Stinson v. Dang CA1/4

Filed 8/28/26 Stinson v. Dang CA1/4

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

ROBERT STINSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A173842
v. (San Mateo County
TON HY DANG, Super. Ct. No. 23CIV02451)
Defendant and Respondent.

Plaintiff Robert Stinson sustained injuries when the motorized scooter
he was riding collided with a car driven by defendant Ton Hy Dang. In a suit
filed by Stinson, a jury found both Dang and Stinson were negligent, and the
negligence of each party was a substantial factor in causing harm to Stinson.
Dang and Stinson were found to be, respectively, 47.5 and 52.5 percent
responsible for the harm.
Stinson filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOV), contending there was no substantial evidence supporting the jury’s
finding that his conduct was a contributing cause of his harm. The trial court
denied the motion, and Stinson now appeals. We conclude the jury’s finding
is supported by substantial evidence, and we therefore affirm.

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I. BACKGROUND
On the afternoon of March 27, 2023, Stinson was riding his motorized
scooter in the bike lane on eastbound East Grand Avenue in South San
Francisco. Dang was in his car going the same direction in the number two
lane (next to the bike lane). At the intersection with Littlefield Avenue, Dang
made a right turn, crossing the bike lane. Stinson’s scooter, proceeding
forward in the bike lane, collided with Dang’s car as it turned in front of him.
Stinson was ejected and landed on the ground, sustaining significant injuries.
The evidence showed that, when Dang began his right turn, it had been
several seconds since he had checked his righthand rearview mirror to see if
there was anyone approaching from behind in the bike lane. And as to
Stinson, there was evidence—offered via estimates by both parties’ accident
reconstruction experts—that he was traveling at about 30 miles per hour, in
excess of the speed limit of 15 miles per hour applicable to motorized scooters.
(Veh. Code, § 22411; see id., § 21235, subd. (b).)
Stinson sued Dang, and after a trial, the jury found Dang was
negligent, and his negligence was a substantial factor in causing harm to
Stinson. The jury found Stinson’s damages, including medical expenses, lost
earnings, and noneconomic losses, totaled $680,000. The jury next found
Stinson was also negligent, and his negligence was a substantial factor in
causing his own harm. As noted above, the jury found Dang was 47.5 percent
responsible, and Stinson was 52.5 percent responsible.
Based on the jury’s findings, the court entered judgment for Stinson on
March 26, 2025, in the amount of $323,000 (i.e., 47.5 percent of the $680,000
in total damages). The court entered an order on May 15, 2025, denying
Stinson’s motions for a new trial and for JNOV. In denying the JNOV
motion, the trial court reasoned that there was clear causation between

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Stinson’s speeding and his harm. The trial court pointed out that Stinson’s
speed affected his ability to avoid the crash in multiple ways, including
affecting his attentiveness that resulted in his failure to notice Dang’s
blinker. On June 18, 2025, the court entered an amended judgment, adding
an award of costs to Stinson in the amount of $29,860.28, for a total recovery
of $352,860.28.
Stinson filed a notice of appeal on June 30, 2025, purporting to
challenge the judgment and the denial of his motions for a new trial and
JNOV. On Dang’s motion to dismiss the appeal, we granted the motion in
part and denied it in part. We explained: (1) Stinson’s appeal of the
judgment was untimely, so this court lacks jurisdiction to review it; (2) the
order denying the JNOV motion is separately appealable, and Stinson’s
notice of appeal was timely as to that order; and (3) the order denying the
new trial motion is not separately appealable, and this court declined to
exercise discretion to review that order in conjunction with the JNOV order.
Following our order on Stinson’s motion to dismiss, his appeal has
proceeded only as to the order denying the motion for JNOV.
II. DISCUSSION
Stinson attacks the denial of his JNOV motion on the sole ground that
there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that any
negligence by him was a substantial factor in causing his own harm. We
reject the argument and will affirm.
A. Legal Standards
We begin with the governing principles of substantive law. The
elements of negligence liability are “ ‘ “a legal duty to use due care, a breach
of such legal duty, and the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the
resulting injury.” ’ ” (Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church (2017) 3 Cal.5th
1077, 1083.) Under the comparative fault doctrine, a defendant has the

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burden to show a plaintiff’s own negligence contributed to the plaintiff’s
harm. (See Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1285.)
The procedural posture in which this appeal comes before us is crucial
here. “ ‘A motion for [JNOV] may be granted only if it appears from the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party securing the verdict,
that there is no substantial evidence in support.’ [Citation.] The standard of
review on appeal is the same: ‘whether any substantial evidence—
contradicted or uncontradicted—supports the jury’s conclusion.’ ” (I.C. v.
Compton Unified School Dist. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 688, 698.) Under the
“ ‘highly deferential’ ” standard applicable to our review of the denial of a
JNOV motion, “ ‘[w]e do not reweigh the evidence.’ ” (Contreras v. Green
Thumb Produce, Inc. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1251, 1259.)
There are “three pillars” to the governing substantial evidence test.
“First, we accept all evidence supporting the trial court’s order. Second, we
completely disregard contrary evidence. Third, we draw all reasonable
inferences to affirm the trial court.” (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020)
44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581.) We must also bear in mind that, by its nature—
whether in the context of a JNOV denial, or any other review of fact finding
in the trial court—the requisite evidentiary threshold of substantiality is
modest. Substantial is not synonymous with “any” and pure speculation is
not enough, but beyond that we will be satisfied with “evidence of ponderable
legal significance that is reasonable, credible and of solid value” as well as
any logical inferences that may be drawn therefrom. (Quigley v. McClellan
(2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1282–1283.)
As a practical matter, the principle that we accept evidence of
“ponderable legal significance” means that we must always respect a jury’s
freedom “to ‘make credibility determinations and believe the [testimony] it

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considers more trustworthy.’ ” (Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew,
Inc. (Fed.Cir. 2012) 688 F.3d 1342, 1362.) A jury is empowered to make
reasonable inferences from the expert testimony, along with other evidence,
and come to its own conclusion that neither a trial court nor an appellate
court may second guess, so long as the substantial evidence test is met. (See
Cooper v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 555,
573 [for judgments notwithstanding the verdict, “ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘[i]f there is any
substantial evidence, or reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in
support of the verdict, the motion should be denied’ ” ’ ” ’ ”].)
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Finding That
Stinson’s Negligence Was a Substantial Factor in Causing Harm
Stinson acknowledges there was substantial evidence he was speeding,
and he does not challenge the jury’s finding that his conduct was negligent,
i.e., “a breach of his legal duty.” He disputes causation, however, arguing
there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding against him on
that issue. We disagree.
1. The Battle of the Experts
At trial, the jury heard from two accident reconstruction experts,
Gerald Bretting, the defense expert, and Rajeev Kelkar, the plaintiff’s expert.
The experts provided different estimates as to the distance that would have
been required for Stinson to stop the scooter at various initial speeds. Kelkar
testified that, if Stinson were traveling at 30 miles per hour, it would take
him 238 feet to stop, assuming a two-second “perception reaction time” and a
deceleration rate of “0.2 G’s.” Using the same perception reaction time and
the same deceleration rate, Kelkar testified that, if Stinson were riding at 20
miles per hour, it would take him 125 feet to stop; at 15 miles per hour, it
would take him about 81 feet to stop.

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When Dang’s counsel later asked Bretting about these scenarios,
Bretting explained that he used a shorter “perception response time” of 1.4
seconds (rather than 2 seconds), because that is “the 85th percentile,” i.e., 85
percent of people would respond in 1.4 seconds or less. Bretting also used a
different deceleration rate—“a 0.4 G deceleration” (rather than 0.2)—because
Stinson’s scooter was “a high-performance is [sic] scooter with hydraulic disc
brakes.” Applying these different variables, Bretting testified that, at 30
miles per hour, Stinson’s stopping distance would be 137 feet; at 20 miles per
hour, the stopping distance would be 75 feet; and at 15 miles per hour, the
stopping distance would be 50 feet. The jury reasonably could accept either
expert’s set of calculations on this point. And, contrary to Stinson’s
suggestion, the evidence before the jury does connect Stinson’s likely stopping
distance to the causation of the collision.
At trial, Stinson testified that all he could remember was a “blue blur
just turn right in front of me” when he was “right in the middle of the
intersection[,]” but in a portion of his deposition testimony that was admitted
into evidence and read to the jury, he testified that about four seconds
elapsed between the time he saw Dang’s car turn in front of him until the
moment of impact. Dang’s counsel later asked Bretting “how far back”
Stinson would have been four seconds before the impact, assuming he was
traveling at 33 miles per hour. Bretting testified Stinson would have been
194 feet away from the point of impact, and he could have stopped in 137 feet.
Bretting testified that, if Stinson had been going at 20 miles per hour, he
would have been 117 feet away four seconds before the impact, and he could
have stopped in 75 feet. The jury reasonably could have relied on this
testimony to conclude Stinson could have stopped in time to avoid the
collision.

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Under Bretting’s calculations, four seconds would have given Stinson
enough time to stop even when traveling at 33 miles per hour (well above the
speed limit). Indeed, wholly aside from speed, we note that the jury
reasonably could have found Stinson was negligent in other ways, such as
failing to pay sufficient attention to notice when Dang turned on his turn
signal. Dang testified that he had his turn signal on for about 5 to 10 seconds
before he turned, and that he always turns on his signal before turning,
testimony that the trial court noted when denying Stinson’s JNOV motion.
Stinson testified he did not see a blinker before Dang started to turn, but the
jury could have concluded Stinson’s testimony on this point was unreliable, or
that it reflected the fact he was not paying sufficient attention to his
surroundings.
We also note Stinson testified at trial that, when he saw the car turn,
he “hit [his] brakes.” Any braking could affect the above calculations as to
exactly where Stinson was four seconds before impact. But Stinson did not
object to Bretting’s testimony on this point; did not cross-examine him about
it; and failed to challenge Bretting’s analysis on this ground either at trial or
on appeal. Nor did the jury have to accept Stinson’s trial testimony about
whether and when he braked. It is true, to be sure, that Stinson’s expert,
Kelkar, testified that, once Dang started turning, “you cannot avoid the
accident,” because Stinson could not have stopped in time to avoid the
collision regardless of the speed at which he was traveling, but this testimony
failed to take into account the deposition testimony from Stinson himself
stating that four seconds elapsed from the time he saw Dang begin to turn to
the time of impact.
Stinson emphasizes that Dang bore the burden of proving causation on
Stinson’s part. The core of Stinson’s argument, and the central thrust of this

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appeal, is that Dang failed to carry his burden on the issue of causation
because Bretting’s testimony does not provide a sufficient basis for the jury’s
finding that Stinson’s own negligence was a substantial causative factor in
the harm he suffered. Specifically, Stinson suggests the jury had to adopt the
view taken by Kelkar because Bretting did not provide a sufficient “rebuttal”
to it. Kelkar opined that, from the time Dang’s car started to turn until the
time of impact was less than two seconds, and according to Stinson, that
estimate—which was the basis of Kelkar’s unavoidability opinion—went
unrebutted.1
We are not persuaded that the jury was obligated to accept Kelkar’s
unavoidability opinion. As an initial matter, the argument flies in the face of
the basic principle that, in a review for substantial evidence, we must
disregard evidence that is contrary to the jury’s findings. On a review of the
record as a whole, the reaction time testimony provided by Stinson in his
deposition tends to support Bretting’s view, not Kelkar’s, since Bretting
testified that four seconds would have given Stinson enough time to stop.
Even Kelkar allowed that, “Yes, if you believe the [four-second] estimate is
correct, then there might have been time to stop.” Stinson contends that
Bretting “admitted” Stinson did not have enough time to stop. But Bretting
only stated that, at 33 miles per hour, Stinson would not have had time to
avoid the collision. And in any event, Bretting’s answer on this point appears
to be based on the assumption that Stinson saw Dang turning only about two

1 The derivation of Kelkar’s less-than-two-seconds-to-impact estimate

appears to be based on materials that are not in the appellate record. For
example, he stated that among the materials he considered in preparing his
testimony was a surveillance video that was in evidence at trial, and that
video may have provided the basis for this opinion. But the video is not in
the record on appeal; only a screenshot has been provided, and only in
Stinson’s appellate reply brief.

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seconds before the collision—in essence, his testimony about only recalling “a
blue blur . . . in front of me”—rather than four. But that is not the only thing
Stinson had to say on this issue, and we must accept the version of his
testimony that supports the judgment.
Nor do we think that Bretting’s testimony was speculative, either
because it was based on logical inferences so far-fetched as to have exceeded
the bounds of reason or because it amounted to an invitation to the jury to
find something that was physically impossible. The jury need not have
accepted Bretting’s ultimate opinion—that Stinson had time to avoid the
accident outright—to have believed that, on this record, Stinson had plenty of
time to mitigate the force of the collision. Accordingly, whatever flaws or lack
of rigor there may have been in Bretting’s logic concerning the complete
avoidability of the accident, we conclude there was enough support in the
record to uphold the jury’s verdict under the substantial evidence test.
Stinson’s assertion that some portions of Bretting’s testimony are ambiguous
or unpersuasive—such as testimony that Stinson characterizes as showing
only that he was in the “wrong place at the wrong time”—provides no basis
for reversal.
Overall, the bottom line is this. Understandably, the arguments and
the expert testimony from each side at trial, Stinson, on the one hand,
contending that Dang was wholly at fault, and Dang on the other, contending
that Stinson was wholly at fault, took maximalist causation positions. It
seems to us the jury chose a middle ground that neither side invited but that
the record and the comparative negligence instructions (as outlined by the
trial court in its order denying Stinson’s posttrial motions) support. While
neither Kelkar nor Bretting referred to Stinson’s four-second estimate
expressly, both experts can reasonably be understood as having offered their

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opinions in the context of it. The jury certainly knew about it. And in
assigning fault to each party, the jury appears to have concluded on its own—
without wholly embracing the Kelkar view or the Bretting view, both of
which were imperfect—that the fairest result here was that Stinson should
be held 52.5 percent responsible for his own injuries, since he could have
either avoided the collision altogether or crashed at a much lower velocity had
he been going slower.
In short, the negligence of both Dang and Stinson was a causative
factor, Stinson’s just a little bit more than Dang’s. The trial court declined to
second-guess that finding, and so do we.
2. The Argument That Stinson’s Speed Was Not a “But For”
Cause of His Injuries
Stinson relies on Toste v. CalPortland Construction (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 362 to support an argument that there is no “but for”
causation. In Toste, the defendant driver backed into the plaintiff, causing
his death, while negligently under the influence of marijuana. (Id. at p. 365.)
The court upheld the jury’s finding that the defendant’s negligence was not a
substantial factor in causing the death of the plaintiff. (Id. at p. 370.) This is
because the plaintiff was positioned in a blind spot behind the defendant such
that the accident would have occurred regardless of the defendant’s
negligence. (Ibid.)
Stinson uses Bowman v. Wyatt (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 286 to argue
similarly. In Bowman, the plaintiff was seriously injured when his
motorcycle collided with a dump truck driven by the defendant. (Id. at
p. 294.) The plaintiff introduced evidence that the defendant’s brakes were
defective and negligently maintained as a substantial factor in causing his
harm. (Id. at p. 295.) But there was no evidence that the defendant
attempted to use his brakes or slow down to avoid the crash. (Id. at pp. 312–

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313.) Thus, the appellate panel concluded that there was no substantial
evidence to support the jury’s finding that the negligently maintained brakes
were a substantial factor in causing the harm. (Id. at pp. 314–315.)
Stinson cites Toste and Bowman for the proposition that his negligent
speeding had no effect on Dang’s negligence in not checking his mirrors
properly and that it was solely Dang’s negligence that caused the crash.
These cases are distinguishable. Toste and Bowman both conclude that the
incidents would have happened regardless of the defendants’ negligence.
(Toste v. CalPortland Construction, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 370;
Bowman v. Wyatt, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 314–315.) Here, however,
the trial evidence, including Stinson’s own deposition testimony and
Bretting’s calculations, supports a conclusion that the accident would not
have occurred without Stinson’s negligence.
Finally, Stinson takes issue with the jury’s “Yes” answer to question 5
specifically, which asked it “Was Robert Stinson’s negligence a substantial
factor in causing his harm.” He insists that, even under comparative
negligence principles, there must still be evidence that a plaintiff’s own
negligence was a “but for” cause of his harm, before any allocation of fault to
the plaintiff by percentage of fault may take place. Stinson reiterated and
amplified this contention at oral argument.
The applicable principles of causation are well established. “The
substantial factor standard”—which of course states the legal rule behind
question 5—“is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the contribution of
the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical.” (Rutherford v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 978.) This standard “subsumes”
and “generally produces the same results as does the ‘but for’ rule of
causation which states that a defendant’s conduct is a cause of the injury if

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the injury would not have occurred ‘but for’ that conduct.” (Id. at p. 969.)
And “ ‘ “[l]egal causation is generally a question of fact to be determined by
the jury . . . unless, as a matter of law, the facts admit of only one
conclusion.” ’ ” (Sobalvarro v. Vibra Health Care (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 748,
763.)
Here, it cannot be said that the uncontroverted facts admit of only one
conclusion, and in arguing to the contrary Stinson makes the same mistake
he does when he suggests that the jury’s verdict is unsupported by
substantial evidence. Even if the jury found that the crash would have
happened regardless of Stinson’s speed, they could still find that his speed
contributed to the severity of his injuries. At a slower speed, Stinson may not
have collided with the car with the force that he did or been launched into the
intersection. Thus, whether question 5 was stated as a “but for” test or a
“substantial factor” test, the jury’s “Yes” answer to question 5—which, as we
have explained, is supported by substantial evidence—would have been the
same on this record either way.
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Stinson’s motion for JNOV is affirmed.
Dang shall recover his costs on appeal.
STREETER, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.

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