Filed 7/28/26 Turicchi v. Quaid CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
R. SCOTT TURICCHI et al., 2d Civ. No. B346952
(Super. Ct. No. 19CV06268)
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
RANDALL QUAID et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
Randall Quaid (Randy)1 and Evgenia Quaid (Evi) appeal
the judgment entered against them and in favor of R. Scott
Turicchi and Lannette C. Turicchi on issues relating to real
property in Santa Barbara. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1992, the Quaids sold the subject property to Bruce
Berman and Nancy Berman. In 2007, the Bermans sold the
1 Due to shared surnames in this case, we use first names
for ease of reference. No disrespect is intended.
property to the Turicchis. The Turicchis have owned the property
since then.
Beginning in 2010—nearly 20 years after selling the
property to the Bermans—the Quaids asserted that Randy never
signed a grant deed in favor of the Bermans, and that the Quaids
were therefore the property’s legal owners. In furtherance of this
theory, the Quaids have traveled to the Turicchis’ other home in
Pasadena to confront them; informed the Archdiocese of Los
Angeles that the Turicchis harbored pedophile priests at the
property; informed the Turicchis’ mortgage lender that they
committed mortgage fraud; and posted numerous claims on social
media that the Turicchis and/or the Bermans stole the property
from the Quaids.
In September 2010, while the Turicchis were remodeling
and away from the property, the Quaids gained access and
squatted on the property. Lannette called law enforcement, and
the Quaids were arrested and removed from the property.
Because the Quaids publicized the property’s street address, the
Turicchis, concerned for their safety, changed the street number.
In 2019, the Turicchis filed a complaint against the Quaids
alleging causes of action for quiet title, declaratory relief, and
slander of title. In 2023, the trial court adjudicated the quiet title
and declaratory relief claims in the Turicchis’ favor.
After requesting a jury trial on the remaining slander of
title claim, the Quaids failed to appear at the April 2025 trial.
Although they received notice of the new trial date, the Quaids
did not appear. After a two-day trial, the trial court ruled in the
Turicchis’ favor. In a subsequent statement of decision, the trial
court found the Turicchis were the property’s legal owners and
the Quaids liable for slander of title, awarded the Turicchis
2
$3,502,347 in damages, and issued a permanent injunction
barring the Quaids from claiming they own the property.
DISCUSSION2
As the appellants, the Quaids bear the burden of
affirmatively demonstrating error. (Denham v. Superior Court
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “Whether legal or factual, no error
warrants reversal unless the appellant can show injury from the
error.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266,
286.) “[T]o demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the
reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal
analysis.” (Id. at pp. 286–287.) “[W]e may disregard conclusory
arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority or
fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the
conclusions [they] want[] us to adopt.” (Id. at p. 287.) It is not
our role to develop the Quaids’ legal theories or arguments on
appeal. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) Nor are
we required to scour the appellate record on our own to find trial
court error. (Young v. Fish & Game Com. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th
1178, 1190.)
2 The Quaids filed three motions to augment when they
filed their reply brief, seeking to add 11 additional exhibits to the
record. The motions are denied because the Quaids have not
explained their delay in moving to augment the record with these
exhibits. (See Regents of University of California v. Sheily (2004)
122 Cal.App.4th 824, 826, fn. 1.) They also do not establish that
these exhibits were before the trial court, either when it ruled on
the Turicchis’ summary adjudication motion or during the trial.
(Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th
434, 444, fn. 3.)
The Turicchis’ motion to strike portions of the Quaids’
appendix is denied.
3
The Quaids’ briefing fails to include cogent legal
arguments, legal analysis, and pertinent legal authority.
Portions of the briefing are unintelligible. (See Berger v. Godden
(1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119.) Thus, we may disregard the
Quaids’ arguments. (See People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450,
482, fn. 2 [“To the extent [a party] perfunctorily asserts other
claims, without development . . . , they are not properly made,
and are rejected on that basis”].) We are mindful that the Quaids
appear in pro per, but that does not entitle them to special
treatment. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–
985.) “ ‘A litigant has a right to act as his own attorney [citation]
“but, in so doing, should be restricted to the same rules of
evidence and procedure as is required of those qualified to
practice law before our courts; otherwise, ignorance is unjustly
rewarded.” ’ ” (Doran v. Dreyer (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 289, 290.)
Notwithstanding the Quaids’ failure to demonstrate error,
we exercise our discretion to address their identifiable arguments
below. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(e)(2)(C).)
Motion for summary adjudication
The Quaids contend the trial court erred when it
summarily adjudicated the cause of action to quiet title on the
basis of adverse possession in the Turicchis’ favor. We disagree.
“[A] motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all
the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “To
determine whether a triable issue of material fact exists, the
court must consider all evidence laid out in the moving papers
and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence.”
(Jones v. Awad (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1206.) A plaintiff
4
moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion
that each element of the cause of action has been proved, and
that there is no defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. (Coral
Construction, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 50
Cal.4th 315, 336.) We liberally construe the evidence in support
of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts
concerning the evidence in their favor. (Lyle v. Warner Brothers
Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 274.)
“To establish adverse possession, the claimant must prove:
(1) possession under claim of right or color of title; (2) actual,
open, and notorious occupation of the premises constituting
reasonable notice to the true owner; (3) possession which is
adverse and hostile to the true owner; (4) continuous possession
for at least five years; and (5) payment of all taxes assessed
against the property during the five-year period.” (Mehdizadeh v.
Mincer (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1305.) “Adverse possession
under color of title is based on a written instrument, judgment, or
decree which purports to convey real property but is for some
reason defective.” (Aguayo v. Amaro (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th
1102, 1110–1111.)
Here, the Turicchis presented undisputed material facts
supporting they possessed the property under color of title. In
evidence was the grant deed conveying title to the Turicchis. The
Turicchis established they continually occupied and possessed the
property for more than five years such that the Quaids would
have had reasonable notice of their occupancy. The Turicchis
also established that, during their possession, they used and
improved the property, including by renovating the property and
5
paying all utilities and other service expenses associated with the
property. The Turicchis also established they paid property taxes
levied and assessed against the property. On this record, the
Turicchis have met their burden of establishing their entitlement
to judgment on their cause of action to quiet title based on a
theory of adverse possession.
The record does not include the Quaids’ opposition to the
Turicchis’ motion or any supporting documentation, such as a
separate statement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3)
[opposition to summary adjudication “shall include a separate
statement”].) Nor is the Quaids’ answer to the operative pleading
part of the record. The absence of these documents prevents us
from reviewing the arguments raised and purported evidence
relied on in the Quaids’ opposition. This is complicated by the
fact that, according to the court’s ruling, the Quaids filed
“multiple duplicate opposition documents . . . some filed on
different dates, including multiple memoranda of points and
authorities, multiple copies of the supporting declaration,
multiple copies of the separate statement, and multiple copies of
requests for judicial notice.”
The Quaids bear the burden of providing an adequate
record to support their contentions, and their failure to do so
requires that the issue be resolved against them. (Blue Mountain
Enterprises, LLC. v. Owen (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 537, 557; see
also Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 [where the record
is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and
the decision of the trial court should be affirmed].) Moreover,
because the Quaids’ opposition is not part of the record, we
cannot assess whether their contentions on appeal were
preserved. “Evidentiary objections not made at the hearing shall
be deemed waived.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (b)(5), (d).)
6
Nonetheless, we address the Quaids’ contentions. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.163.)
The Quaids contend Randy’s signature on the grant deed to
the Bermans was forged, rendering it void. But even assuming
this is true, it does not create a triable issue of fact. The concept
of adverse possession under “color of title” is that the Turicchis
have a good faith belief they hold title to the property based on
the grant deed they received from the Bermans. (Estate of
Williams (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 141, 147.) That the Quaids allege
the Bermans had no lawful title to transfer does not negate the
Turicchis’ claim. “The good faith of the occupant, in relying on a
defective instrument, is a crucial element to establishing adverse
possession based on color of title.” (Ibid.) Thus, even assuming
the deed from the Quaids to the Bermans was forged would not
create a triable issue because it is the subsequent transfer of title
from the Bermans to the Turicchis that supports their claim.
The Quaids also contend their entry onto the property in
2010 disrupted the period of adverse possession. But the Quaids
do not dispute that immediately upon learning of their
unpermitted entry, the Turicchis contacted law enforcement and
had the Quaids removed from the property. Moreover, the
Turicchis’ temporary absence from the property does not equate
to a lack of possession and ownership because they continued to
treat the property as their own and hold it within their
“ ‘exclusive control.’ ” (Montgomery & Mullen Lumber Co. v.
Quimby (1912) 164 Cal. 250, 253.)
The Turicchis carried their burden to show they had lawful
title to the property based on a theory of adverse possession.
Because the Quaids fail to raise a triable issue, summary
adjudication of the first cause of action was appropriate.
7
Judgment
The Quaids contend the trial court erred in ruling in the
Turicchis’ favor on their causes of action for quiet title3 and
slander of title, and in awarding damages and issuing a
permanent injunction. No error has been shown.
In reviewing a judgment based on a statement of decision
after a bench trial, we resolve any conflicts “ ‘ “ ‘in support of the
determination of the trial court decision.’ ” ’ ” (Axis Surplus Ins.
Co. v. Reinoso (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 181, 189.) Where an
appellant contends the judgment is not supported by substantial
evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party. (Ibid.) We do not reweigh the evidence and
liberally construe findings of fact in support of the judgment.
(Ibid.)
Substantial evidence must also support the issuance of a
permanent injunction. (Thompson v. 10,000 RV Sales, Inc. (2005)
130 Cal.App.4th 950, 964.) “The trial court’s decision to grant a
permanent injunction rests within its sound discretion and will
not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of a clear abuse of
discretion.” (Shapiro v. San Diego City Council (2002) 96
Cal.App.4th 904, 912.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings on
the Turicchis’ quiet title claim. The grant deed transferring the
3 As noted above, the trial court already found in the
Turicchis’ favor on their quiet title claim based on an adverse
possession theory. At trial, the Turicchis argued that they
acquired title to the property earlier than by adverse possession
based on the 2007 grant deed from the Bermans in favor of the
Turicchis.
8
property to the Turicchis was in evidence, and Lannette testified
she and her husband purchased the property in 2007.
Numerous documents also evidenced the Quaids’ 1992 sale
of the property to the Bermans, including the grant deed
transferring the property to them. Bruce Berman testified he
purchased the property from the Quaids, and that he did not
forge anyone’s signature. The notary public who notarized the
grant deed authenticated her signature, and testified she never
notarized a document unless the person signing the document
was in her presence. Other documents evidencing the
Quaid-to-Berman sale included the escrow file, with documents
signed by the Quaids, checks to pay off the Quaids’ creditors, a
check to the Quaids for the remainder of the sale proceeds, and
recorded documents demonstrating the release of liens against
the Quaids. Randy’s brother Dennis Quaid also testified he
loaned Randy money to purchase the property, and that he
(Dennis) was repaid when the property was sold to the Bermans.
Finally, the Turicchis introduced a real property schedule from
the Quaids’ 2002 bankruptcy filing, which omitted the property
as an asset.
The Quaids again contend that the grant deed in favor of
the Bermans was forged. They also assert the notary’s signature
is suspect, and that “the money trail” evidencing payoffs to their
creditors was “fabricated.” These contentions are forfeited
because the Quaids did not appear at the trial, and therefore
failed to make these assertions at the trial court level. They may
not raise them for the first time on appeal. (Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 548.)
Substantial evidence also supports the trial court’s finding
on the Turicchis’ slander of title claim. The elements of a slander
9
of title claim include “(1) publication, (2) absence of justification,
(3) falsity, and (4) direct pecuniary loss.” (Seeley v. Seymour
(1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 858.) The crux of a slander of title
claim “is protection from injury to the salability of property
[citations], which is ordinarily indicated by the loss of a
particular sale, impaired marketability or depreciation in value
[citations].” (Sumner Hill Homeowners’ Assn., Inc. v. Rio Mesa
Holdings, LLC (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 999, 1030.)
At trial, the Turicchis introduced into evidence multiple
social media posts from the Quaids outlining their claim that the
Bermans stole the property from them and forged their
signatures. The Turicchis’ expert witness testified that
thousands of individuals had viewed several of the Quaids’
postings. Substantial evidence supports that the Quaids’ claims
were unjustified and false because they had not lived at the
property for more than 30 years since the 1992 sale to the
Bermans.
Also in evidence were the losses the Turicchis sustained
due to the Quaids’ actions, including difficulty selling the
property and obtaining title insurance without resolution of the
Quaids’ competing ownership claim. The Turicchis outlined
damages they would not have sustained had they been able to
sell their home, including $655,778 in property taxes, $310,998 in
homeowner’s insurance, $368,569 in mortgage interest, $392,757
in maintenance and utility expenses, and $140,877 in security
services. The Turicchis also offered evidence they incurred
$1,633,368 in attorneys’ fees and costs. Substantial evidence
supported the trial court’s award of damages in the amount of
$3,502,347.
10
The Quaids contend the damages awarded to the Turicchis
were improper. But the Quaids did not appear at the trial to
rebut the Turicchis’ claimed damages, and any arguments they
have are therefore forfeited. (Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46
Cal.4th 247, 264.) The Quaids bear the burden of establishing
the trial court erred in assessing damages and they have not met
that burden here. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122,
1140–1141.)
Substantial evidence also supports the permanent
injunction prohibiting the Quaids from maintaining that they
own the property, the property was stolen from them, and the
Turicchis are not the property owners; and from making threats
against or threatening to damage the property and entering the
property or adjacent structures thereto. The evidence showed the
Quaids’ unrelenting attempts to deprive the Turicchis of a home
that lawfully belongs to them. The injunction is narrowly
tailored to speech involving the Quaids’ unlawful claim that they
own the home.
The Quaids contend the injunction is an invalid and
unsupported restriction on their right to free speech. Again,
because the Quaids could have raised these arguments at trial
and did not, they are forfeited. Regardless, the right to free
speech is not absolute. (Near v. Minnesota (1931) 283 U.S. 697,
708.) Here, the injunction is restricted to speech concerning
rightful ownership of the property—property that the trial court
determined lawfully belongs to the Turicchis.
The Quaids’ other contentions
The Quaids contend the trial court improperly denied their
request to appear remotely for the jury trial they requested. But
the trial court noted the impossibility of conducting a jury trial
11
with a party appearing remotely. Upon continuing the trial to
April 2025, the court reminded the Quaids that the date was
“absolute” and they were expected “to deal with and remedy any
potential hindrances that might prevent them from coming to
California” for trial. The trial court exercised appropriate
discretion in requiring the Quaids to appear in person, and in
denying their request to continue the trial. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 367.75, subd. (b)(3).)
The Quaids also contend the trial court improperly
conducted the trial without their participation. But they do not
provide any record citations demonstrating they lacked notice,
and a proof of service indicates they were provided notice.
Instead, the record demonstrates the Quaids chose not to attend
the trial. When their motion to continue the trial was denied,
Randy informed the court “we’re not going to be there.”
The Quaids contend their motion to disqualify the trial
court judge should have been granted. But a motion to disqualify
a judge is not an appealable order; it is only reviewable by
petition for writ of mandate. (Swift v. Superior Court (2009) 172
Cal.App.4th 878, 882.) And the Quaids filed a petition for writ of
mandate in this court, which was denied in 2025. The order
denying the disqualification is not cognizable in this appeal.
Finally, the Quaids contend the trial court was biased
against them, but the record does not reflect any bias. To the
extent the Quaids rely on rulings adverse to them to establish
bias, a trial court’s rulings against a party “do not establish a
charge of judicial bias, especially when they are subject to
review.” (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112.)
12
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Turicchis to recover their
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
13
Colleen K. Sterne, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Randall Quaid and Evgenia Quaid, in pro. per., for
Defendants and Appellants.
Rimon, Craig S. Granet; Lurie, Zepeda, Schmalz, Hogan &
Martin and Andrew W. Zepeda for Plaintiffs and Respondents.