Filed 7/2/26 Tafoya v. Booster Fuels CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
ANTHONY TAFOYA, C104234
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 24CV014406)
v.
BOOSTER FUELS, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Anthony Tafoya filed a putative class action lawsuit against his former
employer Booster Fuels, Inc. (Booster Fuels), alleging violations of the Labor Code
and unfair business practices, and seeking civil penalties under the Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) (PAGA). Booster Fuels
moved to compel arbitration of Tafoya’s individual claims under the Federal Arbitration
Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) (FAA). Tafoya resisted arbitration, arguing that he belonged
to a class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce exempt from FAA
coverage because his job involved refueling Amazon delivery trucks. The trial court
agreed with Tafoya and denied the motion to compel arbitration. Because it concluded
the FAA did not apply and Tafoya’s claims were not arbitrable under Labor Code
sections 229 and 432.6, the trial court did not consider the other claims raised in Booster
Fuels’ motion.
1
Booster Fuels now contends the FAA exemption does not apply in this case
because (1) Tafoya did not establish that the class of workers to which he belonged
typically fueled Amazon delivery trucks, and (2) in any event, a class of workers that
typically fueled Amazon delivery trucks would not be engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.
We conclude Tafoya has not established that the FAA exemption applies in this
case. Tafoya’s FAA exemption claim is based on the fact that he typically fueled
Amazon delivery trucks. But there is insufficient evidence to support an implied
finding that the relevant class of workers consisted of Booster Fuels service professionals
who typically fueled Amazon delivery trucks. In any event, the evidence indicates that
the fuel Tafoya delivered was purchased and obtained in California, and there is
insufficient evidence that Tafoya and other Booster Fuels service professionals typically
drove outside California for their jobs, or typically handled or moved goods traveling to
or from other states or countries. In other words, there is insufficient evidence that
Tafoya, and the relevant class of workers, were transportation workers exempt from the
FAA.
We will reverse the trial court’s order and remand the matter so the trial court may
consider the other claims raised in Booster Fuels’ motion.
BACKGROUND
Tafoya was employed by Booster Fuels as a service professional. Although
Booster Fuels did business in California, Oregon, and Washington, it maintained
partnerships with local fuel providers in each of those states for the delivery of fuel to
fleet, office, and commercial parking lots. Tafoya’s primary job duty was to drive a fuel
truck, deliver fuel to commercial fleet vehicles in the Sacramento region, and fill the fuel
tanks of those vehicles. He drove from West Sacramento, California to client sites within
California, regularly fueling more than 150 vehicles per shift. A significant number of
the vehicles Tafoya fueled were Amazon delivery trucks. Tafoya fueled Amazon
2
delivery trucks at Amazon distribution centers in the greater Sacramento area. All of the
fuel Tafoya delivered was purchased and obtained in California.
Tafoya filed a complaint against Booster Fuels on July 18, 2024. The operative
pleading asserted causes of action for violations of the Labor Code, unfair business
practices, and for civil penalties under PAGA.
Booster Fuels moved under the FAA to compel arbitration of Tafoya’s
individual claims. It also moved to strike the class allegations and stay the action
pending completion of arbitration. Tafoya opposed the motion, arguing that he was
a transportation employee exempt from the FAA, and that California Labor Code
sections 229 and 432.6 barred arbitration of his claims.
The trial court denied Booster Fuels’ motion to compel arbitration, concluding that
Tafoya was a transportation worker engaged in interstate commerce and, therefore,
exempt from the FAA. The trial court found that Tafoya delivered fuel to Amazon
trucks, and that the goods arriving at Amazon distribution centers were part of interstate
commerce. It ruled that fueling Amazon trucks was essential to the interstate and foreign
transportation of goods by Amazon trucks. It further ruled that Tafoya could not be
compelled to arbitrate his claims under Labor Code sections 229 and 432.6. Because it
concluded the FAA did not apply and Tafoya’s claims were not arbitrable under Labor
Code sections 229 and 432.6, the trial court did not consider the other claims raised in
Booster Fuels’ motion.
DISCUSSION
I
Tafoya’s FAA exemption claim is based on the fact that he typically fueled
Amazon delivery trucks. Booster Fuels contends the FAA exemption does not apply in
this case because Tafoya did not establish that the class of workers to which he belonged
typically fueled Amazon delivery trucks.
3
The FAA governs arbitration agreements in contracts “evidencing a transaction
involving commerce.” (9 U.S.C. § 2; New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira (2019) 586 U.S. 105,
110 (New Prime Inc.).) However, it does not “apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.” (9 U.S.C. § 1.) At issue here is whether Tafoya falls within a class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce within the meaning of section 1 of the
FAA.
The party opposing arbitration bears the burden of demonstrating that the FAA
section 1 exemption applies. (Betancourt v. Transportation Brokerage Specialists, Inc.
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 552, 559; see Shearson/American Express v. McMahon (1987)
482 U.S. 220, 227.) We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence
and its conclusions of law de novo. (Nieto v. Fresno Beverage Co., Inc. (2019) 33
Cal.App.5th 274, 279.) Substantial evidence is evidence that is “ ‘ “of ponderable legal
significance,” ’ ” reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. (JKH Enterprises,
Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1057.) Whether
the FAA applies is a legal question we determine de novo. (Betancourt, at p. 559; Nieto,
at p. 279.)
In Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022) 596 U.S. 450 (Saxon), the United States
Supreme Court instructed that courts must conduct a two-step analysis in deciding
whether a worker falls within the FAA section 1 exemption. A court must first define
the relevant class of workers to which the worker belongs, and then determine whether
that class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. (Saxon, at p. 455.)
In defining the relevant class of workers, a court must consider the actual work the class
as a whole typically carried out, and not what the company, employer, or industry
generally did. (Id. at p. 456; accord Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC (2024)
601 U.S. 246, 253-255 (Bissonnette).)
4
Tafoya worked for Booster Fuels as a service professional. The job description
for that position stated that service professionals drove fuel trucks to deliver fuel to
commercial and industrial fleet customers and pumped fuel into 80 to 150-plus
customer vehicles per shift. Tafoya averred that his primary job duty at Booster Fuels
was to drive a truck to deliver fuel to commercial fleet vehicles and fill the fuel tanks of
those vehicles. He regularly fueled 150-plus vehicles per shift. The evidence showed
that Tafoya belonged to a class of workers who typically delivered fuel to commercial
and industrial fleet vehicles of Booster Fuels customers and filled those vehicles with
fuel.
Tafoya averred that a significant number of the vehicles he fueled were
Amazon delivery trucks. There was no evidence, however, that Booster Fuels
service professionals, as a class, typically fueled Amazon delivery trucks, and thus
there is insufficient evidence to support an implied finding that the relevant class of
workers was Booster Fuels service professionals who typically fueled Amazon delivery
trucks.
II
Booster Fuels further contends the FAA exemption does not apply in this case
because a class of workers that typically fueled Amazon delivery trucks would not be
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
The United States Supreme Court has explained that the FAA exemption
applicable to workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce pertains to
transportation workers. (Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001) 532 U.S. 105,
109, 119 (Circuit City Stores, Inc.).) Although the exemption is not limited to
workers in the transportation industry (Bissonnette, supra, 601 U.S. at pp. 249, 252,
5
256),1 and the transportation workers need not physically move goods across foreign or
interstate boundaries (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 461), the exemption applies to workers
who play a direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders and are
actively engaged in the transportation of goods across borders through channels of
foreign or interstate commerce (Saxon, at p. 458; accord Bissonnette, at p. 256).
The issue in Saxon was whether a Southwest Airlines ramp supervisor was a
transportation worker exempt under section 1 of the FAA. (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at
p. 453.) Contrary to Tafoya’s contention that the frequency with which other workers
performed identical tasks is immaterial, the court in Saxon explained that the word
“engaged” in section 1 of the FAA emphasized the actual work that class members (and
not just the plaintiff) typically carried out. (Saxon, at pp. 450-451) The Supreme Court
concluded that the ramp supervisor belonged to a class of workers who frequently loaded
and unloaded cargo on and off airplanes bound for, and arriving from, other states or
countries. (Id. at p. 456.) The court held that the class of workers to which the ramp
supervisor belonged was part of the interstate transportation of goods because “one who
loads cargo on a plane bound for interstate transit is intimately involved with the
commerce (e.g., transportation) of that cargo. ‘[T]here could be no doubt that [interstate]
transportation [is] still in progress,’ and that a worker is engaged in that transportation,
when she is ‘doing the work of unloading’ or loading cargo from a vehicle carrying
goods in interstate transit.” (Id. at pp. 458-459.) Consequently, the class of workers was
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce and exempt from the FAA. (Id. at p. 457.)
1 According to the Supreme Court, Congress excluded seamen, railroad employees, and
“any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” from the FAA
because it was concerned about the necessary role transportation workers played in the
free flow of goods and it did not want to disturb established or developing statutory
dispute resolution schemes covering seamen and railroad workers. (Bissonnette, supra,
601 U.S. at p. 253; New Prime Inc., supra, 586 U.S. at p. 110; Circuit City Stores, Inc.,
supra, 532 U.S. at p. 121.)
6
Saxon recognized that application of the exemption is less clear when the class of
workers carries out duties further removed from the channels of interstate commerce or
the actual crossing of borders. (Id. at p. 457, fn. 2.) Although those circumstances were
not present in Saxon, the decisions in United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance
Industries (1975) 422 U.S. 271 (American Building Maintenance Industries) and Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co. (1974) 419 U.S. 186 (Gulf Oil Corp.) are instructive.
(See Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 457, fn. 2; Circuit City Stores, Inc., supra, 532 U.S.
at pp. 116-117.)
American Building Maintenance Industries and Gulf Oil Corp. construed the
phrase “engaged in commerce” in the Clayton Act, which prohibits activities in restraint
of foreign or interstate commerce. (15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; American Building
Maintenance Industries, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 283; Gulf Oil Corp., supra, 419 U.S. at
p. 195.) In American Building Maintenance Industries, the Supreme Court rejected the
contention that janitorial services companies were engaged in interstate commerce merely
because they performed services for enterprises that were engaged in interstate and
foreign commerce. (American Building Maintenance Industries, at pp. 283-284.) The
court held that simply supplying localized services to a corporation engaged in interstate
commerce did not satisfy the “ ‘in commerce’ ” requirement of the Clayton Act. (Id. at
p. 283.) Instead, to be “engaged ‘in commerce,’ ” the janitorial services companies must
themselves be directly engaged in the production, distribution or acquisition of goods or
services in interstate commerce. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court noted that the janitorial
services companies’ activities were limited to providing services within California, and
they purchased equipment and supplies in intrastate transactions from local distributors.
(Id. at pp. 284-285.)
In Gulf Oil Corp., the Supreme Court rejected the argument that companies selling
asphaltic concrete solely in California were engaged in interstate commerce because their
product was used in the construction of interstate highways. (Gulf Oil Corp., supra,
7
419 U.S. at pp. 189, 196-199.) The Supreme Court stated that expanding the meaning
of “in commerce” to include activities “perceptibly connected to” instrumentalities of
interstate commerce (i.e., interstate highways) would create a chain of connection with no
logical endpoint and include a “universe of arguably included activities [that] would be
broad and [have] limits nebulous in the extreme.” (Id. at p. 198.)
Other courts have held that workers who maintained trucks or trains involved in
the transportation of interstate goods, or who machined airplane parts, were not
transportation workers for purposes of section 1 of the FAA. (Coats v. TTX Company
(C.D. Cal., Feb. 27, 2024, No. EDCV232405MWFSPX) 2024 WL 1118997, at *3-4;
Holley-Gallegly v. TA Operating LLC (C.D. Cal., Sept. 16, 2022, No.
EDCV22593JGBSHKX) 2022 WL 9959778, at *2-3, vacated on another ground and
remanded in Holley-Gallegly v. TA Operating LLC (9th Cir. 2023) 74 F.4th 997; Stanley
v. Wings Holdings, Inc. (D. Minn., Sept. 23, 1997, No. 3-96-1141 (PAM)) 1997 WL
826175, at *6; but see In re Western Dairy Transport, LLC (Tex. App. 2014) 457 S.W.3d
467, 472-474.) The district court in Stanley noted that the airline mechanic in that case
did not transport any goods in commerce. (Stanley, at *6.) The district courts in Coats
and Holley-Gallegly concluded that the train and truck mechanics in those cases were too
removed, and only “ ‘perceptively’ ” connected, to instrumentalities of interstate
commerce. (Coats, at *4; Holley-Gallegly, at *3.)
The Supreme Court in Saxon distinguished the facts before it from those in
American Building Maintenance Industries and Gulf Oil Corp. (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S.
at pp. 462-463.) It stated that unlike those who sell asphalt for highway construction, or
those who perform janitorial services for corporations involved in interstate commerce,
Southwest Airlines cargo loaders performed “ ‘activities within the flow of interstate
commerce’ ” by handling the goods traveling in interstate and foreign commerce. (Ibid.)
Because caselaw focuses on whether individuals are actively engaged in the
transportation of interstate goods, and seeks to avoid a chain of connection with no
8
logical endpoint or an overly broad universe of arguably included activities, we focus on
the product Tafoya delivered: the fuel. The evidence indicates Tafoya hauled fuel
locally obtained and delivered. (American Building Maintenance Industries, supra,
422 U.S. at pp. 283-284; Gulf Oil Corp., supra, 419 U.S. at pp. 189, 196-199.) There
was no evidence that the fuel previously or subsequently crossed California’s borders;
that Tafoya or other Booster Fuels service professionals drove to locations outside
California for their jobs; or that Tafoya or other Booster Fuels service professionals
transported goods traveling to or from other states or countries. Even if Amazon drivers
were engaged in interstate commerce – facts not established by substantial evidence in
this case (see Evid. Code, §§ 702, 800; see generally Newton v. Los Angeles Transit Lines
(1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 624, 626 (Newton)) – and even if the Amazon trucks needed fuel
from Booster Fuels to deliver the packages, Tafoya was not directly involved in the
transportation of Amazon packages. There is insufficient evidence that Tafoya or other
Booster Fuels service professionals played a direct role in the transportation of goods
across borders and that they were transportation workers within the meaning of section 1
of the FAA.
In its appellate reply brief, Booster Fuels asked us to stay this matter pending
the decision in Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock (2025) 146 S.Ct. 327 [United States
Supreme Court case No. 24-935]. The request is moot because the United States
Supreme Court has since issued its decision. (Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock (2026)
608 U.S. __ [146 S.Ct. 1358] (Flower Foods).) The Supreme Court held that “a worker
who transports goods on an intrastate leg of an interstate journey” can qualify for the
FAA exemption. (Id. at p. 1363.) Flower Foods does not alter our conclusion in this
case because Tafoya has not established that, unlike the baked goods in Flower Foods,
the fuel delivered by Tafoya and other Booster Fuels service professionals was on an
intrastate leg of an interstate journey. (Id. at pp. 1362-1363.)
9
Other federal decisions are also distinguishable. In Rittman v. Amazon.com, Inc.
(9th Cir. 2020) 971 F.3d 904, packages that had crossed state lines were picked up by
workers at Amazon warehouses and delivered to Amazon customers. (Id. at pp. 907,
915, 917.) But as we have explained, here, unlike in Rittman, there is no evidence
Tafoya or other Booster Fuels service professionals transported goods that had crossed
state lines.
In Lopez v. Aircraft Service Internat. (9th Cir. 2024) 107 F.4th 1096, the court
held that an airline fuel technician was a transportation worker under section 1 of the
FAA because he fueled airplanes that were in interstate and foreign travel. (Lopez, at
pp. 1097-1098, 1101-1103.) And in Wirtz v. B. B. Saxon Co. (5th Cir. 1966) 365 F.2d
457, the appellate court construed the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.),
finding that the military bases at which workers hauled airplane fuel were
instrumentalities of interstate commerce to the extent interstate flights flew into and out
of the bases. (Wirtz, at p. 461) The court in Wirtz also found that the vehicles
performing functions essential to moving and servicing the airplanes were
instrumentalities of commerce. (Id. at p. 461.)
Unlike in Lopez and Wirtz, there is insufficient evidence Tafoya and other
Booster Fuels service professionals fueled vehicles involved in interstate travel. Tafoya
did not establish that the vehicles he fueled had come from, or would travel to, other
states. His understanding that Amazon packages had come from other states, without
a statement of supporting facts, was not substantial evidence that the Amazon trucks he
or other Booster Fuels service professionals fueled were involved in interstate travel.
(See Evid. Code, §§ 702, 800; see generally Newton, supra, 107 Cal.App.2d at p. 626.)
Tafoya did not establish that he fell within the transportation worker exemption
of the FAA. On remand, the trial court must consider the other claims made in Booster
Fuels’ motion to compel arbitration.
10
DISPOSITION
The order of the trial court denying Booster Fuels’ motion to compel arbitration
is reversed. The matter is remanded so the trial court may consider the other claims
raised in Booster Fuels’ motion.
/S/
MAURO, J.
We concur:
/S/
EARL, P. J.
/S/
ROBIE, J.
11