Filed 10/16/26 Tarzana Property, LLC v. Work CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
TARZANA PROPERTY, LLC, B342802
Plaintiff and
Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23VECV00647)
VINCE WORK,
Defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Shirley K. Watkins, Judge. Affirmed.
The Law Office of Cliff Dean Schneider and Cliff Dean
Schneider for Defendant and Appellant.
Grant Shenon Almaraz, David M. Almaraz and Gabriela
Gevorkian for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
A tenant rented a house under a written lease in which he
agreed that the house was “in good order, repair, and in a safe,
clean and tenantable condition” and promised that he would
return it “in as good a state and condition” when he vacated the
property. The tenant left the house in shambles after using it as
a marijuana grow house for nearly seven years. The landlord
sued for breach of the lease, and a jury awarded over $500,000 in
unpaid rent and in damages to repair the house. The trial court
allowed the tenant to argue that the landlord had consented to
the modifications made to the house (and resulting damage), and
thereby waived the lease’s requirement to return the house in a
good condition. But the court largely precluded any evidence
about which of two ex-spouses was in control of the limited
liability corporation (LLC) that was the landlord throughout
much of the lease. The tenant argues on appeal that exclusion of
this evidence was error. It was not. We accordingly affirm the
judgment for the landlord.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The lease, its amendment and its addendum
On May 15, 2016, Vince Work entered into a written lease
to rent a residential property on Tarzana Drive in Tarzana,
California for a period of three years at $6,000 per month. As
pertinent here, the lease also contained the following terms:
-- Condition of the property, upon receipt and upon
return. Work “stipulate[d], represent[ed] and warrant[ed]” that
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he “examined” the property and that at the time of the lease, the
property was “in good order, repair, and in a safe, clean and
tenantable condition.” Critically, Work was required to
surrender the property at the end of the lease “in as good a state
and condition as [the property was] at the commencement” of the
lease (subject to “reasonable use and wear and tear”).
-- Late fee. Work was required to pay a late charge of
$200 per day if he failed to timely pay the monthly rent.
-- Utilities. Work was “responsible for . . . paying for all
utility services” at the property.
In June 2016, Work signed an amendment that negated
some of the provisions of the original lease—namely, the
provisions that had prohibited Work from making any
unauthorized “alterations” or “improvements” to the property,
had required Work to make all repairs to the property, and had
required Work to use the property as a personal residence and to
“comply with any and all laws, ordinances, rules and orders”
relating to the “use” of the property.
In May 2019, Work signed an addendum to the lease that
extended the term for another two years (through May 2021) and
raised the monthly rent to $15,000.
B. Identity and control of the landlord
The landlord named in the original lease was Israel Turk,
but Sheri Reinsdorf—Turk’s granddaughter—signed the lease as
Turk’s attorney-in-fact under a power of attorney. At that time,
Sheri was married to Ronald Reinsdorf.1
1 Because the Reinsdorfs share the same last name, we use
their first names for clarity; no disrespect is intended.
3
Work and Ronald were partners in a business to cultivate
and grow marijuana.
After Turk passed away in October 2016, the property was
transferred to a local synagogue, but almost immediately
purchased by Tarzana Property, LLC (the LLC).2
Control of the LLC has changed over time. At the time the
LLC became the landlord over the property, Ronald was its sole
member. After Sheri filed for dissolution of marriage in
November 2018, Ronald and Sheri signed a “deal memo” in
October 2021 obligating Ronald to transfer his interest in the
LLC to Sheri, but Ronald did not formally do so until an
assignment executed in January 2024.
C. Work’s use and treatment of the property
From 2016 until December 2022 (after the extended term
expired and the lease was a month-to-month tenancy), Work and
Ronald used the property to cultivate and grow marijuana.
Work voluntarily vacated the property on January 31,
2023.3
When Sheri inspected the property in February 2023, it
“was destroyed and completely uninhabitable.” The installation
and dismantling of the grow equipment had caused “brutal
changes” to the property. Electrical and plumbing components
had been added and then removed. A watering system had been
integrated throughout the property, resulting in random holes in
the ceiling and large holes in the walls to run piping. The
2 The parties do not dispute that the LLC has since been the
operative landlord under the lease.
3 The LLC attempted to evict Work, but did not ultimately
invoke that process because Work voluntarily vacated.
4
concrete slab foundation had been opened up with a jackhammer
to access the main sewer line for drainage from the watering
system. There was also damage to the ceilings, walls, and floors
caused by “vast amounts of water.” Walls had been erected in
front of windows, doorways, and sliding glass doors to block the
light.
II. Procedural Background
A. Complaint
On February 20, 2023, the LLC sued Work for breach of the
lease.4 Specifically, the LLC asserted that Work breached the
lease by (1) failing to pay rent; (2) failing to pay accrued late fees;
(3) failing to pay an outstanding utility bill; and (4) leaving the
property in a worse condition than he received it.
B. Trial
The case proceeded to a four-day jury trial in November
2024.5
During the trial, Work did not contest that he had not paid
rent in November 2022, December 2022, and January 2023. He
also did not contest that he incurred late fees for the nonpayment
of rent. And it was undisputed that a utility bill for over $53,000
was still outstanding.
The chief issue at trial was Work’s liability for damage to
the property. The damaged state of the property when Work left
was uncontested, and the LLC’s expert testified that repairing
the damage would cost $652,355.62. The parties introduced
4 Work filed a cross-complaint, which was dismissed.
5 Ronald’s motion to intervene in the action was denied, and
this court affirmed that ruling. (Tarzana Property, LLC v. Work
(Sept. 9, 2026, B341346) [nonpub. opn.].)
5
conflicting evidence of the condition of the property at the time
the lease began: In support of the LLC, Sheri testified that there
was no “cultivation business at the house at the time [Work]
leased the property.” In support of Work, Ronald testified that he
had made all of the changes to the property before the lease
began (and had been the one to dismantle all the equipment at
the end of the lease).
The court ruled that Work could argue that, by virtue of
Ronald’s conduct, the LLC had consented to the modifications to
the property and thereby waived the lease’s provision obligating
Work to return the property in “as good a state and condition” as
when it was leased to him. Consistent with that ruling, the court
also instructed the jury on the theory of waiver and consent, and
used a special verdict form that explicitly asked the jury to decide
whether the lease provision had been waived.
Work also sought to introduce evidence regarding who was
in control of the LLC—Sheri or Ronald—during the time period
when Work was occupying the property.6 The trial court
excluded that evidence, reasoning that this was a landlord-tenant
action brought by the LLC, that the issue of who was controlling
the LLC at any given time was not relevant to any issue beyond
waiver and consent (which the court had ruled was relevant), and
that delving into issues of control also risked resurrecting the
family law issues that had been settled in the dissolution action. 7
6 Work also moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
Sheri did not control the LLC at the time the lawsuit was filed,
but the trial court denied the motion.
7 The court’s reasoning is spelled out during various
colloquies throughout the reporter’s transcript. Work moved to
augment the record with minute orders relevant to the court’s
6
Notwithstanding the trial court’s ruling, the LLC called Sheri in
its rebuttal case to testify that she had “been the 100 percent
owner member of [the LLC] during the entire time” for which the
LLC was claiming damages. The trial court ruled that this
testimony “opened the door” to the issue of the LLC’s governance,
and permitted Work to introduce the 2024 assignment to impeach
Sheri. On redirect examination, Sheri testified to ownership of
the LLC based on the 2021 deal memo.
The jury returned a special verdict in favor of the LLC.
The jury found that (1) Work failed to pay $45,000 in rent for
November 2022, December 2022, and January 2023; (2) Work
owed $5,600 in late fees; (3) Work owed the $53,642.74
outstanding utility bill; and (4) no waiver of the lease’s provisions
regarding damage had occurred, such that Work was liable for
$430,555, which was the amount the jury determined was needed
to repair the property to the state and condition it was in at the
commencement of the lease.
C. Judgment and appeal
Following the entry of judgment in favor of the LLC in the
amount of $534,797.74, Work timely filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
Work challenges the judgment, arguing that the trial court
erred in not allowing him to introduce evidence and argument
reasoning. We deny that motion as untimely. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.155, advisory comment [court may deny motion to
augment the record if not “made within a reasonable time”];
Second District Court of Appeal Local Rule 2(b) [request to
augment should be made within 40 days of filing the record;
motions filed after that deadline “will not be granted except upon
a showing of good cause”].)
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regarding whether Sheri or Ronald owned or controlled the LLC
during the lease. We reject this challenge for two reasons.
First, Work has waived his challenge by submitting an
opening brief that contains no citations to authority (beyond one
citation for the standard of review), and contains a recitation of
the facts that is one-sided, sometimes inaccurate or unsupported
by record citations, and, most importantly, omits the evidence
supporting the judgment.8 (Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners
Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862 [“‘When an appellant . . .
asserts [a point] but fails to support it with . . . citations to
authority, we treat the point as waived.’”]; Forman & Clark Corp.
v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 [noting that the failure to
include a statement of facts that meets the legal requirements
may result in a waiver of any question of the existence of
substantial evidence]; In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194
Cal.App.4th 1507, 1531 [recitation of evidence “in a fashion
favorable” only appellant is “not to be condoned”].) Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).)
Second, Work’s challenge lacks merit because the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the challenged
evidence and argument. (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371,
401 [evidentiary rulings reviewed for an abuse of discretion].)
To be sure, who owned and controlled the LLC during the
lease is relevant to the extent that the LLC, through the actions
of its owner, may have acceded to damage to the property,
thereby waiving the lease’s provision obligating Work to return
the property “in as good a state and condition” as he received it.
(Casey v. Hill (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 937, 978 [waiver is a state
8 Although Work represented himself at trial, he has counsel
on appeal.
8
law contract defense].) But the trial court allowed Work to
introduce evidence and to argue that Ronald—by installing the
grow equipment at the property himself prior to the lease’s
initiation—had consented to the alteration of the property, such
that the LLC could not be heard to complain it came back in a
wrecked condition. Contrary to what Work asserted during oral
argument, the trial court ruled that the waiver and consent
defense applied regardless of who owned the LLC at the time of
the conduct allegedly constituting that waiver or consent. The
jury in any event heard evidence that Ronald signed the lease
amendment and addendum as “landlord”, that Ronald
“manage[d]” and was “in control of” the property and was “acting
on behalf of [the LLC]”, and that Sheri was fully aware of and
consented to the grow operation. The jury nevertheless rejected
that defense, and its rejection was supported by substantial
evidence—namely, Sheri’s testimony that the grow operation had
been installed only after the lease began, such that the property
had been returned to the landlord in a damaged condition.9
(Accord, Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America (1985) 38 Cal.3d 892,
906-907.)
The trial court acted within its discretion in excluding
Work’s proffered evidence regarding who owned or controlled the
LLC for purposes beyond establishing consent and waiver. For
9 Work’s related argument that the 2024 assignment was
“essential” to show that the LLC authorized the exact
“alterations and resulting property condition for which [the LLC ]
later sought damages” ignores that the jury’s verdict was based—
not upon the later-repealed lease provision requiring the LLC’s
permission for alterations—but instead on the separate and
distinct provision obligating Work to return the property to the
LLC in “as good a state and condition” as it was initially rented.
9
starters, ownership and control of an LLC, by itself, has no
intrinsic relevance in a lawsuit initiated by the LLC (Evid. Code,
§ 210), and Work has articulated no theory of relevance and
offered no authority in support of its relevance (beyond consent
and waiver). What is more, any relevance for purposes other
than consent and waiver would at most be marginal, such that
the trial court acted within its discretion to exclude the evidence
under Evidence Code section 352 because such marginally
relevant evidence risked confusing the jury by turning a landlord-
tenant dispute into a continuation of the dissolution proceeding
between Ronald and Sheri. Even if we assume there was error,
the jury ultimately heard nearly all of the evidence regarding
ownership and control (including the 2021 deal memo and the
2024 assignment) when Sheri took the stand in rebuttal—yet the
jury still found Sheri’s evidence more persuasive. (E.g., People v.
Garcia (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1050 [asking whether
erroneous evidentiary ruling creates a “reasonable probability” of
affecting the result].)
We also reject Work’s broader variant of this argument—
namely, that he should have been able to adduce evidence that
the entire lease is an unenforceable “sham” “solely intended to
serve as a means of transferring profits of [the grow] business to
[Sheri and Ronald] without disclosing the true source of the
income.” This argument ignores that the lease contains an
integration clause that negates all prior and subsequent oral
agreements. As a result, extrinsic evidence of other side-deals or
oral promises inconsistent with the terms of the lease are
inadmissible and were properly excluded. (Code Civ. Proc.,
10
§ 1856, subd. (a); Civ. Code, § 1625; Grey v. American
Management Services (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 803, 806-807, 809.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The LLC is entitled to costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
BAKER
_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)
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