Filed 8/19/26 Toukhlandjian v. Petrosian CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
ARTHUR TOUKHLANDJIAN et al., B352437
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV39132)
v.
MOUSHEKH PETROSIAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Michael Shultz, Judge. Affirmed.
By the Law, Barzin Barry Sabahat, for Defendant and Appellant.
AJK Law Firm, Ara Joe Keropian, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
Parties must provide meaningful answers to basic discovery requests if
they wish to present their case at trial. Here, the trial court ordered
defendant Moushekh Petrosian to serve substantive responses to form
interrogatory 15.1, which asked him to identify the facts, witnesses, and
documents that supported his defense. Petrosian failed to comply with the
court’s order for two years, despite a verbal admonition from the court, for
which he was personally present. On the eve of trial, with Petrosian’s
responses still outstanding, plaintiff Arthur Toukhlandjian moved for
terminating sanctions. After giving Petrosian a final chance to serve
responses, and finding the responses Petrosian then served wholly
inadequate, the trial court granted the motion for terminating sanctions and
struck Petrosian’s answer. Petrosian now challenges that order on appeal.
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petrosian and Toukhlandjian were partners in a real estate business.
Unfortunately, their partnership dissolved into a lawsuit; Toukhlandjian
sued Petrosian in 2020, and Petrosian cross-complained in 2021.1
On September 16, 2021, Toukhlandjian served Petrosian with form
interrogatory 15.1, asking Petrosian to “[i]dentify each denial of a material
allegation and each special or affirmative defense in your pleadings and for
each: (a) state all facts upon which you base the denial or special or
affirmative defense, (b) state the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of
1 The complaint is not part of the record on appeal. The cross-complaint
alleges causes of action for breach of contract, fraud, and conversion, among
others.
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all persons who have knowledge of those facts, and (c) identify all documents
and other tangible things which support your denial or special or affirmative
defense, and state the name, address, and telephone number of the person
who has each document.” (Capitalization omitted).
Petrosian’s initial response objected to the interrogatory as “premature”
and claimed it violated the attorney-client privilege and attorney work
product doctrine. Toukhlandjian filed a motion to compel further responses.
Petrosian opposed. On March 2, 2023, the trial court granted the motion, but
did not provide a deadline by which further responses would be due.
A final status conference was held on July 2, 2024, and Petrosian still
had not provided further responses to form interrogatory 15.1. The court
verbally admonished counsel for Petrosian and warned him that responses
must be served. Petrosian was personally present in court to hear the
admonition. At some point, trial was rescheduled to summer 2025.
As of April 29, 2025, approximately three months before trial was then
scheduled to commence, Petrosian still had not served further responses to
form interrogatory 15.1. Toukhlandjian moved for terminating sanctions.
Petrosian opposed, arguing his failure to respond was the result of a mix-up
that occurred when he hired new counsel in October 2024. Petrosian also
complained that Toukhlandjian had waited years to take any steps to enforce
the court’s order compelling further responses. He said he was ready to
provide further responses if the court would allow.
The court initially heard the motion for sanctions on May 27, 2025.
Although the record contains no court order from that date, it appears the
court continued the motion to give Petrosian his requested chance to serve
further responses. On May 29, 2025, Petrosian did so. The new responses
did not mention the denials made in Petrosian’s answer, instead proceeding
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directly to the affirmative defenses. Petrosian waived certain defenses, but
for the remainder, his responses were all identical.
To the “state all facts” portion of the question, Petrosian said “[p]laintiff
was just a hard-money lender who collected all the funds and interest
thereto, which were paid to defendant.” To the “identify all witnesses”
portion, Petrosian responded “Plaintiff herein, Defendant herein.” To the
“identify all documents” portion, Petrosian said “[l]oan documents, escrow
documents showing distribution of funds to Plaintiff . . . for each property.”
On June 6, 2025, Toukhlandjian filed a supplemental reply
complaining that the responses were inadequate. On June 10, 2025,
Petrosian’s counsel filed a supplemental declaration in which he argued
Toukhlandjian was “n[i]t picking” and suggested that if he wasn’t satisfied
now, he never would be.
On June 20, 2025, the motion came on for hearing again and this time
the court granted it, striking Petrosian’s answer to the complaint. The
terminating sanctions order did not extend to Petrosian’s cross-complaint. At
some point, the record is not clear when or why, trial was continued again.
On September 25, 2025, the court held a default prove-up hearing on the
complaint and conducted a bench trial of the cross-complaint. On October 28,
2025, the court entered judgment for Toukhlandjian2 on both the complaint
and the cross-complaint, awarding him $292,791. Petrosian timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Petrosian challenges only the trial court’s decision to grant terminating
2 Toukhlandjian’s company, AIAA Home Holdings, LLC, was also a
plaintiff and is therefore also a party to the judgment and a respondent in
this appeal.
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sanctions on the complaint. We review that decision for abuse of discretion.
(Van Sickle v. Gilbert (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1516.)
The trial court found Petrosian willfully failed to respond to form
interrogatory 15.1, observing that Petrosian was ordered to provide further
responses in March 2023, was verbally admonished to provide further
responses in July 2024, and yet still had not complied when the motion for
sanctions was made in April 2025. The court noted that when Petrosian
finally did provide responses, they were incomplete — as they discussed his
affirmative defenses but not his denials of the allegations in the complaint —
and unusable. Finally, the court pointed to Petrosian’s argument that the
responses need not be improved. The court awarded terminating sanctions
because, more than two years after the responses were ordered and with trial
scheduled to commence in one month, Toukhlandjian was no better informed
about Petrosian’s position than he had been before. This was not an abuse of
discretion.
Petrosian argues there was no evidence to support the court’s finding
that his failure to respond was willful.3 But there was: he failed to comply
with a court order to serve responses for over two years, ignored a court
admonition to comply, at last produced only partial, boilerplate, evasive
responses, and finally took the position that any issue with those responses
3 Petrosian claims his changes of counsel after the court’s March 2023
order “preclude” any finding that his behavior was willful. He supports this
argument only with a citation to Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of
New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, a case that does not discuss
substitutions of counsel. The sanction was imposed on Petrosian, not his
counsel. Toukhlandjian points out that the knowledge of each counsel is
imputed to Petrosian. (Roche v. Hyde (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 757, 797–798
(Roche).) And Petrosian was personally present in July 2024 when the court
admonished his counsel to respond.
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was mere “n[i]tpicking.”
Petrosian also argues the trial court should have considered lesser
sanctions first. Yet he does not explain what lesser sanctions would have
been effective. The form interrogatory at issue seeks the most basic
information a defendant plans to use in response to the plaintiff’s complaint.
When the defendant refuses to provide meaningful answers for two years and
despite multiple court interventions, the court is not required to stop short at
monetary sanctions. Nor may the court reasonably tailor evidentiary or issue
sanctions under these circumstances. Evidentiary sanctions would exclude
every meaningful piece of evidence, and issue sanctions would eliminate
every issue. Had the court chosen to employ such sanctions, the result would
be practically indistinguishable from terminating sanctions.
Next, Petrosian complains that the motion for terminating sanctions
was a trap, and suggests the doctrine of unclean hands should have
prevented Toukhlandjian from waiting until the last moment to bring a
sanctions motion without any attempt to meet and confer.4 This argument
fails for several reasons.5 One, if this was a trap, it was a trap Petrosian
could have avoided at any point by complying with the court’s order and
serving further responses. Two, once the court ordered further responses,
Toukhlandjian had no obligation to meet and confer; the onus was on
4 Petrosian contends that proximity to trial alone is insufficient to justify
terminating sanctions. Whether he is correct or not, proximity to trial was
not the sole basis for the court’s order.
5 Petrosian relies on Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 42 and Kendall-Jackson Winery, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 76
Cal.App.4th 970, but neither case supports his position. Neither case applied
the unclean hands doctrine in a discovery context, much less as a defense to a
motion for terminating sanctions.
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Petrosian to comply. Three, the court gave Petrosian a chance to serve
responses even after the motion for terminating sanctions was filed. The
responses he served then were clearly inadequate, and when the
inadequacies were pointed out, Petrosian chose to argue that they were
insignificant rather than offer to correct them.
Finally, Petrosian claims the trial court violated his due process rights
by treating him differently than it treated Toukhlandjian.6 He explains that
in September 2025, just prior to trial, Toukhlandjian attempted to
voluntarily dismiss another defendant (not party to this appeal) but his
counsel’s office made a clerical error that resulted in the dismissal of the
entire complaint. Toukhlandjian’s motion to vacate the dismissal was
granted. Petrosian complains that “if [r]espondent’s [sic] attorney’s failure to
review a filing before submission constituted excusable neglect . . . then
[a]ppellant’s third counsel’s lack of notice regarding the March [2], 2023
minute order . . . surely warranted at minimum a continuance or an
opportunity to provide further supplemental responses.”
There is no double standard here. The court did give Petrosian an
opportunity to provide further supplemental responses, and the responses he
provided were insufficient. Further, Petrosian’s arguments repeatedly treat
counsel as the primary actors in this dispute, as if separated from the parties
they represent. But counsel are merely agents; the parties are the principals.
(Roche, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 797–798.) We do not view them
independently from one another. (Ibid.) And there is nothing unfair about
6 We have considered Petrosian’s argument that, apart from his
disparate treatment claim, imposing terminating sanctions on a defendant in
his circumstances violates constitutional due process protections. The
argument has no merit.
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permitting one side to correct a clerical error while imposing sanctions on the
other for two years of failure to provide basic discovery.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Respondents shall recover
their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, P. J.
We concur:
TAMZARIAN, J.
DAUM, J.
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