Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

Tarin v. Super. Ct. CA1/5

Filed 11/20/26 Tarin v. Super. Ct. CA1/5
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 11/20/26 Tarin v. Super. Ct. CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

NAFISA TARIN,
Petitioner,
A175073
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF (Contra Costa County
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Super. Ct. No.
C23-00683)
Respondent;
RADC ENTERPRISES, INC., et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.

The original plaintiff in this case, Kasim Tarin (Kasim),1
filed a complaint alleging a claim against employer RADC
Enterprises, Inc. (RADC), under the Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Private Attorneys General Act or
the Act; Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.)2 as well as other Labor Code

1 The record is inconsistent as to the original plaintiff’s

name. His operative first amended complaint listed his name as
“Tarin Kasim,” but later documents filed by his counsel refer to
him as “Kasim Tarin.” To avoid confusion with his successor in
interest, Nafisa Tarin, we refer to the original plaintiff as
“Kasim” and to his successor as “Tarin.” The record is also
inconsistent as to the spelling of his successor’s first name, but
“Nafisa” is used in the vast majority of references in the record,
so we use it for purposes of this opinion.

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code.

1
claims. After Kasim died, the trial court permitted his daughter,
Nafisa Tarin (Tarin), to continue the other Labor Code claims as
successor in interest, but the court concluded that she lacked
standing to substitute in for purposes of the Private Attorneys
General Act claim because she had never been an employee of
RADC. Subsequently, the trial court denied Tarin’s motion for
leave to amend the complaint to substitute in a former RADC
employee as named plaintiff for purposes of the Private Attorneys
General Act claim. The court reasoned that the Act’s standing
and administrative exhaustion requirements preclude
substitution of another plaintiff. Tarin seeks review of that
decision in this petition for a writ of mandate. We hold that the
trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the Private
Attorneys General Act precludes substitution in the
circumstances here.

BACKGROUND

A.

To strengthen enforcement of the Labor Code, the Private
Attorneys General Act authorized aggrieved employees to recover
civil penalties, acting as private attorneys general on behalf of
the state. (See § 2699; Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 1104, 1116 (Adolph); see also Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc.
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 664, 681.) An employee who sues under the Act
functions as an agent of the state—the real party in interest—
and may seek any civil penalties that the state can seek.
(Adolph, at pp. 1116–1117; see also Turrieta, at pp. 681–682.)
The benefits of the Act are intended “ ‘primarily to benefit the
general public,’ ” not the employee who brings the action.
(Adolph, at p. 1116.)

To have standing to bring an action as an “aggrieved
employee,” under the version of the Act effective at the time
Kasim filed his operative Private Attorneys General Act

2
complaint on June 1, 2023,3 the plaintiff must have been
employed by the employer and suffered at least one Labor Code
violation by the employer. (See § 2699, former subd. (c); Adolph,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1116, 1120–1121.)

Before an aggrieved employee may “commence” a lawsuit
under the Act, the employee must first exhaust the claims by
providing written notice to the Labor and Workforce
Development Agency (Agency) and to the employer of the specific
Labor Code provisions allegedly violated, and the facts and
theories supporting the alleged violations. (§ 2699.3, subd.
(a)(1)(A).) After providing such notice, the aggrieved employee
“may commence a civil action pursuant to Section 2699” if the
Agency does not respond within 65 calendar days (or responds
indicating the Agency does not plan to investigate the alleged
violations). (§ 2699.3, subd. (a)(2)(A).) The purpose of the
requirement is to allow the Agency to determine whether to

3 After Kasim filed his Private Attorneys General Act

action, the Legislature passed amendments to the Act generally
applicable to actions filed on or after June 19, 2024. (See Stats.
2024, ch. 44, § 1 [enacting Assem. Bill No. 2288 (2023–2024 Reg.
Sess.), eff. July 1, 2024]; Stats. 2024, ch. 45, § 1 [enacting Sen.
Bill No. 92 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.), eff. July 1, 2024]; Stats. 2025,
ch. 67, §§ 134–135 [enacting Assem. Bill No. 1170 (2025–2026
Reg. Sess.), eff. Jan. 1, 2026]; see also § 2699.5, subd. (b).) Among
other changes, the amendments changed the definition of
“aggrieved employee” for some purposes to “a person employed by
the alleged violator who ‘personally suffered each of the
violations alleged’ during a specified timeframe.” (See Stone v.
Alameda Health System (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1040, 1076, fn. 19,
citing § 2699, subd. (c)(1).) In addition, under the new law, the
portion of the recovery paid to aggrieved employees has been
increased from 25 to 35 percent. (See Stone, at p. 1076 & fn. 19,
citing § 2699, subd. (m).) Here, there is no dispute that Kasim’s
Private Attorneys General Act action is governed by the former
version of section 2699 because it was filed before the effective
date of the amendments.
3
allocate its limited resources to investigating the claims or,
instead, allow the employee to proceed on the Agency’s behalf.
(Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1117.)

Claims under the Act are subject to a one-year statute of
limitations period under Code of Civil Procedure section 340,
subdivision (a), which is tolled for up to 65 days during the
Agency review period. (See Lab Code., § 2699.3, former subd. (d);
LaCour v. Marshalls of California, LLC (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th
1172, 1184–1185; see also Lab. Code, § 2699.3, subd. (e).)

B.

Kasim notified the Agency on March 24, 2023 that he was
pursuing a representative Private Attorneys General Act claim
against RADC. On June 1, 2023, he added his representative
claim under the Act to an existing lawsuit by filing a first
amended complaint. His representative claim alleged that he
was an aggrieved employee under Labor Code section 2699,
subdivision (c), and that RADC violated its duties to him and
other aggrieved employees with respect to the provision of meal
periods and rest breaks, payment of overtime and minimum
wages, payment of wages in a timely fashion, payment of wages
during and upon termination, provision of wage statements,
provision of sick leave, and reimbursement of necessary work-
related expenses. His complaint also alleged class-based claims
under the Labor Code (Lab. Code, §§ 201–204, 226, 226.7, 1194,
2802) and unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et
seq.). As to those claims, Kasim sought to represent a class of
RADC employees who worked in California during the period
from October 1, 2018 to the present.

After Kasim died in January 2025, the trial court granted
Tarin’s request to substitute in as Kasim’s successor in interest
for purposes of the class action claims. Immediately after the
court denied her substitution request as to the representative
Private Attorneys General Act claim, Tarin filed an unopposed
4
motion for leave to file an amended complaint that would
substitute Monica Praster in as named plaintiff in place of
Karim. Tarin’s proposed amendments sought to insert Praster’s
name as named plaintiff, without changing the factual basis or
legal theories in the operative complaint. In an accompanying
declaration, Praster asserted that she had worked for RADC for
three years, from 2021 until May 2024.

Simultaneously, Praster filed a motion to intervene in the
case as named plaintiff for the representative Private Attorneys
General Act claim, which RADC opposed. Prior to moving to
intervene, Praster had notified the Agency of her representative
claim under the Act on February 10, 2025. Praster was also the
plaintiff in a separate Private Attorneys General Act lawsuit
against RADC, filed in April 2025.

The trial court denied the motions by both Tarin and
Praster.4

DISCUSSION

A.

A writ of mandate is appropriate in all cases in which there
is otherwise no “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the
ordinary course of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086; Gomez v.
Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 686.) Although
mandamus review is not available to compel an exercise of
discretion, it is appropriate to correct an abuse of discretion, as
Tarin contends occurred here. (See Gomez, at p. 686; see also
Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 164 (Peterson)
[issuing a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to
grant leave to amend the complaint]; Figueroa v. Northridge
Hospital Medical Center (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 10, 13 (Figueroa)

4 Praster has separately appealed from the trial court’s

denial of her intervention motion, which is not at issue in Tarin’s
writ petition.
5
[explaining that mandamus review is available to challenge
denial of a motion for leave to amend a complaint].)

Absent writ review, Tarin would have to wait to obtain
review on appeal from a final judgment. (See Figueroa, supra,
134 Cal.App.4th at p. 12 [explaining that denial of a motion for
leave to amend a complaint is nonappealable unless all issues in
the case have been resolved].) The delay would result in
piecemeal litigation of the underlying Labor Code violations and
the Private Attorneys General Act claim and an inefficient use of
the court’s and the parties’ resources. (Cf. Peterson, supra, 31
Cal.3d at p. 164 [“ ‘mandamus will lie when it appears that the
trial court has deprived a party of an opportunity to plead his
cause of action or defense, and when extraordinary relief may
prevent a needless and expensive trial and reversal’ ”].)

RADC contends that because Praster has a separate
Private Attorneys General Act action pending, she would have an
adequate remedy if denied writ review. However, RADC does not
explain how Praster’s separate litigation provides a remedy for
Tarin, the petitioner in this writ proceeding.

We therefore conclude that writ review is appropriate.

B.

Tarin contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying her leave to amend her complaint to substitute in
Praster as the named plaintiff. We agree.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision
(a)(1), “[t]he court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any
terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or
proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party.”
Although leave to amend rests in the trial court’s discretion, the
“courts liberally allow amendments for the purpose of permitting
plaintiffs who lack or have lost standing to substitute as plaintiffs
the true real parties in interest,” as long as the defendant is not
6
prejudiced. (Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v.
Nextel Communications, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 131, 135–
136 (Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights); see also
Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235,
243 (Branick); Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th
294, 305–306 (Demetriades).) Amendment should be freely
allowed, “ ‘particularly when the only change is a substitution of
parties without alteration of the substantive grounds of the
suit.’ ” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 995, 1006–1007 (Cloud).) When the “mere addition
of a party plaintiff d[oes] not alter the general set of facts
originally alleged,” the “defendants [a]re not prejudiced and no
reasonable purpose would [be] served” by refusing the
amendment. (Citizens Assn. for Sensible Development of Bishop
Area v. County of Inyo (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 151, 160 (Citizens
Assn.).)

For purposes of the statute of limitations, an amendment
will “relate[] back” to, or be deemed filed as of the date of, the
original complaint where the amended complaint “ ‘(1) rest[s] on
the same general set of facts, (2) involve[s] the same injury, and
(3) refer[s] to the same instrumentality, as the original one.’ ”
(Branick, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 244.) An amendment to
substitute a party is ordinarily entitled to relation-back effect “so
long as recovery is sought on the same general set of facts as those
alleged in the original complaint.” (Cloud, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1006, citing Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co.
(1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 600.) The requirement that recovery in the
amended complaint be sought based on the same general set of
facts fulfills the “the main policy of the statute of limitations,”
which is “to put defendants on notice of the need to defend
against a claim in time to prepare a fair defense on the merits.”
(Citizens Assn., supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 160.)

7
Here, Tarin proposed to amend the complaint solely to
substitute in Praster as named plaintiff for the representative
claim under the Act. The proposed amendments would not have
prejudiced RADC because they would not have changed the
factual allegations against which RADC would have to defend.5
(See Citizens Assn., supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 160.) The trial
court erred in denying leave to amend under these circumstances.

Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights is instructive.
In that case, the original plaintiff, a foundation, lost standing
when the standing requirements for actions under the unfair
competition law were modified subsequent to the filing of the
lawsuit. (Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights, supra,
143 Cal.App.4th at p. 133.) The foundation “sought to add a
plaintiff . . . who [wa]s allegedly a member of the group of injured
persons whom the [foundation] originally sought to represent,
and who allege[d] the same misconduct originally alleged by the”
foundation. (Id. at p. 136.) The court concluded that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend, because
“[a]mendments of this kind are liberally permitted, and there was
no reason to prohibit the amendment in this case.” (Ibid.; see
also Cloud, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1011 [holding that where
the plaintiff lacked standing to sue, the trial court should have
granted leave to amend the complaint].) The same is true here.

RADC argues that the trial court correctly concluded that
leave to amend was inappropriate because the Act’s standing and
exhaustion requirements preclude substitution of an aggrieved
employee and application of the relation back doctrine. The trial

5 RADC does not contend that allowing substitution would

have delayed the trial date or added to the burdens of discovery.
(See Demetriades, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 306 [explaining
that in considering whether to grant leave to amend a complaint
to substitute a party, the court may consider whether the
substitution would prejudice the defendant, such as by delaying
trial or increasing discovery burdens].)
8
court reasoned that Praster could not be an “ ‘aggrieved
employee’ ” under section 2699, subdivision (c)(1), for purposes of
substitution where she was not employed by RADC in 2018, the
beginning of the class period for the Labor Code claims, and
where her administrative notice was not “contemporaneous” with
Kasim’s. That conclusion was legally erroneous.

As alleged, Praster was plainly an aggrieved employee
under section 2699, former subdivision (c). She was employed by
RADC from 2021 to May 2024, and Tarin’s proposed amendment
alleges that Praster suffered the same violations asserted by
Kasim. (See § 2699, former subd. (c).) As a result, Praster has
standing to pursue an action under the Act. (See Adolph, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 1114.) For the same reason, we reject RADC’s
contention that allowing substitution here would equate to an
improper “assign[ment]” of Kasim’s claim. (See Amalgamated
Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2009) 46
Cal.4th 993, 1003 [holding that a Private Attorneys General Act
cause of action is not assignable].) The proposed amendment
relies on Praster’s standing as an aggrieved employee in her own
right, rather than any assignment of Kasim’s interest.

The fact that Praster was not an RADC employee in 2018,
at the beginning of the class period for Kasim’s class-based
claims, matters not. Kasim’s Private Attorneys General Act
claim was not a class claim, as his complaint expressly stated.
(See Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 975 [holding
that representative Private Attorneys General Act actions need
not satisfy class action requirements]; see also Estrada v. Royalty
Carpet Mills, Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 582, 607.) Given that the
limitations period for claims under the Act is one year (see Code
Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (a); Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1117),
the relevant time frame for Kasim’s Private Attorneys General
Act action began the year before he filed his administrative notice

9
and first amended complaint, in 2022—when Praster was
employed by RADC.

The trial court also reasoned that Praster could not have
been an aggrieved employee because her administrative notice
was not filed until February 2025, nearly two years after Kasim
filed his March 24, 2023 notice. Yet the definition of “aggrieved
employee” in section 2699 makes no reference to an
administrative exhaustion requirement. (See § 2699, subd. (c)(1);
§ 2699, former subd. (c).) Moreover, section 2699.3, which
contains the exhaustion requirement, sets forth requirements for
an “aggrieved employee” to commence a civil action—making
clear that whether an employee is “aggrieved” is separate from
whether the employee has satisfied the exhaustion requirement.
Further, exhaustion is a precondition to the commencement of the
action. (§ 2699.3, subd. (a)(1)(A).) The exhaustion provision
imposes no requirement that an aggrieved employee wishing to
continue an action, already commenced, must file a new notice.
(See ibid.; see also Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management,
Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1150 [“By its express language,
section 2699.3 governs only the commencement of actions under
the [Private Attorneys General Act], not the continuation of
actions or the filing of amended complaints in actions that were
[already] pending”], disapproved on another ground in ZB, N.A. v.
Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 196, fn. 8.) As a result, the
timing of Praster’s administrative notice did not impact her
standing to substitute in as named plaintiff.

Our conclusion is consistent with Hutcheson v. Superior
Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 932, 941 (Hutcheson), which held
that nothing in the Act precludes substitution and application of
the relation back doctrine even where the proposed substitute’s
administrative notice is filed subsequent to the date of the
original plaintiff’s notice. In that case, because the original
named plaintiff, Van Steenhuyse, no longer wished to continue

10
with the suit, Hutcheson sought to replace Van Steenhuyse as
the named plaintiff. (Id. at p. 937 & fn. 2.) The parties
stipulated to the filing of an amended complaint adding
Hutcheson and removing Van Steenhuyse as the named plaintiff,
but the employer argued that Hutcheson could not benefit from
the earlier complaint and administrative notice filed by Van
Steenhuyse based on the relation back doctrine. (Id. at pp. 938,
940–945.) After reviewing the statutory requirements for
standing, exhaustion, and the limitations period, the court
disagreed, concluding that “nothing in the [Act] prohibits”
Hutcheson from taking over Van Steenhuyse’s action. (Id. at pp.
941, 939.) At the time Van Steenhuyse filed his original
complaint, Hutcheson met the standing requirements for an
aggrieved employee because he was an employee of the defendant
employer and the alleged violations had been committed against
him. (Id. at p. 941.) Further, although Hutcheson could not
himself have filed suit at the time of Van Steenhuyse’s original
complaint because he had not yet submitted his administrative
notice, he fulfilled the exhaustion requirement four months later,
before he sought to substitute in for Van Steenhuyse. (Id. at p.
941.) As a result, “Hutcheson met th[e] [notice] requirement
before he became a plaintiff in his own suit, and before he became
a plaintiff in the suit that Van Steenhuyse had filed.” (Ibid.) The
court saw “no bar to Van Steenhuyse, who acts as the proxy of the
[Agency], substituting a qualified plaintiff to take his place as the
[Agency]'s proxy.” (Ibid.)

Hutcheson further explained that its conclusion was
consistent with the Legislature’s objective of strengthening the
enforcement of the Labor Code. (Hutcheson, supra, 74
Cal.App.5th at p. 942.) Precluding substitution would allow the
employer to “avoid[] potential liability for civil penalties over
some period of time, simply because Van Steenhuyse
relinquished his role as a representative plaintiff,” which would
weaken enforcement of the Act. (Id. at p. 944.) The court’s
11
holding was also consistent with the goals of the administrative
exhaustion requirement. (Id. at p. 943.) Both purposes of the
requirement—allowing the Agency to decide whether to
investigate a claim, and giving the employer an opportunity to
submit a response to the Agency—were met when Van
Steenhuyse submitted his notice. (Ibid.) In addition, allowing
Hutcheson to substitute in based on Van Steenhuyse’s
administrative notice “would not grant the [Agency] or Hutcheson
or any other aggrieved employees the potential for any more than
they had under Van Steenhuyse’s original complaint.” (Id. at p.
944.) As a result, Hutcheson’s amended complaint, substituting
Hutcheson in and removing Van Steenhuyse as named plaintiff,
could relate back to the date of Van Steenhuyse’s original
complaint. (Id. at p. 945.)

Under Hutcheson, the Private Attorneys General Act does
not preclude substitution of a named plaintiff who qualifies as an
“aggrieved employee,” even though the substitute plaintiff’s
administrative notice was filed subsequently to the original
plaintiff’s notice. (Hutcheson, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at pp. 941–
942.) Here, as in Hutcheson, the proposed substitute, Praster,
was an aggrieved employee at the time the original complaint
was filed because she was employed by the defendant employer
and had suffered an alleged violation. (See § 2699, former subd.
(c); Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1114.) The original plaintiff,
Kasim, satisfied the administrative notice requirement before
filing suit, which served to notify both the Agency and RADC.
Although Praster did not submit her own administrative notice
until February 10, 2025, nearly two years after Kasim’s notice,
she met the exhaustion requirement well before Tarin sought
leave to amend the complaint for substitution purposes. Notably,
RADC does not contend that Praster’s substitution would change
the period for which damages are recoverable for purposes of
Kasim’s action. Praster’s substitution would not enlarge the
issues in Kasim’s original complaint, but instead would continue
12
the representative action that Kasim had commenced. (See
Hutcheson, at p. 944.)

Hargrove v. Legacy Healthcare, Inc. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
782, relied upon by the trial court and by RADC, does not compel
a contrary result. In Hargrove, Cornell sought leave to replace
Hargrove as the named plaintiff in a representative Private
Attorneys General Act action after Hargrove died. (Id. at p. 786.)
The court recognized that under some circumstances, “a [Private
Attorneys General Act] complaint may be amended to provide for
the substitution of another person as the representative plaintiff
in the action,” and an amended Private Attorneys General Act
complaint may relate back to the original complaint. (Id. at pp.
789–790.) The court held, however, that substitution and
relation back were improper in that case because at the time that
Hargrove’s original complaint was filed, Cornell was not an
aggrieved employee. (Id. at pp. 791–793.) Cornell’s employment
with the defendant employer did not start until four years after
Hargrove’s employment had ended, so the two never worked for
the defendant employer at the same time. (Id. at pp. 787, 793.)
Under those circumstances, Hargrove concluded that Cornell
could not benefit from Hargrove’s earlier administrative notice
under the relation back doctrine. (Id. at p. 792.)

Here, unlike in Hargrove, Praster was an aggrieved
employee at the time Kasim’s Private Attorneys General Act
complaint was filed as well as at the time that he submitted his
administrative notice, and her employment predated the
beginning of the limitations period in 2022. As in Hutcheson, the
Act’s statutory requirements do not preclude Praster’s
substitution as the named plaintiff in place of Karim in his
representative action.

Finally, RADC argues that allowing substitution in the
circumstances here would circumvent the amendments to the Act
enacted after Kasim filed suit, because Praster’s separate Private

13
Attorneys General Act action is subject to the amendments.
RADC asserts generally that subsequent reforms narrowed
standing requirements, reformed penalty structures, expanded
employer’s cure rights, and granted trial courts broader authority
to manage representative claims. RADC has not pointed,
however, to any specific difference that would affect the litigation
and cause it prejudice. Ultimately, once Kasim filed his Private
Attorneys General Act action, RADC was faced with defending
against a representative claim that was subject to the pre-2024
statutory scheme and reached violations from 2022 forward.
Nothing about Tarin’s proposed substitution of Praster would
alter that.

In sum, the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Tarin leave to amend the complaint to substitute Praster as
named plaintiff in the representative Private Attorneys General
Act action.

DISPOSITION

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the
respondent trial court to grant leave to amend the complaint.
Tarin is awarded her costs in this writ proceeding. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(A).)

BURNS, J.

WE CONCUR:
SIMONS, Acting P. J.
CHOU, J.

Tarin v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (A175073)

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