Filed 7/7/26 Trevena v. Triller CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
OLIVER TREVENA, B340896
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV05840)
v.
TRILLER, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Steve Cochran, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded.
Keosian Law and Natalie Hairabedian Suri for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Plaintiff and appellant Oliver Trevena filed a complaint
against defendants Triller, Inc. (Triller), Triller Hold Co LLC,
Mike Lu, and Proxima Media, LLC (collectively, defendants),1
asserting fraud and breach of contract claims. Trevena alleged
that in 2017, he and Triller CEO Lu discussed a partnership to
grow Triller’s new social media app and Lu gave Trevena a
2 percent ownership stake in Triller. Trevena claimed
defendants deliberately failed to honor their promise to recognize
that ownership stake after inducing him to invest significant
labor and goodwill in Triller. Defendants moved for summary
judgment. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed
Trevena’s complaint.
We reverse as to Trevena’s fraud causes of action. Lu’s
alleged representations to Trevena were sufficiently specific to
form the basis of a fraud claim. Trevena also established that
triable issues of material fact exist regarding whether Lu made
the alleged misrepresentations.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Trevena is an actor and producer. In 2017, he met Lu,
Triller’s CEO. Triller’s main product is a video-based social
media app.
According to Trevena, during his initial meeting with Lu,
he shared his ideas with Lu about “how to develop and expand
the Triller app.” They “discussed how a partnership” would be
mutually beneficial, and they “came to a mutual agreement that
[Trevena] would be a consultant for Triller, as well as have
shares in the company and be one of the owners of the Triller
1 In October 2019, Proxima Media, LLC acquired a majority
interest in Triller from Triller’s parent company, Carnegie
Technologies, LLC.
2
app.” Trevena claims Lu represented that Trevena “would be a
2% shareholder and owner of Triller,” and that “it would be worth
a lot if [Trevena] helped [him] grow the app.” Trevena also
asserts that Lu always held himself out as “the unequivocal sole
owner and decision maker with respect to the Triller app.”
In April 2018, Trevena and Triller entered into a
Consulting Agreement. Trevena agreed to provide services as an
“entertainment reporter/booker—to recruit and produce celebrity
personalities to use and promote the Triller platform.” The
contract expired in December 2018.2 The Consulting Agreement
did not include any provisions regarding Trevena’s equity or
ownership in Triller.
Throughout 2018, Trevena introduced Lu and other Triller
executives to his contacts in the music and entertainment
industry. Trevena also created his own content to live stream on
the Triller app.
In late 2018, Lu sent Trevena a text message requesting
that he post “ ‘a TON of [T]rillers in the next 10-days’ ” in the
run-up to closing another round of investment funding. Lu told
Trevena, “ ‘Time to make your shares worth a couple of million
dollars! I’m actually not joking[.] If we do this right[,] [a] billion
exit is realistic.’ ” Lu also texted Trevena, “ ‘Next 10 days if we
can get . . . someone big to do another [T]riller[,] I’ll def reward it
with more shares.’ ” Trevena did as Lu requested.
2 Defendants claim Triller and Trevena entered into a second
consulting agreement for a reduced fee in August 2019. Trevena
denies signing a second agreement but claims he agreed to
Triller’s reduced fee because he believed he held an ownership
stake in Triller.
3
In 2019, Trevena continued to introduce Triller executives
to his personal connections in the industry. He also took Triller
executives to meetings with music labels in Europe and attended
multiple dinners to persuade potential partners to invest in
Triller.
In early 2019, Trevena texted Lu on two different occasions
that he wanted to “ ‘get [his] deal set’ ” and “ ‘lock [his] Triller
deal in.’ ” Lu reassured Trevena that Triller’s general manager
had “ ‘already put [Trevena] in the budget’ ” presented to the
board and that Lu would talk to the general manager. Lu later
confirmed that he talked to Triller’s other CEO, Bobby
Sarnevesht, “ ‘about [Trevena’s] involvement’ ” and told Trevena,
“ ‘We are good.’ ”
In September 2019, Lu texted Trevena asking for his full
legal name and address “ ‘for the advisor shares that we’re
sending out[.]’ ” Trevena e-mailed Lu the requested information.
In the months that followed, Trevena and Lu continued to
exchange text messages but did not discuss the shares.3
According to Trevena, in the summer of 2020, Sarnevesht
twice acknowledged Trevena was owed shares, including once in
Lu’s presence. Trevena claims that Sarnevesht told him at a
dinner with Lu that “[Sarnevesht] knew how much [Trevena] had
done for Triller and how involved and vested [Trevena] was in the
company.” Sarnevesht said he would get the paperwork in order
for Trevena’s board position and shares. Trevena tried to follow
up with Sarnevesht numerous times, but Sarnevesht did not
show up to their scheduled meetings. He subsequently assured
Trevena in person “that [Trevena] was a partner in the app and
3 Trevena and Lu primarily discussed the status of
outstanding consulting fees owed to Trevena.
4
that [Sarnevesht] was aware of everything that [Trevena] had
done in the earliest stages and he would make sure that
[Trevena] got his shares.”
Around this time, Trevena texted Lu to ask when he would
receive the paperwork for the “[a]dvisory board shares.” Lu
initially responded that he would talk to the legal team. In later
messages, Lu told Trevena that he would “ ‘bring it up,’ ” but it
was “ ‘not [his] call anymore’ ” because it required board
approval. Trevena responded: “ ‘I guess you should tell them you
gave your word several times that I was going to be on the
advisory board and given shares pre and post Proxima takeover
and let’s hope they honor that.’ ”
A few days later, Trevena texted Lu: “ ‘I have not received
my board shares or paperwork even though I was told by you on
several occasions that I was for sure getting them. I would not of
[sic] used my network and pushed how I did jus[t] for $. I did it
as I was told I was part of the team for the long haul. Part of the
board.’ ” He accused Lu of “ ‘not stick[ing] to [his] word’ ” and
insisted that either Lu secure board approval for his shares “ ‘or
try to make this right [him]self with shares.’ ”
In September 2020, Sarnevesht texted Trevena to confirm
he had been added to the advisory board and granted “5k in
Warrant per month.” In October, Triller’s counsel sent Trevena
an Advisory Board Agreement and a Warrant Agreement. The
Advisory Board Agreement retained Trevena as an advisor to
Triller for a term of one year and, as compensation for his
services, authorized a warrant for the purchase of $5,000 of
shares at fair market value each month. The Warrant
Agreement separately offered Trevena the option to purchase
17,947 shares at $8.36, equaling approximately $150,000 in
5
equity. Trevena did not sign the agreements because he believed
they did not reflect Lu’s earlier statements giving him a 2 percent
ownership stake in Triller.
Complaint
In February 2021, Trevena filed a complaint against
defendants asserting causes of action for breach of contract,
breach of implied-in-fact contract, breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, fraud and
deceit, fraud and intentional misrepresentation, fraud in the
inducement, fraudulent concealment, promissory fraud, and
unfair competition. The complaint sought an accounting.
Trevena’s fraud causes of action alleged that Lu falsely
promised to make him an owner and shareholder in 2017, and
subsequently misrepresented Trevena’s status as a shareholder,
to induce Trevena to use “his promotional capabilities and
celebrity status” to grow the app and secure investment, without
ever intending to “deliver” his “shares and ownership rights” in
Triller.
Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendants moved for summary judgment, or, in the
alternative, summary adjudication. With respect to the fraud
claims, defendants argued Lu’s alleged promise was not an
actionable representation because there was no evidence
regarding the material terms of Trevena’s alleged ownership
stake, such as the form of the shares, the number of units,
vesting or exercise provisions, the date of issue, or the specific
entity in which he would hold equity. Defendants also contended
that many of the alleged misrepresentations—such as Lu’s
statement that the shares would be worth millions—were
6
opinions and predictions of future value that were not actionable
as fraud.
Defendants argued that Trevena could not show any
promise Lu made was false or made with fraudulent intent.
Defendants maintained that the promise Lu made about shares
or equity guaranteed Trevena only the opportunity to become an
owner and shareholder of Triller “someday” in the future.
Defendants argued they fulfilled that promise by sending
Trevena the offers for purchase memorialized in the Advisory
Board Agreement and the Warrant Agreement. Defendants also
contended that Trevena could not raise triable issues as to his
contract causes of action.
Defendants’ compendium of evidence included a declaration
from Lu, Trevena’s responses to interrogatories, Lu’s responses to
interrogatories, the Consulting Agreement, the Advisory Board
Agreement, and the Warrant Agreement. In his verified
discovery responses, Lu stated “[t]here was never an agreement
by Triller (nor any person associated with Triller) to provide Mr.
Trevena with any equity, stock, options, or warrants in Triller
before he rendered any services.” He also stated that he made
Trevena the limited offer to acquire shares in Triller through the
Warrant Agreement “as a gesture of appreciation for Mr.
Trevena’s prior efforts.” According to Lu, this was consistent
with his “offer to provide Mr. Trevena with the right to acquire
approximately $150,000 worth of equity ownership.”
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
Trevena opposed defendants’ summary judgment motion,
arguing that triable issues existed as to his fraud causes of
action. He contended that the terms of Lu’s promise of 2 percent
ownership in Triller were sufficiently clear and definite, and that
7
there was a material factual dispute about whether Lu falsely
promised Trevena an ownership stake to “entic[e] Plaintiff to
divulge his network and his connections . . . .” Trevena
contended that in addition to evidence that Lu made an express
promise of ownership, circumstantial evidence indicated Lu never
intended to keep his promise at the time he made it, “but simply
engaged Plaintiff so that he [could] utilize Plaintiff’s network and
connections for his own personal benefit.”
In his declaration supporting the opposition, Trevena
referenced and attached e-mails he sent from 2018 to 2020,
introducing Triller management to his connections in the
entertainment industry. He submitted a lengthy text message
chain documenting his communications with Lu between 2018
and 2020. Trevena further supported the opposition with a
declaration from Lu’s former fiancée stating that Lu had no
connections in Hollywood until he met Trevena. Lu told her that
Trevena was “a partner and a stake holder [sic] in Triller,” and
she was present when Lu introduced Trevena to others as a
partner in Triller.
Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment
In 2024, after two hearings on the motion, the trial court
granted summary judgment. As to Trevena’s contract causes of
action, the court stated it did not find “a demonstrable difference
in scope between what’s in the consultancy agreement and what
Plaintiff describes as the services provided.” The court also did
not find a material factual dispute about the formation of a
contract, reasoning: “I think the case cited[,] Barton[ v. Elexsys
Internat., Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1182 (Barton)], . . . is
illustrative. I believe the parties were talking about Plaintiff
having some ownership interest . . . but I don’t think terms were
8
reached or that it was certain enough to create [a] legal
enforceable obligation.” The court then explained: “The fraud
claims are not close. Because I’m finding that no contract was
formed, the purchase agreement or advisory board agreement
was not breach of anything.” The court also summarily disposed
of Trevena’s remaining causes of action.4
Trevena timely appealed. On appeal, Trevena challenges
only the trial court’s ruling as to his fraud-based causes of
action.5
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial
burden of showing that the plaintiff cannot establish an element
of the cause of action or there is a complete defense. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 853 (Aguilar).) As the moving party, the
4 The court entered an order granting defendants’ motion for
summary judgment “dismiss[ing] all of Plaintiff’s causes of action
in Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice” and separately signed and
entered an order of dismissal. We deem the trial court’s order
granting summary judgment a final judgment for purposes of the
appeal. (Ung v. Koehler (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 186, 192, fn. 2;
see Swain v. California Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th
1, 6 [trial court order that “clearly intended to finally dispose of
plaintiffs’ complaint” amended to include entry of judgment].)
5 Defendants sought summary adjudication as an alternative
to summary judgment and Trevena does not challenge the trial
court’s ruling as to his contract-based claims. We therefore
affirm the judgment as to the contract causes of action. (Severin
Mobile Towing, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 292, 302–303.)
9
defendant “bears an initial burden of production to make a prima
facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material
fact . . . .” (Aguilar, at p. 850.) A defendant must either present
evidence that “conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s
cause of action” or present evidence “that the plaintiff does not
possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Id. at
p. 855; see also Y.K.A. Industries, Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency of
City of San Jose (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 339, 367 [moving party
must “affirmatively establish the factual conditions or predicates
. . . by undisputed facts in order to shift the burden on the motion
to [plaintiff]”].)
If the defendant meets this initial threshold, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence demonstrating there is a
triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) A triable issue
exists if “the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to
find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion
in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar, at
p. 850.) In determining whether triable issues exist, courts
“ ‘liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing
summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence
in favor of that party.’ ” (Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Swift
Distribution, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 277, 286.) If the evidence
does not raise a triable issue of material fact, the defendant is
entitled to summary judgment. (Ibid.)
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo.
(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 860.) “ ‘[W]e apply the same
three-step analysis required of the trial court: We first identify
the issues framed by the pleadings, since it is these allegations to
which the motion must respond. Secondly, we determine
10
whether the moving party has established facts which negate the
opponents’ claim and justify a judgment in the movant’s favor.
Finally, if the summary judgment motion prima facie justifies a
judgment, we determine whether the opposition demonstrates
the existence of a triable, material factual issue.’ [Citation.]”
(Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1161–1162.)
II. There Are Triable Issues of Material Fact as to
Trevena’s Fraud Claim6
Establishing a fraud claim requires “evidence of (1) a
misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’),
(3) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (4) justifiable
reliance, and (5) resulting damage.” (Unterberger v. Red Bull
North America, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 414, 423.)
“ ‘Promissory fraud’ is a subspecies of the action for fraud and
deceit. A promise to do something necessarily implies the
intention to perform; hence, where a promise is made without
such intention, there is an implied misrepresentation of fact that
may be actionable fraud.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12
Cal.4th 631, 638 (Lazar).)
As an initial matter, we agree with Trevena that
defendants could not defeat his fraud claim as a matter of law
6 Trevena’s complaint stated five separate causes of action
based in fraud: fraud and deceit, fraud and intentional
misrepresentation, fraud in the inducement, fraudulent
concealment, and fraudulent promise without intent to perform.
The unfair competition cause of action was derivative of the fraud
causes of action. The parties did not distinguish between these
causes of action in their briefing on summary judgment. On
appeal, Trevena challenges the trial court’s ruling as to a
singular “fraud claim” and cites the elements of promissory fraud
11
merely by demonstrating that, as the trial court indicated, there
was no “legally enforceable obligation” and “no contract was
formed.” Whether or not there was a meeting of the minds or
consideration sufficient to form a contract, “[a]ctionable deceit
exists where a promise is made ‘without any intention of
performing it.’ (Civ. Code, § 1710, subd. (4).)” (Building Permit
Consultants, Inc. v. Mazur (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1414.)
Indeed, even where the plaintiff alleges the defendant has
fraudulently induced the plaintiff to enter into a contract, “the
plaintiff’s claim does not depend upon whether the defendant’s
promise is ultimately enforceable as a contract.” (Lazar, supra,
12 Cal.4th at p. 638.)
The trial court thus could not find summary judgment
warranted as to the fraud claim based on a lack of evidence that
the parties entered into a contract giving Trevena an ownership
interest in Triller. However, because we will affirm the trial
court’s ruling if correct on any ground supported by the record,
we review the matter de novo to determine whether defendants
established they were entitled to summary judgment on any
other basis. (Jimenez v. County of Los Angeles (2005) 130
Cal.App.4th 133, 140.)
in Civil Code section 1710, subdivision (4). Because Trevena’s
fraud causes of action allege the same injury— that he did not
receive his promised 2 percent ownership in Triller—we consider
his fraud allegations as a single cause of action and similarly
refer to them as a singular “fraud claim” in this opinion. (See
Stoner v. Williams (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 986, 1003, 1004
[multiple fraud theories gave rise to single cause of action where
only one injury alleged].)
12
A. The alleged representations were sufficiently
specific to be actionable
Defendants argued that Trevena’s evidence of Lu’s alleged
representations did not identify terms of ownership sufficiently
definite or certain to support a fraud claim. Citing Trevena’s
complaint and interrogatory responses, defendants argued the
alleged promise omitted “what form the[ ] ‘ownership’ or ‘shares’
would take, how they would be provided,” which entity would
provide them, how Trevena’s ownership share would be
calculated, “vesting or exercise provisions” attached to the shares,
or when he was supposed to receive the shares.
“A ‘promise’ is an assurance that a person will or will not do
something.” (Granadino v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 411, 417.) A promise must be sufficiently clear to be
actionable as a legal obligation. (Aceves v. U.S. Bank N.A. (2011)
192 Cal.App.4th 218, 225 (Aceves) [elements of fraud based on
false promise similar to elements of promissory estoppel, which
required “ ‘ “ ‘a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms’ ” ’ ”];
see id. at pp. 226, 231.) “To be enforceable, a promise need only
be ‘ “definite enough that a court can determine the scope of the
duty[,] and the limits of performance must be sufficiently defined
to provide a rational basis for the assessment of damages.” ’
[Citation.]” (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183
Cal.App.4th 1031, 1045.)
The evidence of Lu’s statements to Trevena is sufficient to
establish an actionable representation. Trevena’s interrogatory
responses and declaration reflect that at the inception of their
business relationship, during a discussion about a mutually
beneficial “partnership,” Lu represented that Trevena would be
an owner of Triller and would receive shares commensurate with
13
a 2 percent shareholder status. Trevena identified who made the
representation (Lu, Triller’s CEO) and described Lu’s assurance
that he would take a specific action (Lu would give Trevena
shares representing a 2 percent ownership stake). This is
sufficiently clear and definite to determine the scope of Lu’s
performance—either Lu gave Trevena a 2 percent shareholder
interest in Triller, or he did not. (See, e.g., Aceves, supra, 192
Cal.App.4th at p. 226 [bank’s promise to negotiate before
foreclosure was clear and unambiguous because “[t]he bank
either did or did not negotiate”].)
Defendants’ cited authorities did not support their
contention that Lu’s promise is not an actionable basis for fraud.
In the cited authorities, courts determined statements were too
vague and uncertain to form legal obligations when they
conditioned future outcomes on subjective performance (Rochlis
v. Walt Disney Co. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 201, 213−216
[commitment to award “reasonable” bonuses “appropriate to
[plaintiff’s] responsibilities and performance” was not an
enforceable promise]); when they were made as general, passing
reassurances about a plaintiff employee’s future financial
condition (Barton, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1190–1191
[statements that key employees “ ‘had to be taken care of’ ” and
that plaintiff had “ ‘ “nothing to worry about” ’ ” because he had
“ ‘ “100,000 shares of stock,” ’ ” when he in fact had far less, was
not a promise that stock options would continue to vest after
termination]); or when they concerned a particular transaction
that typically required definite terms to be enforceable (Peterson
Development Co. v. Torrey Pines Bank (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 103,
115 [“usual principles of lender liability” required “letter of
commitment” to include specific loan terms to constitute
14
enforceable obligation for permanent financing]). In contrast,
here, there is evidence that Lu made an affirmative and
unequivocal representation to Trevena that he would receive a
specific and quantifiable ownership stake in a business
enterprise.
Defendants also contended that certain statements
identified as misrepresentations—namely, Lu’s statements that
the shares would be worth millions of dollars and that he would
“def[initely]” be rewarding Trevena with more shares—were
inactionable “opinions, puffery, or predictions of future events.”
Defendants’ argument missed the mark. These statements are
not the misrepresentations that form the basis for Trevena’s
fraud claim. Rather, by referencing Trevena’s shares or implying
their existence, these statements suggest Lu understood Trevena
to be a shareholder of the company at the time he made them. A
reasonable trier of fact could conclude from this evidence that Lu
made the misrepresentation at the core of the fraud claim—that
Lu gave Trevena an ownership interest in Triller and promised to
give him shares commensurate with that interest.
B. Triable issues exist as to whether Lu made the
alleged misrepresentation
In their summary judgment motion, defendants argued
that Lu promised Trevena only “[t]he opportunity to be an ‘owner
and shareholder of ’ ” Triller, which they fulfilled by providing
Trevena with the Advisory Board Agreement and the Warrant
Agreement affording purchase options for shares. They argued
Trevena could not show this representation was false or made
with fraudulent intent. They denied that Lu ever represented to
Trevena that he already had an ownership interest in Triller.
15
The issues to be decided in a summary judgment motion
are framed by the pleadings. Trevena’s complaint alleged that
Lu represented that he was giving Trevena an ownership stake
in Triller, and that he promised to provide Trevena shares
commensurate with that established ownership. As to this
alleged misrepresentation, defendants’ summary judgment
motion asserted only that there was no evidence it was ever
made. Defendants did not advance arguments as to Trevena’s
ability to prove the falsity or fraudulent intent of the
representation.7
Defendants’ evidence was sufficient to make a prima facie
showing that Lu did not give Trevena an ownership interest in
Triller or promise that defendants would give him shares. In
verified responses to Trevena’s interrogatories, Lu stated
defendants had never agreed to provide Trevena “with equity,
stock, options, or warrants in Triller before he rendered any
services”; “as a gesture of appreciation” for Trevena’s efforts, Lu
offered him “the ability to acquire $150,000 of equity in Triller”;
and consistent with this, defendants later sent Trevena the
Warrant Agreement.
The burden then shifted to Trevena to present evidence
from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Lu
promised Trevena would receive shares themselves, not merely
an option to purchase them. Trevena met this burden.
Trevena declared that he and Lu negotiated and agreed to
a mutually beneficial “partnership” in which Lu made Trevena an
owner in Triller and promised him shares consistent with a
2 percent ownership stake, because Trevena’s extensive network
7 Defendants’ motion did not argue that Trevena could not
establish justifiable reliance or damages.
16
in the entertainment industry would help grow the app. He
stated that he leveraged his personal network for Triller because
he believed he was an owner and shareholder who would benefit
if the company succeeded financially. Lu encouraged this
impression by referencing the value of Trevena’s shares and
promising “more shares.” Trevena further declared that
Sarnevesht acknowledged that Trevena was entitled to shares,
and he promised to deliver them on more than one occasion.
When Trevena confronted Lu about his promise, Lu did not
dispute Trevena’s assertion that Lu had guaranteed Trevena the
shares themselves years earlier. Finally, Trevena proffered
evidence that Lu represented to others that Trevena was a
“partner” and “stakeholder” in Triller.
Evidence that Trevena and others understood he had an
ownership interest, Lu indicated Trevena stood to profit as a
current shareholder, and Lu did not dispute Trevena’s
understanding of what he was owed, was sufficient to raise a
triable issue that Lu falsely represented that Trevena had an
ownership interest in Triller.
17
DISPOSITION
The trial court judgment is reversed as to Trevena’s fifth
cause of action for fraud and deceit; sixth cause of action for fraud
and intentional misrepresentation; seventh cause of action for
fraud in the inducement; eighth cause of action for fraudulent
concealment; ninth cause of action for promissory fraud; and
tenth cause of action for unfair competition derivative of the
fraud claim. We direct the trial court to enter an order granting
summary adjudication of the remaining causes of action.
Appellant to bear his own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, Acting P. J.
We concur:
HANASONO, J.
KARNOW, J.*
* Retired Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
18