Filed 6/30/26 Vasile v. FAA Beverly Hills CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
CHARLES VASILE, B338580
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19STCV02964)
v.
FAA BEVERLY HILLS, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Colin Leis, Judge. Affirmed.
Barrington Legal, Inc., Eamon Jafari and Jacob R. Gould
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Manning, Leaver, Bruder & Berberich, Daniel F. Berberich
and Timothy D. Robinett for Defendant and Respondent.
______________________________
In October 2018, Charles Vasile and his company, Vasile
Properties Airport Plaza LLC, leased a car from FAA Beverly Hills
Inc., doing business as Beverly Hills BMW (FAA). Three months
later, Vasile filed suit against FAA alleging the dealership had
violated the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code,1 § 1750
et seq.) (CLRA) by misrepresenting the monthly lease payment
for the car.
Vasile claimed that, during negotiations, dealership
representatives quoted him a monthly lease price of $786.48.
He further claimed that when an FAA salesperson “delivered the
vehicle, along with the requisite agreement for the transaction,”
the salesperson “represented that the terms contained in the
agreement correctly reflected the terms originally presented to
[Vasile].” The written lease, however, provided for a total monthly
payment of $815.45—an increase of $28.97 resulting from the
addition of an optional maintenance package to the base lease
terms. Vasile initially claimed nearly $20,000 in damages. Later,
he reduced his claimed damages to $1,042.92, i.e., the total he paid
for the maintenance package over the course of the 36-month lease.
At the January 2024 jury trial in the action, FAA argued
that its personnel had accurately presented the lease terms
and, alternatively, that Vasile had not relied on any purported
misrepresentations. In support, FAA presented evidence—
including testimony from its finance manager and one of Vasile’s
former assistants—that Vasile orally agreed to the $815.45
monthly payment amount prior to signing the lease, that Vasile
was a sophisticated businessperson who had executed more than
1 Unless otherwise specified, statutory references are to the
Civil Code.
2
100 leases in the past, and that Vasile willfully had failed to honor
the terms of certain prior leases.
Using a special verdict form approved by Vasile’s counsel,
the jury found that FAA had “represent[ed] that the lease
agreement for [the car] had been supplied in accordance with a
previous representation when it had not,” in violation of the CLRA.
(See § 1770, subd. (a)(16) [it is “unlawful” to “represent[ ] that
the subject of a transaction has been supplied in accordance with
a previous representation when it has not”].) But the jury further
found that Vasile was not “harmed by [FAA’s] representation.” The
trial court denied Vasile’s posttrial motions challenging the verdict
and entered judgment in favor of FAA.
Vasile now asks us to reverse, arguing that: (1) the special
verdict form improperly “collapsed” the elements of harm and
causation under the CLRA, (2) the court erred by allowing the
parties to present argument in response to a jury note concerning
the meaning of the term “representation,” and (3) insufficient
evidence supports the verdict in favor of FAA.
We, however, conclude that Vasile forfeited his challenges to
the special verdict form and the response to the jury note by failing
to object at trial. And we conclude that Vasile fails to demonstrate
that the trial evidence compels a verdict in his favor as a matter
of law. (See Eriksson v. Nunnink (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 708, 733
(Eriksson) [“ ‘[w]hen the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly
concluded that the party with the burden of proof failed to carry
that burden and that party appeals . . . the question for a reviewing
court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of
the appellant as a matter of law’ ”].)
Accordingly, we affirm.
3
FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We summarize only the facts and procedural history relevant
to our resolution of this appeal.
A. Stipulated Facts
At the outset of the trial, the court read to the jury
56 stipulated facts identifying the key players involved in the
lease transaction and the general timeline of relevant events:
Vasile, then a 65-year-old retired physician, visited the
FAA dealership the morning of October 9, 2018 to discuss leasing
a car. Vasile’s two assistants, Victor Mora and Lacey Markel,
accompanied him.
During the visit, Vasile spoke with salesperson Sanya
Vujovic and sales manager Toufie Sarwan. Sarwan discussed
with Vasile the possibility of leasing the vehicle for 36 months for
a monthly payment of $723, as reflected in a worksheet Sarwan
showed to Vasile. Once Vasile expressed interest in these terms,
Sarwan asked for permission to run Vasile’s credit “to determine
whether he had premium tier credit to qualify for the [proposed]
terms.”
Sarwan determined that Vasile did not have the required
credit, and the two therefore discussed an alternative option of
Vasile co-leasing the vehicle with his company, Vasile Properties
Airport Plaza LLC. Via another worksheet, Sarwan showed Vasile
alternative lease terms, which included monthly payments of $781.
Sarwan also agreed that FAA would paint the rims of the vehicle
another color, free of charge. Vujovic provided Mora with her
personal cell phone number so he could contact her concerning the
car. Vasile then left the dealership sometime before 6:00 p.m.
At approximately 6:30 p.m. that evening, Vasile, using Mora’s
phone, called Vujovic on her personal cell phone and left a voicemail
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in which he stated that he wanted to lease the car. Mora and
Vujovic then exchanged a series of text messages over the next
three days, all of which “were sent and received on behalf of Vasile
with Vasile’s authorization”:
“[October 9, 2018, 6:49 p.m.]
“[Vujovic]: Hi. I got your voice mail. I’ll call you back as soon
as I can.
“[Mora]: Call me back tonight if you can. If not, call me
tomorrow morning. We want to get the car tomorrow.
“[Vujovic]: Ok. Still here.”
“[October 9, 2018, 9:48 p.m.]
“[Vujovic]: Can you guys come back on Thursday to get it?
I’m off tomorrow. I will send you the structure tomorrow.”
“[October 10, 2018, 8:35 a.m.]
“[Mora]: Good morning[, Vujovic]. We can come
tomorrow to get the car. Please email the structure to [email
address]. Does Dr. Vasile have to sign anything else?
“[Vujovic]: Good morning. Yes, he has to sign a lot of leasing
paperwork, but we can do everything tomorrow. It shouldn’t take
long, though.
“[Mora]: Okay. What’s the earliest time we can meet you
tomorrow?
“[Vujovic]: What time works for you? 9:30 a.m.?
“[Mora]: I have to take [Vasile] to a doctor[’]s appointment
in Beverly Hills at 12:15 p.m. It will be in the morning before or
afternoon after the appointment. I will find out and let you know.
“[Vujovic]: Sounds perfect.”
5
“[October 10, 2018, 5:08 p.m.]
“[Mora]: Hi [Vujovic,] it’s [Mora] again. I’m planning
on seeing you tomorrow morning around 9:30 a.m.–10:30 a.m.
Dr. Vasile wanted to know if you could just email or fax me the
papers he has to sign so he doesn’t have to come with me to get the
car? Let me know. Also, please email the structure of payments to
[email address] so I can prepare the check.
“[Vujovic]: No, he has to sign. But I can deliver the car with
papers and [U]ber back. Would that work?
“[Mora]: If you could deliver the car here to Dr. Vasile’s
house, with the paper for him to sign, that would be perfect.
“[Vujovic]: Ok great. Can we do it then after his doctor’s
appointment tomorrow? Because I will need the finance guy to
call him to go over paperwork. Actually the morning would work
too but let me know.
“[Mora]: The morning would be best. What time could you be
here in Marina Del Rey?
“[Vujovic]: 10:30?
“[Mora]: 10:30 a.m. is good. How long will it take to sign the
papers with you and the finance guy?
“[Vujovic]: I came to work to get everything approved and
figure it out. I’ll have the finance guy call him either first thing in
the morning or later today. Please send me the updated insurance
card (not expired).”
“[October 10, 2018, 6:57 p.m.]
“[Vujovic]: [Photograph of lease deal structure] $2,598
drive off payment with tax $832.29 for 12K miles a year.
“[Mora]: Thanks. Please bring a copy of it tomorrow.”
“[October 11, 2018, 8:56 a.m.]
“[Vujovic]: I might be a little late because I still need the
finance guy to print out the documents. One of them comes in at 9.
6
“[Mora]: Okay. Dr. Vasile has a 12:15 p.m. appointment
in Beverly Hills. So if we can finish everything by 11:30 a.m.–
11:45 a.m., it should be fine.
“[Vujovic]: Yes we’ll definitely finish by then.”
“[October 11, 2018, 9:39 a.m.]
“[Vujovic]: My finance guy wants to talk to you guys. Is it
okay if he calls now at this number?
“[Mora]: Sure go ahead.”
One of FAA’s finance managers, Abir Nahar, then called
Vasile, and they discussed the monthly payment amount for the
lease. Vasile said the amount “sounded high.” Nahar told Vasile
that he would “discuss [the] concern about the monthly payment
amount with the manager with whom Vasile had negotiated the
deal, i.e., . . . Sarwan, and would get back to Vasile shortly.”
Vujovic and Mora then engaged in a further text message
exchange:
“[Vujovic]: The finance guy is calling the manager. The
manager who gave [Vasile] the deal was off yesterday too.
“[Mora]: Okay. Dr. Vasile would like to speak to the office
manager. Can you have him call this number?”
“[October 11, 2018, 9:55 a.m.]
“[Vujovic]: [Photograph of a finger pointing at text reading
“$723”] That was the payment before they [ran] the credit and
after that it went up. They are trying to figure it out. [Sarwan]
(the manager who gave him the deal) says 832 sounds high too.
“[Mora]: Okay. Just let me know.
“[Vujovic]: Ok so they figure[d] it out[.] [I]t is 714.98 plus tax
[equals] 786.48. What’s your email[, Mora]?
“[Mora]: [Email address]. What time will you be here at the
Marina?
7
“[Vujovic]: Leaving now. Eta 40 min.
“[Mora]: See you soon. Drive safe.”
“[October 11, 2018, 11:24 a.m.]
“[Vujovic]: 3 min.
“[Mora]: Okay.”
At approximately 11:30 a.m. on October 11, Vujovic arrived
at Vasile’s home with the car and the lease paperwork. Vujovic,
Vasile, Mora, and Vasile’s other assistant, Markel, were the only
people present in the home at the time. Vasile signed the lease
agreement and related documents and provided Vujovic with a
check for the down payment in the amount of $2,598. After signing,
“Vasile had a copy made of several pages of the subject written
lease agreement and related documents.” Vujovic left Vasile’s home
before 12:11 p.m., “and Vasile left to go to his doctor[’s] appointment
as well.”
On October 20, 2018, Vasile received the first account
statement with respect to the lease. The statement reflected a
monthly payment amount of $815.45 due by November 10, 2018.
On October 29, 2018, at 10:16 a.m., Mora texted Vujovic: “I’m
trying to get ahold of the sales manager[,] Mr. Sarwan. Dr. Vasile
wants to talk to him.” Vujovic responded, “Hi, [Mora]. He gets in
at noon. [Phone number.]” Mora replied, “Thanks. I’ll call when
he gets in.”
Finally, on November 1, 2019, Vujovic called Mora, but was
unable to reach him. Instead of answering the call, Mora texted
Vujovic, “I can’t talk right now. I’ll call you back shortly.”
8
B. Trial Testimony and Exhibits
1. Vasile’s Case
During his case in chief, Vasile testified on his own behalf
and presented excerpts from the deposition of his former assistant,
Mora, who was not available to testify at trial.
a. Vasile’s testimony
Initially, Vasile testified that when he spoke with the finance
manager the morning the car was delivered, the finance manager
told him the total monthly payment would be approximately $814
because of the optional maintenance package. Vasile said he told
the finance manager, “I did not order a maintenance package,” and
“if he did that, I would not take the car.” Later, however, Vasile
testified that he and the finance manager “never spoke” of the
optional maintenance package.
Vasile further testified that, when Vujovic arrived to deliver
the car, she represented that the lease documents reflected the
terms Vasile had negotiated with Sarwan, the sales manager, while
at the dealership:
“[FAA’s counsel]: When Sanya Vujovic brought the lease
documents to your house, did she give you any assurance that the
lease agreement reflected the monthly payment amount that you
had agreed to?
“[Vasile]: Yeah. She—she—because I asked her, ‘So do these
documents reflect the deal that we made in the office?’ And she
said ‘Yes.’
“[FAA’s counsel]: And those were the exact words that you
used when you—when you asked her that question?
“[Vasile]: The exact words, I don’t remember the exact words,
but she had all these papers. I didn’t have a chance to—I couldn’t
read them in 15 minutes. It would take two days. So I said,
9
‘Are these documents reflective of the deal that I made with
Mr. Sarwan?’ And she said, ‘Yes.’ ”
Finally, Vasile testified that after he received the first
statement reflecting the $815.45 monthly payment amount,
he attempted to call Sarwan “many, many times” to discuss
the price discrepancy and Sarwan “was always unavailable.”
He testified that, as a result, it took “four [or] five months” for
him to understand the purported overcharge was the result of
the optional maintenance package. Vasile further testified that,
notwithstanding a demand letter from his attorney and the filing
of the instant suit, the dealership “absolutely would not correct”
the alleged error in the lease terms. Vasile nonetheless continued
paying the full $815.45 due each month and paid “thousands of
dollars in maintenance even though [FAA] tried to give it to [him]
free every time [he] came in.”
On cross-examination, FAA’s counsel introduced Vasile’s
deposition testimony in which Vasile described his view of Vujovic
as a “young” salesperson who “didn’t know anything” about the
lease terms:
“[Counsel2]: Did [Vujovic] say anything to you about what
the monthly price of the lease was?
“[Vasile]: No. She was very, very, very young, and she was,
like, a clerk, you know. Just a young girl that shows you the car.
And I felt sorry for her.
“[Counsel]: Did you ask her to confirm if the monthly lease
amount was correct?
“[Vasile]: I didn’t ask her anything. She didn’t know
anything. She was just struggling with signing, looking for a place
2 It is not clear from the record whether Vasile’s counsel or
FAA’s counsel posed these questions at Vasile’s deposition.
10
to sign on each piece of paper, trying to make sure she didn’t miss
a signature.
“[Counsel]: And other than telling you where to sign, she
didn’t tell you anything else about the lease agreement?
“[Vasile]: Didn’t mention one thing.”
Also on cross-examination, Vasile testified that he owns a
property in Los Angeles consisting of between 40 and 50 commercial
spaces for lease, and that he “[p]robably” has executed “[m]ore than
100” leases in the 25 years he has owned the property. And Vasile
confirmed that, in addition to signing at the bottom of the FAA
lease agreement, he had signed (1) the acknowledgement of his
purchase of the optional maintenance package on page 3 of the
lease, (2) an “Optional Products and Services Disclosure” reflecting
that the $786.48 monthly base price of the lease would be increased
to $815.45 in light of Vasile’s purchase of the optional maintenance
package,3 and (3) a separate “BMW Full Maintenance Program
Upgraded Agreement” confirming Vasile’s purchase of the
maintenance package and memorializing his right to cancel the
package within 60 days for a full refund. Vasile testified that
he never attempted to cancel the optional maintenance package
“[b]ecause [he] never purchased it.”
Finally, FAA introduced a copy of Vasile’s declaration
in opposition to FAA’s motion for summary judgment. In the
declaration, Vasile attested—contrary to his trial testimony—that
3 Vasile signed the bottom of the “Optional Products and
Services Disclosure” under an acknowledgment providing, in
pertinent part: “[I] consent to including the above charges in the
retail installment sales contract” for the vehicle. But as Vasile’s
counsel noted at trial, the form also contains boxes labeled “Accept”
and “Decline” immediately adjacent to the maintenance package
option. Vasile did not initial either of these boxes.
11
he had spoken with Sarwan over the phone on October 29, 2018,
and that Sarwan had informed him that he “apparently [had]
agreed to purchase an ‘optional maintenance package[,]’ . . .
which increased the monthly lease payments . . . to $815.45.”
(Capitalization omitted.)
b. Mora’s testimony4
Mora testified that “[b]ased on [his] interactions and [his]
observations that day at the time of the lease signing, to the
best of [his] knowledge[,] . . . the written lease agreement that
Dr. Vasile signed reflect[ed] the optional package that Dr. Vasile
selected during the telephone call with [the dealership].” Mora
further testified that, immediately after signing the lease, Vasile
commented that he was “going to go after it” or “going to fix it,”
which Mora understood to mean Vasile intended to dispute the
$815.45 monthly payment amount in the lease.
In addition, Mora testified that, after working for Vasile for
more than 10 years, he had quit because he “wasn’t getting paid
correctly” and because of “physical and verbal abuse.” Mora further
testified that Vasile had behaved unethically in a variety of prior
business dealings and legal proceedings: Vasile had asked Mora
to lie in a deposition in a prior lawsuit. Vasile had failed to “hold
up his end of the bargain with respect to . . . lease[s] [with his
commercial tenants]” on “[m]ore than five” occasions. And Vasile
had “acted in a dishonest manner” by presenting a signed lease in a
4 Because the parties stipulated that the court reporter
need not transcribe the reading of Mora’s deposition excerpts,
it is not always apparent from the record which party introduced
each portion of his testimony. In the interest of simplicity, we
summarize the entirety of Mora’s pertinent testimony in our
overview of Vasile’s case in chief.
12
lawsuit with a Cuban restaurant. Mora explained: “[T]here was
an issue over the lease. And the tenant that was there presented
a lease that did not have a signature. . . . That he did not sign.
But we presented a lease that had a signature on it.”
Finally, Mora testified that “[i]f [Vasile] disagreed with a
bill[,] he just wouldn’t pay,” that Vasile sometimes would use a
wheelchair “to appear weak” to gain an advantage in business
dealings, and that Vasile previously had sued Beverly Hills Rolls
Royce.
2. FAA’s Case
In its case in chief, FAA presented testimony from
salesperson Vujovic, sales manager Sarwan, and finance manager
Nahar. As set forth, ante, FAA also presented portions of Mora’s
deposition testimony.
a. Vujovic’s testimony
Vujovic testified, in pertinent part, that when she told Vasile
at the dealership that his monthly payment would be higher due
to his poor credit, “he stood up, which was kind of unusual, as . . .
he was in a wheelchair, and he was upset, . . . and then he left.”
“So [she] told [her] manager there’s nothing to do.” Then, when
Mora later contacted her and said Vasile wanted to lease the car,
she “was trying to remember what was the final payment that
we offered him.” The approximately $832 monthly payment
she initially texted Mora “was the number that was saved in
the computer system” because “that was what the payment was
supposed to be” before Sarwan “gave [Vasile] even more [of a]
discount”—“probably . . . another 1,500 off [the standard pricing]
to make [the deal] happen” “and made the payment [$]786.48.”
She further testified that the lease agreement she provided
to Vasile reflected that $786.48 monthly payment amount:
13
“[FAA’s counsel]: And the—the—the number of $786.48—
“[Vujovic]: Yes, that is—that is the payment that we agreed
on. And what I found out later, that’s the actual number on the
contract that I took.
“[FAA’s counsel]: And is that the base amount before you add
any additional optional products and services?
“[Vujovic]: Correct.”
Vujovic also explained that she never texted Mora the
$815.45 total monthly payment amount “because [the finance
manager] told [her] that [Vasile] knows that he purchased the
maintenance [package, a]nd he knows that the payment is going up
because of it.”
With respect to her oral representations to Vasile at the time
he signed the lease, Vujovic provided contradictory testimony. She
first testified that she was “100 percent sure” that she pointed out
the optional maintenance package to Vasile. But she later testified
that she could not recall precisely what she said to Vasile at the
time he signed the lease documents:
“[FAA’s counsel]: Did you make any promises to [Vasile]
that this—these lease documents represent[ed] a deal that you
previously agreed to?
“[Vujovic]: I mean, that was the—that was the deal that we
agreed to. Honestly, I don’t really remember what was said at the
time. But, yeah, as I was going through the contract, I told him,
‘This is the price that we agree[d] on and the payment.’ ”
In addition, Vasile’s counsel introduced an excerpt from
Vujovic’s deposition in which she testified she “[did]n’t remember”
her conversation with Vasile at his home. Vasile’s counsel also
questioned Vujovic about a lease-related document bearing both
Vasile’s signature and a time stamp of 4:41 p.m. on October 11 (i.e.,
after Vujovic had left Vasile’s home the day of signing). Vujovic,
14
however, testified she “never even noticed that there was a date
stamp on that form,” so she “wouldn’t know” whether it referred
to the time the document was printed, signed, or something else.
Finally, Vujovic testified that “there was no indication
whatsoever that [Vasile] was ever unhappy,” and that Vasile’s
assistant, Markel, invited her to dinner the day Vasile leased the
car to “celebrate.” She further testified: “[N]obody contacted me to
complain; this maintenance or anything could have been canceled.
Let’s say he had buyer’s remorse, for the love of God, call me and
cancel.”
b. Sarwan’s testimony
Sarwan testified that he had a clear memory of Vasile
because he was “an unusual person” and because of “his behavior[;]
[h]e even got up and walked around from his wheelchair.” Sarwan
further testified that, while at the dealership, Vasile represented
that he had good credit. Sarwan therefore presented initial lease
terms based on that assumption. But once Sarwan ran Vasile’s
credit, he determined that Vasile did not qualify for premium tier
pricing, and Vasile “got really upset.” Vasile “made some comments
like . . . dealerships, crooks, things like that. And then he . . . took
himself out, and his assistants followed him.” Vasile said, “ ‘I’m
going to go to Long Beach BMW. I can get a car there. I’m not
going to do business with you guys.’ So he left.” Later, however,
Vasile returned and “at some point he ended up leasing the vehicle.”
In addition, Sarwan testified that approximately one month
after the transaction, Vasile called him on his extension: “He
was really, really upset and irate actually on the phone, again,
making allegations that we, basically, did something with the
numbers, changed the numbers on him. The contract is not what
it’s supposed to be. And he was using foul language, using the
15
F word. He was really upset on the phone. I tried to calm
him down to understand what he was talking about, but he was
threatening, attorneys, ‘I’m going to come after you guys.’ And at
that point, I said, ‘Dr. Vasile, I cannot have a conversation using . . .
this type of language, and I’m going to hang up right now.’ And
that’s what I did.” Sarwan further testified that he never received
the demand letter addressed to his attention that Vasile’s attorneys
purportedly sent via certified mail.5
c. Nahar’s testimony
Finally, Nahar, the finance manager, testified in relevant
part: “I just remember there was a transaction where the customer
[didn’t] sign at the dealership, so the salesperson brought me the
paperwork. I called the customer, went over the paperwork and the
numbers. If I can recall, he didn’t agree to the payment. So then I
called the sales manager. He then told me to let the customer know
that his credit wasn’t what it was supposed to be. But then—and
that’s why the payment had gone to whatever it was. Called the
customer back. He then remembered and agreed. Then I proceeded
with offering him . . . the additional protection plans. The only one
he bought was the maintenance. He accepted the higher payment
with the maintenance. And that was the end of the call. Got the
paperwork together. The salesperson took it, brought it back.”
C. Jury Instructions, Deliberations, and Verdict
Vasile elected not to put on any rebuttal case. Accordingly,
after FAA rested, the court provided the jury with its instructions.
As to the elements of the CLRA claim, the court instructed the jury
with Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instruction No. 4700:
5 The record does not contain any evidence that Sarwan ever
signed for such a letter.
16
“To establish this claim, Charles Vasile must prove all of
the following:
“1. That Charles Vasile acquired, or sought to acquire,
by purchase or lease, a 2018 BMW X5 for personal, family, or
household purposes;
“2. That [FAA] represented that the subject of a transaction
had been supplied in accordance with a previous representation
when it had not;
“3. That Charles Vasile was harmed; and
“4. That Charles Vasile’s harm resulted from [FAA’s]
conduct.
“Charles Vasile’s harm resulted from [FAA’s] conduct if
Charles Vasile relied on [FAA’s] representation(s). To prove
reliance, Charles Vasile need only prove that the representation
was a substantial factor in his decision. Charles Vasile does not
need to prove that it was the primary factor or the only factor in the
decision.
“If [FAA’s] representation of fact was material, reliance may
be inferred. A fact is material if a reasonable consumer would
consider it important in deciding whether to buy or lease the goods.”
In addition, the court provided the jury with a special verdict
form expressly approved by Vasile, which provided in pertinent
part:
“1. Did Charles Vasile acquire, or seek to acquire, by lease,
the 2018 BMW X5 vehicle for personal, family, or household
purposes?
“_____Yes _____No
“If your answer to question 1 is Yes, then answer questions 2
[sic]. If your answer to question 1 is No, stop here, have the
presiding juror sign and date this form.
17
“2. Did [FAA] represent that the lease agreement for the
2018 BMW X5 vehicle had been supplied in accordance with a
previous representation when it had not?
“_____Yes _____No
“If your answer to question 2 is Yes, then answer question 3.
If your answer to question 2 is No, stop here, have the presiding
juror sign and date this form.
“3. Was Charles Vasile harmed by [FAA’s] representation?
“_____Yes _____No
“If your answer to question 3 is Yes, then answer question 4.
If your answer to question 3 is No, stop here, have the presiding
juror sign and date this form.
“4. Did Charles Vasile’s harm result from [FAA’s] conduct?
“_____Yes _____No
“If your answer to question 4 is Yes, then answer question 5.
If your answer to question 4 is No, stop here, have the presiding
juror sign and date this form.”
The jury began deliberating the morning of January 19, 2024.
At noon that day, the jury sent the following note to the court:
“Can we have clarification on what number two is asking?
Specifically, what does representation mean? Also, does the ‘when
it had not’ equate to a double negative? What is the ‘it’?”
In response, the court advised the jury: “I received your
question, and the attorneys and I have discussed your question.[ 6]
And I have decided that the best way to answer the question you
wrote down is for each attorney to have five minutes to—total to
explain to you how that attorney believes you should interpret
question 2 in order to answer question 2. [Vasile] will go first and
6 No transcript of this discussion appears in our appellate
record.
18
then [FAA]. And then because [Vasile] has the burden of proof,
[Vasile] will get the final word.”
During his supplemental argument, Vasile’s counsel told the
jury, “[T]he synonyms for ‘represent’ include[ ] ‘portray,’ ‘describe,’
‘imply.’ So did [FAA] portray that the lease agreement—or the
terms of the lease agreement [are] the key here—had been provided
in accordance with the previous representation about the terms
when the lease agreement had not?” (Internal quotations
corrected.)
FAA countered: “The word ‘representation’ is a fancy legal
term that means to verbally tell somebody something. To make a
statement to somebody. When you make a misrepresentation, that
means to make a false or untrue statement. You also asked, what
does the term ‘it’ at the end of the sentence mean? The word ‘it’
means the lease contract. Question No. 2 in the special verdict form
is asking whether or not—it’s asking essentially whether or not
[FAA] misrepresented or made a false statement about the amount
of the lease payment to Dr. Vasile at the time he signed the lease,
contrary to all the other information and documents that Vasile
signed showing the monthly payment amount and the inclusion
of the optional maintenance package. [¶] . . . [¶] As you [will]
recall, the monthly payment amount in the lease contract is
$815.45. . . . Vasile claims that, at the time he signed the lease
contract, Ms. Vujovic assured him that the lease contract reflected
the terms he originally agreed to. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . The question is
essentially asking whether or not Ms. Vujovic told . . . Vasile at the
time of the lease signing that the total monthly lease payment was
786 instead of the higher amount of 815.”
Vasile’s counsel did not object to FAA’s argument, but insisted
in rebuttal that FAA’s definition of “representation” was “not
accurate.” “Representation,” Vasile’s counsel argued, “doesn’t mean
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a verbal statement. . . . Representation can include anything. . . .
Clearly, [Vujovic’s] delivery and the paperwork for [Vasile] to
sign was representing that [these are] the lease terms that were
provided previously even if [Vujovic] said nothing. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . .
So the answer to no. 2 should—it’s a ‘yes.’ Pretty simple. That’s the
entire case.”
Later that afternoon, the jury returned its verdict. The
jury unanimously answered “yes” to question 1, i.e., whether
Vasile sought to acquire the vehicle for personal purposes. As to
question 2—whether FAA represented “that the lease . . . had been
supplied in accordance with a previous representation when it
had not”—the jury found in favor of Vasile, with 9 of the 12 jurors
answering the question “yes.” Finally, in response to question 3,
the jury unanimously found that Vasile was not “harmed by [FAA’s]
representation.” Consistent with the instructions set forth in the
special verdict form, the jury did not answer question 4 (or any
further questions) posed in the form.
The trial court denied Vasile’s posttrial motions and entered
judgment in favor of FAA.
Vasile timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Vasile Forfeited His Challenge to the Special
Verdict Form
Vasile contends we must reverse the judgment because “the
special verdict illegally conflated ‘harm’ with causation” and “likely
misled the jury.” (Boldface & capitalization omitted.) We, however,
conclude that Vasile forfeited his challenge by approving the
allegedly defective form and then failing to raise any challenge to
the form before the court discharged the jury. (See Zagami, Inc. v.
James A. Crone, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1093, fn. 6
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(Zagami) [“[a]lthough inconsistent jury findings in a special
verdict are not subject to waiver by a party [citation], if the form
of a verdict is defective, the complaining party must object or risk
waiver on appeal of any such defect”].)
Vasile insists we nonetheless must review his challenge
because “the form misstated the law by collapsing elements”
and “the legal accuracy of instructions/verdict forms . . . remains
reviewable notwithstanding a party’s acquiescence.” (Boldface
omitted.) But Vasile cites no authority supporting that a special
verdict form misstates the law by including an inquiry concerning
two elements of a claim in a single question. (Cf. Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 624 [defining a special verdict as “that by which the jury finds the
facts only, leaving the judgment to the court,” and requiring only
that “those conclusions of fact . . . be so presented as that nothing
shall remain to the court but to draw from them conclusions of law”
(capitalization omitted)].) Instead, the cases on which Vasile relies
either involve internally inconsistent findings in a special verdict
or fail to analyze a special verdict form at all. (See Soule v. General
Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548 (Soule) [no analysis of special
verdict form]; Lundquist v. Reusser (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1193, 1203
[no analysis of special verdict form]; Mize-Kurzman v. Marin
Community College Dist. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 832, 868, fn. 14
[expressly declining to address the plaintiff ’s challenge to the
special verdict form], disapproved on another ground in People
ex rel. Garcia-Brower v. Kolla’s Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 719, 734;
Zagami, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092 [involving inconsistent
responses on a special verdict form valuing a skiploader at both
$15,500 and $30,000]; Mendoza v. Club Car, Inc. (2000) 81
Cal.App.4th 287, 303 [involving internally inconsistent responses
on special verdict form].)
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Further, as FAA persuasively argues, some appellate
courts have rejected similar challenges to special verdict forms.
(See J.P. v. Carlsbad Unified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th
323, 338 [rejecting argument that the trial “court erred by failing
to include separate questions on each element of equitable estoppel
in the special verdict form submitted to the jury”]; see also Red
Mountain, LLC v. Fallbrook Public Utility Dist. (2006) 143
Cal.App.4th 333, 364–365 [no prejudicial error where special
verdict form failed to address the defenses of impossibility or
impracticability of performance].)
Vasile insists that FAA’s authorities are distinguishable
because those cases did not involve any failure by the jury to render
a finding on an element of a claim; rather, “th[ose] courts approved
verdict forms that did not separately ask about every subsidiary
evidentiary matter or defense.” And Vasile urges that here, in
contrast, because the jury failed to reach question 4 in the special
verdict form, it failed to make any finding on causation—a required
element of a CLRA claim. But the face of the form belies Vasile’s
argument. In responding to question 3—“Was Charles Vasile
harmed by [FAA’s] representation?”—the jury necessarily made a
finding that FAA’s representation did not cause Vasile any harm.
(Italics added.)
We therefore conclude that Vasile has forfeited any challenge
to the special verdict form.
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B. Vasile’s Challenge to the Jury Note Response
Fails
Vasile contends the court violated Code of Civil Procedure
section 6147 and committed reversible error by permitting the
parties to present further argument in response to the jury’s note
seeking clarification as to the meaning of the term “representation.”
FAA counters that Vasile forfeited any challenge to the court’s
response to the jury note, and that any error in the court’s response
was harmless. We agree with FAA.
Although our appellate record contains no transcript of the
court’s discussion of the jury note with counsel for the parties,
Vasile does not dispute FAA’s assertion that he “affirmatively
agreed to” the supplemental argument procedure the court proposed
in response to the note. Vasile therefore forfeited any challenge to
the procedure on appeal. (See People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th
826, 877 (Rogers) [“counsel’s acquiescence in the trial court’s
response [to the jury’s question] forfeits the claim of error on
appeal”].)
Further, Vasile fails to demonstrate any prejudice resulting
from the response. (See Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 574 [“A
judgment may not be reversed on appeal, even for error involving
‘misdirection of the jury,’ unless ‘after an examination of the
entire cause, including the evidence,’ it appears the error caused a
7 Code of Civil Procedure section 614 provides: “After
the jury have retired for deliberation, if there be a disagreement
between them as to any part of the testimony, or if they desire to be
informed of any point of law arising in the cause, they may require
the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being brought
into court, the information required must be given in the presence
of, or after notice to, the parties or counsel.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 614,
capitalization omitted.)
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‘miscarriage of justice.’ [Citation.] When the error is one of state
law only, it generally does not warrant reversal unless there is
a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error, a result
more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached”].)
Vasile identifies no misstatements of law in the parties’
supplemental arguments. Nor does he posit an alternative
response to the note the court might have supplied. (See Rogers,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 877 [noting defendant’s failure to “identify
any respect in which the standard instruction could have been
improved upon”].) And he ignores that the jury found in his favor
on the issue of whether FAA made a misrepresentation with respect
to the lease agreement.
Accordingly, Vasile fails to demonstrate any reversible error
by the court in responding to the jury’s note.
C. Vasile Fails To Demonstrate the Trial Record
Compels a Judgment in His Favor
Finally, we reject Vasile’s argument that insufficient evidence
supports the jury’s verdict.
Preliminarily, Vasile fails to acknowledge that the substantial
evidence standard of review “takes on a unique formulation” in
the circumstances present here. (In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
654, 671.) “ ‘[W]hen the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly
concluded that the party with the burden of proof failed to carry
that burden and that party appeals . . . the question for a reviewing
court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor
of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically,
the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was
(1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character
and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that
it was insufficient to support a finding.” [Citation.]’ ” (Eriksson,
supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 733.) We therefore review the record
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to determine whether the evidence compels a judgment in Vasile’s
favor. (See Horn v. Oh (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1094, 1099.)
Vasile fails to satisfy the heavy burden imposed by this
standard. (See Bookout v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of
Transportation (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1486 [“[w]here, as
here, the judgment is against the party who has the burden of proof,
it is almost impossible for him to prevail on appeal by arguing the
evidence compels a judgment in his favor”].) Vasile argues that
the “paper delta” between the $786.48 base price quoted in Vujovic’s
text and the $815.45 total monthly payment on the face of the
lease conclusively establishes he suffered harm. But he makes
no attempt to demonstrate that the record compels a finding in his
favor on causation. Rather, Vasile merely reiterates his contention
that the jury made no causation finding—a contention squarely
refuted by the face of the special verdict form (see Discussion ante,
part A). And our own examination of the record reveals substantial
evidence—including testimony from Mora, Nahar, and Vasile
himself—from which the jury could conclude that Vasile did not rely
on any misrepresentation by FAA. We therefore conclude Vasile
has failed to meet the stringent appellate burden of establishing
that a verdict in his favor is compelled as a matter of law.8
Accordingly, we affirm.
8 In light of our conclusion, we need not address the parties’
dispute concerning whether the demand letter Vasile’s counsel
purportedly sent to Sarwan satisfies the notice requirements the
CLRA establishes as a prerequisite for a damages award. (See
§ 1782.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
BENDIX, J.
WEINGART, J.
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