Filed 8/20/26 Tripathi v. City of La Canada Flintridge CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
DANIEL J. TRIPATHI et al., B343214
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC633162)
v.
CITY OF LA CAÑADA FLINTRIDGE,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gail Killefer, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Evan D. Williams and Evan D. Williams for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Hennelly & Grossfeld and Paul T. Martin for Defendant
and Respondent.
____________________________
Plaintiffs Daniel J. and Leanna Tripathi appeal from a
judgment in favor of defendant and respondent City of
La Cañada Flintridge (the City). The Tripathis argue the trial
court erred in precluding one of their witnesses from offering
expert testimony, and that error prevented them from offering
evidence in support of their claim for an easement by necessity on
their property.
We affirm. The Tripathis do not explain what theory or
circumstances entitle them to an easement by necessity. They
do not address the trial court’s findings that led the court to deny
them an easement by necessity. They do not explain how their
witness’s anticipated testimony might have altered those findings
or otherwise supported their unstated theory of easement by
necessity. They therefore fail to demonstrate the trial court’s
purported error prejudiced them.
BACKGROUND
1. Complaint and summary adjudication
The Tripathis sued the City and others for declaratory
relief, quiet title, inverse condemnation, and property-damage
negligence in an action concerning easements for access to the
Tripathis’ property. In their first amended complaint, filed in
May 2019, the Tripathis alleged that at the time they purchased
their property in 2011, a City-issued certificate of compliance led
them to believe the property included an easement allowing
access. They further alleged the easement in fact was unusable
because of a flood control channel created in the 1960’s. The
Tripathis sought, inter alia, an order creating a different
easement to allow them to enter and exit their property.
2
In February 2022, the trial court granted summary
adjudication on the causes of action for inverse condemnation and
property damage, and the parties prepared for trial on the
remaining two causes of action.
2. Proceedings concerning the Tripathis’ expert witness
In September 2022, the Tripathis served on the City a
“Written Exchange of Expert Witness Information.” (Boldface &
some capitalization omitted.) In this document, the Tripathis
indicated they intended to offer at trial the opinions of Aghjan
Yakob, a civil engineer identified as a “non-retained expert
witness,” and Richard L. Kadow, a title consultant listed as a
“retained expert witness.”1 The Tripathis also served a
declaration of their counsel attaching Kadow’s curriculum vitae
and describing the general substance of his expected testimony.
No such information was provided regarding Yakob.
The trial court held a bench trial in May 2024. Before the
Tripathis called Yakob as a witness, the City’s counsel objected to
Yakob providing any expert opinion testimony because the
Tripathis had not provided an expert witness declaration for him.
The Tripathis’ counsel stated Yakob had worked on developing
the Tripathis’ property since 2015, and could testify as a
percipient witness to the work he had done. Citing Fatica v.
Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 350, the Tripathis’ counsel
argued Yakob also could “give his opinions as an engineer”
concerning how various documents addressed access to the
property. Counsel stated the Tripathis “were making decisions
as to how to proceed with building [on the property] . . . based on
1 The document identifies Yakob as “John Jacobs,” but at
trial he identified himself as Aghjan Yakob.
3
the assistance of this hired engineer who was helping them
through the process.”
The trial court observed Fatica involved a treating
physician providing expert testimony, and Yakob “isn’t exactly a
treating physician.” The court concluded the Tripathis had not
properly designated Yakob as an expert witness, and limited his
testimony to that of a percipient lay witness.
3. Statement of decision and judgment
Following trial, the trial court issued a statement of
decision. The court explained the question raised under the
declaratory relief cause of action was the Tripathis’ right to an
alternative easement. The Tripathis’ claimed that right under
(1) the City-issued certificate of compliance; (2) a condemnation
order issued in 1967; and (3) “theories of equitable easement,
prescriptive easement, and easement by necessity.”
The court interpreted the certificate of compliance not to
guarantee the Tripathis’ the easement they sought, and the
Tripathis could not claim to have been misled by the certificate
when they had constructive notice of the flood control channel
“ ‘since those facts were open and notorious.’ ”
The court disagreed with the Tripathis’ assertion that the
1967 condemnation order granted the flood control district an
exclusive easement that voided the Tripathis’ easement. The
court cited case law holding an easement is only exclusive if
expressly made so by the instrument creating it, and found
nothing in the condemnation order expressly granting the flood
control district an exclusive easement.
The court found the Tripathis were not entitled to an
easement by necessity, which the court concluded would require
the Tripathis to prove “strict necessity,” i.e., that the easement
4
they sought “constitutes the only access to their property.” The
court noted the Tripathis’ property had not one but two existing
easements, and therefore the Tripathis “cannot prove strict
necessity.” The court further found the Tripathis’ easement-by-
necessity argument “necessarily relies on their argument that the
[condemnation order] gave the County an exclusive easement,”
an argument the court had rejected in its discussion of the
condemnation order.
The court found the Tripathis failed to put forth clear and
convincing evidence of continuous and uninterrupted use of their
desired easement over a period of five years, and therefore
were not entitled to a prescriptive easement.
The court denied the Tripathis an equitable easement
because the easement they sought would “turn [a City-owned]
recreational area into [the Tripathis’] personal driveway,” which
would “be a significant hardship to the City and the residents
who enjoy the [recreation area].”
The court found the quiet title cause of action concerned
the same easements at issue in the declaratory relief cause of
action, and the quiet title claim thus failed for the same reasons
as the declaratory relief claim.
The court entered judgment in favor of the City. The
Tripathis timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
The Tripathis’ sole argument on appeal is the trial court
erred in precluding Yakob from offering expert opinion testimony,
and that error prejudiced them as to their claim for easement by
necessity. The Tripathis’ briefing does not challenge any of the
trial court’s other rulings, including the grant of summary
adjudication or its rulings regarding the certificate of compliance,
5
the condemnation order, and prescriptive and equitable
easements.
The Tripathis argue Yakob was exempt from the expert
declaration requirement because that requirement applies only to
an expert who is “a party or an employee of a party, or has been
retained by a party for the purpose of forming and expressing an
opinion in anticipation of the litigation or in preparation for the
trial of the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.210, subd. (b).) The
Tripathis contend Yakob was not a “retained” expert because
they hired him not for purposes of litigation but to help them
develop their property, and his opinions would be based on
knowledge he acquired independent of the litigation. They
analogize to case law holding that treating physicians may offer
expert opinion without submitting an expert declaration. (See,
e.g., Schreiber v. Estate of Kiser (1999) 22 Cal.4th 31, 34.) The
City disagrees, arguing Yakob is not analogous to a treating
physician.
We decline to decide whether the trial court erred in
excluding Yakob’s testimony, because as set forth below, the
Tripathis fail to demonstrate prejudice from that purported error.
(J.R. v. Electronic Arts Inc. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1107, 1115,
fn. 2 [appellant bears “burden of demonstrating both error and
prejudice”].)
In their opening brief, the Tripathis argue, “A miscarriage
of justice resulted here because the trial court was not presented
with any expert testimony regarding access to the property and
the suitability of the easements for access. [Citation.] A central
issue of the trial here was the question of whether or not the
existing easements were suitable for the Tripathi[s’] right to
ingress and egress on a developed lot. Mr. Yakob, as an engineer
6
who was in conversation with the city concerning this very issue,
could have opined as to the suitability of access and whether or
not the right to ingress and egress truly existed for the purposes
of building a single family home. [Citation.] Such testimony
would have greatly affected the decisions of the trial court,
specifically as it relates to a finding of an easement by necessity.”
As the City observes, an easement by necessity requires
“strict necessity for the claimed right-of-way, as when the
claimant’s property is landlocked.” (Murphy v. Burch (2009)
46 Cal.4th 157, 163.) “No easement will be implied where there
is another possible means of access, even if that access is shown
to be inconvenient, difficult, or costly.” (Id. at p. 164.) The City
notes the parties stipulated below two existing easements passed
to the Tripathis when they purchased the property, and therefore
the Tripathis cannot demonstrate strict necessity for an
alternative easement. The City argues, “[T]he alleged ‘suitability’
of an express grant of easement for ingress and egress is
irrelevant to whether an easement by necessity was created by
implication.”
In their reply, the Tripathis argue the law does not require
that a property be landlocked to meet the strict necessity
requirement — rather, the question is “whether the existing
easements allow for occupancy or successful cultivation of the
Tripathi property.” The Tripathis contend, “Mr. Yakob intended
to testify concerning the legal requirements for access to the
Tripathi property and whether such access existed with the
existing easements. [Citation.] Therefore, the error of excluding
Mr. Yakob’s testimony was not harmless.”
7
Whether or not a property need be landlocked to meet the
strict necessity requirement, the Tripathis on appeal do not
explain the theory under which they are claiming strict necessity.
It is not clear if they are claiming their property actually is
landlocked, or if not, what other circumstances make an implied
easement strictly necessary. They offer only unspecific assertions
about the “suitab[ility]” of the existing easements or “legal
requirements for access,” and claim Yakob would offer opinions
relevant to these issues, again without specificity. They do not
discuss the trial court’s findings that there are not one but two
existing easements allowing access to their property, and that the
flood control district’s easement is not exclusive and therefore
does not void the Tripathis’ easements. Because they do not
discuss these findings, they provide no explanation as to how
Yakob’s anticipated testimony might alter those findings or offer
an alternative basis to grant an easement by necessity. In the
absence of that explanation, we cannot determine whether the
exclusion of Yakob’s expert testimony prejudiced the Tripathis.
The Tripathis therefore have not met their burden to show
prejudicial error.
8
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The City of La Cañada
Flintridge is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
9