressly
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VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
prohibited “overpayments” based on the “ ‘straddling’ of years
for leave cash outs, which is a ‘PEPRA Exclusion.’ ”
Seeking to settle any uncertainty on this point, VCERA
filed a lawsuit seeking a judicial declaration that the resolution
was legal. The named defendants included a number of
associations representing covered county employees, as well as
one retired employee, Leroy Smith, the former county counsel of
Ventura County.
Smith filed a cross-complaint seeking a contrary judicial
declaration. He had accrued 368.16 leave hours each year based
on the annual leave accrual rate governing his job position. The
terms of his employment permitted him to redeem or cash out
200 hours of leave time each calendar year. For his retirement,
Smith designated October 10, 2019, to October 10, 2020, as his
final compensation period. During this period, he cashed out
240 hours of leave time — 40 hours on December 14, 2019, and
200 hours on February 14, 2020. Smith sought a declaration
that in calculating his retirement benefits, VCERA was legally
obligated to include cash payments for all 240 hours and could
not permissibly limit the calculation to the 200 hours he was
allowed to cash out in a single calendar year.
The trial court granted summary adjudication in favor of
VCERA, relying largely on this court’s discussion of the issue in
Alameda County. The trial court concluded that the statutory
text was ambiguous, but, as Alameda County had explained, the
VCERA’s position was consistent with the Legislature’s
overarching statutory objective of curbing pension spiking.
Two of the defendant associations, the Criminal Justice
Attorneys Association of Ventura County and Ventura County
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VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
Professional Peace Officers’ Association (collectively, “Employee
Associations”), appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the
judgment of the trial court. Like the trial court, the Court of
Appeal found ambiguity in section 31461(b)(2) and resolved that
ambiguity by reference to the Legislature’s purpose. Consistent
with Alameda County, the Court of Appeal interpreted the
provision in light of its purpose to prevent pension spiking and
“to comport with ‘the underlying concept of compensation
earnable, which is intended to reflect pay for work ordinarily
performed during the course of a year. [Citation.] A member’s
compensation earnable during the final compensation period is
meant to reflect the average pay the retiring employee received.’
[Citation.] And, an employee’s average pay during this
compensation period includes payment for leave cashouts that
is subject to annual limitations.” (Ventura County Employees’
Retirement Assn. v. Criminal Justice Attorneys Assn. of Ventura
County (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1119, 1129.) The Court of Appeal
thus held that VCERA properly excluded from the compensation
earnable calculation compensation for Smith’s 40 hours in
excess of Ventura County’s annual allowance of 200 hours of
cashed out leave time.
We granted review to clarify this issue of statewide
importance on the proper calculation of retirement benefits for
covered public employees.
III.
As a threshold matter, the parties debate whether we
already decided the issue in Alameda County. Again, the
pertinent passage of the Alameda County opinion reads in full:
“Prior to PEPRA’s amendment, even in counties that limited the
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VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
amount of leave time that could be cashed out in a calendar year,
employees were able to double the amount of cashed out leave
time received during a final compensation year by designating a
final compensation year that straddles two calendar years, for
example, July 1 through June 30. By cashing out leave time in
the second half of the prior calendar year and the first half of
the subsequent calendar year, a retiring employee could double
the amount of cashed out leave time received in the final
compensation year. By limiting the inclusion of cashed out leave
time to that ‘earned and payable’ in a ‘12-month period,’
subdivision (b)(2) and (4) prevent this practice.” (Alameda
County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1062–1063.)
VCERA argues that this passage makes clear that section
31461(b)(2) prohibits the practice at issue here — i.e., as much
as “doubl[ing] the amount of cashed out leave time received
during a final compensation year by designating a final
compensation year that straddles two calendar years.”
(Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1062.) The Employee
Associations disagree, noting that Alameda County resolved
questions about the constitutionality of the PEPRA
amendments, but did not decide the “specifics of how subdivision
(b)(2) applied to different practices among the county litigants.”
The Employee Associations argue that Alameda County’s
description of section 31461(b)(2) as curbing so-called straddling
practices with respect to leave cashouts was not only
unnecessary to the decision but also inconsistent with the plain
language of the statute.
We agree with the Employee Associations that we did not
definitively decide this issue in Alameda County because the
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case did not directly present it. The primary question there was
whether section 31461’s new limits on the inclusion of certain
amounts as “compensation earnable” were changes that
impermissibly impaired the contractual and constitutional
pension rights of legacy employees. And although we described
the prohibition of the practice at issue here as one of these
changes (Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1063), we did
not undertake a statutory analysis of section 31461(b)(2) to
explain how the amendment prevented that practice. It is
therefore appropriate for us to now conduct that analysis, as the
Employee Associations ask us to do. (See Brown v. City of
Inglewood (2025) 18 Cal.5th 33, 40 [“ ‘The proper interpretation
of a statute is a question of law we review de novo’ ”].)
But we disagree with the Employee Associations that this
statutory analysis changes the conclusion. Reading the
statutory text in light of its purposes, we now confirm what we
previously said in Alameda County: Under section 31461(b)(2),
the calculation of compensation earnable must exclude any
leave cashouts that exceed the relevant annual limits set by the
terms of employment.
IV.
Our inquiry begins with the text of the provision, which
we interpret in context, giving the language its ordinary
meaning. (In re Ja.O. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 271, 283.) “If the
statutory ‘text is unambiguous and provides a clear answer, we
need go no further.’ ” (Ibid.) “Only when the statute’s language
is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one reasonable
interpretation, may the court turn to extrinsic aids to assist in
interpretation.” (Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc.
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(2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103; see Brown v. Gardner (1994)
513 U.S. 115, 118 [“Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional
possibilities but of statutory context”].) We may consult other
aids, such as the purpose of the statute, legislative history, and
public policy. We also consider portions of the statute in context
with both the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which
it is a part, giving meaning to every word, phrase, sentence, and
part of the act consistent with the legislative purpose. (People
v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 989–990.)
Again, section 31461 defines the term “ ‘[c]ompensation
earnable’ ” to mean “the average compensation as determined
by the board, for the period under consideration upon the basis
of the average number of days ordinarily worked by persons in
the same grade or class of positions during the period, and at
the same rate of pay.” (§ 31461, subd. (a)(1).)5 The provision
then states: “ ‘Compensation earnable’ does not include, in any
case, the following: . . . (2) Payments for unused vacation,
annual leave, personal leave, sick leave, or compensatory time
off, however denominated, whether paid in a lump sum or
otherwise, in an amount that exceeds that which may be earned
and payable in each 12-month period during the final average
5
The term “period under consideration” refers to “the
relevant time period under section 31462.1 (or section 31462 if
it applies instead).” (County of Marin Assn. of Firefighters v.
Marin County Employees Retirement Assn. (1994)
30 Cal.App.4th 1638, 1647.) Within VCERA, individuals with a
one-year period are referred to as “Tier 1” members, while
individuals with a three-year period are referred to as “Tier 2”
members.
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salary period, regardless of when reported or paid.”
(§ 31461(b)(2), added by Stats. 2012, ch. 296, § 28.)
The Employee Associations argue that this language
plainly forecloses any conclusion that section 31461(b)(2)
prohibits the practice of counting as compensation earnable all
of the leave cashouts paid to an employee during a final
compensation period that straddles multiple calendar years,
regardless of any cap on the amount that can be cashed out
during a single calendar year. The Employee Associations
emphasize that the Legislature did not use the term “calendar
year” but instead referred to “12-month period” — a term they
contend is “unambiguously defined by the employee’s elected
final compensation period.” Based on that premise, the
Employee Associations contend that “an employee may
designate a final compensation period that permits that
employee to include all leave cashouts which they have earned in
the period they are allowed [to] choose, with the caveat that the
cashout does not exceed that which may be ‘earned and payable’
during the final compensation period.” They insist that “there
is nothing in the statute which reasonably subjects it to an
employer’s calendar-year restrictions on leave cashouts.”
On its face, the statute might be read as the Employee
Associations suggest. But we are not persuaded that their
reading is the only possible reading. The Employee
Associations’ argument assumes that section 31461(b)(2)’s
reference to what is “earned and payable” in “each 12-month
period during the final average salary period” must refer to
whatever amounts are paid in the very same 12-month period
(or, in the case of Tier 2 employees, the three 12-month periods)
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selected by the employee as the final compensation period.6 This
is, however, just an assumption; nothing in the plain language
of the statute compels this understanding. The text does not, by
terms, refer to the final compensation period selected by the
employee, but “each 12-month period during” that period.
(§ 31461(b)(2).) And as all recognize, the use of the word
“payable” connotes something different from “paid”; it suggests
a focus not on the mere fact of payment but on the rules that
determine when, and to what extent, an amount is “[c]apable of
being paid.” (Black’s Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990), p. 1128, col. 2,
italics added [defining “payable”].) So the question set out in
section 31461(b)(2) is not how much leave cashout an employee
has received during the final compensation period, but how
much of that leave cashout was, under the relevant rules of
employment, capable of payment in “each 12-month period
during” the final compensation period.
While it is linguistically possible to understand the
answer to this question as the Employee Associations do, their
reading raises questions when considered in the broader context
of the statute. Why include the “12-month period” limitation in
section 31461(b)(2) at all if the section’s measurement period is,
as the Employee Associations say, “unambiguously defined by”
6
While section 31461(b)(2) uses the term “final average
salary period,” the parties and the cases alike have generally
referred to a “final compensation period.” (See, e.g., Alameda
County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1058, 1060; In re Retirement
Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 426, 441–442.) Neither party here
identifies any material distinction between the terms that is
relevant to our consideration of the issue here. We, therefore,
use the terms interchangeably.
16
VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA
COUNTY
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
the final compensation period chosen by the employee? At least
for those employees with one-year final compensation periods,
the Employee Associations’ reading renders the “12-month
period” limitation useless; the statute would operate just the
same if the words were struck out of the statute. As VCERA
puts it, “If the Legislature intended to include in compensation
earnable any amount paid during a member’s [final
compensation period], it could and would have omitted the
restriction of each 12-month period,” which measures what is
“payable” annually as cashed out leave. Whatever conceivable
effect the “12-month period” limitation might have for a three-
year final average salary period (which, of course, contains
multiple 12-month periods), this point gives us pause.
Ultimately, we are hard-pressed to conclude that section
31461(b)(2) unambiguously includes all leave cashouts an
employee is paid during whatever 12- or 36-month period the
employee chooses to designate as the final compensation period.
VCERA, by contrast, would understand the phrase
“earned and payable in each 12-month period” as referring to
the applicable annual cashout limits, as the most pertinent
“constraint[s] on the amount of leave time that can be cashed
out” during the final compensation period. (Alameda County,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1096, fn. 31.) As explained above, under
the terms of employment, an employee is typically allowed to
cash out only a certain amount of unused leave hours each year.
These limits are typically based on a calendar year, as they are
in this case, but they could also theoretically be based on the
fiscal year or, for that matter, any other 12-month period the
county employer might elect. In VCERA’s reading, only
amounts within these annual limits can be considered “payable
17
VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA
COUNTY
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
in each 12-month period” during the final compensation period,
in order to count as compensation earnable (§ 31461(b)(2)). The
terms of Smith’s employment, for instance, allowed him to cash
out 200 hours of accrued leave time per calendar year. Thus,
even though Smith’s designation of a one-year final
compensation period straddled two calendar years, VCERA
excluded from compensation earnable payment for any leave
hours that exceeded the 200-hour allowance applicable “in each
12-month period” during the final compensation period year.
Considering the relevant statutory phrase as a whole, we
conclude that section 31461(b)(2) is at least plausibly read as
VCERA urges. On this reading, section 31461(b)(2) limits
compensation earnable based on leave cashouts an employee
receives during the final compensation period to those cashouts
that are allowable in any relevant 12-month period, i.e., that is,
what the terms of employment prescribe for measuring the
period for allowable leave cashouts. Put differently, to the
extent that compensation earnable during the final
compensation period is intended to reflect a retiring employee’s
year of compensation for purposes of pension calculations,
section 31461(b)(2) limits compensation earnable to those
cashouts that occur during the final compensation period
selected by the employee — but subject to any annual cashout
allowances in place during the relevant time period.7 This
7
This statutory interpretation would also apply to Tier 2
employees who designate a three-year final compensation period
with an annual compensation earnable that is “calculated as an
average over three specific years.” (Alameda County, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 1057; see § 31462.) Because there are three “12-
month period[s]” that are relevant under section 31461(b)(2),
18
VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA
COUNTY
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
reading understands section 31461(b)(2)’s “in each 12-month
period” language together with the preceding phrase “earned
and payable” in a manner that endeavors, as possible, to give
meaning to both.
The Employee Associations raise various arguments
against VCERA’s proposed reading, but none persuades us that
the argument is foreclosed by plain statutory text. First, the
Employee Associations argue that VCERA’s reading founders on
the use of the word “during” in the phrase “earned and payable
in each 12-month period during the final compensation period.”
(§ 31461(b)(2).) In their view, the use of the word “during”
means that the “12-month period” or periods in question must
be wholly encompassed by the final compensation period. But
the ordinary usage of the word “during” is not so circumscribed.
(See Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2026)
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/during> [as of
July 27, 2026] [defining “during” as “throughout the duration of”
or “at a point in the course of” (italics added)]. All internet
citations in this opinion are archived by year, docket number
and case name at <https://courts.ca.gov/opinions/cited-supreme-
court-opinions>.) We see no clear textual reason why a
calendar-year, employment-based limit on leave cashouts
cannot determine what is “earned and payable in each 12-month
period during the final average salary period” even if the
calendar-year limits in question are not wholly encompassed by
payments for unused leave time must not exceed the annual
allowance for “each” (ibid.) such period in order to calculate the
“average annual compensation earnable” (§ 31462, subd. (a)).
19
VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA
COUNTY
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
the final average salary period. 8 This reading is, at a minimum,
not so implausible as to compel the Employee Associations’
contrary approach.
Second, the Employee Associations argue that if the
Legislature had wanted to limit the measurement of
compensation earnable to a particular period of time, it could
have specified as much. They rely, in particular, on provisions
governing California’s State Teachers’ Retirement System
(CalSTRS), which specify that “compensation earnable” is
measured on the basis of a “school year” running from July 1 to
June 30. (Ed. Code, §§ 22115, subd. (a), 22169.) The argument
misses the point. No one questions that even after PEPRA,
legacy members can continue to designate the 12- or 36-month
period used to measure their compensation earnable. The
question here concerns the statutory exclusion from
“compensation earnable” for leave cashouts that “exceed[] that
which may be earned and payable in each 12-month period
during the final average salary period.” (§ 31461(b)(2).) And
because the CalSTRS statute contains no parallel exclusion, it
8
The Employee Associations insist this reading is
implausible because it means that there may be multiple
relevant limitations in a single calculation. The argument is
unpersuasive. If a Tier 1 member designates a straddled period
from August 1 of “Year 1” to July 31 of “Year 2,” there are two
relevant annual limits on the amount of leave that may be
cashed out during that time. It is entirely possible to read
section 31461(b)(2), as VCERA suggests, as instructing that the
amount of cashed out leave may not “exceed that which is earned
and payable” in “each” of Year 1 and Year 2.
20
VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA
COUNTY
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
offers no real help in understanding the meaning of section
31461(b)(2).
Finally, the Employee Associations also argue that our
opinion in Alameda County not only fails to support, but actually
forecloses, VCERA’s interpretation of what it means to “exceed[]
that which may be earned and payable in each 12-month period
during the final average salary period.” (§ 31461(b)(2).) As they
note, the same “earned and payable in each 12-month period”
language in section 31461(b)(2) also appears in a subsequent
subdivision, which governs payments made at the termination
of employment. (§ 31461, subd. (b)(4).) In Alameda County, we
concluded that this particular provision of PEPRA likely
effected no material change in the law because prior appellate
decisions had established that cashouts of unused leave that
could be made only upon separation from service did not count
as compensation earnable. (See Alameda County, supra, 9
Cal.5th at p. 1087.) According to the Employee Associations, it
follows that section 31461(b)(2), which uses the same language,
“cannot be said to work a major change in the way annual leave
cashouts are treated by retirement systems if Section 31461,
subdivision (b)(4) made no material change in the
implementation of CERL.” VCERA is therefore wrong to
conclude that section 31461(b)(2) imposes new limits on the
amount of cashed out leave time that can be included in
compensation earnable.
The argument is unpersuasive. Simply because the
Legislature used the operative language in section 31461,
subdivision (b)(4) to codify certain appellate rulings regarding
the payment of termination pay does not mean that the relevant
21
VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA
COUNTY
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
language, as used in section 31461(b)(2), effected no change with
respect to pre-termination cashed out leave time.9 Alameda
County squarely held to the contrary. (Alameda County, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 1090.) And in explaining how section 31461(b)(2)
changed the law, Alameda County described one function of that
provision as preventing the practice of avoiding annual
limitations on leave cashouts by designating straddled calendar
years as the final compensation period. (Alameda County, at pp.
1062–1063.) The Alameda County opinion may not definitively
foreclose the Employee Associations’ arguments here, but
certainly nothing in the opinion offers them any affirmative
help.
We acknowledge that VCERA’s reading of section
31461(b)(2) may not be the most immediately obvious or
intuitive reading of the statutory text. But it is, at the least, a
plausible reading. Because the statutory text does not
unambiguously dictate either result proposed by the parties, we
must consider PEPRA’s underlying purpose along with other
extrinsic evidence to discern the statute’s meaning. (See People
v. Reynoza, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 989–990; Murphy v. Kenneth
Cole Productions Inc., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1103.)
Considerations of statutory purpose conclusively resolve
the issue in favor of VCERA’s interpretation. As we have
9
Indeed, Alameda County acknowledged that section
31461, subdivision (b)(4) arguably did change the law with
respect to certain payments made in anticipation of an
employee’s retirement, but noted that the argument was
immaterial because in that case the change was “largely
coextensive” with the changes made by section 31461(b)(2).
(Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1087, fn. 26.)
22
VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA
COUNTY
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
explained (see ante, at pp. 6–7), the Legislature’s primary
motivation in enacting PEPRA was to close loopholes the
Legislature perceived as permitting pension spiking by
realigning the statute with the “underlying concept of
compensation earnable, which is intended to reflect pay for work
ordinarily performed during the course of a year.” (Alameda
County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1063.) VCERA’s interpretation of
“earned and payable in each 12-month period” is consistent with
this understanding of the Legislature’s purpose. (§ 31461(b)(2).)
Because the “calculation required by section 31461 assumes
that all employees have worked the same number of days,”
allowing employees to boost leave hours above the annual
allowance restriction to increase compensation earnable “can be
viewed as distorting the pension calculation and increasing
pension benefits beyond the amount anticipated by the
underlying theory of compensation earnable.” (Alameda
County, at p. 1096.) The effect would be to permit employees to
increase — sometimes considerably — their amount of
compensation earnable, based not on the work they ordinarily
perform during the course of a year, but based on the strategic
timing of leave cashouts. This is, as we have previously
explained, the type of “manipulation of an employee’s pattern of
work and pay to produce inflated compensation earnable” that
PEPRA was designed to address. (Alameda County, at p. 1061;
see id. at pp. 1062–1063.)
The Employee Associations do not seriously dispute the
point, except to note that Smith is seeking a modest addition of
only 40 hours beyond the 200-hour annual allowance for cashed
out leave time. That may be true, but the statutory
interpretation question we face here is not so cabined. If the
23
VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA
COUNTY
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
Employee Associations’ reading of the statute is correct, then, as
we have previously observed, other employees in CERL plans
throughout the state could as much as “double the amount of
cashed out leave time received during a final compensation year
by designating a final compensation year that straddles two
calendar years.” (Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1062.)
This result is perhaps not so inconceivable as to rank as absurd,
but it is quite unlikely the Legislature intended legislation
targeted at curbing pension spiking to prohibit PEPRA
members from including any amount of cashed out leave time
from the calculation of pension benefits (§ 7522.34, subd. (c)(5)),
and yet allow legacy members to include potentially double the
cashout amount.
As VCERA points out, the Legislature that enacted section
31461(b)(2) was also concerned with administrability and the
ability of counties to anticipate and meet their funding
obligations. (See Ventura County, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 490.)
The legislative history recites that “[r]estricting special pay
items, such as unused leave allowances, from being added to the
base compensation used to determine an employee’s retirement
benefits also could lower normal costs, to the extent that those
pay items were previously factored into payroll assumptions
used to develop contribution rates. Eliminating unanticipated
spikes in final compensation could reduce the risk of unfunded
liabilities for employers.” (Dept. of Finance, Enrolled Bill Rep.
on Assem. Bill No. 340 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 11, 2012, p.
4.) These administrability concerns, too, favor VCERA’s
reading. VCERA’s approach permits counties to better predict
their funding obligations under the pension systems, relative to
a system under which somewhere between 100 and 200 percent
24
VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA
COUNTY
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
of the annual limit on leave cashouts may ultimately be counted
as compensation earnable, depending on the retiring employee’s
election. (See Sacks v. Oakland (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1070,
1084 [courts should construe statutes “with a view to promoting
rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute” and to
“reaching a workable interpretation that is in accord with
practicality and common sense” (italics added)].)
Against these considerations of legislative purpose, the
Employee Associations insist that, to the extent there is
ambiguity in the statutory language governing pension
calculations, the provisions must be liberally construed with “all
ambiguities [resolved] in favor of the applicant.” (Barrett v.
Stanislaus County Employees Retirement Assn. (1987) 189
Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603.) But as our cases have made clear, “such
construction must be consistent with the clear language and
purpose of the statute.” (Ventura County, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p.
490, italics added.) And while the Employee Associations
understandably take the position that their members should be
permitted to maximize their pension benefits, including
increasing the allowable amount of cashed out leave calculated
in the final compensation period, their position in this case
cannot be squared with the Legislature’s overarching purpose in
enacting PEPRA, which was to impose limits on these practices
that would help to “maintain the integrity of the pension
system” and to facilitate “ ‘its successful operation’ ” for the
benefit of all its members. (Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th
at p. 1095.)
We again emphasize that “there is nothing inherently
abusive” about an employee cashing out leave time to the extent
25
VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA
COUNTY
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
permitted by an employer, even when the employee cashes out
the maximum amount in back-to-back years. (Alameda County,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1063.) But the prospect of employees
cashing out leave time under these circumstances cannot be
“divorced from their pension consequences.” (Ibid.) For legacy
members, the Legislature has determined the pension
consequences of cashing out accrued leave time are acceptable
only if such compensation does not exceed what is “earned and
payable in each 12-month period during the final average salary
period.” (§ 31461(b)(2).) As explained above, in light of the
statutory purposes underlying the passage of PEPRA, it is
unquestionably the reading that makes the most sense.
Reading this statutory text in light of the Legislature’s purposes
in enacting PEPRA, we confirm what we said in Alameda
County: Section 31461(b)(2) prevents retiring employees who
have designated a final compensation period that straddles
calendar years from including in compensation earnable
amounts of cashed out leave in excess of the applicable annual
allowance for leave cashouts. (Alameda County, at pp. 1062–
1063.)
26
VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA
COUNTY
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
KRUGER, J.
We Concur:
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
GROBAN, J.
EVANS, J.
BOULWARE EURIE, J.*
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
27
VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT
ASSOCIATION v. CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS
ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA COUNTY
S283978
Concurring Opinion by Chief Justice Guerrero
I join in the majority’s holding that the phrase “each
12-month period” in Government Code section 31461,
subdivision (b)(2),1 should be understood to incorporate
applicable annual leave cashout limits pursuant to an
employee’s terms of employment. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 26.) I
also join the introduction and parts I–III of the majority opinion
(id. at pp. 1–13) and its discussion of statutory purpose (id. at
pp. 23–26). I respectfully disagree, however, with the path
taken by the majority to reach its ultimate holding. The
majority acknowledges that its interpretation of section 31461,
subdivision (b)(2) “may not be the most immediately obvious or
intuitive reading of the statutory text.” (Maj. opn., ante, at
p. 22.) I believe this understates the divergence between the
statutory text and the interpretation we adopt today. While I
agree the statute should be interpreted in the manner the
majority does, I disagree that this interpretation is apparent on
the face of the statutory text.
The subdivision at issue provides for the exclusion of leave
cashout payments “in an amount that exceeds that which may
be earned and payable in each 12-month period during the final
1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Government
Code.
1
VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA
COUNTY
Guerrero, C. J., concurring
average salary period, regardless of when reported or paid.”
(§ 31461, subd. (b)(2).) The majority interprets the phrase “in
each 12-month period” to mean “in any relevant 12-month
period.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18, italics added.) Typically, a
calendar year will be the relevant 12-month period because
county employees’ terms of employment often set leave cashout
limits by calendar year. But the statute does not contain the
qualifier “relevant.” (§ 31461, subd. (b)(2).) I do not see how the
majority’s interpretation is apparent on the face of the text.
The majority also interprets the word “during” such that a
calendar year may be “during” a one-year final average salary
period that straddles two calendar years. (Maj. opn., ante, at
pp. 19–20.) The majority relies on a dictionary that defines
“during” as “ ‘throughout the duration of’ ” or “ ‘at a point in the
course of.’ ” (Id. at p. 19, italics omitted.) But the majority does
not explain which of these definitions applies here. I do not
think either does. For individual defendant Leroy Smith, the
final average salary period ran from October 2019 to October
2020. No calendar year was a 12-month period “throughout the
duration of” October 2019 to October 2020, nor was any calendar
year a 12-month period “at a point in the course of” October 2019
to October 2020. The majority reads “during” to mean partly
during, i.e., overlapping with, which seems inconsistent with
how the word is ordinarily used.
But I think that the majority is ultimately correct in its
reading because the extrinsic evidence reveals a latent
ambiguity. A latent ambiguity arises “ ‘where the language
employed is clear and intelligible and suggests but a single
meaning, but some extrinsic evidence creates a necessity for
interpretation or a choice among two or more possible
2
VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA
COUNTY
Guerrero, C. J., concurring
meanings.’ ” (Mosk v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 474, 495,
fn. 18; see also Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735
[“the ‘plain meaning’ rule does not prohibit a court from
determining whether the literal meaning of a statute comports
with its purpose or whether such a construction of one provision
is consistent with other provisions of the statute”]; California
School Employees Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 Cal.4th
333, 340 [“We need not follow the plain meaning of a statute
when to do so would ‘frustrate[] the manifest purposes of the
legislation as a whole’ ”].)
Here, the purpose of the amendments that created the
language at issue “was to circumscribe CERL’s [County
Employees Retirement Law of 1937 (§ 31450 et seq.)] ‘very broad
and general definition of “compensation earnable” ’ in order to
reduce pension ‘ “spik[ing],” ’ the manipulation of an employee’s
pattern of work and pay to produce inflated compensation
earnable during the final compensation period.” (Alameda
County Deputy Sheriff’s Assn. v. Alameda County Employees’
Retirement Assn. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1032, 1061 (Alameda
County).) While the statutory language on its face does not
clearly suggest the interpretation that the majority adopts, the
purpose of avoiding pension spiking suggests this
interpretation, as the example of Smith in this case illustrates.
As mentioned, Smith’s final average salary period ran
from October 2019 to October 2020. His leave cashout limit was
200 hours per calendar year. He cashed out 40 hours in
December 2019 and 200 hours in February 2020. He earned
well over 240 hours of leave per year. Taking the text at face
value, we might conclude that all 240 hours of leave that he
cashed out during his final average salary period should be
3
VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA
COUNTY
Guerrero, C. J., concurring
included in his compensation earnable because it was all earned
and payable during the 12-month period that constituted his
final average salary period. But under this interpretation, his
compensation earnable would depend on when in 2019 he
cashed out his leave. If he had cashed out his leave in
September 2019 instead of December 2019, his compensation
earnable would be lower. Thus, this interpretation would
permit pension spiking because it would allow employees to
manipulate their “pattern of work and pay to produce inflated
compensation earnable during the final compensation period.”
(Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1061.)
The majority’s interpretation, on the other hand, excludes
leave cashouts in excess of the 200 hours that Smith was
permitted to cash out in each calendar year. Under this
interpretation, it does not matter when in 2019 he cashed out
his leave; the 40 extra hours from 2019 are excluded regardless.
That is, the majority’s interpretation does not permit pension
spiking. Under these circumstances, I agree that
“[c]onsiderations of statutory purpose conclusively resolve the
issue in favor of” the majority’s interpretation. (Maj. opn., ante,
at p. 23.)
Ultimately, I think that the majority’s interpretation is
what the Legislature intended. When we discern the
Legislature’s intent, “ ‘The intent prevails over the letter, and
the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit
of the act.’ ” (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 979;
see also Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 485
[“However, the legislative purpose will not be ‘sacrificed to a
literal construction of any part of the act’ ”].) Therefore, I agree
with the majority’s interpretation.
4
VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA
COUNTY
Guerrero, C. J., concurring
For these reasons, I concur in the introduction and parts
I–III of the majority opinion, the discussion of statutory purpose
in part IV of the majority opinion, and the judgment.
GUERRERO, C. J.
5
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion Ventura County Employees’ Retirement
Association v. Criminal Justice Attorneys Association of Ventura
County
__________________________________________________________
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 98 Cal.App.5th 1119
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S283978
Date Filed: July 27, 2026
__________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Santa Barbara
Judge: Colleen K. Sterne
__________________________________________________________
Counsel:
Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver, Jacob A. Kalinski, Michael A.
Morguess and Brian P. Ross for Defendants and Appellants.
Norman Dowler and Michael G. Walker for the Retired Employees’
Association of Ventura County, Inc., Regina (Renee) Artman, Scott
Barash, Lyn Krieger, Mark Lunn, Roberto R. Orellana, Tracey Frances
Pirie, Marty Robinson and Chris Stephens as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Defendants and Appellants.
Nossaman, Ashley K. Dunning, Aalia Taufiq, Alexander Westerfield
and Jennifer L. Meeker for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Karen Levy and Schuyler Campbell for the Board of Retirement of the
Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Association as Amicus
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
Hanson Bridgett, Raymond F. Lynch, Judith W. Boyette and Emily J.
Leahy for the San Bernardino County Employees’ Retirement
Association, the Sacramento County Employees’ Retirement System,
the Mendocino County Employees’ Retirement Association and the
Kern County Employees’ Retirement Association as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):
Jacob A. Kalinski
Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver, PC
16130 Ventura Blvd., Suite 600
Encino, CA 91436
(747) 221-7100
Ashley K. Dunning
Nossaman LLP
50 California Street, 34th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 438-7228