Filed 9/23/26 Tran v. Coast Community College Dist. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
LOUIS TRAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G065696
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
01336537)
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE
DISTRICT et al., OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Robert Shawn Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.
Lakhman & Kasamatsu and Ann L. Lakhman for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Callahan & Blaine, David J. Darnell, James M. Sabovich and
John D. Stanley for Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff Louis Tran challenges summary judgment for
defendants Coast Community College District (Coast), Christine Nguyen, and
Randy Flint on his conversion claim. He contends triable issues exist as to
whether (1) he had a right to possess commercial kitchen equipment he had
installed in a café on defendants’ campus, and (2) defendants wrongfully
interfered with his attempts to retrieve the equipment.
We conclude plaintiff failed to raise any triable issue. The
undisputed evidence showed the lease required him to remove the equipment
before the lease expired; because he did not do so, he lost the right to possess
the equipment. And the undisputed evidence shows defendants nonetheless
gave plaintiff multiple opportunities to retrieve the property, showing they
had no intention to interfere with any possessory rights he may have had.
The trial court thus correctly granted summary judgment. We affirm.
FACTS
The parties’ separate statements establish the following
undisputed facts. Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with defendant
Coast allowing him to convert classroom space into a café. Plaintiff built the
café, installing various fixtures necessary for running the restaurant.
The lease stated the fixtures “shall remain the property of
[plaintiff] and shall be removed by [plaintiff]. Any personal property of
[plaintiff] not removed on or before the [e]xpiration [d]ate or any earlier
termination date shall be deemed to have been abandoned by [plaintiff] and
may be disposed of or retained by [defendants].” Defendants could also ask
plaintiff to remove “alterations or utilities installations.”
When the lease expired in October 2022, plaintiff did not remove
the fixtures. Defendants sent a letter in December 2022 instructing plaintiff
to contact them “to facilitate access to the premises and removal of said
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fixtures on or before January 5, 2023, after which date all remaining property
will be surrendered by the lessee.” Plaintiff went to campus to get his fixtures
the day before defendant’s deadline, however defendants did not know he was
coming. Because they did not have someone available to monitor removal of
the equipment, defendants did not allow plaintiff to enter the property. There
was an altercation during which a security guard tried to take plaintiff’s keys
and threatened to have him arrested.
Defendants sent an email in February 2023 offering plaintiff “one
final opportunity to remove [his] fixtures,” asking him to coordinate with
defendants to remove them. Plaintiff did not contact defendants or attempt to
remove his fixtures before the requested deadline.
A third letter in March 2023 then offered a “final notice to
remove [plaintiff’s] fixtures” and again asked plaintiff to coordinate with
defendants. This letter also advised plaintiff that any unremoved fixtures
would be deemed abandoned and would be “disposed of or retained by”
defendants. Plaintiff did not contact defendants or attempt to remove his
fixtures before the deadline.
Plaintiff’s second amended complaint asserted causes of action
for breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, conversion, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court sustained
defendants’ demurrer to all causes of action other than conversion. The trial
court then granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.1
1 Judgment was entered after the plaintiff filed his notice of
appeal. (See Mukthar v. Latin American Security Service (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 284, 288 [when an order on a summary judgment motion is
followed by entry of judgment, “the appellate court may deem the premature
notice of appeal to have been filed after the entry of judgment”].)
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DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends the court wrongly granted summary judgment
on his sole remaining cause of action for conversion because there are triable
issues of material fact as to whether he owned the equipment in question,
and whether defendants wrongfully interfered with those ownership rights.
“Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no triable
issues of material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on all causes of action.” (Choi v. Sagemark Consulting (2017) 18
Cal.App.5th 308, 318.) We review the trial court’s ruling de novo, viewing the
evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (Ibid.)
“‘Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the
property of another. The elements of a conversion are the plaintiff’s
ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of the conversion;
the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights;
and damages. It is not necessary that there be a manual taking of the
property; it is only necessary to show an assumption of control or ownership
over the property, or that the alleged converter has applied the property to
his own use.’” (Spates v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 208,
221 (Spates).)
Here, plaintiff has not raised a triable issue as to the first
element, his right to possession. Plaintiff does not dispute the lease’s validity
or that he was bound by its terms. The lease requires removal of all fixtures
before the stated expiration date and states unremoved fixtures are
“abandoned” by plaintiff. Plaintiff conceded he did not remove the restaurant
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equipment before the lease expired. By the terms to which he agreed, the
equipment was “deemed to have been abandoned.” 2
The expiration of the lease ended plaintiff’s possessory rights
and, consequently, his conversion claim. We are not persuaded by plaintiff’s
argument that the December 2022 letter inherently admits plaintiff’s
continued possessory rights by offering to allow plaintiff to come to campus to
get the items. The letter asserted the lease had expired and cited section 7.4,
confirming that personal property not removed before the lease’s expiration
shall be deemed abandoned. Nothing reasonably suggests defendants
restored plaintiff’s property rights by extending him grace.3
Even if plaintiff had retained some right to possession, he has not
raised a triable issue as to the second element: defendants’ conversion by a
wrongful act. (See Spates, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 222 [conversion claim
failed because “[a]s a matter of law, there was no wrongful act or disposition”
of the property].)
“To establish a conversion, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to
show an intention or purpose to convert the goods and to exercise ownership
2 At oral argument, defendants’ counsel cited Civil Code section
1019 as well as Wolfen v. Clinical Data, Inc. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 171, 179,
footnote 2 and Rinaldi v. Goller (1957) 48 Cal.2d 276, 282 in support of an
argument the fixtures were abandoned when the lease expired. We decline to
consider these authorities. (Quinteros v. Harbor Distributing, LLC (2026) 121
Cal.App.5th 60, 79 fn. 11 [“And we will not decide issues raised for the first
time at oral argument”].)
3 Plaintiff contends there are questions of fact which show he did
not intend to abandon the fixtures. However, plaintiff’s supporting facts
occurred after the lease expired. They are therefore immaterial.
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over them, or to prevent the owner from taking possession of his property.”
(Zaslow v. Kroenert (1946) 29 Cal.2d 541, 550 (Zaslow).)
Of particular relevance to this case, “the act of taking possession
of a building and locking it does not, of itself, constitute a conversion of the
personal property therein.” (Zaslow, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 550.) “[E]very
failure to deliver [property] is not such a serious interference with the
owner’s dominion that the defendant should be required to pay the full value
of the goods” as a conversion.4 (Ibid. [citing cases holding a person taking
lawful possession of a building was not liable for conversion of furniture or
machinery left inside].)
The undisputed facts show defendants did not “show an intention
or purpose to convert the goods and to exercise ownership over them, or to
prevent the owner from taking possession of his property.” (Zaslow, supra, 29
Cal.2d at p. 550.) Even after the lease expired in October 2022, defendants
repeatedly offered to let plaintiff collect his abandoned equipment. While his
first effort in January 2023 was unsuccessful due to the security guard, and
the parties dispute the exact circumstances leading up to that incident, it is
undisputed defendants again invited plaintiff to retrieve the equipment in
February 2023 and yet again in March 2023. Plaintiff cannot, in perpetuity,
ignore defendants and still hold them liable for conversion of property he
declined to retrieve.
On that point, plaintiff asserts for the first time on appeal that
there was a “subsequent refusal to allow removal of affixed items” in March
4 While Zaslow held the defendants were not liable for
conversion, it remanded the matter for determination of trespass damages
due to the defendants’ “intermeddling” with the property. (Zaslow, supra, 29
Cal.2d at p. 551.) Plaintiff has not asserted a trespass claim here.
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2024. Plaintiff testified at deposition he was eventually able to take some of
his property from the premises but not all of it—he was forced to leave the
items attached to the walls.
We do not reach this assertion. These facts are not in plaintiff’s
separate statement or in his response to defendants’ statements of fact
(Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2005) 133
Cal.App.4th 1197, 1214 [a fact missing from a party’s separate statement
precludes reliance on that fact or any theory in reliance on it].) Moreover, this
was not an argument made to the trial court. Contentions raised for the first
time on appeal will not be considered because neither the parties nor the
court had the opportunity to address them. (R & J Sheet Metal, Inc. v. W.E.
O’Neil Construction Co. of California (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 878, 912.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Responding party is entitled to costs
on appeal.
SCOTT, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SERVINO, J.
SCHWARM, J.*
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution
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