Filed 10/8/26 Susan L. v. Luis N. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
SUSAN L., B348869
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 25TRPT00001)
LUIS N., Jr.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gia G. Bosley, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Melissa B. Buchman and Melissa B.
Buchman for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance by Defendant and Respondent.
_____________________________
INTRODUCTION
Susan L. sought a restraining order under the Domestic
Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.1) (DVPA)
protecting herself and, as additional protected persons, her minor
children, Hudson L. and Nathalia N., from Luis N., Jr. The trial
court denied Susan’s request. We conclude that, because the trial
court applied the correct legal standard and the evidence does not
compel a finding in Susan’s favor, the court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Susan’s request for a domestic violence
restraining order. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Susan’s Relationship with Luis Ends, Susan Leaves
the State, and Luis Seeks To Determine His Parental
Rights
Susan and Luis met at an airport in Miami in July 2023.
They began a long-distance relationship, traveling between Luis’s
home in California and Susan’s home in New York to see each
other. Susan eventually became pregnant and moved to
California in April 2024 to start a family with Luis. She brought
Hudson—her seven-year-old son from a prior relationship—with
her. Susan and Luis’s child Nathalia was born in May 2024.
By December 2024—eight months after Susan moved to
California—she went back to New York with Hudson and
Nathalia. Concerned Susan would not return, Luis filed a
petition asking the court to determine Nathalia was his child.
1 Statutory references are to the Family Code.
2
Luis sought joint legal and physical custody of Nathalia and
visitation for both parents.
B. Susan Files a Request for a Domestic Violence
Restraining Order
A few days after Luis filed his petition, Susan (still in
New York) filed a request for a domestic violence restraining
order seeking to protect herself, Hudson, and Nathalia from Luis.
Susan said she filed the request “as a result of Luis’s verbal
abuse and coercive control exerted over” her and “physical and
emotional abuse” of Hudson.
Much of Susan’s declaration focused on how Luis treated
Hudson. She said she disagreed with how Luis parented Hudson,
including cutting Hudson’s hair and making him copy sentences
as a form of discipline.2 She said Hudson was having “behavioral
issues at school,” including “fighting with other students, and
then hitting them.” Susan stated that, after one report of
misbehavior at school, Luis hit Hudson on his buttocks with a
belt, which prompted a week of arguments about how to
discipline Hudson. Susan claimed Luis spanked Hudson a second
time, also in response to reported misbehavior at school.
Susan also described examples of emotional abuse and
coercive control by Luis. She said Luis disparaged or demeaned
her and her background, including by telling Hudson that his
2 Luis made Hudson write sentences that said, among other
things, “My dad disciplines me because he loves me and wants
me to be a respectful boy”; “I will think before I act”; “I will
apologize when I make a mistake”; “I will keep my hands and my
feet to myself at all times”; and “I will treat people the way
I want to be treated.”
3
biological father had abandoned him, telling Hudson that
members of Susan’s family had a criminal history, and making
comments to Susan about her experience as a single mother and
her upbringing. She also stated that Luis would “take the car
keys away from her” when they argued, that he would block her
car in the driveway so she could not leave, and that he once took
away the credit card he had given her to pay for living expenses.
Susan’s declaration did not include allegations of physical
violence by Luis towards her.
C. The Trial Court Denies Susan’s Request for a
Restraining Order
The hearing on Susan’s petition occurred over five days.
The trial court heard testimony from Luis and Susan and
reviewed documentary and video evidence, including recordings
of the couple’s interactions,3 pictures, text messages, and call
records.
Luis admitted that twice in November 2024 he spanked
Hudson with a belt. He said both spankings were in response to
reports of escalating misbehavior at school, which caused the
school to suspend Hudson and to consider referring him to a
juvenile diversion program. Luis testified Susan had walked in
during the first spanking incident and reprimanded Hudson for
his behavior, testimony that contradicted Susan’s statements she
objected to the punishment at the time. Luis testified he did not
discipline Hudson “without first obtaining Susan’s consent to
3 Susan and Luis often filmed each other with their smart
phones.
4
whip her son with a belt.”4 To the contrary, Luis said, Susan
agreed to spanking as a form of punishment. Luis testified his
spanking never caused any physical injury.
Luis also confirmed he made some of the statements Susan
complained about, such as commenting (usually to Susan, but
also around Hudson) on the criminal history of Susan’s
ex-husband and her brother. Luis denied, however, he refused to
let Susan use the family car. Luis also described the many phone
calls he received from Susan after she left for New York, as well
as sexually explicit videos she sent him.
In her testimony Susan adopted the allegations in her
declaration and elaborated on many of them. She also testified
about some things that were not in her declaration. For example,
she described two incidents where Luis became physical with her
and one where Luis, without her permission, told a friend about
Hudson’s behavioral difficulties at school.5 Susan denied
intentionally sharing sexually explicit videos with Luis. And she
denied she had agreed Luis could punish Hudson by spanking
him.
The trial court denied Susan’s request for a domestic
violence restraining order. The court found that Susan’s
testimony was not credible and that she had failed to prove by a
4 Luis once stated it was “correct” that he did not “ask
Susan’s consent” the first time he hit Hudson, but Luis otherwise
testified Susan consented to how he punished Hudson and denied
he was “inflicting corporal punishment on Hudson without
Susan’s consent.”
5 Luis stated he shared the information to get advice from
the friend, who came from “a lineage of school administrators”
and was a law student.
5
preponderance of the evidence there was abuse “as defined in
Family Code section 6203.” The court made factual findings
about some of the incidents Susan and Luis described in their
testimony. The court found Susan’s account of one alleged
physical altercation not credible. After reviewing video of
another alleged physical altercation, the court found that Luis
had calmly asked Susan to stop filming him, that he had not
acted “in an aggressive manner,” and that the contact he made in
hitting or touching the phone camera Susan was using to film
him did not rise to the level of abuse.
On the issue of whether Luis could discipline Hudson by
spanking him with a belt, the court credited Luis’s testimony
Susan “had given him permission to discipline Hudson.” The
court stated it was “clear to the court” based on a recording “there
had been some acknowledgement” Luis “was on an equal playing
field in terms of making a determination with regard to
discipline.” The court also found that Hudson “was on the verge
of being expelled from school” and that the court “did not hear
any evidence of injury” as a result of the discipline. The court
concluded Luis’s corporal punishment of Hudson was not “an
instance of abuse.”
The court also rejected Susan’s allegations of emotional
abuse, again finding Susan’s testimony was not credible. The
court stated Susan reached out to Luis after she left California,
called him in the early morning hours, sent him sexually explicit
videos, and even sent him photographs that included Hudson.
The “only issue” the court had in evaluating emotional abuse was
that at one point Luis insisted Susan leave, when it was “not
clear” she had the “resources” to do so. Nevertheless, “in
balancing the conduct of the parties,” the court found the
6
evidence did not prove abuse within the meaning of the Family
Code. Susan timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
The DVPA authorizes a court to issue a protective order
“‘“to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a
recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period of
separation of the persons involved” upon “reasonable proof of a
past act or acts of abuse.”’” (In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia
(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 225; see §§ 6220, 6300.) Abuse within
the meaning of the DVPA includes, among other things, placing
“a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily
injury to that person or to another” and engaging “in any
behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to
Section 6320.” (§ 6203, subd. (a)(3) & (4).) Section 6320, in turn,
allows a court to enjoin a range of behavior against a protected
person, including “striking,” “battering,” and “disturbing the
peace of the other party, and, in the discretion of the court, on a
showing of good cause, of other named family or household
members.” (§ 6320, subd. (a).) Disturbing the peace “refers to
conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys
the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” (§ 6320,
subd. (c).)
“The party seeking a restraining order bears the burden of
establishing the circumstances justifying the order.” (Jan F. v.
Natalie F. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 583, 593.) A court must
consider “the totality of the circumstances in determining
whether to grant or deny a petition for relief.” (§ 6301, subd. (d).)
7
“The burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence.”
(Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 11 (Curcio).)
B. The Trial Court Applied the Correct Legal Standard
and Considered the Totality of the Circumstances
“Generally, we review a trial court’s decision to grant or
deny a restraining order under the DVPA for an abuse of
discretion.” (Jan F. v. Natalie F., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
p. 592.) But the threshold “question of whether a trial court
applied the correct legal standard to an issue in exercising its
discretion is a question of law” we review de novo. (Rodriguez v.
Menjivar (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816, 821; accord, Jan F., at
p. 593.)
In denying Susan’s petition for a domestic violence
restraining order, the trial court articulated and applied the
correct legal standard. The court stated Susan had “to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that acts occurred as defined in
Family Code section 6203.” (See Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at
p. 11.) Contrary to Susan’s suggestion, the trial court did not
rule that, as a matter of law, a non-abusive parent had to
affirmatively object to corporal punishment or demonstrate
actual injury to obtain a domestic violence restraining order.
Instead, the trial court did what the law requires it to do: The
court considered the totality of circumstances to determine
whether Luis’s discipline of Hudson amounted to abuse of Susan
under the statute. (See Jennifer K. v. Shane K. (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 558, 578 [“the central issue . . . is not one of law,
as appellant urges us to think, but of fact”].)
8
Because Susan sought the restraining order, the trial court
properly focused on how Luis’s discipline of Hudson affected her.6
As Susan correctly argued in the trial court and argues on
appeal, abuse of a child can support a parent’s request for a
domestic violence protective order if the abuse affected the parent
as specified in the statute; for example, by placing the non-
abusive parent “in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious
bodily injury to herself or the child” or disturbing the parent’s
“peace by causing the destruction of her mental or emotional
calm.” (Guo v. Xiao (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 812, 818; see §§ 6203,
subd. (a), 6320, subd. (a); Perez v. Torres-Hernandez (2016)
1 Cal.App.5th 389, 401.) But that does not mean the trial court
applied the wrong legal standard: Whether a parent consented to
corporal punishment and whether the discipline was excessive
(evidenced by, for example, physical injury) are among the
totality of circumstances the court may consider in determining
whether the non-disciplining parent experienced reasonable
apprehension of “imminent serious bodily injury” or whether the
discipline disturbed the parent’s peace. (See Gonzalez v. Santa
Clara County Dept. of Social Services (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 72,
86-87; People v. Checketts (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1194;
People v. Whitehurst (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1050.) The trial
court applied the correct legal standard and considered
appropriate factors in determining whether Luis’s conduct in
spanking Hudson constituted abuse of Susan.
6 Had the trial court found Susan was entitled to a
restraining order, the court would have had discretion to include
Hudson as an additional protected person in a protective order
“on a showing of good cause.” (§ 6320, subd. (a); see J.H. v. G.H.
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 633, 643.)
9
C. The Record Does Not Compel a Finding in Susan’s
Favor
Susan argues that, even if the trial court applied the
correct legal standard, the court still should have issued a
restraining order. Where the trial court “determined that the
party with the burden of proof did not carry its burden,” the
question for the reviewing court is “whether the evidence compels
a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” (Estes v.
Eaton Corp. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 636, 651, italics omitted.)
“This is ‘an onerous standard’ [citation] and one that is ‘almost
impossible’ for a losing plaintiff to meet . . . .” (Ibid.) “In
reviewing the evidence, we examine the entire record to
determine whether there is any substantial evidence—
contradicted or uncontradicted—to support the trial court’s
findings. [Citation.] We must accept as true all evidence
supporting the trial court’s findings, resolving every conflict in
favor of the judgment. [Citation.] We do not determine
credibility or reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] If substantial
evidence supports the judgment, reversal is not warranted even if
facts exist that would support a contrary finding.” (Curcio,
supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 12.)
Susan argues Luis conduct in spanking Hudson amounted
to abuse of Susan as a matter of law. As discussed, and contrary
to Susan’s argument on appeal, the trial court considered
whether Luis’s “interaction with Hudson” was “an instance of
abuse,” meaning an act “as defined in Family Code section 6203.”
The trial court, considering the totality of the circumstances,
concluded the spankings did not amount to abuse, finding that
Susan gave Luis the right to discipline Hudson and that the
discipline was proportional and not excessive. Again, these were
10
proper considerations, and Susan has cited no authority that
would compel a court to issue a restraining order under those
circumstances.
Susan disputes she consented to the discipline. But we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment,
and accept the trial court’s findings Susan was not a credible
witness on this issue. (See Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 12
[“[w]e must accept as true all evidence supporting the trial court’s
findings, resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment,” and
we do “not determine credibility or reweigh the evidence”].)
Substantial evidence—Luis’s testimony—supported the court’s
finding Susan gave Luis permission to discipline Hudson and
consented to his methods of discipline.
Susan cites an August 2024 recording she says proves she
did not consent to the method of discipline. But the court found
that video was part of a “back and forth” discussion of how to
appropriately discipline Hudon, and there was evidence the
discussion ended with Susan and Luis agreeing he had authority
to punish Hudson, including by spanking him. And substantial
evidence supported the trial court’s finding Luis did not
physically injure Hudson.
The trial court also found not credible Susan’s testimony
that she experienced emotional abuse and that Luis’s conduct
disturbed her peace. We must accept that finding, even if we
think Luis’s conduct at times was inappropriate. (See Jennifer K.
v. Shane K., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 579 [“‘in a bench trial,
the trial court is the “sole judge” of witness credibility’”]; In re
Marriage of Martindale & Ochoa (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 54, 61
[“we are required to defer to the court’s credibility
determinations”]; In re Marriage of Berman (2017)
11
15 Cal.App.5th 914, 920 [“‘the trial court weighs the evidence and
determines issues of credibility and these determinations and
assessments are binding and conclusive on the appellate court’”];
see also K.L. v. R.H. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 965, 981 [“What
disturbs the peace of a person differs in each case.”].)
Susan points to several other incidents that she asserts
were “uncontroverted” and that disturbed her peace. Some of
those events, however, were controverted. For example, Luis
denied he prevented Susan from visiting Nathalia in the hospital,
denied he praised Nathalia’s lighter skin tone in front of Hudson,
and denied he told Susan that she could not use the family car.
While Susan cites evidence that could support a finding Luis
disturbed her peace, she cites “no evidence that would compel”
(Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007)
154 Cal.App.4th 547, 566) that finding as a matter of law. (See
Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 13 [“[t]he DVPA was not
enacted to address all disputes between former couples, or to
create an alternative forum for resolution of every dispute
between such individuals,” even if one party “understandably was
upset” by the other’s conduct].)
Susan also faults the trial court for failing to address every
negative comment Luis admitted he made or that was otherwise
uncontroverted, including Luis’s statements to Hudson and
Susan about the criminal history of Susan’s family members, to
Hudson about his biological father abandoning him, and to Luis’s
friend about Hudson’s troubles in school. Section 6340,
subdivision (b), however, provides that, if (as here) the trial court
denies a petition for a domestic violence restraining order, the
court must “provide a brief statement of the reasons for the
decision in writing or on the record.” The trial court did exactly
12
that, making clear over the five days of the hearing the court was
thoroughly reviewing “everything” the parties introduced into
evidence. The court also gave Susan broad latitude to submit
evidence of the incidents she claimed constituted abuse. The trial
court did not have to address each allegation of impropriety, and
we do not infer from the court’s failure to address certain
allegations that the court failed to consider all the evidence. (See
In re Marriage of Everard (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 109, 127-128 [all
that is required for “detailed findings of fact” under section 6305,
subdivision (a)(2), which governs mutual restraining orders, are
sufficient findings to permit appellate review, and the “‘trial court
is not required to make findings with regard to detailed
evidentiary facts or to make minute findings as to individual
items of evidence’”]; cf. Vinson v. Kinsey (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th
1166, 1178-1180 [trial court failed to consider the totality of the
circumstances where the court conducted only a brief hearing and
the limited scope of the court’s inquiry during the hearing
suggested the court “neither acknowledged nor evaluated”
additional evidence of abuse].)
Finally, Susan argues it was undisputed Luis committed
battery—and thus abuse—when he made contact with her phone
after she refused to stop filming him. Again, while the evidence
could have supported such a finding, it did not compel it. The
trial court heard both parties’ testimony about the incident,
reviewed the video, and found that Luis was “calm” and “not
acting in an aggressive manner” and that therefore the contact
was not abuse. Given the court’s credibility findings, substantial
evidence supported the trial court’s finding Luis’s conduct was
not sufficiently offensive to constitute abuse within the meaning
of section 6203.
13
DISPOSITION
The order denying the domestic violence restraining order
is affirmed.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
14