Filed 8/27/26 Varma v. The Bank of New York Mellon CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
RAJESH VARMA et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, E085566
v. (Super.Ct.No. CVCO2403625)
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Daniel A. Ottolia, Judge.
Affirmed.
Rajesh Varma and Mahima Varma, in pro. per., for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Troutman Pepper Locke, Jared D. Bissell, and Meagan S. Tom for Defendant and
Respondent.
Rajesh and Mahima Varma appeal from an order denying and striking their
petition for entry of default administrative judgment and damages. We issued a tentative
opinion stating that we were inclined to affirm the trial court’s order. In that tentative
1
opinion, we noted that the Varmas’ opening brief contained citations to cases that do not
exist, citations to cases that do not stand for the proposition cited, and quotations that do
not appear in the authorities cited. We noted that all of those citations bear the hallmarks
of fabricated legal authority created by generative artificial intelligence (AI), commonly
referred to as AI hallucinations. (Schlichter v. Kennedy (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 24, 26
(Schlichter); Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 426, 445
(Noland).) We cautioned that attorneys have been sanctioned for filing briefs containing
AI hallucinated citations and that the same outcome was possible for pro se litigants. The
Varmas did not request oral argument.
We subsequently issued an order to show cause why the Varmas should not be
sanctioned for “‘relying on fabricated legal authority’” in the opening brief. (Schlichter,
supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 26.) We conclude that the Varmas have failed to show
cause why sanctions should not be imposed. We otherwise affirm.
BACKGROUND
In June 2024, the Varmas filed a pro se “petition for entry of default
administrative judgment and damages” against the Bank of New York Mellon (hereafter
Bank of New York or the bank). (Capitalization omitted.) The pleading was
accompanied by 68 pages of exhibits.
According to the petition and attachments, in 2016 a lender assigned the mortgage
on the Varmas’ residence in Corona, California to the Bank of New York. In 2019, the
bank foreclosed on the property. The bank took possession of the property in 2021.
2
In November 2023, the Varmas sent the Bank of New York an “administrative
notice and default” in the form of an affidavit demanding that the bank respond within 10
days or the “entire Affidavit and default provisions shall be deemed true and correct.”
The default provisions included that the Bank of New York agreed “to a Deed of release
or a Reconveyance,” “to set aside any Note and Deed of Trust,” “to cancel and set aside
the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale recorded” on a certain date, and to “return any money or
property of Affiants including but not limited to any original documentation, including
but not limited by, any Notes, securities, assets, applications, transfers, blotters, book
entries, assignments, and security interests to Affiants’ address stated herein.” The
Varmas allege that they did not “receive a proper response” from the bank within 10
days.
Over the next six months, the Varmas sent the Bank of New York numerous
additional notices. Those notices advised the bank that it was in default because it did
not respond sufficiently to the Varmas’ previous affidavit and notices; the subsequent
notices gave the bank an opportunity to cure that default. The Varmas alleged that the
Bank of New York did not respond to those notices and that, “[b]y their silence,” the
bank agreed that the foreclosure on the residential property “was null and void.” The
Varmas notified the Bank of New York that they considered the “commercial matter
settled and closed.”
In April 2024, the Varmas filed a form entitled “UCC Financing Statement (UCC-
1)” with the California Secretary of State, which the Varmas intended to be a lien under
3
the Uniform Commercial Code. It identifies the Bank of New York as the debtor and the
Varmas as the secured parties. In the form, the Varmas asserted: “Debtor has tacitly
agreed and admitted Secured Parties owed Debtor zero on [a certain] Public Account No.
… on or before May 2, 2018. By their tacit admission and acquiescence, Debtor owes
Secured Parties damages in the amount of $10,500,000.00.”
The Varmas’ petition contains one cause of action: “order for satisfaction of lien.”
(Capitalization, boldface, and underlining omitted.) They alleged that the “matter has
been resolved through Petitioners’ private administrative process as described in the
Statement of Facts and therefore, by their tacit admission, there is no controversy or
dispute for this Honorable Court to adjudicate. [The Bank of New York] is in default of
an opportunity to respond to Petitioners’ Commercial Affidavits under penalty of perjury
attesting to this fact. They have abandoned their right to answer, oppose and appeal.”
The Varmas sought the following forms of relief: (1) a court order that someone
(presumably the bank) “[r]emove all derogatory reporting with the credit bureaus” and
“report all the account as ‘Paid or Settled in Full as Agreed’” and (2) an award of
damages in the amount of $10,500,000 “as tacitly agreed and as stated in Petitioner’s
UCC-1 Financing Statement.”
The Bank of New York filed an opposition to the Varmas’ petition. The bank
asked the court to dismiss the Varmas’ petition “with prejudice, order rescission of the
invalid UCC-1 lien, and award costs in favor of” the bank.
4
The trial court issued a tentative ruling denying the petition. Neither party
requested oral argument, so the court adopted the tentative ruling as the court’s final
ruling. The tentative ruling is not included in the record on appeal.
In August 2024, the trial court issued a minute order denying the petition as
“without merit.” The minute order provides: “There is no statutory authority for the
filing of a Petition for Entry of Default Administrative Judgment. The UCC sections
cited by Petitioners are inapplicable to any issue in this action or in the foreclosure action.
The Petition is stricken pursuant to CCP § 436, which provides; ‘[t]he court … at any
time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: Strike out all or any part of any
pleading not drawn in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of
the court.’ The relief requested by respondent cannot be granted by the court as it does
not have the power to award costs or order re[s]cission of the UCC-1 lien statement.”
DISCUSSION
I. Appealability
The existence of an appealable order or “judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite
to an appeal.” (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126.) We are independently
obligated “‘in this as in every matter to confirm whether jurisdiction exists.’” (Kirk v.
Ratner (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1060.) If an “order is not appealable, we must
dismiss the appeal.” (Reddish v. Westamerica Bank (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 275, 277.)
“The right to appeal is wholly statutory.” (Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v.
Superior Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5 (Dana Point).) Section 904.1 of the Code of Civil
5
Procedure “lists appealable judgments and orders” in civil cases. (Dana Point, at p. 5;
unlabeled statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.) Section 904.1 codifies
“the one final judgment rule,” which provides that an appeal is generally only allowable
from a final judgment. (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 756.)
Prejudgment orders generally “‘are not appealable, but are “reviewable on appeal” from
the final judgment.’” (Doran v. Morgan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1292-1293
(Doran).) Section 904.1 sets forth exceptions to the one final judgment rule and
identifies prejudgment orders that are appealable. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012)
206 Cal.App.4th 751, 780.)
Section 904.1 does not identify an order denying and striking a petition for entry
of default administrative judgment and damages as an appealable order. (§ 904.1., subd.
(a)(1)-(14).) But because the order strikes the Varmas’ pleading, does not grant leave to
amend, and thus does not contemplate or permit any further proceedings in the superior
court, “no issues in the action remain for further consideration” and no “further judicial
action is required for a final determination of the rights of the parties.” (Doran, supra, 76
Cal.App.4th at p. 1293; Dana Point, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 5.) We accordingly construe
the order denying and striking the petition as a final judgment, which is appealable under
subdivision (a)(1) of section 904.1. (Doran, at p. 1293.)
II. Governing principles of appellate law
We presume that an appealed judgment is correct. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5
Cal.5th 594, 609; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) The appellant
6
bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error and providing an adequate record
on appeal. (Jameson, at p. 609.) To carry that burden, the appellant must provide “the
reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to
the record.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286-287; Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C); unlabeled rule references are to the California
Rules of Court.) All of those principles apply to self-represented litigants. (Nwosu v.
Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.)
III. The pleading
The Varmas argue that the trial court did not have authority to strike or deny their
petition for entry of default administrative judgment because the Bank of New York did
not file a motion to strike, a demurrer, or any other noticed motion. According to the
Varmas, the trial court’s authority was limited because the petition initiated a special
proceeding under section 23, “arising from the statutory framework of the UCC and
CUCC.” The Varmas have forfeited the argument by failing to provide any legal
authority supporting it.
In the section of their opening brief containing this argument, the Varmas cite two
cases for various principles concerning special proceedings. Neither case supports the
asserted propositions. The Varmas cite People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 338
for the proposition that “special proceedings are governed exclusively by the statutes
creating them, and general civil procedure rules do not apply unless expressly
authorized,” but the case says nothing at all about special proceedings. The Varmas also
7
cite McDonald v. Severy (1936) 6 Cal.2d 629, 631 for the proposition that “special
proceedings are not subject to general pleading rules applicable to civil actions,” but it
too says nothing about special proceedings. The Varmas thus have not provided any
legal authority to support their argument, so we deem the argument forfeited. (County of
Sacramento v. Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 858, 861 (Singh).) We will not develop the
Varmas’ arguments for them. (Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Placer (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 634, 640 (Pacific Bell).)
IV. Remaining arguments
The Varmas make many additional arguments challenging the trial court’s ruling.
None is meritorious.
First, many of the arguments that the Varmas make are not supported by citation
to any legal authority or supported by any legal analysis. For example, the Varmas
contend that the trial court abused its discretion by ignoring a notarized certificate of
dishonor, which they argue constitutes “binding evidence” and “legally established [the
Bank of New York’s] commercial default.” The argument is not supported by any
citation to legal authority or legal analysis. Arguments not supported by legal authority
and analysis are forfeited. (Singh, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 861.) Again, we will not
develop appellants’ arguments for them. (Pacific Bell, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 640.)
Second, the Varmas’ opening brief contains numerous citations to cases that do
not exist, citations to cases that do not stand for the propositions for which they are cited,
and quotations that do not appear in the authorities cited. For example, the Varmas
8
erroneously cite People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 518 for the
proposition that both the Uniform Commercial Code and the California Uniform
Commercial Code are binding statutory authority, so “[o]nce invoked, courts are
obligated to enforce their provisions.” (Emphasis omitted.) Romero is a criminal case
that has nothing to do with either the Uniform Commercial Code or the California
Uniform Commercial Code. (Romero, at pp. 504, 507-530.) Moreover, the Varmas
erroneously cite Romero as the source of the following quotation: “‘The court’s authority
is confined to the limits established by statute.’” Romero does not contain that quotation.
Finally, the Varmas cite numerous cases that do not exist, including: West Covina
Healthcare v. Superior Court (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1241; Bock v. Hughes (1939) 34
Cal.App.2d 613; Tate v. Progressive Comm. Ins. Co. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 998; and
Rappaport v. Gelfand (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 611. Fictional cases and quotations do not
support the propositions and arguments for which they are cited (Noland, supra, 114
Cal.App.5th at p. 447), so we consider those arguments forfeited too (Singh, supra, 65
Cal.App.5th at p. 861).
V. Order to show cause
We issued an order to show cause why the Varmas should not be sanctioned for
relying on fabricated legal authority in their opening brief. We conclude that the Varmas
have failed to show cause why they should not be sanctioned. We accordingly impose
sanctions in the amount of the Bank of New York’s appellate attorney fees, to be
determined by the trial court.
9
A. Legal framework
Self-represented litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys. (Sheerer v.
Panas (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 367, 370 (Sheerer); Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8
Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) The Varmas therefore were “obligated to comply with the
California Rules of Court” in filing their opening brief. (Schlichter, supra, 116
Cal.App.5th at p. 31.)
“Rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) provides that each point in every brief must be supported ‘by
argument and, if possible, by citation of authority.’” (Schlichter, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th
at p. 31.) We are authorized to impose sanctions on self-represented litigants for
committing any “unreasonable violation” of the rules. (Rule 8.276(a)(4); Sheerer, supra,
119 Cal.App.5th at p. 371; Schlichter, at p. 31; Noland, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 442-443 [compiling case authority for sanctions imposed by appellate courts for rule
violations].) Citation to fabricated legal authority constitutes an unreasonable violation
of the rules of court. (Noland, at p. 447; Schlichter, at p. 33.)
Like attorneys, pro se litigants are free to use generative AI to assist in drafting
briefs but must check every citation to ensure that the cited authority exists, that it
supports the proposition for which it is cited, and that quotations are accurate. (Sheerer,
supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 371; Schlichter, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 33; People v.
Alvarez (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1115, 1119 (Alvarez).) The use of nonexistent
authorities and quotations in court filings is improper regardless of the source.
10
Attorneys who have filed briefs containing citations to fabricated legal authority
have been sanctioned. (Schlichter, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 33; Alvarez, supra, 114
Cal.App.5th at p. 1120; Noland, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 449; Shayan v. Shakib
(2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 619, 624-626 (Shayan).) Pro se litigants have been warned of
the same possible outcome. (Sheerer, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 371.)
B. Relevant proceedings
On August 26, 2024, the trial court entered its order denying the petition for entry
of default administrative judgment and damages. One month later, the Varmas filed a
petition for writ of mandate challenging the propriety of the order. The Varmas sought
and obtained a fee waiver for filing that petition. In December 2024, we summarily
denied the petition. The Varmas subsequently filed a petition for review of that denial,
which our Supreme Court denied on February 11, 2025.
Ten days later, on February 21, 2025, the Varmas’ filed the notice of appeal in the
present case, challenging the same ruling. The Varmas sought and obtained a filing fee
waiver for this appeal. The Varmas signed the initial fee waiver applications under
penalty of perjury. The Varmas also sought and obtained fee waivers in the superior
court for preparing and certifying the clerk’s transcript.
The Varmas filed their opening brief in August 2025. The Varmas represented
themselves in the appeal. The certificate of word count was signed by Trina Patterson.
Patterson certified that the brief contained 7,090 words. Patterson also signed one of two
proofs of service filed with the brief.
11
When the Varmas filed their opening brief, Patterson had two appeals of her own
pending in this court—Patterson v. Digital Federal Credit Union (June 23, 2026,
E085332) (Patterson v. Digital Federal) and Patterson v. Nuvision Credit Union (July 2,
2026, E085327) (Patterson v. Nuvision). Patterson is not a lawyer and represented
herself in those cases. (Patterson v. Digital Federal, E085332; Patterson v. Nuvision,
E085327.)
The present case was fully briefed in September 2025. In May 2026, we issued an
order striking the opening brief filed in August 2025 and gave the Varmas seven days to
file a corrected opening brief with a certified word count compliant with rule 8.204(c)(1).
On May 18, 2026, the Varmas filed a new opening brief; Rajesh signed the certificate of
word count. He certified that the brief contained 7,303 words (213 more words than their
original brief). In June 2026, we struck the newly filed brief and gave the Varmas seven
days to file another opening brief containing a certificate of word count compliant with
rule 8.204(c)(1) but otherwise identical to the opening brief originally filed in August
2025. The Varmas filed a corrected opening brief on June 8, 2026. Both Rajesh and
Mahima signed the new opening brief. Rajesh signed the certificate of word count and
certified that the brief contained 7,090 words (the same number as the original brief).
Patterson signed proofs of service for the opening briefs filed in May 2026 and June
2026.
On June 12, 2026, we provided the parties with the court’s tentative opinion in this
case. The tentative opinion explained that we were inclined to affirm. We noted that the
12
opening brief contained citations to cases that do not exist, citations to cases that do not
stand for the propositions for which they are cited, and quotations that do not appear in
the authorities cited, and the brief thus bears the hallmarks of generative AI. We warned
that “like attorneys, pro se litigants must check and verify every citation to ensure that the
cited case exists, that cases support the propositions for which they are cited, and that
quoted material is accurate” and that failure to do so has resulted in attorneys being
sanctioned and could result in the brief being stricken or the appeal being dismissed. The
parties did not request oral argument, so the cause was submitted.
We subsequently issued an order to show cause why sanctions should not be
imposed for the Varmas’ reliance on fabricated legal authority. Among other authorities,
we cited rule 8.204(a)(1)(B). We stated that we were considering imposing sanctions
because the opening brief contained (1) citations to four cases that appear not to exist, (2)
seven quotations attributed to existing cases that do not appear in those cases, and (3) six
propositions attributed to existing cases that are not supported by those cases. We listed
all of those nonexistent cases and quotations, along with the unsupported propositions.1
1 In the order to show cause, we stated that in the opening brief the Varmas cited the
following cases that appear not to exist: (1) West Covina Healthcare v. Superior Court
(2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1241; (2) Bock v. Hughes (1939) 34 Cal.App.2d 613; (3) Tate v.
Progressive Comm. Ins. Co. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 998; and (4) Rappaport v. Gelfand
(1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 611. We further stated that in the opening brief the Varmas
attributed to existing cases the following quotations that do not appear to exist in those
cases: (1) “The court’s authority is confined to the limits established by statute” (People
v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497); (2) “Where a party is legally bound
to speak and remains silent, such silence is deemed as acquiescence” (U.S. v. Tweel
(1977) 550 F.2d 297); (3) “Where a party has, with knowledge of the facts, acquiesced in
a transaction or has remained silent when he ought to have spoken, equity will estop him
from later asserting a claim” (Strong v. County of Santa Cruz (1975) 15 Cal.3d 720); (4)
13
We gave the Varmas 10 days to file a response to the order to show cause and ordered
them to appear at a hearing.
The Varmas filed a written response to the order to show cause, and both of them
signed it. They stated: “At the time the Opening Brief was prepared, Appellants were
self-represented litigants attempting to navigate several complex legal proceedings
occurring simultaneously. Because they lacked the financial resources to retain appellate
counsel, they relied, in most part, upon artificial intelligence research tools believing
those tools would provide accurate legal research.” The Varmas also stated that they “did
not know that ‘ghost cases’ were even a recognized problem in legal research” “[u]ntil
this Order to Show Cause was issued.” The Varmas assured the court that they had not
intended to mislead or deceive the court or to misrepresent the law. They instead
“believed they were making a smart decision by using AI to complete their appellate
briefs.” The Varmas represented that as a result of the order to show cause they now
“[A] party who fails to timely raise an objection or file an answer is barred from opposing
entry of judgment” (Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448); (5) “A court may not rewrite a
complaint to add allegations” (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242);
(6) “The law must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly” (FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc. (2009) 556 U.S. 502); and (7) “If judges could add to statutes to fix what
they see as mistakes, statutes would mean whatever judges say, not what Congress
enacted” (Pereira v. Sessions (2018) 585 U.S. 198). We also stated that in the opening
brief the Varmas attributed to existing cases six propositions that are not supported by
those cases. For example, the Varmas cited Edelstein v. City and County of San
Francisco (2002) 29 Cal.4th 164, 171-172 for the following propositions that it does not
support: (1) “in special proceedings, the court’s authority is strictly limited by statute,”
(2) the trial court had a nondiscretionary duty to enter judgment in favor of the Varmas,
and (3) courts are not permitted to “add allegations or causes of action that were never
pled.”
14
understand that “every citation must be independently verified against officially
published California authorities before filing any document,” and they explained that the
“experience has fundamentally changed how Appellants will conduct legal research in
the future.” The Varmas apologized and asked that we not impose monetary sanctions
because (1) they had learned their lesson, (2) “[t]here is no reasonable likelihood that
these mistakes will recur,” and (3) imposition of such “sanctions would serve little
deterrent purpose and would instead impose a significant hardship upon self-represented
litigants who acted without bad faith and within the realms of the law.”
The day after the Varmas filed their response to the order to show cause, we issued
an order proposing to take judicial notice of the opening briefs and unpublished opinions
in Patterson v. Digital Federal, supra, E085332 and Patterson v. Nuvision, supra,
E085327. We had issued both opinions within the preceding two weeks. We provided
the Varmas with copies of the documents and gave them an opportunity to present
“information relevant to the propriety of taking judicial notice or the tenor of the matters
to be noticed” either orally at the hearing on the order to show cause or by filing a written
response. (Evid. Code, §§ 455, subd. (a), 459, subd. (c).)
The Varmas filed a written response to the order. The Varmas again apologized to
the court for including erroneous legal authorities and quotations in their opening brief.
They again explained that “[a]t the time the briefs were prepared, Appellants were
simultaneously dealing with numerous court proceedings and, in an[] effort to research
15
the law more efficiently, relied upon artificial intelligence research tools that they
believed generated authentic legal authorities.”
The Varmas opposed judicial notice of the filings in Patterson v. Nuvision and
Patterson v. Digital Federal on the basis that the appeals are unrelated and “involve
different litigants, different respondents, different procedural histories, different factual
records, and different legal issues.” According to the Varmas, the only similarities in the
appeals were that the appellants all relied on the same “administrative process,” the same
trial judge presided over all three proceedings, and “similar research methods were used
while preparing several appellate briefs during approximately the same time period.”
The opening briefs in Patterson v. Digital Federal and Patterson v. Nuvision were
filed in May 2025 and June 2025. There are substantial similarities between both of
those briefs and the Varmas’ brief, and certain portions of Patterson’s opening briefs are
identical to the Varmas’ opening brief. All three briefs include a section entitled “Issues
Presented on Appeal,” and seven of the issues listed are materially identical in all three
briefs. The “Law and Argument” section of the Varmas’ brief contains 15 separate
sections. (Emphasis omitted.) Eight of those sections are materially the same as sections
contained in both of the opening briefs in Patterson’s appeals.
The pleadings in both of Patterson’s cases are very similar to the pleading in this
case and involve similar fact patterns. Like the Varmas, Patterson defaulted on certain
loans (though not a mortgage) and thereafter claimed that (1) the loans were satisfied
even though she had not paid the outstanding balances and (2) the creditors owed her
16
money. (Compare Background, ante, with Patterson v. Digital Federal, supra, E085332
and Patterson v. Nuvision, supra, E085327.)
Like the Varmas’ opening brief, the opening briefs in Patterson v. Digital Federal
and Patterson v. Nuvision were replete with citations to nonexistent or inapposite cases
and nonexistent quotations that bore the hallmarks of fabricated legal authority created by
generative AI. In Patterson v. Digital Federal, we concluded, as we do here, that the
arguments based on those nonexistent authorities were forfeited. (Patterson v. Digital
Federal, supra, E085332.) We issued an order to show cause in Patterson v. Nuvision
why sanctions should not be imposed for Patterson’s reliance on fabricated legal
authority. (Patterson v. Nuvision, supra, E085327.) Patterson filed a written response to
the order to show cause and appeared at a hearing on the matter. (Ibid.) She admitted
that in preparing the opening brief she personally used an unspecified form of AI and
“was not aware when she filed the opening brief that ‘ghost caselaw was even a thing.’”
(Ibid.)
In Patterson’s written response to the order to show cause and at the hearing, she
told the court that she had prepared appellate briefs for other self-represented litigants for
16 years. (Patterson v. Digital Federal, supra, E085332.) Patterson explained that she
“believes that ‘a pro per person has the right to hire or get their briefs prepared by
someone else other than them with their assistance or I should say with me assisting
them.’” (Ibid.) The court asked Patterson whether she planned to prepare briefs for self-
17
represented litigants in the future, and she said “‘[n]ot really,’ because she is in the
process of ‘kind of’ ‘weaning [herself] out of that.’” (Ibid.)
In Patterson v. Nuvision, we found that Patterson failed to show cause why she
should not be sanctioned for relying on fabricated legal authority in her opening brief.
We further found that “Patterson ‘unreasonably violated rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) “by not
support[ing] each point with citations to real (as opposed to fabricated) legal authority.”’”
(Patterson v. Nuvision, supra, E085327.) We imposed sanctions in the amount of $500
but suspended execution of the sanction. (Ibid.) We also referred the matter to the State
Bar to investigate the possible unauthorized practice of law. (Ibid.; see Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 6125.)
Both Rajesh and Mahima appeared at the hearing on the order to show cause in the
present case. They apologized for what had happened, which Rajesh characterized as
“the error in judgment.” Rajesh told the court that “someone else was helping [them]
out.” We asked Rajesh to clarify what he meant in light of the fact that in the responses
to the order to show cause and the order concerning judicial notice the Varmas attributed
the citation errors to AI and not to someone else assisting them with the brief. Rajesh
explained that neither he nor Mahima drafted the opening brief. Instead, they paid
Patterson for legal advice and to draft the opening brief. Rajesh said that he and Mahima
reviewed the opening brief before they signed and filed it but “didn’t read it in detail,”
because they “were relying upon [Patterson’s] supposedly legal knowledge, to make sure
18
that everything is in order.”2 The Varmas did not verify any of the citations in the brief
before they filed it and “were not aware that it was AI generated.”
The court asked the Varmas about the other court proceedings they were dealing
with when they filed the opening brief. Mahima explained that she owns or co-owns the
Montessori School of Corona, where she also teaches, and that she was involved in
litigation that had been brought against the school by a former teacher’s family.
After the hearing, we ordered the Varmas to submit documentation supporting the
representations that they made in their applications to waive the appellate filing fee. The
Varmas did not submit any such documentation. We subsequently ordered the filing fee
waivers retroactively withdrawn and ordered the Varmas to pay the filing fee.
C. Analysis
In response to the order to show cause, the Varmas took some positive steps.
They admitted that their brief contained citations to nonexistent cases and quotations and
propositions of law that were not supported by the cases cited. They also admitted that
they did not personally verify the citations in the brief before they filed it. The Varmas
apologized to the court for the error.
We nevertheless find that the Varmas have failed to show cause why we should
not sanction them for relying on fabricated legal authority in the opening brief. The
Varmas claim that the mere issuance of the order to show cause taught them a valuable
2 The reporter’s transcript from the hearing states that Rajesh answered the court’s
question about reading the brief as follows: “I mean, we went through, like we did in
detail.” But the video recording from the hearing reveals that Rajesh stated: “I mean, we
went through it, not, didn’t read it in detail.”
19
lesson about not verifying the accuracy of the legal authority contained in a written filing
with the court. We find that claim lacking in credibility.
In the Varmas’ written responses to the order to show cause and the order
concerning judicial notice, the Varmas claimed that they personally used some form of
AI to generate the opening brief and did not realize that AI could fabricate legal authority
or produce “‘ghost cases.’” But at the hearing, the Varmas directly contradicted their
own prior, written accounts of how the brief was generated. Rajesh told the court that
they had not drafted the brief at all. Instead, the Varmas paid a nonlawyer (Patterson) to
draft the brief, took legal advice from Patterson, and relied on her supposed legal
knowledge to ensure that everything in the brief was “in order.” According to Rajesh, the
Varmas did not even read “in detail” the brief that they signed and filed as self-
represented litigants. Given that Patterson has appeared before the court and admitted
that she has drafted briefs for other self-represented litigants, we are inclined to believe
the Varmas’ representation at the hearing about how the brief was drafted, and we thus
are not inclined to believe the representations made in their written filings in response to
the order to show cause and the order concerning judicial notice.3
Moreover, the record supports a reasonable inference that the Varmas delegated to
Patterson the drafting of their response to the order to show cause. The Varmas referred
to AI hallucinated legal authorities as “‘ghost cases,’” just as Patterson did in response to
3 We take judicial notice of the opening briefs and unpublished opinions in
Patterson v. Digital Federal, supra, E085332 and Patterson v. Nuvision, supra, E085327
because the documents are “of substantial consequence to the determination of” the order
to show cause. (Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (c); see also id., § 452, subd. (d).)
20
the order to show cause in Patterson v. Nuvision (claiming she did not realize “‘ghost
caselaw was even a thing’”). (Patterson v. Nuvision, supra, E085327.) We have never
encountered that use of that expression anywhere else, and we could not find a single
such use of it in a search of all federal and state case law. Given that the Varmas paid
Patterson to draft their opening brief, and given that both Patterson and the Varmas used
the same distinctive terminology in response to our orders to show cause, it is reasonable
to infer that Patterson at least assisted the Varmas in drafting their written response to the
order to show cause. We accordingly give little weight to the Varmas’ written claims that
they have learned their lesson.
Our finding that the Varmas lack credibility is additionally supported by their
conduct in response to the court’s order concerning their fee waiver. Given Mahima’s
claim at the hearing that she owns a Montessori school, we questioned the Varmas’
entitlement to the waiver. (See Gov. Code, § 68636, subd. (b).) The Varmas did not file
any response to our order directing them to submit documentation showing their
eligibility. Given that the Varmas did not even attempt to defend the representations that
they made under penalty of perjury on their fee waiver applications, we infer that no such
documentation exists. For all of these reasons, we do not find credible the Varmas’ claim
that they have already learned their lesson from the mere issuance of the order to show
cause.
Moreover, although the Varmas claim to have first learned of the fabricated and
inapposite authorities from the order to show cause, the Varmas actually had notice of the
21
issue when they received our tentative opinion. We noted that the brief was replete with
citations to cases that do not exist, citations to cases that do not stand for the propositions
for which they are cited, and quotations that do not appear in the authorities cited, all of
which bore the hallmarks of AI-generated hallucinations. We warned the Varmas of the
possible consequences for including such fabricated legal authority in the opening brief,
including the imposition of monetary sanctions. But the Varmas chose to do nothing to
remediate the problem after receiving our tentative opinion. For example, the Varmas
did not move to strike or to withdraw the opening brief or to file a corrected brief. And
the Varmas subsequently claimed that they were not even aware of the issue until they
received the order to show cause. All of this further leads us to doubt the sincerity of
their apology and their claim that the issuance of the order to show cause has been
sufficient in itself for them to learn their lesson.
As to the propriety of imposing sanctions, it is undisputed that the opening brief
was replete with fabricated legal authority. The Varmas do not deny that their brief
contained the citations to four nonexistent cases, the seven fabricated quotations, and the
six unsupported propositions that we identified in the order to show cause. And the
Varmas admit that they did not verify the accuracy of any of the citations contained in the
brief.
The Varmas’ only credible explanation for the extensive use of fabricated legal
authority in their opening brief is that someone else drafted the brief and that they were
unaware that she used generative AI. Although we are inclined to believe that the
22
explanation is factually accurate, it does not excuse the Varmas’ conduct. As self-
represented litigants who signed the brief, the Varmas were solely and exclusively
responsible for the contents of the brief. In particular, and regardless of who drafted the
brief, the Varmas were responsible for verifying the accuracy of the legal authority,
citations, and propositions in the brief. (Sheerer, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 371; see
also Shayan, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at pp. 621, 624 [regardless of the drafting process,
“the signatory attorney is responsible for the content of the brief and subject to sanctions
for inaccuracies it contains”].)
For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Varmas have failed to show
cause why they should not be sanctioned for relying on fabricated legal authority in their
opening brief. The Varmas “unreasonably violated rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) ‘by not
support[ing] each point with citations to real (as opposed to fabricated) legal authority.’”
(Schlichter, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 33; rule 8.276(a)(4).)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Bank of New York shall recover its costs of
appeal.
For the Varmas’ unreasonable violation of rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), we sanction the
Varmas in the amount of the Bank of New York’s appellate attorney fees, payable to the
Bank of New York. The matter is remanded to the trial court to determine the amount of
the fee award. As with other attorney fee awards, the trial court retains discretion to
decrease the amount generated by a lodestar fee calculation. (Thayer v Wells Fargo Bank
23
(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 834 [“There is no hard-and-fast rule limiting the factors that
may justify an exercise of judicial discretion to increase or decrease a lodestar
calculation”].)
We direct the clerk of this court to forward a copy of this opinion to the State Bar
to conduct any investigation it deems appropriate concerning the possible unauthorized
practice of law by Trina Patterson. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6125.)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
MILLER
J.
24