Filed 8/7/26 Tanghe v. De La Cruz CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
Californi a Rul es of Co urt, rul e 8. 11 15( a), pro hibit s c ou rts an d part ies from citi ng or r ely ing o n op inio ns
not c ertifie d for p ubli cati on or order ed p ubli sh ed, exc ept a s s pe cifie d b y rul e 8. 11 15(b) . T his opin ion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ARIANNA ELIZABETH TANGHE,
F090175
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. FL-25-000316)
v.
JUAN DE LA CRUZ, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. David
Hood, Judge.
Arianna Elizabeth Tanghe, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Murphy, Pearson, Bradley & Feeney, Suzie M. Tagliere and Lauren Holappa for
Defendant and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Harrell, J.
Arianna Elizabeth Tanghe appeals in propria persona from a June 5, 2025 order of
the Stanislaus County Superior Court denying her petition for a protective order against
Juan De La Cruz pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 15657.03. She also
appeals from the court’s May 15, 2025 order denying her request to continue the trial date
and reopen discovery. In her opening brief, Arianna2 contends the court’s denial of
discovery “limited,” “frustrated,” and “depriv[ed] [her] from vindicating” her “statutory
rights” (capitalization omitted) under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil
Protection Act (§ 15600 et seq.). We conclude the denial was proper because Arianna
was not entitled to conduct discovery in a section 15657.03 proceeding. We affirm the
May 15, 2025 order and the June 5, 2025 order of the trial court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Arianna—a dependent adult—lives with Robert Tanghe and Kelli King-Tanghe,
her parents and conservators. Robert and Kelli are members of their community’s
homeowners’ association (HOA) and Robert is a member of HOA’s board of directors
(HOA Board).
Liberty Property Management (Liberty) is HOA’s property management company.
De La Cruz is employed by Liberty as a community manager and reports directly to the
HOA Board.
On August 23, 2024, Robert e-mailed De La Cruz with a complaint about a
neighbor. Robert alleged the neighbor engaged in “hostile environment harassment and
discriminating conduct against” Arianna by “vocaliz[ing] about ‘getting rid of the
cripples’ in the neighborhood when Kelli pushes Arianna in her adapted racing chair” and
throwing “nails onto [their] driveway,” “unknown substances at [their] courtyard wall,”
1 Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent statutory citations refer to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.
2 In this opinion, we refer to individuals who share the same surname by their
given names. No disrespect is intended.
2.
and “what appears to be fecal matter at [their] house.” De La Cruz relayed Robert’s
complaint to the HOA Board, which then directed De La Cruz to send a letter to the
neighbor advising “any discriminatory language is not acceptable.”
After receiving the foregoing letter, the neighbor contacted De La Cruz and
disputed Robert’s allegations. In addition, the neighbor claimed a security camera at the
Tanghe residence “was pointed at his courtyard” near his daughter’s bedroom and he
“didn’t feel comfortable being recorded.” De La Cruz relayed the neighbor’s complaint
to the HOA Board, which then directed De La Cruz to send a letter to Robert. The
letter—dated December 20, 2024—identified Robert as the recipient and HOA as the
sender and read in part:
“It has been reported that there is a camera and a bright light pointed at
your neighbor’s courtyard. Please remove or relocate[] the camera and
light.
“Rules, Regulations and Enforcement Procedures, Section II (A). Noise,
Use and Enjoyment: All owners, residents, and guests must refrain from
any activities which unreasonably annoys or disturbs other Owners or
residents.” (Boldface & italics omitted.)
On February 5, 2025, Robert and Kelli—on Arianna’s behalf—filed a form EA-
100 “Request for Elder or Dependent Adult Abuse Restraining Orders” (boldface
omitted) against De La Cruz. Robert and Kelli alleged the following abuse occurred on
December 20, 2024:
“Mr[.] De La Cruz demanded we remove a security camera that showed a
trespassing neighbor and was used in filing a complaint with the
C[alifornia] Civil Rights Dep[ar]t[ment] and obtaining a [temporary
restraining order] against that harassing neighbor[.] [¶] … [¶]
“Due to the ongoing harassment, Arianna … cannot sleep in her own bed in
her own bedroom. Given her developmental delay, she does not understand
why she is being ‘punished’ (her words)[.]” (Some capitalization omitted.)
3.
They further alleged:
“Mr[.] De La Cruz has known since 8/23/24 that [the neighbor] has been
harassing Arianna due to her disability. He has communicated, aided, and
abetted [the neighbor] in violation of State and Federal Fair Housing Acts,
the Ralph Civil Rights Act, and the Bane Civil Rights Act….”
Robert and Kelli sought personal conduct orders, stay-away orders, an order for
counseling, and a temporary restraining order, among other things.
On February 7, 2025, the superior court issued a temporary restraining order and
scheduled a March 3, 2025 hearing. At the March 3, 2025 hearing, the court scheduled a
June 5, 2025 short cause trial.
On or around March 24, 2025, Robert—on Arianna’s behalf—propounded a
request for production of documents, including those demonstrating any communication
between De La Cruz and the neighbor “[b]etween August 1, 202[4] and March 24, 2025.”
In a letter to Robert dated March 27, 2025, counsel for De La Cruz objected to the
request on the basis “discovery is not appropriate” “at this juncture.”
On May 1, 2025, Robert—on Arianna’s behalf—filed a request to continue the
June 5, 2025 trial date and reopen discovery. On May 2, 2025, the superior court
scheduled a May 15, 2025 hearing thereon and ordered Arianna to file and serve her
moving papers regarding discovery by May 8, 2025, and De La Cruz to file and serve
opposition papers by May 13, 2025. On May 13, 2025, De La Cruz filed an opposition.
He emphasized Arianna failed to file and serve the moving papers. In a “Findings and
Order After Hearing” (boldface & some capitalization omitted) filed May 15, 2025, the
court denied Arianna’s May 1, 2025 request without prejudice, finding “[t]here is no
proof of service on file and [De La Cruz] has filed an opposition objecting to notice and
service.”
At the June 5, 2025 short cause trial, Robert—appearing on Arianna’s behalf—
gave an opening statement in which he asserted (1) Arianna “is a victim of crime
committed by” the neighbor, who is “the main harasser”; (2) De La Cruz as community
4.
manager failed to “take prompt action to correct and end a discriminatory housing
practice by a third party”; (3) De La Cruz “communicated with [the neighbor] and
demanded that a security camera [at the Tanghe]’s dwelling be removed”; and (4) the
actions of both the neighbor and De La Cruz caused “mental suffering, fear, and
emotional distress.” Robert “renew[ed] [his] objection to the Court not allowing limited
discovery per [Code of Civil Procedure section] 2024.050.”
De La Cruz testified he reported directly to the HOA Board, which made the
determinations as to members’ complaints. With regard to Robert’s complaint against
the neighbor, De La Cruz acknowledged receipt thereof, notified the HOA Board, “let
[Robert] know that the [HOA B]oard was taking necessary steps to address it,” and
forwarded the family’s subsequent e-mails to the HOA Board “to keep them updated.”
De La Cruz added he only saw Robert “once a month at [the] regularly scheduled [HOA
B]oard meetings” and encountered Arianna “twice when she attend[ed] [said] meetings.”
In an oral statement of decision, the court concluded the burden of proving De La
Cruz subjected Arianna to physical abuse, neglect, abandonment, isolation, or any other
treatment resulting in physical harm or pain or mental suffering was not met, pointing out
the family’s “legitimate concerns” were “really focused on [the] neighbor” and “may also
be focused on the [HOA B]oard.” The court also observed “there’s no legal basis … to
allow discovery in these types of proceedings ….” The petition for a section 15657.03
protective order was denied and the temporary restraining order was terminated.
DISCUSSION
As noted, Arianna contends on appeal the superior court’s denial of discovery
“limited,” “frustrated,” and “depriv[ed] [her] from vindicating” her “statutory rights”
(capitalization omitted) under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act
(§ 15600 et seq.). Here, the particular right at issue is the right to obtain a protective
order under section 15657.03.
5.
“An elder or dependent adult who has suffered abuse, as defined in Section
15610.07,[3] may seek protective orders ….” (§ 15657.03, subd. (a)(1).) “Upon filing a
petition for protective orders … , the petitioner may obtain a temporary restraining order
….” (Id., subd. (d).) “Within 21 days, or, if good cause appears to the court, 25 days,
from the date that a request for a temporary restraining order is granted or denied, a
hearing shall be held on the petition. If no request for temporary orders is made, the
hearing shall be held within 21 days, or, if good cause appears to the court, 25 days, from
the date that the petition is filed.”4 (§ 15657.03, subd. (f).) Though section 15657.03 is
detailed, nothing therein expressly provides for discovery. (See ibid.; see also Code Civ.
Proc., § 1858 [“In the construction of a statute … , the office of the Judge is simply to
ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what
has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted ….”]; cf. Thomas v. Quintero (2005)
126 Cal.App.4th 635, 650, fn. 11 (Thomas) [“There is no provision under [Code of Civil
Procedure] section 527.6 allowing for discovery ….”].)
Furthermore, the expedited process described in section 15657.03, subdivision (f)
does not harmonize with the usual discovery timelines. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 2024.020, subds. (a), (b) [discovery proceedings must be completed “on or before the
30th day” “before the date initially set for the trial of the action” and “continuance or
3 Section 15610.07, subdivision (a) reads:
“ ‘Abuse of an elder or a dependent adult’ means any of the following: [¶]
(1) Physical abuse, neglect, abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other
treatment with resulting physical harm or pain or mental suffering. [¶]
(2) The deprivation of a care custodian of goods or services that are
necessary to avoid physical harm or mental suffering. [¶] (3) Financial
abuse ….”
4 The statute allows for continuances. (See § 15657.03, subds. (m) [“The
respondent shall be entitled, as a matter of course, to one continuance, for a reasonable
period, to respond to the petition.”], (n)(1) [“Either party may request a continuance of
the hearing, which the court shall grant on a showing of good cause…. The court may
also grant a continuance on its own motion.”].)
6.
postponement of the trial date does not operate to reopen discovery proceedings”],
2025.210, subd. (b) [plaintiff may serve deposition notice “on any date that is 20 days
after” service of complaint], 2025.270, subd. (a) [oral deposition must be scheduled “for
a date at least 10 days after service of the deposition notice”], 2030.260, subd. (a)
[written response to interrogatories due 30 days after service thereof].) We observe
Division Two of the First Appellate District reached a similar conclusion in Thomas,
supra, 126 Cal.App.4th 635 with respect to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, the
statute governing civil harassment restraining orders. In finding “there is insufficient
time in which to conduct discovery” “under the civil harassment scheme” (Thomas,
supra, at p. 650, fn. 11), the appellate court was likely referring to Code of Civil
Procedure section 527.6, former subdivision (d), whose language is comparable to that
found in section 15657.03, subdivision (f).5 (See Byers v. Cathcart (1997) 57
Cal.App.4th 805, 811 [“quick and truncated procedure” for Code of Civil Proc., § 527.6
antiharassment injunctions]; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before
Trial (The Rutter Group 2026) ¶ 9.699.3, p. 73 [“[B]ecause the hearing date is so prompt
[under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6], there is no time to conduct discovery.”];
5 At the time Thomas was decided, Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6,
subdivision (d) (added by Stats. 2002, ch. 1009, § 2) read in part:
“Within 15 days, or, if good cause appears to the court, 22 days from the
date the temporary restraining order is issued, a hearing shall be held on the
petition for the injunction….”
Former subdivision (d) was subsequently redesignated as subdivision (g). (See
Stats. 2013, ch. 158, § 2.) Current Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6,
subdivision (g) reads:
“Within 21 days, or, if good cause appears to the court, 25 days from
the date that a petition for a temporary order is granted or denied, a
hearing shall be held on the petition. If a request for a temporary
order is not made, the hearing shall be held within 21 days, or, if
good cause appears to the court, 25 days, from the date that the
petition is filed.”
7.
see also Wendz v. State Dept. of Education (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 607, 633 [“ ‘To
understand the intended meaning of a statutory phrase, we may consider use of the same
or similar language in other statutes, because similar words or phrases in statutes in pari
materia ordinarily will be given the same interpretation.’ ”].)
In her brief, Arianna cites several cases for the proposition the denial of discovery
“is unconscionable” and “is counter intuitive” to, “frustrates the legislative intent of,”
“thwarts the public reason” behind the enactment of, “impermissibly weakens” the Elder
Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act. None of these cases, however, dealt
with the question of whether discovery is allowed in a section 15657.03 proceeding.
Because Arianna was not entitled to conduct discovery in a section 15657.03
proceeding,6 the superior court properly denied her request therefor.7
DISPOSITION
The May 15, 2025, and June 5, 2025 orders are affirmed. Costs on appeal are
awarded to respondent Juan De La Cruz.
6 To the extent Arianna believes this determination amounts to a “denial of all
discovery” in all proceedings under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil
Protection Act, she is mistaken. (See §§ 15657 [civil action for abuse of elderly or
dependent adults], 15657.02, subd. (a)(1)(A) [preponderance-of-the-evidence evidentiary
standard for any claim of remedies sought under § 15657 where “[t]he plaintiff prevails
on a discovery motion pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 2023.030 of the Code of
Civil Procedure due to spoliation of evidence by the defendant”].)
7 In light of our conclusion, we need not address De La Cruz’s other
counterarguments.
8.