Filed 7/2/26 Valdes v. Murrey CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
VANESSA VALDES, B346857
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant (Los Angeles County
and Appellant, Super. Ct. No.
24STCV16656)
v.
STEWART LUCAS MURREY,
Defendant, Cross-
complainant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Cherol J. Nellon, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Vanessa Valdes, in pro. per., for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant
and Appellant.
Stewart Lucas Murrey, in pro. per., for Defendant, Cross-
complainant and Respondent.
____________________
This appeal is part of an ongoing legal battle between
appellant Vanessa Valdes (Valdes) and respondent Stewart
Lucas Murrey (Murrey). Valdes appeals the trial court’s order
denying her motion to strike Murrey’s cross-complaint pursuant
to the anti-SLAPP law (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16).1 We conclude
that the court erred in denying the motion, because (1) the
activity underlying eight of Murrey’s 11 tort claims is not illegal
as a matter of law and (2) Murrey failed to demonstrate a
reasonable probability of prevailing on the remaining three
claims for abuse of process, conspiracy to abuse process, and
malicious prosecution. Accordingly, we reverse the order denying
Valdes’s anti-SLAPP motion and remand for further proceedings
as directed below.
BACKGROUND
I. The Origin of The Parties’ Dispute
In December 2019, Murrey messaged Valdes on a dating
application (the app), inviting her to “hang [out]” with him and
providing his phone number. Valdes responded with “Bold move”
and a smiley emoticon.
This exchange prompted Murrey to launch into a tirade.
Among other things, he claimed that he had only sought Valdes’s
company because he was “amused by how [she would] mess it
up[,]” berated her for including pictures of herself standing next
to a man in her dating profile, called her a “moron[,]” and said
“it’s fun watching you burn lol [i.e. ‘laugh out loud’].” Valdes
1 SLAPP is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public
participation.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57.) All further statutory references are to
the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
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warned Murrey she would report him to the app. Murrey called
her a “loser” and “moron[,]” threatened to “subpoena[] [her] idiot
‘report’ and possibly su[e] [her] for defamation[,]” and accused her
of being “jealous when rejected.” Valdes reported Murrey, saying
that she felt “threatened” by their exchange and was “afraid for
any woman who agrees to meet with him in person[,]” and
blocked him on the app. Murrey also blocked Valdes.
In August 2022, Valdes saw a post about Murrey in the
Los Angeles chapter of a private Facebook group called “Are We
Dating The Same Guy?” (the Facebook group). The post received
comments from hundreds of Facebook users, many of them
women who either shared stories of disturbing encounters with
Murrey or expressed shock and dismay at his alleged conduct.
Valdes “felt . . . [the] need[,] in the interest of public safety[,] to
share [her] story along with all the other testimonials[.]” She
posted the following comment: “HOW HAS THIS GUY NOT
BEEN REMOVED FROM DATING APPS AND ARRESTED
ALREADY?!?! [¶] I matched with him a couple years ago and
received the most BIZARRE and threatening messages from him!
It was so weird and scary that I even reported him to [the app],
but never knew if anything was done about him. APPARENTLY
NOT!! I’m so disgusted to see all these horrible testimonials
about him, because it means he gets away with everything. He
needs to be stopped!!” Valdes included screenshots of her
exchange with Murrey, redacting his phone number, and the
report she made to the app.
II. Murrey’s Lawsuit Against Valdes and Others
In June 2023, Murrey sued Valdes and multiple other
women who posted in the Facebook group and similar groups.
Murrey accused these women of “conspir[ing] to harm [his]
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reputation and violate his right to free speech based upon his sex
and other discriminatory elements[.]” Among other things,
Murrey brought causes of action for (1) libel, (2) sex
discrimination, (3) gender violence, (4) false light, (5) invasion of
privacy, (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), (7)
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, (8)
negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, and
(9) civil conspiracy.
Valdes moved to strike Murrey’s complaint as to her
pursuant to the anti-SLAPP law. In April 2024, the motion was
granted.
III. The Restraining Order
In April 2024, Valdes filed a petition for a civil harassment
restraining order against Murrey. She alleged that Murrey
“made several posts on public websites[] . . . that included [her]
personal information . . . as well as false claims and accusations
regarding [her] character, actions, and behaviors.” For example,
in September 2023, Murrey published an article in which he
stated that Valdes had “appeared in both police and FBI reports
for the[] serious crimes of cyber[]bullying and electronic
harassment[,]” and accused her of being part of a vast conspiracy
involving “social media companies” and Israeli and United States
intelligence agencies.
As a result, Valdes “received digital hate mail.” She
attached to her petition an email from a user going by the name
“JC Roux[,]” which read as follows: “To the lovely ladies currently
representing themselves against this vicious lawsuit [e.g.
Murrey’s 2023 lawsuit] . . . [¶] At least [Murrey] is going to f***
you dumb c**** for real” (the email). Valdes characterized the
email as “[h]ate mail received from an unknown source due to
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[Murrey’s] lies and inflammatory language about [her] and [her]
co-defendants.”
In July 2024, Valdes’s petition was denied for “fail[ure] to
sustain [her] burden of proof.”
IV. The Instant Lawsuit
In July 2024, Valdes filed a “SLAPPback” lawsuit against
Murrey.2
In February 2025, Murrey filed a cross-complaint alleging
11 causes of action against Valdes, namely: (1) abuse of process,
(2) malicious prosecution, (3) doxing,3 (4) negligence, (5) civil
harassment, (6) civil extortion, (7) gender violence, (8) false light,
(9) IIED, (10) cyberbullying, and (11) conspiracy to commit
several of the aforesaid torts.
Murrey’s allegations fall into three categories. First, he
alleged that Valdes’s August 2022 Facebook post was “false and
intentionally harmful” and that Valdes “conspired with” other
users on the Facebook group to publicly post Murrey’s private
information, including the “private texts” Murrey sent her on the
app. Second, Murrey claimed that Valdes helped create a
2 “ ‘SLAPPback’ means any cause of action for malicious
prosecution or abuse of process arising from the filing or
maintenance of a prior cause of action that has been dismissed
pursuant to a special motion to strike under” the anti-SLAPP
law. (§ 425.18, subd. (b)(1).)
3 “ ‘Doxing’ is a relatively recent Internet-based form of
harassment that involves posting a target’s private personal
information online so it can be used by other parties—perhaps
the poster’s supporters or internet ‘trolls’—to attack the targeted
individual.” (Dziubla v. Piazza (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 140, 145,
fn. 1 (Dziubla).)
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fundraising webpage to raise legal funds for the defendants in
Murrey’s prior lawsuit (the GoFundMe page). Murrey’s 2019
messages to Valdez were republished to the GoFundMe page,
embellished with “clown symbols[.]” Murrey claimed that the
widespread publicization of the GoFundMe page resulted in him
receiving death threats on Facebook. Third, Murrey alleged that
Valdes maliciously filed both an unsuccessful request for a civil
harassment restraining order and the instant lawsuit against
him.
In March 2025, Valdes filed an anti-SLAPP motion to
strike the cross-complaint. Valdes argued that Murrey’s cross-
complaint, which largely duplicated the claims in his prior
unsuccessful lawsuit, targeted protected activity and was
“retaliatory and meritless.” Murrey opposed the motion.
V. Ruling; Appeal
In April 2025, Valdes’s anti-SLAPP motion proceeded to a
hearing. One month later, the trial court denied the motion. The
court found that Murrey’s claims for doxing, negligence, civil
harassment, civil extortion, gender violence, false light, IIED,
cyberbullying (and derivative conspiracy claims) arose from
protected activity, but were not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute
because Valdes’s activity constituted criminal doxing as a matter
of law. Accordingly, the court proceeded to the second prong of
the anti-SLAPP statute only as to Murrey’s claims for abuse of
process and malicious prosecution (and derivative conspiracy
claims). The court determined that Murrey showed a reasonable
probability of prevailing on those claims.
Valdes timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Anti-SLAPP Law
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“A SLAPP is a civil lawsuit that is aimed at preventing
citizens from exercising their political rights or punishing those
who have done so.” (Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore (2010)
49 Cal.4th 12, 21.) “In 1992, out of concern over ‘a disturbing
increase’ in these types of lawsuits, the Legislature enacted
section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Ibid.; see § 425.16,
subd. (a).)
Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1), provides: “A cause of
action against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under
the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion
to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.” This procedure is intended to “weed[] out,
at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected
activity.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384, italics
omitted.)
“[A] trial court tasked with ruling on an anti-SLAPP
motion must ask two questions: (1) has the moving party ‘made a
threshold showing that the challenged cause of action arises from
protected activity’ [citation], and, if so, (2) has the nonmoving
party ‘established . . . a probability that [it] will prevail’ on the
challenged cause of action by showing that the claim has
‘minimal merit’ [citations]?” (Abir Cohen Treyzon Salo, LLP v.
Lahiji (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 882, 887.)
II. Standard of Review
“We review de novo the . . . denial of an anti-SLAPP
motion.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park).) In so doing, we “consider the
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pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the
facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (b)(2).) “[W]e do not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting
factual claims[,]” and “must draw all reasonable inferences from
the evidence in favor of [Murrey] as the plaintiff[]” on the
countersuit targeted by the anti-SLAPP motion. (Lee v. Kim
(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 720.)
III. Analysis
A. Protected Activity
Valdes challenges the trial court’s determination that eight
of Murrey’s claims—namely, doxing, negligence, civil
harassment, civil extortion, gender violence, false light, IIED,
cyberbullying, and conspiracy to commit the aforesaid—did not
arise from protected activity.
1. Murrey’s claims arise from protected activity
Under the anti-SLAPP statute, “[a] claim arises from
protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis
for the claim. [Citations.] Critically, ‘the defendant’s act
underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an
act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’
[Citations.]” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1062–1063, italics
omitted; see also Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11
Cal.5th 995, 1009 [to determine whether a claim arises from
protected activity, courts consider “ ‘what actions by the
defendant supply th[e] elements [of the challenged claims] and
consequently form the basis for liability’ ”].)
Murrey’s claims arise from protected activity. His assorted
tort claims are predicated upon Valdes publishing personal
messages between herself and Murrey on the Facebook group and
the GoFundMe page (doxing, negligence, civil harassment, civil
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extortion, gender violence, false light, IIED, cyberbullying,
conspiracy) and filing a police report, restraining order, and/or
SLAPPback suit against Murrey (negligence, civil harassment,
false light, IIED). All of this conduct stems from either protected
speech or petitioning activity. (§ 425.16, subd. (e); see also
§ 425.16, subd. (a) [the anti-SLAPP law “shall be construed
broadly” to “encourage continued participation in matters of
public significance”].) On appeal, Murrey does not dispute this
characterization of Valdes’s activity.
2. Valdes’s activity was not illegal as a matter of
law
If “the evidence conclusively establishes[] that the
assertedly protected speech or petition activity was illegal as a
matter of law, the defendant is precluded from using the anti-
SLAPP statute to strike the plaintiff’s action.” (Flatley v. Mauro
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 320 (Flatley).) In this context, the word
“illegal” means that the underlying conduct is criminal.
(Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 793, 806 [“[T]he Flatley rule applies only to criminal
conduct, not to conduct that is illegal because [of a] violation of
statute or common law.”].)
At the trial court and on appeal, Murrey argues that
Valdes’s publication of private messages on the Facebook group
and on the GoFundMe page constitutes criminal doxing. The
trial court agreed with him. We do not.
Section 653.2 of the Penal Code prohibits the “electronic . . .
distribut[ion][] [or] publi[cation] . . . [of] personal identifying
information, including, but not limited to . . . an electronic
message of a harassing nature about another person, which
would be likely to incite or produce” “unwanted physical contact,
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injury, or harassment[] by a third party.” (Pen. Code, § 653.2,
subd. (a).) The statute also requires that the defendant act “with
intent to place another person in reasonable fear for his . . .
safety” and “for the purpose of imminently causing that other
person unwanted . . . harassment[] by a third party[.]” (Ibid.)
Even construed in the light most favorable to Murrey, the
evidence does not conclusively show that Valdes acted with the
specific intent required for doxing liability. Murrey’s own
evidence places Valdes’s intent in dispute. To the declaration
supporting his cross-complaint, Murrey attached a transcript of
Valdes testifying under oath that she posted to the Facebook
group “in the interest of public safety” and “to share [her]
truthful story[,]” not to make Murrey fear for his safety or to
imminently cause harassment by third parties.
At best, Murrey’s evidence shows that Valdes had motive to
dox him, given her personal distaste for him and their ongoing
legal disputes. This inference provides a basis for Murrey to
argue that Valdes “inten[ded] to place [Murrey] in reasonable
fear for his . . . safety” (Pen. Code, § 653.2, subd. (a)), but it does
not “conclusively establish[]” unlawful intent as a matter of law.
(Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 320; Dziubla, supra, 59
Cal.App.5th at p. 151 [“[I]t is not sufficient that plaintiff[] can
reasonably argue or offer some evidence that defendant’s conduct
was unlawful.”].)
Murrey argues that because “Valdes publish[ed] [the]
private messages” that he had sent to her on the app in 2019 “in
an environment where other users were simultaneously posting
death threats and branding him a murderer” (i.e. the Facebook
group), “[t]he reasonable inference is that Valdes intended, or at
minimum was reckless as to whether, her contributions would
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cause [Murrey] fear for his safety.” Recklessness, which Murrey
concedes his evidence arguably shows, does not satisfy the
requirements of the doxing statute. (Pen. Code, § 653.2,
subd. (a).)
Based on disputed intent alone, we can conclude that
Murrey has not demonstrated Valdes’s activity constituted
criminal doxing as a matter of law. (Dziubla, supra, 59
Cal.App.5th at pp. 152–153.) Because Valdes’s protected activity
is not subject to the illegality exception to the anti-SLAPP
statute, the trial court should have determined whether Murrey
demonstrated a probability of prevailing on his causes of action
for doxing, negligence, civil harassment, civil extortion, gender
violence, false light, IIED, cyberbullying, and conspiracy to
commit the aforesaid. We remand the matter to the trial court
for that determination. (See Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting Inc.
(2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1527 [“the more prudent course is
to remand the matter to the trial court to determine in the first
instance whether [the plaintiff] demonstrated a reasonable
probability of prevailing on the merits”].)
B. Reasonable Probability of Prevailing on the Merits
Valdes also argues that the trial court erred in finding that
Murrey demonstrated a reasonable probability of prevailing on
his claims for abuse of process, conspiracy to abuse process, and
malicious prosecution.
“A claim has [the] ‘minimal merit’ ” required to survive an
anti-SLAPP motion “if it is ‘ “both legally sufficient and
supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a
favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by [Murrey] is
credited.” ’ [Citations.]” (Gruber v. Gruber (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th
529, 537 (Gruber), italics omitted.) Therefore, “when the . . .
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court examines [Murrey’s evidence] filed in support of [his]
second step burden, the court must consider whether [Murrey]
has presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
on [his] causes of action, and . . . when the . . . court considers
[Valdes’s] opposing [evidence], the court cannot weigh [it] against
[Murrey’s evidence], but must only decide whether [Valdes’s
evidence], as a matter of law, defeat[s] [Murrey’s] supporting
evidence.” (Schroeder v. Irvine City Council (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 174, 184, italics omitted.)
C. Malicious Prosecution
Murrey alleges that Valdes maliciously brought two actions
against him: (1) the SLAPPback lawsuit Valdes filed in July 2024
and (2) Valdes’s unsuccessful petition for a civil harassment
restraining order. Neither is sufficient to sustain a cause of
action for malicious prosecution. Valdes’s SLAPPback lawsuit
has not yet been terminated. (Gruber, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at
p. 537 [“To prevail on a claim for malicious prosecution, a
plaintiff must establish[,]” among other things, that “the prior
action was terminated in the plaintiff’s favor on the merits.”].)
And “the unsuccessful filing of a petition for an injunction under
[the civil harassment statute] may not form the basis for a
malicious prosecution action.” (Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130
Cal.App.4th 1563, 1574 (Siam); see also Kenne v. Stennis (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 953, 970 (Kenne) [same].)
Because Murrey’s cause of action for malicious prosecution
is based upon a lawsuit that has not yet been decided and an
unsuccessful civil harassment restraining order petition, “the
cause of action fails as a matter of law. It follows that the trial
court erred in denying [Valdes’s] [anti-SLAPP motion] as it
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applied to the” malicious prosecution cause of action. (Siam,
supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1574.)
D. Abuse of Process and Conspiracy
“To succeed in an action for abuse of process, a litigant
must establish that the defendant (1) contemplated an ulterior
motive in using the process, and (2) committed a willful act in the
use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the
proceedings.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1057
(Rusheen).) “Malicious prosecution and abuse of process are
distinct. The former concerns a meritless lawsuit (and all the
damage it inflicted). The latter concerns the misuse of the tools
the law affords litigants once they are in a lawsuit (regardless of
whether there was probable cause to commence that lawsuit in
the first place).” (S.A. v. Maiden (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 27, 41–
42 (S.A.).)
The trial court erred in determining that Murrey
demonstrated minimal merit on his abuse of process claim
because he proffered evidence “sufficient to support an inference
that Valdes’s ulterior motive for filing the [civil harassment]
restraining order was to harass” him. But “the mere filing or
maintenance of a lawsuit—even for an improper purpose—is not
a proper basis for an abuse of process action.” (Oren Royal Oaks
Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42
Cal.3d 1157, 1169.) “Alternatively stated, neither the initiation
of a meritless claim nor the continued prosecution of a claim after
it becomes apparent the claim is meritless can support an abuse
of process cause of action.” (S.A., supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at
p. 42.)
The only other plausible anchors for Murrey’s abuse of
process claim are his allegations that Valdes “fak[ed] evidence”
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and “intentionally misrepresented facts to the court[]” during the
restraining order proceedings. These allegations also fail to
support his cause of action, as the presentation of false evidence
or testimony is protected by the litigation privilege. (Civ. Code,
§ 47, subd. (b); Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1058 [collecting
cases wherein the litigation privilege barred abuse of process
claims based on the presentation of false evidence].)
Murrey also argues that his abuse of process claim “arises
in part from extra[]judicial conduct: the social media campaign,
[the] GoFundMe page[,] [and] impersonation accounts[.]” By its
nature, an abuse of process claim cannot stem from purely
extrajudicial acts. (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056 [“The
common law tort of abuse of process arises when one uses the
court’s process for a purpose other than that for which the
process was designed.”]; Meadows v. Bakersfield Sav. & Loan
Assn. (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 749, 753 [“[T]he essence of the tort
[is] . . . misuse of the power of the court; it is an act done in the
name of the court and under its authority for the purpose of
perpetrating an injustice.”].) Murrey provides no authority
supporting this novel proposition. (Coziahr v. Otay Water Dist.
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 785, 799 [“Points must be supported by
reasoned argument[] [and] authority, . . . or may be deemed
forfeited.”].)
Because Murrey failed to demonstrate a reasonable
probability of prevailing on the merits of his abuse of process
claim, his derivative conspiracy claim also fails. (Kenne, supra,
230 Cal.App.4th at p. 969 [“[F]ailure to show a probability of
success on . . . the underlying tort claim[] . . . bars [the plaintiff’s]
conspiracy claim as a matter of law.”].)
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DISPOSITION
The order denying the anti-SLAPP motion is reversed. The
matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. On remand, the trial court is
directed to (1) grant Valdes’s anti-SLAPP motion as to Murrey’s
causes of action for abuse of process and malicious prosecution;
(2) strike all allegations from Murrey’s conspiracy cause of action
deriving from his abuse of process claim; and (3) determine
whether Murrey has demonstrated a reasonable probability of
prevailing on the merits of his doxing, negligence, civil
harassment, civil extortion, gender violence, false light, IIED,
cyberbullying, and remaining conspiracy causes of action. Valdes
is entitled to costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J.
GOORVITCH
We concur:
________________________, Acting P. J.
CHAVEZ
________________________, J.
RICHARDSON
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