Filed 7/21/26 The Amah Mutsun Tribal Band v. County of San Benito CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE AMAH MUTSUN TRIBAL BAND, H053010
(San Benito County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. CU-22-00249)
v.
COUNTY OF SAN BENITO et al.,
Defendants;
HENRY RUHNKE et al.,
Real Parties in Interest and
Appellants;
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA ex rel. ROB BONTA, as
Attorney General,
Intervener and Respondent.
(San Benito County
CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL Super. Ct. No. CU-22-00247)
DIVERSITY et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
COUNTY OF SAN BENITO et al.,
Defendants;
HENRY RUHNKE et al.,
Real Parties in Interest and
Appellants;
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA ex rel. ROB BONTA, as
Attorney General,
Intervener and Respondent.
This appeal is from an order modifying a stipulated sealing order in litigation
under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code, § 21000
et seq.). By stipulation of all parties then involved—including real parties in interest
Henry Ruhnke, Thomas McDowell and Victoria McDowell Charitable Remainder
Unitrust, and Thomas John McDowell and Victoria Knight McDowell, trustees
(collectively, appellants or real parties) and petitioner the Amah Mutsun Tribal Band—
the trial court sealed Volume III of the administrative record: The court agreed with the
stipulating parties that the interest in protecting information about tribal cultural
resources and government-to-government communications overrode the public’s right of
access. When the Attorney General was granted leave to intervene for the People of the
State of California, the court modified its sealing order to grant the Attorney General
access to the sealed records. In modifying the sealing order, the court did not address
appellants’ objection that granting the Attorney General access on behalf of “the People”
meant Volume III should be unsealed as to all people. Without moving to unseal the
record in the trial court, real parties appealed the order modifying the sealing order.
Because real parties lack standing to appeal the modification order, we will dismiss the
appeal.
2
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Tribal Band’s Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint
The Amah Mutsun alleged that the County of San Benito, in approving appellants’
plan to develop tribal ancestral lands, rushed to produce a flawed Environmental Impact
Report without engaging “the [t]ribe in the kind of meaningful and timely consultation
required under CEQA.” The Amah Mutsun asserted three causes of action: (1) violation
of CEQA; (2) violation of CEQA “provisions intended to protect tribal cultural resources,
known collectively as ‘AB 52’ ”; and (3) violation of state planning and zoning laws.
B. The Sealing Order
In 2023, the trial court entered a stipulated sealing order. The parties to the
litigation, including the Amah Mutsun and appellants, stipulated to organize the
administrative record into three volumes, the third of which would “include the
confidential tribal cultural resource and related consultation files to be lodged under
seal.” The parties stipulated that good cause existed for sealing Volume III. The court
found that “an overriding interest in protecting … confidential information about tribal
cultural resources and government-to-government consultation” overcame the right of
public access to Volume III of the administrative record. (Pub. Resources Code,
§ 21082.3, subds. (c)(1)–(2) & (f) [prescribing nondisclosure, subject to exception for
confidential exchange of information, of “information submitted by a California Native
American tribe during the consultation or environmental review process”]; id., § 21084.3,
subd. (b)(2)(C) [protecting confidentiality of tribal cultural resource].) The court ordered
access “restricted to the court and the parties and their respective attorneys” and
prohibited the parties and their attorneys “from disclosing the contents of any materials
that have been sealed in anything that is subsequently publicly filed.”
C. The Attorney General’s Intervention
In 2025, the Attorney General sought and received leave to intervene on behalf of
the People. The Attorney General’s proposed petition for writ of mandate in intervention
3
included a single cause of action for violation of CEQA. Like the Amah Mutsun, the
Attorney General alleged that the county rushed its CEQA review and failed to
adequately consult the tribal band.
D. Modification to the Sealing Order and Appeal
With its motion for leave to intervene, the Attorney General also moved to modify
the sealing order “to grant the Attorney General’s Office access to volume III of the
administrative record.” The Attorney General sought to access Volume III subject to the
same conditions as the existing parties to the litigation.
Appellants opposed, arguing that if the Attorney General wanted to access the
sealed records, the Attorney General had to demonstrate why the records should still be
kept sealed from the public. Filing no motion of their own, appellants in their opposition
urged the trial court to unseal the entire record to the public if the Attorney General was
granted access. The county joined appellants’ opposition, suggesting that sealing might
be more narrowly tailored by publicly filing a redacted version of Volume III with only
“specific information [that] requires protection” redacted.
The trial court granted the motion. It reasoned that the People’s intervention was a
“changed circumstance” justifying modification to permit the Attorney General access to
the “Confidential Record” because the grant of leave to intervene made “the People …
become a party to the case.”
Appellants timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Appealability and Standing
We begin by addressing whether the trial court’s order modifying its earlier
sealing order to permit the Attorney General to access the sealed records is appealable, an
issue central to our jurisdiction. (See Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007)
158 Cal.App.4th 60, 75 (Mercury Interactive).) The Attorney General moved to dismiss
the appeal on the alternate grounds that the order is not appealable and that appellants
4
lack standing to prosecute their appeal. Having deferred the motion for consideration
with the merits, we will now grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.1
Generally, only final judgments are appealable. (Mercury Interactive, supra,
158 Cal.App.4th at p. 76.) But several courts have determined that “[o]rders concerning
the sealing and unsealing of documents are appealable as collateral orders.”
(Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 471, 481,
fn. 2 (Overstock); see also Oiye v. Fox (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1063–1064 (Oiye).)
The collateral order doctrine permits appeal from a final order on a collateral
matter. (See Mercury Interactive, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 76.) The Supreme Court
has explained that the appealed order “ ‘must direct the payment of money by appellant
or the performance of an act by or against him.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Sjoberg v. Hastorf
(1948) 33 Cal.2d 116, 119; see also Sese v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th
710, 716 [holding that order denying interim attorney fees was not appealable because it
did not direct the payment of money or compel any act by or against the appellant].) The
continued vitality of this requirement has come under some question, although its
application has been described as the majority approach. (See Lester v. Lennane (2000)
84 Cal.App.4th 536, 561–562 [discussing split of authority and applying requirement];
Dr. V Productions, Inc. v. Rey (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 793, 797–799 [discussing split of
authority]; Muller v. Fresno Community Hospital & Medical Center (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 887, 902 [concluding that “the supposed limitations of a payment of
money and the performance of an act are in actuality indications that the order in question
is collateral to the main action,” but a collateral order is appealable where a court is
satisfied that it is “truly collateral”].)
1
We also grant the Attorney General’s May 6, 2025 application for leave to file a
reply. We have considered the reply brief included with the application.
5
The modification order at issue here did not direct payment of money by
appellants or the performance of an act by or against them. The order allowed the
Attorney General access to the sealed records because the People had become a party to
this litigation. The sensitive information to which the Attorney General was granted
access was not sensitive to appellants. This case is therefore distinguishable from those
finding that orders sealing or unsealing records were appealable. (Cf. Mercury
Interactive, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 68, 77, 107 [holding that unsealing was an act
against defendants where trial court unsealed documents that had been produced by a
defendant in discovery and designated confidential pursuant to a protective order before
being filed under seal by the plaintiffs]; Oiye, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1047, 1062–
1064 [holding that defendant could appeal order that sealed a declaration defendant
submitted]; Overstock, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 479, 481–483 [defendants appealed
denial of requests to seal information produced in discovery under protective order];
Marino v. Rayant (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 846, 850, 855, fn. 2 [defendant appealed from
denial of request to seal restraining order proceedings, which defendant contended were
making it difficult for him to apply for jobs and increasing the scrutiny he faced by
airport authorities when returning from international travel]; In re Marriage of Tamir
(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1077, 1078, fn. 5, 1087–1089 [unsealing documents
including financial records from divorce and related proceeding was appealable]; In re
Marriage of Nicholas (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1569, 1573, fn. 3 (Nicholas)
[unsealing documents from contentious marital dissolution proceeding was appealable];
In re Marriage of Burkle (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1050, 1051, fn. 6 [vacating
provisional sealing order concerning financial and other records from divorce proceeding
was appealable]; In re Providian Credit Card Cases (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 292, 296–
297, fn. 2, 308 [unsealing defendants’ alleged trade secrets was an act against
defendants]; In re Marriage of Lechowick (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1408–1410 [order
denying journalist’s motion to unseal records in a marital dissolution proceeding was
6
appealable]; Gilbert v. National Enquirer, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1148, fn. 3,
1149 [unsealing information about appellant’s drug use, alcohol, and sexual relationships
was appealable].) Indeed, it remains debatable whether the modification order modified
the sealing order at all. The sealing order had always applied to the “parties” and their
attorneys. Although the stipulation treated “the Parties” as a defined term, “the parties”
was not a defined term in the sealing order. Thus, the sealing order’s own terms could
reasonably be interpreted to grant the Attorney General self-executing access—without
need for modification—once the Attorney General became party to the suit.
Even if the modification order might be appealable as a collateral order, appellants
lack standing to challenge the order because they are not aggrieved by the order. (See
Six4Three, LLC v. Facebook, Inc. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 109, 115; see also Code Civ.
Proc., § 902.) “[A] party is aggrieved if an order ‘injuriously affect[s]’ its rights or
interests. [Citation.] The injured interest must be ‘recognized by law’ [citation], and the
injury must be ‘immediate, pecuniary, and substantial’; it cannot be nominal or be ‘ “ ‘a
remote consequence of the judgment.’ ” ’ ” (Six4Three, at p. 115.) The order does not
injuriously affect appellants’ rights or interests.
Appellants contend that they are aggrieved because the modification order
deprives them of their right to have the case adjudicated in public. Not so. The
modification order granted the Attorney General access to the sealed records as a party
intervening in ongoing litigation. The modification order in no way altered the scope of
the information that can, and cannot, be filed publicly in the CEQA litigation. Although
appellants complain that they are unable to resort to sealed records to respond—“in the
court of public opinion”—to the Attorney General’s allegation that the CEQA process
was “ ‘rushed,’ ” that constraint was an express purpose of the stipulated sealing order,
which was entered after the Amah Mutsun had made the same allegation. The injury
appellants claim was the logical and intended end of the sealing order to which appellants
stipulated. Appellants’ belief there is a greater public interest in disclosure now that the
7
Attorney General has intervened is a ground to argue in a motion to unseal, not in this
context.2
Appellants’ asserted concern for public access to future filings may be raised—by
a proper motion—in the trial court: To the extent appellants dispute that Volume III
comprises only “records that are required to be kept confidential by law” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 2.550(a)(2))3 and that are therefore exempt from operation of rules 2.550 and
2.551, they may move to unseal the records (rule 2.551(h)(2)) and may oppose any
request to seal future filings. But the order appellants have appealed is not a source of the
injury that they claim as their basis for standing.
Equally unavailing are appellants’ suggestions that the modification order is
tantamount to an unsealing order such that it requires a court to reassess issues not raised
by the motion, including whether the records are properly kept sealed from the public.
Rule 2.550(d) requires a trial court to make specified findings before it may order
that a record be filed under seal. It does not require the same findings when a court
unseals material or narrows the scope of a prior sealing order. Rather, rule 2.551(h)(4)
requires courts to “consider” the same “matters” in determining whether to unseal a
record. Rule 2.551(h)(5) requires the court to “specify the particular records that are
2
We reject appellants’ premise that participation as a party by “the People of the
State of California” makes the interest in universal access to all evidence before the fact
finder presumptively dispositive. (See, e.g., Gov. Code, § 65352.4 [acknowledging
“ ‘tribes’ potential needs for confidentiality with respect to places that have traditional
tribal cultural significance”]; Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21080.3.1, subd. (b)
[incorporating Gov. Code, § 65352.4], 21082.3, subd. (c)(1) [prohibiting disclosure to the
public of “[a]ny information submitted by a California Native American tribe during the
… environmental review process”].)
3
Undesignated rules references are to the California Rules of Court.
8
unsealed” and “the particular persons who may have access to the record” if it “unseals
only part of the record or unseals the record only as to certain persons.”4
The rules supply no basis to compel the trial court to reconsider its sealing order
more broadly than a noticed motion for unsealing requires.5 Instead, the rules expressly
require a noticed motion before sealed records may be unsealed: Rule 2.551(h)(3)
precludes the trial court from ordering a record unsealed on its own motion without
giving the parties notice and a reason for unsealing the record; rule 2.551(h)(2) requires a
party seeking to have a record unsealed to make that request by noticed motion. So
appellants’ opposition to the Attorney General’s duly noticed motion was not a proper
vehicle for the relief it sought. Appellant’s contrary position both flouted
rule 2.551(h)(2) and invited the trial court to flout rule 2.551(h)(3). In issuing the
modification order, the court ruled on no more and no less than the limited question
raised by the Attorney General’s motion. It had neither the occasion nor the authority to
reach the question appellants would like us to review.
Were we to reach the merits of the appeal, we would find it meritless for the same
reasons. Appellants’ unsupported premise is that the Attorney General, to obtain access
to the sealed records, had to support and defend the original sealing order to which
appellants had stipulated. Under this novel theory, appellants contend that either (1) the
Attorney General should be denied any access to the sealed records because the Attorney
General failed to demonstrate that they had been properly sealed in the first place; or
(2) the Attorney General should be given access only if the records are made universally
4
We note that the challenged modification order did not change the status of any
previously sealed record or authorize access for anyone other than the “ ‘parties and their
respective attorneys’ ” for the purpose of “fully participat[ing] as a party in the case.”
5
Appellants’ invocation of Nicholas is inapt. Nothing in the Nicholas court’s
discussion of revisiting sealing orders obviates the need for a noticed motion. (Nicholas,
supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1575, 1577; see also rule 2.551(h)(2)–(3).)
9
accessible. The Attorney General should, in other words, have no greater access to
protected material than persons or entities lacking any interest in the litigation. Even
construing the motion as seeking to unseal the records “as to [a] certain person[]”
(rule 2.551(h)(5)), the Attorney General did not seek to unseal the records as to the public
but pledged to abide the confidentiality requirements applicable to all parties in the case.
We fail to discern the logic of putting the Attorney General to the burden of
demonstrating that the records are properly sealed when the Attorney General had no role
in the original sealing and merely seeks access—coextensive with the original parties’—
to records that were already sealed by appellants’ stipulation.6
B. Motion to Unseal the Appellate Record
At appellants’ request, the administrative record was transmitted to this court.
(See rules 8.121(b)(1) & 8.123(b)(1).) Because Volume III was sealed by the trial court,
it remains sealed in this court. (See rule 8.46(b).) Seven weeks after the filing of
respondents’ briefs, appellants moved this court to unseal Volume III. (See
rule 8.46(f)(2).) Through this motion, appellants ask us to decide, in the first instance,
whether Volume III may properly remain sealed. (See rule 8.46(f)(5).) But our dismissal
of the appeal requires no consideration of the administrative record, so we will instead
strike the administrative record from the record on this improper appeal.7 (See
6
Because we express no opinion on the propriety of the trial court’s sealing or
unsealing any part of Volume III, we deny the Attorney General’s October 27, 2025
request for judicial notice filed in support of their respondent’s brief.
7
“ ‘Courts prefer to rest their decisions upon the merits of causes, rather than to
spend time on matters collateral to questions on appeal.’ ” (Diaz-Barba v. Superior
Court (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1481.) For example, courts prefer to consider
appeals “ ‘on all of the briefs submitted, rather than to spend time determining what, if
any, portions of briefs are or are not relevant, or should or should not be stricken out.’ ”
(Id. at p. 1482.) Here, however, striking a broad category of irrelevant material from the
appellate record obviates any need to resolve a question not presented by this improper
appeal.
10
Overstock, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 500 [explaining that striking irrelevant material
obviates the need to address related sealing issues]; Oiye, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1070 [noting “the court’s control” of its files and records]; rule 8.121(b)(2) [limiting
requirement that appellants request transmittal of administrative record to circumstance
where appellate claim requires consideration of that record]; see also rule 8.123(e)
[providing for return of administrative record].) Appellants’ December 16, 2025 motion
to unseal is denied.8
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. The Amah Mutsun Tribal Band and the Attorney
General shall recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
8
Because we do not reach the motion’s merits, we also deny the Attorney
General’s January 14, 2026 request for judicial notice in support of his opposition to the
motion and appellants’ January 16, 2026 application for leave to file a reply in support of
the motion.
11
LIE, J.
WE CONCUR:
GROVER, Acting P. J.
WILSON, J.
Ruhnke et al. v. The Amah Mutsun Tribal Band
H053010