Filed 10/8/26 Superior Court v. Raymond CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A174848
v. (Super. Ct.
RAYMOND RAYMOND, No. CCH-25-588266)
Defendant and Appellant.
Petitioner San Francisco Superior Court obtained a workplace violence
restraining order (WVRO) against Raymond Raymond based on the assertion
that Raymond had “harassed” and expressed “anger and hostilities” towards
court employees, including an event on May 6, 2025, where Raymond
followed and yelled at court employees, calling one of them a “ ‘punk’ ” and
kicking the door of the courtroom the employees escaped into. On appeal,
Raymond characterizes his interactions with court employees as
demonstrative of “natural team work between [himself] and the clerks of the
court” and claims the events giving rise to the WVRO were “simply a glitch in
team work.” Under the applicable standard of review, Raymond’s “glitch”
provides the clear and convincing evidence necessary to issue a WVRO.
Therefore, we affirm.
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BACKGROUND
WVRO Petition and Temporary Restraining Order
In June 2025, petitioner filed a petition for WVRO (Code Civ. Proc.,1
§ 527.8), identifying three employees seeking protection: Stewart L., Madelle
M., and Maria G., each of whom submitted a supporting declaration in
addition to a supporting declaration by petitioner’s chief operations officer.2
Stewart worked as a legal research attorney for department 302 of the
San Francisco Superior Court and had an office located in the “antechamber
area of department 302.” In early April 2025, Stewart “heard someone
aggressively rattling the doors to the antechamber area.” It was Raymond,
who entered and proceeded to speak about a pending civil matter,3 but he
was “hard to follow” and “appeared agitated”; Raymond “eventually left.”
“About a week later,” Raymond returned in the afternoon when the
department was closed “and the doors were locked.” Raymond “was able to
open the doors to the department” and “proceeded to discuss his matter” with
Stewart’s colleague. Stewart’s colleague stopped Raymond “in the doorway
and asked him to leave multiple times.” Raymond refused, and his “volume
and demeanor over a three-to-four-minute period escalated.” After his
colleague had repeatedly asked Raymond to leave, Stewart “approached
[Raymond] and restated several times that he needed to leave. In response,
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2 We use first names for privacy and intend no disrespect. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.90(b)(6).)
3 At the time the WVRO petition was filed, Raymond had two pending
civil matters, both of which are currently on appeal but are beyond the scope
of this review.
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[Raymond] became very angry and hostile.” Raymond stated, “something to
the effect of ‘you are all murders of justice.’ ”
“In late April 2025,” Raymond “was knocking on the doors to
department 302” when Madelle, a court clerk, opened the door in response.
Raymond “asked several questions regarding his ex parte matter,” to which
Madelle explained that Raymond “needed to check the court website.”
According to Madelle, Raymond “did not appear to understand what [she]
was explaining to him.” “A few days later,” Raymond called the court and
requested to appear in person for his ex parte matter. Madelle “explained
that per the court’s rule, parties may only appear remotely in ex parte
matters. During the call, [Raymond] was very aggressive and raised his
voice.” Raymond “kept insisting on talking to the assigned judge and would
not listen when [Madelle] explained that the court does not permit personal
appearances in ex parte matters.”
On May 6, 2025, at 11:59 a.m., Raymond e-mailed Maria, the courtroom
clerk for department 302, to contest a tentative ruling. According to Maria,
Raymond “appeared upset” in the e-mail and stated that he “ ‘presume[d]
Judge Quinn sustained’ the demurrer filed against him, although the
tentative ruling for his matter was not yet posted.”
Around 1:00 p.m. the same day, Stewart was returning from lunch with
two court employees when they observed Raymond “following closely behind”
them. Raymond did not have any matters on calendar that day and had been
apparently waiting for Stewart. Raymond yelled “ ‘hey 302,’ ” ostensibly in
reference to the department number where Stewart worked, and called
Stewart “a ‘punk’ in an agitated manner” while continuing to “rapidly” follow
the group. Stewart became “fearful,” and the group “rushed into the
courtroom in department 302.” Raymond “forcibly grabbed” the courtroom
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door as Stewart closed it, “pulled the door open and tried to enter” the
courtroom. Stewart was able to close and lock the door, at which point
Raymond “continued yelling and angrily kicked the door,” “causing it to
rattle.” A colleague called the sheriff but Raymond left before officers
arrived, only to return a few hours later, at which point he was sent away by
officers.
At 4:12 p.m., still on May 6, Raymond e-mailed the department again:
“It’s after 3 PM on May 6th, my contesting statement belongs here at this
time”; the e-mail explained Raymond’s disputes with the tentative ruling.
According to Maria, the “overall tone and content” of Raymond’s two e-mails
“appear[ed] to be erratic and include[d] capitalization throughout and
accusations of lies and concealment.” Raymond also left a voicemail, in which
he “sounded agitated and indicated that he could not locate the court’s
tentative ruling,” which “coupled with [Raymond’s] escalating and erratic
behavior over a month period have caused [Maria] to fear for [her] safety and
that of [her] colleagues.”
The following day, May 7, 2025, Raymond returned to the department
for an ex parte hearing in his matter despite being “informed previously that
ex parte hearing are conducted virtually.” “A couple days later,” Raymond
appeared again in the department without a hearing.4 Raymond remained in
the courtroom after the conclusion of the calendar “and indicated that he
wanted to speak with the judge to contest his own matter. The deputy
present told [Raymond] that he would not be heard.”
On May 15, 2025, Raymond left two voicemails that were “alarming in
nature.” Raymond stated that he was leaving the message “ ‘because I don’t
4 The court had issued a tentative ruling, which Raymond did not
contest. Thus, there was no scheduled hearing in the matter.
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know what else to do,’ ” and “ ‘I’m going to do something that might cause you
a headache.’ ” The statements “were perceived as veiled threats and caused
immediate fear and concern for safety as the ambiguity and suggestive
nature of these phrases raised fears of potential harm.”
As a result of Raymond’s conduct, Stewart, Madelle, and Maria
declared that they feared for their safety and believed a restraining order was
necessary for protection from “the credible threat of violence that [Raymond]
poses.” Stewart claimed he had “become jumpy any time someone comes too
close” and that Raymond’s “aggressive actions and escalating erratic behavior
have taken a physical and emotional toll on [him].” Stewart, Madelle, and
Maria further stated that, at the time of preparing their declarations, the
court had issued an adverse ruling in one of Raymond’s pending matters, and
they were concerned about Raymond’s “potentially angry and retaliatory
reaction to the unfavorable ruling” toward them and other court staff.
On June 25, 2025, the court (Hon. Harry Jacobs) issued a temporary
restraining order and notice of a July 2025 hearing on the petition. The
temporary restraining order, in relevant part, required Raymond to stay at
least 100 yards away from the courthouse except “for legitimate and
necessary purposes related to legal proceedings to which [Raymond] is a
party, witness, or direct participant,” in which case he was required to “check
in with court security” upon arrival and inform security that he “has an
active restraining order against him.” Raymond was personally served with
the petition and supporting declarations, the temporary restraining order,
and the notice of hearing.
Raymond’s Responses to the Petition
Raymond filed multiple documents in response to the WVRO petition.
Filings on July 24, 2025, included a document titled “Request for
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Admissions,” a judicial council form response to the WVRO petition with a
nine-page attachment titled “Attachment 12,” and a request to continue the
hearing on the petition. In the request for admissions, Raymond sought
“admissions from department 302 clerk Maria,” claiming that Maria told him
to “feel free to come directly to department [302]” if he ever had trouble
printing documents or appearing remotely for hearings. Raymond narrated
his version of the events giving rise to the petition, acknowledging that he
had told Stewart, “ ‘Procedure that buries the substantive . . . is murder,’ ”
because Stewart had “punk[ed] [him] down.” Raymond admitted to having
done “unseemly things on May 6th” but claimed his conduct was “far more
ordinary than anger and violence.” “Yes I did kick the door,” Raymond
conceded, “but this was an emphasis of my being perturbed” and it “barely
qualifie[d] as violent.”
Raymond’s response to the WVRO petition similarly admitted that
Raymond did “1 or 2 unseemly things,” such as calling Stewart “punk boy” “in
regard to the tentative ruling on May 6th” and “kick[ing] the bottom of the
door” to department 302 but maintained that “None of this . . . antisocial
behavior qualifies as anger or much of anything in the way of violence.”
“Apart from this,” Raymond continued, “there is no antisocial behavior from
me at all. God allows me to show my irritation to facts I object to. You
should too. I will never be silent.”
In his request to continue the hearing, Raymond claimed his “schedule
is inhuman” and sought a 30-day continuance. The July hearing was reset
for August 2025.
On August 14, 2025, Raymond filed a document titled “Respondent’s
Summing Up Statements to His Attachment 12 Response to Petition for
Restraining Order,” in which Raymond described his attachment 12 as
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“unwieldy, so [he] . . . summed up the issues from both sides.” Raymond
attached several documents from his other pending matters including an
August 2025 “Notice of Habeas Corpus Petition in the Supreme Court,” pages
of handwritten notes, pictures of the doors to department 302, and clippings
of various quotations such as “Dinosaurs know things” and “Never try to
teach a pig to sing it wastes your time and annoys the pig.”
The next day, August 15, Raymond filed a second request to continue
the hearing. The same day, the court issued an order denying the request
and maintaining the August 2025 hearing date.
On August 18, the day before the hearing, Raymond filed two
documents; one titled “Respondent’s Memorandum of Three Hearings
Petitioners Have Neglected to Facilitate or Provide,” and the other titled
“Respondent’s Submission to COO.” The 51-page memorandum of three
hearings purported to “make the record full in regard to the antisocial
dichotomy” set forth in a separate petition for writ of mandate; it included a
request for “leave to present [Raymond’s] 15 minute presentation” in
response to the WVRO petition along with various documents dating back to
2012.
Raymond’s 38-page “Submission to COO” supposedly contained “every
page passed to [petitioner’s] Chief Operations Officer . . . in this matter,”
which was comprised of a mix of handwritten and typed documents.
Hearing on Petition and WVRO
A hearing on the petition took place on August 19, 2025, with Raymond
appearing in person. The court (Hon. John True) started by noting that it
had “carefully reviewed the papers on file in this matter” including “the
voluminous filing offered by Mr. Raymond.” After a brief statement by
petitioner, Raymond argued that he “get[s] along with maybe 50 percent of
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all the clerks” in other departments and claimed petitioner was “completely
misconstruing” his interactions with Stewart, Madelle, and Maria.
Petitioner then noted that since Raymond had been served with the
temporary restraining order, “he has continued to come to the courthouse” to
“photograph the hallway outside of [Stewart’s] office” and “has also submitted
letters, handwritten letters, directly to [Madelle and Maria] who are the
protected parties”; both the photographs and letters were submitted with
Raymond’s responsive filings. In response, Raymond claimed he was serving
“courtesy copies” and again accused petitioner and the court of
“misconstru[ing]” his actions.
After some discussion of Raymond’s other matters, the court stated that
it did not “have any jurisdiction or desire to get into those other cases” and
that it was “here to decide whether it is appropriate to continue the
restraining order that is currently in effect.” The court proceeded to sign the
WVRO and explain its terms to Raymond. The court then “closed” the
hearing and asked the sheriff’s deputy to escort Raymond outside.
The same day, August 19, the court filed a formal WVRO, which
included a stay away order from the courthouse except “for legitimate and
necessary purposes (e.g., filing papers related to a new or pending case at the
court or appearing in proceedings in which [Raymond] is a party or witness).
Upon arrival, [Raymond] must check in with the court security, provide a
valid photo identification, and make the sheriff’s officer(s) aware that he is
entering the court facility and has an active restraining order against him.
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Sheriff’s officer(s) or security officers shall escort [Raymond] while he is in
the courthouse.”5
On October 16, 2025, Raymond filed a notice of this appeal, purportedly
taken from “An order from an improper hearing. Violation of CCP 1-005.”
DISCUSSION
As petitioner argues on appeal and as Raymond concedes, Raymond’s
opening brief “is deficient in a couple of the particulars necessary to conform
the brief fully to” the applicable California Rules of Court, specifically, rule
8.204, which makes it difficult to discern Raymond’s contentions on appeal.
We construe Raymond’s briefing to raise two arguments—a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the WVRO and a challenge to the
court’s purported “refusal to allow the time line evidence into the hearing.”
Neither has merit.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
“Any employer . . . of an employee who has suffered harassment,
unlawful violence, or a credible threat of violence from any individual, that
can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at
the workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after
hearing on behalf of the employee.” (§ 527.8, subd. (a).) “If the judge finds by
clear and convincing evidence that the respondent engaged in harassment,
engaged in unlawful violence, or made a credible threat of violence, an order
shall issue prohibiting further harassment, unlawful violence, or threats of
violence.” (Id., subd. (k).)
5 According to petitioner, after issuance of the WVRO, Raymond
continued to file and leave documents outside the offices of the protected
parties.
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Harassment “is a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a
specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and
that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which
would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and
must actually cause substantial emotional distress.” (§ 527.8, subd. (b)(4).)
Likewise, a credible threat of violence “is a knowing and willful statement or
course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for their
safety, . . . and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).) A
course of conduct “is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a
period of time . . . including following or stalking an employee to or from the
place of work,” “following an employee during hours of employment,” “or
sending correspondence to an employee by any means.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).)
On appeal, “when presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence associated with a finding requiring clear and convincing evidence,
the court must determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made
the finding of high probability demanded by this standard of proof.”
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005.) “In conducting its
review, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact
may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the
evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Id. at
pp. 1011–1012.)
Here, considering the clear and convincing standard, we conclude the
WVRO is supported by substantial evidence. Stewart, Madelle, and Maria
identified specific instances where Raymond entered their workplace and
followed, yelled, and acted aggressively towards them, including kicking a
10
door to the courtroom; they declared that Raymond’s aggressive behavior
escalated over a short period of time and that they feared for their safety.
Stewart specifically declared that Raymond targeted him at work, which
caused him to become jumpy, and that he experienced physical and emotional
distress as a result. This evidence is sufficient to constitute harassment
within the meaning of the WVRO statute. (§ 527.8, subd. (b)(4).) Further,
Raymond left voicemails about “ ‘do[ing] something that might cause you a
headache,’ ” which were construed as veiled threats and constitute a credible
threat of violence. (Id., subd. (b)(2).)
Moreover, there was no legitimate purpose for Raymond’s conduct
because it was not in furtherance of his pending matters. Rather, Raymond
was attempting to access non-public areas of the court (e.g., the antechamber
area with employee offices), was appearing when he had no matters on
calendar, and was attempting to engage in ex parte communication with the
court. Finally, there is substantial evidence of irreparable harm due to
future harassment and threats of violence. (§ 527.8, subd. (f)(1).) Indeed, as
demonstrated by Raymond’s position that his conduct was “far more ordinary
than anger and violence” and “barely qualifie[d] as violent,” it was highly
likely that Raymond’s conduct would continue and, in fact, did continue in
violation of the temporary restraining order.
While Raymond attempts to construe his conduct as innocuous, the
standard for evaluating the conduct as an objective one, i.e., whether a
“reasonable person” would fear for their safety or suffer substantial
emotional distress. (§ 527.8, subd. (b)(2), (4).) Thus, Raymond’s subjective
interpretation of his conduct does not undermine or negate the substantial
evidence supporting the court’s findings. (City of Los Angeles v. Herman
(2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 97, 102 [WVRO was supported by substantial evidence
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“regardless of [respondent’s] subjective intent”].) Rather, as the court noted,
Raymond’s filings and interpretation of events “quite frankly, tend to
corroborate the claims that [petitioner is] making.” Thus, sufficient
substantial evidence supports the WVRO.
Presentation of Evidence
“Section 527.8 provides for an expeditious means to address alleged
‘workplace violence,’ ” and “while a lawyer is permitted [citation], many of
these matters proceed in propria persona.” (CSV Hospitality Management
LLC v. Lucas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 117, 123.) “When a party seeks an
injunction, the court must hold a hearing, receive relevant testimony, and
issue the injunction if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that
harassment exists.” (Ibid.) To the extent the court admits or excludes
evidence at the hearing, we review that decision for abuse of discretion.
(Qaadir v. Figueroa (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 790, 803.)
Here, the court followed the process for issuance of a WVRO: it
provided notice, “carefully reviewed” Raymond’s responsive filings, allowed
Raymond to argue at the hearing, and issued an order after hearing
consistent with section 527.8. At the hearing, Raymond made no request to
cross-examine any declarant nor did he object to any evidence.
Raymond appears to argue that the court failed to consider a
“timeline,” but he points to nowhere in the record where the court excluded
any evidence. Instead, as the court repeatedly stated at the hearing, it
considered Raymond’s filings. In any event, even assuming the court
excluded some evidence, we see no abuse of discretion. Raymond’s proposed
“historical timeline” went beyond the scope of the WVRO petition by referring
to clerks in other departments who were not seeking protection. Accordingly,
Raymond’s timeline purportedly showing that he had amicable relationships
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with “maybe 50 percent” of non-party court employees is not relevant to the
petition.
In summary, we can identify no error in the proceedings or issuance of
the WVRO. To the extent we have not addressed a particular argument
raised by Raymond, we deem it forfeited due to Raymond’s inadequate
appellate briefing. (Bishop v. The Bishop’s School (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 893,
910 [failure to develop arguments by “stating the law, and calling out
relevant portions of the record, [which show] that the trial court committed
reversible error,” “justifies rejection of [appellant’s] argument[s] on this basis
alone”].)
DISPOSITION
The WVRO order is affirmed. In the interests of justice, we decline to
award costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
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DESAUTELS, J.
We concur:
RICHMAN, ACTING P. J.
SWEET, J.*
The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco v. Raymond
(A174848)
* Judge of the Marin Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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