Filed 7/16/26 Stringer v. City of Los Angeles CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
NATALIE STRINGER B337152
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STCP03042)
CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Gregory G. Yacoubian and Gregory G.
Yacoubian, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Denise C. Mills, Chief
Deputy City Attorney, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Chief Assistant City
Attorney, Shaun Dabby Jacobs, Supervising Assistant City
Attorney, and Merete Rietveld, Deputy City Attorney, for
Defendants and Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
Natalie Stringer, a former police officer with the
Los Angeles Police Department, appeals from the judgment after
the trial court granted in part and denied in part her petition for
writ of administrative mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5).1
Stringer sought an order directing the City of Los Angeles and
the Chief of Police to set aside the termination of her employment
with the Department, reinstate her, and award her backpay.
In 2021 the Los Angeles City Council passed Ordinance
No. 187134 that required all City employees to get vaccinated
against COVID-19 unless they qualified for a medical or religious
exemption. The City issued a directive prescribing the COVID-19
testing policy for nonexempt unvaccinated employees (including
those awaiting a decision on their exemption request) and the
consequences for failing to comply. City department heads issued
a notice to each unvaccinated employee describing the testing
protocols, which included requirements that each employee pay
for the testing and sign the notice acknowledging the employee’s
obligations. Stringer chose not to get vaccinated, applied for a
religious exemption, and refused to sign the notice acknowledging
her responsibilities to submit to COVID-19 testing while the
Department was considering her request for an exemption. The
Chief of Police relieved her of duty and initiated the process to
discharge her from the Department. The Board of Rights
ultimately sustained the Department’s decision to terminate
Stringer’s employment.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2
Stringer filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate,
claiming that the City’s requirement she pay for the COVID-19
tests and complete the testing on her personal time violated
Labor Code section 2802 and Ordinance No. 187134; that the
Board terminated her employment in violation of her due process
rights under Skelly v. Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194
(Skelly)2; and that the penalty the Board imposed was
disproportionate to her misconduct. The trial court granted the
writ in part, ruling the Department violated Skelly, and ordered
the City to award Stringer backpay from the date the
Department suspended her pay to the date the Chief of Police
issued the final order terminating her employment (a period of
approximately four months).
Stringer argues the Department’s notice requiring her to
pay for COVID-19 tests and complete the testing on her personal
time as a condition of employment violated Ordinance
No. 187134. She also argues that any misconduct on her part did
not justify the Board’s decision to terminate her employment and
that the trial court improperly limited the remedy for the
Department’s Skelly violation to an award of backpay. Finally,
she contends her loss of employment without a jury trial on the
misconduct charge violated the Seventh Amendment of the
United States Constitution. We affirm.
2 In Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d 194 the Supreme Court held
that a permanent civil service employee subject to discipline “be
accorded certain procedural rights before the discipline becomes
effective,” including “notice of the proposed action, the reasons
therefor, a copy of the charges and materials upon which the
action is based, and the right to respond, either orally or in
writing, to the authority initially imposing discipline.” (Id. at
p. 215.)
3
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The City Council Enacts a COVID-19 Vaccination
Policy and Issues a Directive for Unvaccinated
Employees
Effective August 25, 2021, Ordinance No. 187134, codified
as Los Angeles Administrative Code section 4.701,
subdivision (a), provided: “To protect the City’s workforce and
the public that it serves, all employees must be fully vaccinated
for COVID-19, or request an exemption, and report their
vaccination status in accordance with the City’s Workplace Safety
Standards, no later than October 19, 2021.” The ordinance stated
that the vaccination and reporting requirements were “conditions
of City employment,” unless the employee was “approved for an
exemption from the COVID-19 vaccination requirement as a
reasonable accommodation for a medical condition or restriction
or sincerely held religious beliefs.” (L.A. Admin. Code, § 4.701,
subd. (b).) Under the ordinance employees who qualified for a
medical or religious exemption were “subject to weekly COVID-19
tests,” with the tests to be provided “at no cost during their work
hours.” (L.A. Admin. Code, § 4.702, subd. (b).)
City officials negotiated with the City’s labor organizations
on the “impacts” of the City’s vaccination policy, including “the
consequences for non-compliance with the Mandatory Reporting
and Vaccination conditions of employment,” but reached “a
stalemate in negotiations.” In light of the “catastrophic public
health emergency,” the City Council decided it did not have time
to exhaust the procedure for resolving the impasse in the
collective bargaining process. On October 26, 2021 the City
Council directed the mayor to implement the terms of a “Last,
4
Best, and Final Offer Over Outcomes for Non-Reporting and Non-
Compliance” (Last Offer). The Last Offer outlined the procedures
for the head of each City department to follow to take “corrective
action for violations of Ordinance No. 187134.” The department
head had to issue each employee who failed to comply with the
vaccine mandate (did not vaccinate and did not request an
exemption) a “Notice of Mandatory COVID-19 Vaccination Policy
Requirements” (Notice), which would instruct the employee how
to submit proof of full compliance and, in the interim (until the
employee received two doses of the vaccine), how to submit to
COVID-19 testing twice per week, on the employee’s personal
time, at a cost of $260 per pay period. The Last Offer specified
the employee had to test with “the City or a vendor of the City’s
choosing.”
The Last Offer provided that employees who filed
“exemption paperwork” and were “awaiting the result of the
City’s evaluation process” would be “subject to the same terms
applicable to employees who were not fully vaccinated and who
have received a Notice,” including the testing protocol for
employees who did not request an exemption. The Last Offer
stated: “Each employee who is required to test while awaiting
the determination by the City of their exemption request shall be
required to sign a Notice and to comply with its terms as outlined
above and herein. Failure to sign and fulfill the conditions of the
Notice shall constitute failure to meet a condition of employment
and shall result in appropriate and immediate corrective action.”
5
B. Stringer Requests an Exemption, Informs Her
Commanding Officer She Decided Not To Get
Vaccinated, and Refuses To Sign the Notice
Stringer submitted a request for a religious exemption.
Before the Department ruled on her request Stringer informed
her commanding officer that she had decided not to receive the
COVID-19 vaccine or establish an account with the City’s vendor
to complete the required testing. On November 3, 2021 Stringer’s
commanding officer issued Stringer the Notice that informed
Stringer of her obligation to submit to COVID-19 testing and the
consequences for failing to comply.
The Notice described the City’s vaccination policy and
listed the testing obligations of employees who were awaiting
approval of exemption requests, including the requirement to test
twice a week on their time and at their cost through the City or a
vendor of its choosing. After listing the testing requirements the
Notice stated: “I understand that if I do not follow all the terms
and conditions above, including showing proof of full vaccination
within the time frame above, I will immediately be placed off
duty without pay pending pre-separation due process procedures
(Skelly) and I will be served with a written notice of proposed
separation from City employment for failing to meet a condition
of employment.” The last page of the Notice provided a space for
Stringer to sign underneath a paragraph stating she agreed “to
abide by all of the terms and conditions” of the Notice. Stringer’s
commanding officer reviewed the contents of the Notice with
Stringer, including the consequences for not complying with the
Notice. Stringer did not sign the Notice.
6
C. The Department Charges Stringer with Misconduct
and Recommends Termination, and the Board of
Rights Sustains the Recommended Penalty
On December 6, 2021 the Chief of Police signed a complaint
charging Stringer with failing “to comply with the requirements
of the Notice of Mandatory COVID-19 Vaccination Policy
Requirements, a condition of employment”; temporarily relieved
her of duty; and directed her to report to the Board of Rights with
the proposed penalty of termination of her employment with the
Department. After a hearing the Board concluded: “Officer
Stringer is unvaccinated and has refused to be tested and thereby
charged by the City’s vendor. . . . [S]he testified she refused
testing because she believed it was unfair that vaccinated officers
were not required to be tested. She felt discriminated against as
an officer seeking a religious exemption. . . . [T]he City’s policy of
mandatory testing by the City’s vendor, . . . as well as the policy
that an officer may have payment for testing deducted from their
paycheck, is not before this Board.” The Board acknowledged the
testimony of Stringer’s commanding officer that Stringer was “an
exemplary employee,” but the Board found Stringer guilty of the
violations.
The Board acknowledged Stringer’s commendations for
“leadership, hard work, teamwork, integrity, and . . . thorough
investigations at the scene” and recognized all of her performance
evaluations “either met or sometimes exceeded standards.”
Nevertheless, the Board, “based on the totality of the
circumstances,” sustained the proposed penalty of removal from
the Department.
7
D. Stringer Files a Petition for Writ of Mandate
Stringer filed a petition for writ of mandate under
sections 1085 and 1094.5 seeking an order directing the City,
among other things, to set aside the decision to terminate her
employment. She also requested an award of backpay. The City
demurred to Stringer’s cause of action under section 1085 and
moved to strike portions of the petition. The court sustained the
demurrer, denied the motion to strike, and set a briefing schedule
for the petition.
Stringer filed her operative second petition for writ of
mandate under section 1094.5, Labor Code sections 2802, 2804,
and 1102.5, and Los Angeles City Charter section 1070.3
Stringer argued that the requirement she pay for COVID-19
3 Labor Code section 2802, subdivision (a), provides:
“An employer shall indemnify his or her employee for all
necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in
direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties, or of his
or her obedience to the directions of the employer, even though
unlawful, unless the employee, at the time of obeying the
directions, believed them to be unlawful.” (See Krug v. Board of
Trustees of California State University (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th
234, 241.) Labor Code section 2804 invalidates any “contract or
agreement, express or implied, made by any employee to waive
the benefits” of Labor Code section 2802. (See In re
Acknowledgment Cases (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1498, 1507.)
Stringer did not specify which subdivision of Labor Code
section 1102.5 she claimed applied to her or the City violated, but
the statute generally concerns an employee’s right to disclose
information to a government or law enforcement agency.
Los Angeles City Charter section 1070 concerns an employee’s
rights when the Department pursues disciplinary action against
the employee.
8
testing violated Labor Code section 2802 and Ordinance
No. 187134, that the Department relieved her of duty and
suspended her pay in violation of her rights under Skelly, supra,
15 Cal.3d 218, and that the penalty the Board imposed “was
clearly excessive.” At the hearing counsel for Stringer argued the
City’s requirement an unvaccinated employee had to pay for
COVID-19 testing and complete the testing “on the employee’s
own time” “specifically contradict[ed] the provision” of the
“Los Angeles Administrative Code, which codified Ordinance
187134.” That provision, according to counsel for Stringer, stated
“the City would pay for the testing.”4
The trial court ruled the Board terminated Stringer’s
employment in violation of her due process rights under Skelly,
granted the petition on that ground, and directed the Board to
award her backpay from January 17, 2022 to May 25, 2022. The
court denied Stringer’s other claims, including that the Notice
violated Ordinance No. 187134 and that the penalty was
disproportionate to the misconduct. The court stated the
ordinance had “no provision for COVID-19 testing—employees
must be vaccinated or exempt from the vaccine on medical or
religious grounds.” Stringer timely appealed.
4 Counsel for Stringer also argued the Notice violated Labor
Code section 2802. Stringer does not make this argument on
appeal.
9
DISCUSSION
A. The Notice Did Not Violate Ordinance No. 187134
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“Administrative mandamus is available to obtain judicial
review of a public agency ‘decision made as the result of a
proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given,
evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the
determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal,
corporation, board, or officer.’” (Bedard v. City of Los Angeles
(2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 442, 453 (Bedard); see § 1094.5, subd. (a);
Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 810 (Fukuda);
Harrington v. Housing Authority of Riverside County (2026)
118 Cal. App. 5th 1086, 1098.) “In a proceeding for
administrative mandate, the judicial inquiry extends to whether
the public agency ‘has proceeded without, or in excess of,
jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there
was any prejudicial abuse of discretion.’” (Bedard, at p. 453; see
§ 1094.5, subd. (b); Fukuda, at p. 810; Harrington, at p. 1098.)
“The trial court reviews the administrative decision de novo
but affords the administrative findings ‘a strong presumption of
correctness.’” (Bedard, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 454; see
Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 817.) “‘[T]he party challenging
the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the
court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight
of the evidence.’” (Bedard, at p. 454; see Fukuda, at p. 817.)
“‘“‘When an appeal is taken from the trial court’s
determination, it is given the same effect as any other judgment
after trial rendered by the court: the only question is whether
10
the trial court’s (not the administrative agency’s) findings are
supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] Conflicts in the
evidence must be resolved in favor of the judgment and where
two or more inferences can be reasonably drawn from the facts,
the reviewing court must accept the inferences deduced by the
trial court.’. . . [¶] “‘Evidence is substantial if any reasonable
trier of fact could have considered it reasonable, credible and of
solid value.’ [Citation.] Additionally, a reviewing court ‘may look
to the findings in [the administrative agency’s] decision for
guidance in determining whether the trial court’s judgment is
supported by substantial evidence.’”’ [Citations.] ‘However, we
are not bound by any legal interpretations made by the
administrative agency or the trial court; rather, we make an
independent review of any questions of law.’” (Bedard, supra,
106 Cal.App.5th at p. 454; see Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at
p. 824; Lozano v. City of Los Angeles (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 711,
723.)
“‘Courts interpret municipal ordinances in the same
manner and pursuant to the same rules applicable to the
interpretation of statutes.’” (Harrington v. City of Davis (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 420, 434; accord, Tran v. County of Los Angeles
(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 154, 162; Lateef v. City of Madera (2020)
45 Cal.App.5th 245, 253.) We review de novo “‘rulings on
questions of law such as interpretation of city charters and
municipal codes.’” (Sieg v. Fogt (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 77, 88.)
2. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled the
Notice Did Not Violate the Ordinance
The trial court did not err in denying Stringer’s claim the
Notice violated Ordinance No. 187134. Section 4.702,
11
subdivision (a), of the ordinance stated, “Employees who qualify
for the medical or religious exemptions may be subject to weekly
testing.” Section 4.702, subdivision (b), of the ordinance
provided: “Employees with medical or religious exemptions and
who are required to regularly report to a City worksite shall be
subject to weekly COVID-19 tests. Testing will be provided to the
employees at no cost during their work hours following a process
and timeline determined by the City.” The ordinance’s provision
regarding “no cost” COVID-19 testing referred only to employees
who qualified for an exemption. (L.A. Admin. Code, § 4.702,
subds. (a), (b).) (See Lateef v. City of Madera, supra,
45 Cal.App.5th at p. 253 [“‘“It is axiomatic that in the
interpretation of a statute where the language is clear, its plain
meaning should be followed.’””].) The provision did not include
employees such as Stringer who were waiting for the Department
to approve their request for an exemption. We cannot read into
the provision a matter the City Council did not address. (See
ibid. [“we are not empowered to insert language into a statute, as
‘[d]oing so would violate the cardinal rule of statutory
construction that courts must not add provisions to statutes’”].)
The statement of the City Council’s intent in enacting the
ordinance confirms the ordinance limited the free testing service
to employees who had already qualified for an exemption: “The
City’s goal is to have a vaccinated workforce. As such, employees
will not have the option to ‘opt out’ of getting vaccinated and
become subject to weekly testing. Only those with a medical or
religious exemption and who are required to regularly report to a
work location are eligible for weekly testing.” (L.A. Admin. Code,
§ 4.702.) Requiring Stringer to pay for COVID-19 testing and to
12
complete those tests on personal time did not violate Ordinance
No. 187134.
B. The Court Did Not Err in Ruling the Board Did Not
Abuse Its Discretion in Discharging Stringer
We “‘review de novo whether the agency’s imposition of a
particular penalty on the petitioner constituted an abuse of
discretion by the agency. [Citations.] But we will not disturb the
agency’s choice of penalty absent ‘“an arbitrary, capricious or
patently abusive exercise of discretion”’ by the administrative
agency.’” (Bedard, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 454; see County
of Los Angeles v. Civil Service Com. of County of Los Angeles
(2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 871, 877 [“The court may not substitute its
own judgment for that of the [administrative agency], [or]
‘disturb the agency’s choice of penalty absent “‘an arbitrary,
capricious or patently abusive exercise of discretion’” by the
administrative agency’ [citation], but must uphold the penalty if
there is any reasonable basis to sustain it.”].) In considering
whether an abuse of discretion “occurred in the context of public
employee discipline, . . . the overriding consideration in these
cases is the extent to which the employee’s conduct resulted in, or
if repeated is likely to result in, ‘[harm] to the public service.’
[Citations.] Other relevant factors include the circumstances
surrounding the misconduct and the likelihood of its recurrence.”
(Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 218; accord, County of Los Angeles,
at p. 877.) “‘Of these three factors, harm to the public service is
the “overriding consideration.”’” (Bedard, at p. 458.)
The trial court correctly ruled the Board did not abuse its
discretion in discharging Stringer because she failed to meet a
condition of her employment. For unvaccinated employees who
13
applied for an exemption, the City’s Last Offer made semiweekly
COVID-19 testing and testing on the employee’s personal time a
condition of employment. Stringer does not dispute she failed to
comply with this condition of employment.
The court properly concluded that, “[c]onsidering the public
health emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic” and “the
impact on the City’s employees and operations,” it was not
unreasonable for the Board “to select a penalty of discharge.”
Stringer’s failure to comply with the requirements of the Notice
endangered the public health. In March 2020 the mayor declared
a local emergency in response to the COVID-19 virus, which, as
the City Council stated 18 months later, “continues to change and
evolve.” The City Council found that vaccination was “the most
effective way to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and to limit . . .
hospitalizations and deaths” and that the conditions for
employment in the City’s Last Offer addressed “unvaccinated
first responders who regularly interact[ed] with vulnerable
members of the public while performing their duties.” Stringer’s
refusal to get vaccinated and to sign the Notice affirming her
intent to comply with the testing requirements placed the public
and her coworkers at risk. The Board reasonably decided to
discharge her for violating a condition of her employment
designed to protect public health. (See Bedard, supra,
106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 448, 458 [where the plaintiff failed to
submit proof she had been vaccinated against COVID-19, did not
apply for an exemption, and refused to sign the Notice, the Board
“did not abuse its discretion in finding that termination was the
appropriate remedy”].)
Stringer argues there was no evidence that her refusal to
sign the Notice “caused harm to the public service” or that her
14
“minor” misconduct “was likely to recur,” given the City later
“revoked the ‘rule’ for which [she] was fired.”5 Stringer is
incorrect. As discussed, the City Council determined vaccination
would reduce hospitalizations and transmission of the disease,
and Stringer’s refusal to receive the vaccine and her refusal to
pay for the mandated COVID-19 testing jeopardized public
health. She informed her commanding officer she would not
comply with unambiguous conditions of employment. Therefore,
her misconduct (and the threat to public health) recurred every
day she went to work and refused to comply with the
requirements of the Notice. (See Bedard, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 456, 458 [because the employee informed her commanding
officer “she would not be vaccinated for personal reasons,” the
Board “could reasonably infer that at the point in time it was
making its decision, the public harm would be recurring”].)
Stringer refused to comply with the City’s policy “to address the
5 Stringer asserts that in February 2023 the City Council
“passed a Resolution to discontinue ‘COVID-19 surveillance
testing requirements’ for all current and future employees.” The
City Council, however, did not pass this resolution until after the
Board made its decision in this case. The administrative record
does not include a copy of the resolution, and the trial court
declined to take judicial notice of it; therefore, we do not consider
it. (See Bedard, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 458, fn. 11 [events
occurring after the Board’s decision, including the City Council
passing a resolution ending the vaccination requirement, had “no
bearing on the Board’s decision”]; see also Anton’s Services Inc. v.
Hagen (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 90, 101 [“Evidence outside the
administrative record is generally not admissible in proceedings
filed under Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5.”].)
15
imminent threat to public health and safety and workplace safety
posed by allowing unvaccinated City employees to remain in the
workplace and to continue to interact with the public and other
City employees.” The trial court did not err in ruling the Board
did not abuse its discretion in terminating Stringer for this
serious misconduct.6
C. Stringer Was Not Entitled to a Jury Trial
Finally, citing Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Jarkesy (2024) 603 U.S. 109, a case the United States Supreme
Court decided after the trial court ruled on her petition, Stringer
argues her “loss of employment, loss of income, loss of future
pension income, through administrative proceedings violated the
Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial.” In Jarkesy the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sought civil
penalties and other remedies against an investment manager and
a related entity for securities fraud. (Id. at p. 118.) The SEC
decided to adjudicate the matter before an administrative law
judge, rather than in federal court where the factfinder would
6 Because the Board had ample justification for discharging
Stringer, the trial court properly limited the award for the Skelly
violation to backpay. (See Barber v. State Personnel Board (1976)
18 Cal.3d 395, 402 [the remedy for a violation under Skelly “is to
award back pay for the period of wrongful discipline”]; Bedard,
supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 460 [“Barber established that the
only remedy for the violation of an employee’s due process is
backpay when her discharge is justified.”]; Williams v. City
of L.A. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1217 [“the proper remedy for
a Skelly violation is an award of backpay for the period described
in Barber, rather than reinstatement”].)
16
have been a jury, and the administrative law judge imposed a
sizeable civil penalty for the wrongdoing. (Id. at pp. 117, 119.)
The United States Supreme Court held the “SEC’s antifraud
provisions replicate common law fraud, and it is well established
that common law claims must be heard by a jury.” (Id. at p. 120.)
The Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amendment of the
United States Constitution “extends to a particular statutory
claim if the claim is ‘legal in nature’” and that a civil penalty is
“‘a type of remedy at common law that could only be enforced in
courts of law.’” (Id. at pp. 122, 123.)
Jarkesy does not apply here, primarily because the
Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of a right to a jury trial in suits
at common law does not apply in state courts. (See Nationwide
Biweekly Administration, Inc. v. Superior Court (2020) 9 Cal.5th
279, 330 [“The federal civil jury trial provision of the
Seventh Amendment applies only to civil trials in federal court;
federal decisions explicitly hold that the civil jury trial provision
of the Seventh Amendment does not apply to state court
proceedings.”]; Crouchman v. Superior Court (1988) 45 Cal.3d
1167, 1173, fn. 5 [same]; Orange County Water Dist. v. Alcoa
Global Fasteners, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 252, 356 [same].) In
addition, Stringer’s suggestion a public employer’s disciplinary
action is somehow like an SEC proceeding fails; a public
employer terminating an employee for misconduct is nothing like
a federal agency seeking civil penalties for securities fraud.
Stringer asserts the Los Angeles City Charter “gives the Police
Chief a ‘private right’ to take disciplinary action, which, under
the SEC decision requires a jury trial.” Stringer, however,
provides no legal authority or reasoned argument to support this
assertion. (See Estrada v. Public Employees’ Retirement System
17
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 870, 889; Public Employment Relations Bd.
v. Bellflower Unified School Dist. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 927,
939.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment granting in part Stringer’s petition and
directing the City to award Stringer backpay from January 17,
2022 to May 25, 2022 is affirmed. The City is to recover its costs
on appeal.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
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