Filed 11/4/26 Stevenson v. Schultz CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Nevada)
DOUGLAS SCHULTZ, C103755
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CU0000128)
v.
MARIANNE STEVENSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
_____________________________
C103382
MARIANNE STEVENSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. FL001430)
v.
DOUGLAS SCHULTZ,
Defendant and Respondent.
This is a consolidated appeal from (1) an interlocutory judgment ordering the
partition and sale of residential property in Nevada County Superior Court case
No. CU0000128 (Case No. CU0000128), and (2) the denial of a request for spousal
support and for the division of community property in Nevada County Superior Court
case No. FL001430 (Case No. FL001430).
1
In 2000, Douglas Schultz and Marianne Stevenson were married in the State of
Nevada. In 2004, they purchased a residential property in Grass Valley, California,
taking title as “husband and wife as joint tenants.” In 2020, Schultz obtained a judgment
of divorce from Stevenson in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Dubai divorce
decree addressed marital status and child custody only; it made no findings related to
division of property or spousal support.
Years later, Schultz commenced an action in Case No. CU0000128 (the partition
action), to partition the Grass Valley property. Stevenson opposed partition, arguing that
the Dubai divorce decree is not enforceable in California and therefore the property is
community property and not subject to partition (Code Civ. Proc., § 872.210, subd. (b)).1
The trial court ultimately entered an interlocutory judgment in favor of Schultz, finding
that the parties are divorced and that the property is not community property.
Meanwhile, Stevenson filed a request for an order in a family law proceeding,
Case No. FL001430, asking the family law court to deny comity to the Dubai divorce
decree; treat the parties as a married couple seeking dissolution; assume jurisdiction over
the partition action; and address issues of spousal support, child custody/visitation, and
division of property. After a hearing, the family law court denied her request based on
lack of personal jurisdiction and inconvenient forum.
Stevenson appeals both rulings. Regarding the interlocutory judgment, she argues
that the trial court abused its discretion by extending comity to the Dubai divorce decree
because it was based on Islamic (Sharia) laws that violate state public policy and
constitutional principles of equal protection and due process. She also challenges a pre-
judgment order denying her motion to set aside an entry of default as to other (non-
partition) causes of action. Regarding her request for relief in family law court,
1 Undesignated section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2
Stevenson argues the court erred in finding no personal jurisdiction and abused its
discretion by dismissing the case based on inconvenient forum.
In the first appeal, we conclude that Stevenson’s challenges to the interlocutory
judgment either have been forfeited or lack merit. We decline to review Stevenson’s
challenges to the order denying her motion for relief from default because that order is
not reviewable on appeal from the interlocutory judgment. In the second appeal, we
conclude that Stevenson has failed to carry her burden of showing that the trial court
erred in finding no personal jurisdiction. We therefore affirm the rulings in both cases.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Schultz and Stevenson, both of whom are United States citizens and of Christian
faith, were married in Nevada in 2000. In 2004, they purchased a residential property in
Grass Valley, California, taking title as “husband and wife as joint tenants.” From 2004
to 2011, the couple resided at the property with their two children: A son born in 2004
and a daughter born in 2007.
In 2011, the family moved to Dubai, UAE. The family lived together in Dubai
from 2011 until 2017. In 2017, due in part to suspicions of marital infidelity, Stevenson
left Dubai and moved back to California.
Dubai Divorce Decree
On January 2, 2020, Schultz initiated the process to divorce Stevenson under
Dubai Sharia law by making a unilateral declaration of intent to divorce, also known as a
talaq pronouncement of divorce. 2 (See Chaudry v. Chaudry (N.J. Super.Ct.App.Div.
1978) 159 N.J. Super. 566, 574-575.)
2 Stevenson contends that under applicable Sharia law only the husband had the
legal right to “effectuate” such a divorce and a wife could do so only with her husband’s
permission.
3
Thereafter, on February 25, 2020, Schultz filed an action in a Dubai court to
“certify” (i.e., finalize) the talaq pronouncement of divorce. Stevenson retained counsel
to represent her in the Dubai proceeding.
After several continuances—granted, in part, to allow Stevenson time to
familiarize herself with the case—the matter came on for hearing on September 6, 2020.
The issues before the Dubai court included not only Schultz’s request to “certify” the
divorce but also Schultz’s separate request to establish custody over the couple’s
children. Schultz appeared at the hearing with counsel. It is not clear from the record
whether Stevenson or her counsel was physically present for the September 6 hearing. At
the hearing, the court heard testimony from Schultz and two other witnesses.
On September 20, 2020, the Dubai court entered a judgment of dissolution. In
rendering its decision, the court expressly found that “in consideration of the fact that
both parties are adherents of the Christian faith and [that] neither party has advocated the
application of their respective country’s legal framework, the UAE’s legal statutes have
jurisdiction.” Thus, “[i]n light of the permissibility of unilateral divorce within Islamic
Sharia and the UAE’s Personal Status Law derived from its precepts,” the court
concluded that it had been “conclusively established” that Schultz “unequivocally
divorced [Stevenson] through a definite and unequivocal declaration on 02/01/2020.”
Further, because the children had surpassed the age typically associated with maternal
custody under Sharia law, the court awarded Schultz full custody of the children.
The Dubai divorce decree addressed marital status and child custody only; it made
no findings related to division of property or spousal support.
California Dissolution Proceeding
On January 14, 2020, after the talaq pronouncement of divorce but before
commencement of the Dubai action to “certify” the divorce, Stevenson filed a petition for
dissolution of marriage in Nevada County Superior Court (Case No. FL20-015613; the
4
2020 dissolution proceeding). Shortly thereafter, Schultz filed a motion to quash service
of the summons in the 2020 dissolution proceeding.
After briefing and argument, the family law court granted the motion to quash.
The court concluded that Schultz’s contacts with the state of California are “substantial
and systematic enough to support a finding of general personal jurisdiction,” but that the
exercise of jurisdiction over him would not be fair and reasonable. The court held that
“California has minimal to no state interest in adjudicating” Stevenson’s petition for
dissolution; that exercising jurisdiction would impose a “substantial burden” on Schultz,
and that Stevenson “can obtain effective relief in the [UAE] dissolution matter.”
Stevenson filed a motion for reconsideration. The family law court granted
reconsideration but ultimately reaffirmed its decision to grant the motion to quash.
Stevenson did not appeal the order quashing service.
California Partition Action
In April 2022, Schultz commenced an action in Nevada County Superior Court
(Case No. CU0000128; the partition action) seeking partition of the Nevada County
property, among other causes of action.
After unsuccessfully attempting to serve Stevenson by other means, the trial court
granted Schultz’s request for service by publication. When Stevenson failed to file a
responsive pleading, Schultz requested entry of default, which the court clerk entered on
March 2, 2023.
On March 30, 2023, Schultz filed a second amended complaint, the primary
purpose of which was to eliminate a cause of action for partition of personal property. As
with the first amended complaint, the summons for the second amended complaint was
served by publication.
In August 2023, Stevenson filed a motion to set aside the entry of default, arguing
that she failed to respond to the complaint because she was unaware it had been served.
The trial court denied the motion to set aside entry of default based on Stevenson’s lack
5
of diligence in seeking relief and failure to demonstrate excusable neglect. Nevertheless,
a few months later, the parties stipulated to lift the default as to the partition cause of
action so that it could be decided on the merits.
In January 2024, Stevenson filed a motion to transfer the partition case to family
law court. In support of her motion, Stevenson argued that the Dubai divorce is not
entitled to comity because it is contrary to California public policy and violated
Stevenson’s rights to due process and equal protection. Accordingly, Stevenson argued
that she and Schultz are still married and that the Grass Valley house is community
property and not subject to partition (§ 872.210, subd. (b)).
The trial court denied Stevenson’s transfer motion. In its ruling, the court
extended comity to the Dubai divorce decree as it relates to the status of the marriage and
found that Schultz and Stevenson are “not married.” The court also held that Stevenson
failed to show how recognition of the Dubai divorce decree in the partition action would
prejudice Stevenson’s rights or violate California public policy.
In September 2024, Schultz filed a motion for entry of interlocutory judgment
concerning partition of the property. The motion argued that because Schultz and
Stevenson are no longer “ ‘husband and wife,’ ” they own the property as “ ‘joint
tenants,’ ” each having an undivided one-half interest in the property. The motion sought
to have the property sold and the net proceeds divided amongst them.
Stevenson opposed the motion for entry of interlocutory judgment and filed a
motion to stay the partition action. Stevenson argued that a stay was necessary to
preserve her right to challenge the validity of the Dubai judgment in family law court.
The trial court denied the stay request.
On April 21, 2025, the trial court granted Schultz’s motion for entry of an
interlocutory judgment. In its ruling, the trial court rejected Stevenson’s claim that the
parties are still married: “Despite multiple efforts by defendant to invalidate it, this court
has recognized the validity of the Dubai divorce between the parties, determined that the
6
parties are no longer married and determined that plaintiff’s partition action is not barred
by [Code of Civil Procedure] § 872.210.” Thereafter, on May 2, 2025, the court entered
its interlocutory judgment for partition of the property.
On May 8, 2025, Stevenson filed a notice of appeal of the order granting the
motion for entry of an interlocutory judgment.
California Family Law Proceeding
In or about September 2023, Stevenson filed a request for a domestic violence
restraining order (DVRO) against Schultz in Nevada County Superior Court (Case
No. FL0001430; the DVRO action). 3 Notably, in her request for a DVRO, Stevenson did
not argue that she and Schultz were still married. Rather, she alleged that they “used to
be married.” In November 2023, Schultz moved to quash the service of the summons in
the DVRO action or, in the alternative, to dismiss on grounds of inconvenient forum. In
support of the motion, Schultz argued that the “main incidents” of alleged domestic abuse
occurred in Florida, not California. In addition, Schultz asserted that he “lives in Dubai
and has not visited the state of California since March 1, 2022, nor has he resided in the
State of California since April 2007,” but that he “does spend time in Florida” and would
“have the ability to appear in person in that court.” Stevenson opposed the motion to
quash. She argued, among other things, that the court may exercise jurisdiction over
Schultz because he owns property in California and voluntarily submitted to the court’s
jurisdiction by filing the partition action in California. The family law court denied the
motion to quash and the motion to dismiss.
3 Around the same time, September/October 2023, Stevenson filed a petition for
dissolution of marriage and request for a DVRO in Florida, where Stevenson was
residing at the time Stevenson claims that the Florida action ultimately was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.
7
In November 2024, Stevenson filed a request for order (using Judicial Council
form FL-300) seeking additional relief in the DVRO action. Specifically, she asked the
family law court to deny comity to the Dubai divorce decree; treat the parties as a married
couple seeking dissolution; assume jurisdiction over the partition action; and address
issues of spousal support, child custody and visitation, and division of property. In her
request, she identified several alleged marital assets, including the Nevada County
property, vehicles, precious metals, guns and ammunition, and a retirement fund. Schultz
opposed the request.
On December 30, 2024, the family law court conducted an evidentiary hearing,
with live testimony, regarding the request for a DVRO. At the conclusion of testimony,
the family law court concluded that it had jurisdiction, but nevertheless denied
Stevenson’s request for a DVRO, finding that Stevenson had “lied … on the [witness]
stand.” The court continued the hearing on Stevenson’s request for spousal support,
division of property, and other relief to January 22, 2025.
At a “review hearing” on January 22, 2025, the family law court denied
Stevenson’s requests for non-DVRO relief. In its ruling, the court explained that it had
reviewed the documents in the DVRO action, the partition action, and the 2020
dissolution proceeding, and concluded that “there are no new facts or law that persuade[]
the court to modify the prior orders or ruling” and that the court lacked personal
jurisdiction over this matter. The court added that “[t]his matter has been previously
adjudicated, and the parties are divorced based upon a matter that occurred in the United
Arab Emirates (UAE).” Further, even if the court had personal jurisdiction, it “would
find … this is an inconvenient forum since the children live in Florida.” Based upon
these findings, the court dismissed the action.
On March 18, 2025, Stevenson appealed the order dismissing her requests for non-
DVRO relief.
8
REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Schultz’s motion for judicial notice in the partition action, filed on February 19,
2026, is granted as to the material attached to the motion. Stevenson’s motion for
judicial notice in the partition action, filed on February 20, 2026, is denied as
unnecessary and irrelevant.
DISCUSSION
I
Partition Action
Stevenson raises two arguments on appeal in the partition action. First, she
contends the trial court abused its discretion in extending comity to the Dubai judgment
because the judgment was based on Sharia laws that violate state public policy and
constitutional protections of due process and equal protection. Second, she contends the
trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for relief from default. 4
In opposition, Schultz argues that we should dismiss the appeal of the partition
action because the challenged orders are not appealable and Stevenson has failed to
provide an adequate record for appellate review. If we do not dismiss the appeal, Schultz
argues that we should affirm because there was no abuse of discretion.
A. Appealability
We begin with Schultz’s request that we dismiss the appeal of the partition action
as being taken from nonappealable orders. The existence of an appealable judgment is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal. (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126.)
Reviewing courts must resolve any doubts regarding appealability before turning to the
4 Stevenson refers to the motion as seeking relief from “the default judgment,” but
there is no default judgment; there is only an interlocutory judgment on the partition
cause of action.
9
merits of the appeal and must dismiss an appeal taken from a nonappealable order.
(Ibid.; Doe v. United States Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1432.)
Because the right to appeal is strictly statutory, a judgment or order is not appealable
unless expressly made so by statute. (Department of Water Resources Cases (2026)
119 Cal.App.5th 602, 618.)
Here, Stevenson’s notice of appeal identifies the April 22, 2025 order granting the
motion for interlocutory judgment as the order being appealed. As Schultz correctly
points out, that order is not appealable. (§ 904.1.) However, because it is reasonably
clear that Stevenson was trying to appeal the judgment of partition action, and because
we discern no prejudice to the respondent, we can and will liberally construe the notice of
appeal to have been taken from the May 2, 2025 interlocutory judgment for partition,
which is appealable. (Walker v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15, 20; Los Altos Golf & Country Club v. County of Santa
Clara (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 198, 203; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.100(a)(2),
8.104(d)(2); see Orien v. Lutz (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 957, 961, fn. 3 [interlocutory
judgments directing partition are appealable]; § 904.1, subd. (a)(9).)
By contrast, we conclude that the order denying Stevenson’s motion to set aside
the entry of default is not an appealable order. Such an order is reviewable only on
appeal from a resulting default judgment. (First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003)
108 Cal.App.4th 956, 960; Scognamillo v. Herrick (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1146;
§ 906.) In this case, there was no default judgment. The only judgment entered by the
court is the interlocutory judgment directing partition, which has nothing to do with the
entry of default because the parties stipulated to lift the default as to the partition cause of
action. Accordingly, we agree with Schultz that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the
order denying the motion for relief from default. The appeal of that order is either moot
(because of the parties’ stipulation regarding the partition cause of action) or premature
(because there has been no final judicial determination of the other causes of action).
10
B. Adequacy of Record
We next address whether Stevenson forfeited her challenges to the partition
judgment by failing to provide an adequate record.
The cardinal rule of appellate review is that the trial court’s judgment or order is
presumed correct and prejudicial error must be affirmatively shown. (Foust v. San Jose
Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187.) A necessary corollary to this
rule is that the plaintiff has the burden of providing an adequate record on appeal. (Ibid.)
We agree with Schultz that the record provided by Stevenson was inadequate
because it does not include all the filings related to the motion which is the subject of this
appeal. In particular, the record furnished by Stevenson did not include the Declarations
of Schultz, Robin Shofner, and Kevin Singer, and the request for judicial notice
submitted by Schultz in support of his motion for the interlocutory judgment. Under
California Rules of Court, rule 8.124(b)(1)(B), an appellant’s appendix must contain any
document filed or lodged in the case “that is necessary for proper consideration of the
issues, including, … any item that the appellant should reasonably assume the respondent
will rely on.” Stevenson failed to comply with this rule, leaving us with an incomplete
record that omitted the evidence upon which Schultz’s motion was based. However, on
our own motion, we have augmented the appellate record to include these omitted
documents. (State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WallDesign Inc. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1525,
1528, fn.1.) 5 As augmented, the record is adequate for us to evaluate Stevenson’s claim
on the merits.
5 Although we sometimes use our discretionary authority to augment the record
with documents omitted through mistake or neglect, we are not required to do so. (State
Comp. Ins. Fund v. WallDesign Inc., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528, fn. 1.)
11
C. Judgment for Partition
Turning to the merits of Stevenson’s contention that the trial court abused its
discretion in granting partition, we will affirm the interlocutory judgment of partition
without prejudice to Stevenson’s right to challenge the future allocation of proceeds.
Partition is a “ ‘procedure for segregating and terminating common interests in the
same parcel of property.’ ” (14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998)
63 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1404-1405.) The primary purpose of a partition action is to sever
the unity of possession and divide the existing property interests. (LEG Investments v.
Boxler (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 484, 493.) The manner of partition may be “in kind”
(physical division of the property) or “by sale” (ordering the property sold and the
proceeds divided among the parties). (Cummings v. Dessel (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 589,
597; §§ 873.210, 873.510, 872.820.)
As a general rule, a co-owner of property has “an absolute right to partition unless
barred by a valid waiver.” (LEG Investments v. Boxler, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 493;
§§ 872.210, subd. (a), 872.710, subd. (b).) However, no action to partition property may
be commenced or maintained between spouses for partition of community or quasi-
community property. (§ 872.210, subd. (b).)
In finding that Schultz is entitled to partition, the trial court concluded that this
was not an action to divide community property between spouses because the parties
already are divorced. The trial court found that the Dubai judgment dissolved their
marriage and, from that point forward, they held the property only as joint tenants and not
as “husband and wife.”
Stevenson attacks this finding by claiming that the Dubai divorce decree should
not be recognized under the doctrine of comity. In particular, she argues that the Dubai
divorce is not entitled to comity because it is based on a talaq pronouncement of divorce,
which violates California’s public policy favoring gender equality and constitutional
protections against gender-based disparate treatment. Stevenson contends therefore that
12
she and Schultz are still married, and that the Nevada County property is community
property, which is not subject to partition.
We conclude that Stevenson has failed to show that the trial court erred in
extending comity to the Dubai divorce decree.
Under the doctrine of comity, courts of this nation generally will give effect to the
judgment of a foreign nation if the foreign court had proper jurisdiction and enforcement
of the judgment will not prejudice the rights of United States citizens or violate domestic
public policy. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 314.) A trial court’s decision to
extend comity to a foreign judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.; see
Cummings v. Dessel, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 597.) Under that standard, we review
the trial court’s findings of fact (express or implied) for substantial evidence, its
conclusions of law de novo, and we reverse its application of the law to the facts “only if
arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 712.)
Based on the record before us, we find no abuse of discretion. Even if we agree
that parts of Sharia law—such as a talaq pronouncement of divorce—are contrary to
domestic public policy favoring gender equality and constitutional protections against
gender-based disparate treatment, the mere fact that some laws of the foreign nation are
inconsistent with those of the sovereign does not preclude application of comity. (See In
re Estate of Toland (2014) 180 Wash.2d 836, 847 [mere fact that foreign and domestic
laws are different does not establish a violation of public policy]; Derr v. Swarek (5th
Cir. 2014) 766 F.3d 430, 443 [uniformity of laws and procedural rules between the
domestic and foreign states is not necessary].)
The basic principle of judicial comity is that “ ‘a court should not assume to
disturb another court’s disposition of a controversy unless there are good reasons for
doing so.’ ” (16 Am.Jur.2d (2026), Conflict of Laws, § 11, citing In re General
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and Source (2006)
212 Ariz. 64, 81.) The standard for refusing to enforce a foreign judgment on public
13
policy grounds is high and infrequently met. (30 Am.Jur.2d (2026), Executions and
Enforcement of Judgments, § 647, citing Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys (In re
Fairfield Sentry Ltd.) (2d Cir. 2013) 714 F.3d 127, 139, fn. 12, & Pariente v. Scott
Meredith Literary Agency, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 771 F.Supp. 609, 617.) The standard
“ ‘is not simply that the law is contrary to our public policy, but that it is so offensive to
our public policy as to be “ ‘prejudicial to recognized standards of morality and to the
general interests of the citizens….’ ” ’ [Citation omitted.] Even when a foreign law
offends public policy, ‘it may still be applied in a limited context where the potential
harm is minimal….’ ” (In re Marriage of Elali & Marchoud (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 668,
686; Wong v. Tenneco (1985) 39 Cal.3d 126, 136; see In re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate
(1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 256, 261-262 [in context of intestate succession, foreign law
permitting polygamy may be applied under principles of comity].)
Here, we are not persuaded that extending comity to the Dubai divorce decree
impermissibly prejudiced Stevenson’s rights or flouted state public policy favoring
gender equality. It is important to remember that the Dubai judgment only adjudicated
two issues—marital status and child custody—and that the trial court extended comity to
the judgment as it related to the status of marriage only. (See Johnson v. Johnson
(Ct.App. Nov. 14, 1997, Appeal No. 02A01-9603-CH-00061) 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS
806, at pp. *12-13 [a foreign divorce decree can be recognized to the extent that it
dissolves a marital relationship without giving full comity to the decree].) Since
Stevenson plainly did not wish to remain married to Schultz, we cannot say that it was an
abuse of discretion for the trial court to recognize the Dubai judgment as dissolving
marital status. (See Ashfaq v. Ashfaq (Tex.Ct.App. 2015) 467 S.W.3d 539, 543-544 [trial
court acted within its discretion in recognizing Pakistani talaq divorce as valid under
principles of comity]; Chaudry v. Chaudry, supra, 159 N.J.Super. at p. 575 [principles of
comity dictate that Pakistan divorce should have been recognized and enforced to the
extent it affects the marital status of the parties]; see also Ahmad v Khalil (N.Y. Sup.Ct.
14
2013) 40 Misc.3d 1206(A) [975 N.Y.S.2d 364] (slip opn.) [comity should be extended to
uphold the validity of Jordanian divorce decree that merely terminated the marital status
of the parties].)
The premise underlying Stevenson’s claim of prejudice appears to be that
recognizing the foreign divorce precludes her from obtaining spousal support and an
equitable division of the marital property. 6 We disagree with this premise.
“[A]s the California Supreme Court has explained, a dissolution judgment does
not affect the disposition of community property as to which the judgment is silent.
‘Under California law, a spouse’s entitlement to a share of the community property arises
at the time that the property is acquired. [Citations.] That interest is not altered except
by judicial decree or an agreement between the parties. Hence “under settled principles
of California community property law, ‘property which is not mentioned in the pleadings
as community property is left unadjudicated by decree of divorce, and is subject to future
litigation, the parties being tenants in common meanwhile.’ ” [Citations.] This rule
applies to partial divisions of community property as well as divorces unaccompanied by
any property adjudication whatsoever.’ ” (In re Marriage of Huntley (2017)
10 Cal.App.5th 1053, 1059 (Huntley); accord, In re Marriage of Dunmore (1996)
45 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1379, fn. 6 [“[E]ven where there is an ostensible, final and
complete judgment the parties may nonetheless litigate issues of property rights that are
not expressly adjudicated by that judgment.”])
When a community property asset is left unadjudicated in a dissolution judgment,
it remains subject to division by a subsequent request for order in a family law
proceeding or by an independent partition action. (See 6 Cal. Fam. Law Practice &
Procedure (2d ed. 2026) § 212.03[2]; Fam. Code, § 2556; Huntley, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th
6 Stevenson contends that issues related to child custody and support have been
rendered moot as the children have reached the age of majority.
15
at pp. 1059-1061; Berry v. Berry (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1155, 1159; Zarrahy v. Zarrahy
(1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1, 5; Henn v. Henn (1980) 26 Cal.3d 323, 330-332; see also Irwin
v. Irwin (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 317, 320 [California adheres to the concept of “ ‘divisible
divorce’ ” and, hence, if issues of property division and spousal support are not
mentioned in the dissolution judgment, they may be made the subject of an independent
action].) Until the unadjudicated marital asset is divided, California courts treat the asset
as being held by the parties as tenants in common. (Berry, at p. 1159; Zarrahy, at p. 5;
Henn, at p. 330.) A California court, which otherwise has jurisdiction over the parties, is
not deprived of jurisdiction to award spousal support or divide marital property by a
previously entered dissolution judgment that did not address those issues. (Huntley, at
p. 1061; In re Marriage of Newman (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 846, 847, 849-851.)
Newman and Huntley are instructive. In In re Marriage of Newman (2000)
80 Cal.App.4th 846, a husband and wife filed separate actions for dissolution of their
marriage. In the husband’s action, filed in Georgia, the only relief sought or obtained
was dissolution of the marriage. (Id. at p. 848.) The wife thereafter filed an action in
California in which she sought both dissolution of the marriage and spousal support.
(Ibid.) The wife did not appear in the Georgia action, and the husband obtained a final
judgment of divorce that did not address spousal support, division of property, or any
other issue. (Ibid.) Thereafter, the husband successfully moved to quash the wife’s
petition for dissolution and spousal support. (Ibid.) The wife appealed and the court of
appeal reversed, holding that because the Georgia action did not address the issue of
support, the California court was not precluded from exercising jurisdiction to establish a
support order. (Id. at p. 851; see also In re Marriage of Richardson (2009)
179 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1244.)
Huntley, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th 1053, involved a motion to divide unadjudicated
community property following entry of a default dissolution judgment. (Id. at p. 1056.)
The husband filed a petition for marital dissolution, which listed a house as the only
16
community property. (Id. at p. 1057.) The subsequent default judgment dissolved the
marriage but did not mention community property. (Ibid.) Two years later, the wife filed
a motion to adjudicate omitted community property assets, including furnishings,
vehicles, and retirement benefits. (Id. at pp. 1057-1058.) The trial court denied the
motion. (Id. at p. 1056.) The court of appeal concluded that the trial court erred in
denying the wife’s motion because the “dissolution judgment did not divide—or even
mention—any community property,” and, consequently, the community property
remained subject to division as a missed asset. (Id. at pp. 1060-1061.) The appellate
court concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the motion under Family Code
section 2556, which was enacted to “alleviate the burden of filing an entirely new action”
by providing the court with “continuing jurisdiction” to award community assets “that
have not been previously adjudicated by a judgment in the proceeding.” (Huntley, at
p. 1059.)
Newman and Huntley stand for the proposition that a spouse’s interest in a marital
asset is not altered or extinguished in a dissolution proceeding where the asset was left
unadjudicated by the judgment. Such is the situation here. As noted, the Dubai judgment
only adjudicated the issues of marital status and child custody. It did not address, and
therefore has no effect upon, spousal support or the division of community property in
California. 7 (See In re Marriage of Moore & Ferrie (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1472, 1481;
In re Marriage of Melton (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 931, 939; Giovannoni v. Giovannoni
7 Schultz argues that Stevenson had 90 days from the date of the Dubai ruling to
“ask the Dubai court for reconsideration of its determinations concerning spousal support
and asset division,” but nothing in the record to shows that (1) the Dubai court made any
determinations regarding spousal support or asset division, or (2) that Stevenson would
have had only 90 days to seek reconsideration of any such determinations. The citations
in Schultz’s brief are inadequate to support his claim. (In re Marriage of Pasco (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 585, 591-592.)
17
(1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 666, 671; Ahmad v Khalil, supra, 40 Misc.3d 1206(a) [975
N.Y.S.2d 364] (slip opn.).)
For purposes of division of property on dissolution of marriage, property acquired
by the parties during marriage in joint form, including property held in joint tenancy, is
presumed to be community property. (Fam. Code, §§ 760, 2580, 2581; see also Fam.
Code, § 2650.) The property at issue here, acquired by the parties as “husband and wife,”
is therefore presumed to be unadjudicated community property, which remains subject to
litigation. 8
Because we conclude the Dubai dissolution does not preclude spousal support or
an equitable division of the marital property in California, we fail to see how the trial
court’s decision to recognize the Dubai dissolution (as to the status of marriage only)
prejudiced Stevenson’s constitutional rights or violated state public policy. Thus, we find
no abuse of discretion in the decision to grant comity.
In reaching this conclusion, we note that the trial court has ordered the partition
and sale of property but has not yet determined how the proceeds will be disbursed,
reserving jurisdiction “to order the manner in which the sale proceeds are to be disbursed,
and to order equitable adjustments that the Court considers just and appropriate.” It is
therefore premature for us to consider whether the distribution of proceeds amounts to an
abuse of discretion. (See Adoption of S.S. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 607, 626; see also
Zarrahy v. Zarrahy, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at pp 5-6.) Accordingly, we shall affirm the
8 We do not view section 872.210 as an obstacle to the partition action. Indeed, it
appears the result reached in this case is essentially the same result that would have
occurred had the parties divorced in California and failed to include the real property in
the decree dividing the community property. (Zarrahy v. Zarrahy, supra,
205 Cal.App.3d at pp. 4-5; Berry v. Berry, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at p. 1159; see
Huntley, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1059; cf. Fam. Code, § 2556.)
18
interlocutory judgment of partition without prejudice to Stevenson’s right to challenge
the allocation of proceeds between the parties as an abuse of discretion.
II
DVRO Action
Stevenson’s second appeal challenges the family law court’s denial of her request
for an order in the DVRO action seeking spousal support and the division of community
property. Stevenson argues the family law court erred in dismissing her request based on
lack of personal jurisdiction and inconvenient forum. 9
In opposition, Schultz argues that Stevenson’s appeal suffers from multiple
procedural defects, including unsupported contentions of fact and law, a failure to
identify and apply the correct standard of review, and an inadequate record. Schultz also
argues that we should dismiss this appeal because (1) the previous rulings in the 2020
dissolution proceeding and partition action are dispositive and should be followed, and
(2) Stevenson has failed to demonstrate how the challenged ruling is prejudicial.
We agree with Schultz that the procedural deficiencies in Stevenson’s briefing are
fatal to her appeal. But even if we were to ignore the defects in the briefs, her appeal
nonetheless would fail on the merits.
A. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
1. Background Legal Principles
Generally, jurisdiction to dissolve the status of marriage is a form of jurisdiction in
rem. (In re Marriage of Gray (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1239, 1250.) The “status of the
parties to the marriage is considered the ‘res’ or subject matter of the divorce
9 Stevenson also reasserts her challenges to the grant of comity in the partition
proceeding. Because those claims have been addressed in connection with the appeal of
the partition action, we need not consider them here.
19
proceeding.” (Ibid.) Thus, the domicile of one spouse in the forum state is sufficient to
give that state the power to grant a valid divorce. (Ibid.)
A court also has in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction to determine the character of
marital property that is located in California. (See 3 Cal. Family Law Prac. & Proc.
(2d ed. 2026) § 90.22[2].) “A court having jurisdiction in rem over property need not
have in personam jurisdiction over the defendant in order to determine questions of title
to that land.” (In re Marriage of Leff (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 630, 645.)
In contrast, because an action for support or division of property imposes a
personal obligation on the party, a court ordinarily must have in personam jurisdiction
over the party to render a valid judgment. (See 3 Cal. Family Law Prac. & Proc. (2d ed.
2026) § 90.22[1]; Muckle v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 218, 226.)
Under California’s long-arm statute (§ 410.10), courts may exercise personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents on any basis consistent with the federal and state
constitutions. (ViaView, Inc. v. Retzlaff (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 198, 209 (ViaView).) “ ‘A
state court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has not
been served with process within the state comports with the requirements of the due
process clause of the federal Constitution if the defendant has such minimum contacts
with the state that the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate “ ‘traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) The minimum contacts test ensures that
“ ‘a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of “random,”
“fortuitous,” or “attenuated” contacts’ [citation] but only ‘where the contacts proximately
result from actions by the defendant himself that create a “substantial connection” with
the forum State[,]’ ” such that the defendant “ ‘should reasonably anticipate being subject
to suit there, and it is reasonable and fair to force him to do so.’ ” (Rivelli v. Hemm
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 380, 391-392 (Rivelli).)
Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant may be either general or
specific. (Rivelli, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 392.) General jurisdiction may be asserted
20
if the nonresident defendant’s contacts with California are substantial, continuous, and
systematic. (ViaView, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 209.) “In such a case, ‘it is not
necessary that the specific cause of action alleged be connected with the defendant’s …
relationship to the forum.’ ” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996)
14 Cal.4th 434, 445 (Vons Companies).) “Such a defendant’s contacts with the forum are
so wide-ranging that they take the place of physical presence in the forum as a basis for
jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 446.)
“If the nonresident defendant does not have substantial and systematic contacts in
the forum sufficient to establish general jurisdiction, he or she still may be subject to the
specific jurisdiction of the forum, if the defendant has purposefully availed himself or
herself of forum benefits [citation], and the ‘controversy is related to or “arises out of” a
defendant’s contacts with the forum.’ ” (Vons Companies, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 446.)
Specific jurisdiction exists when, although the defendant lacks such pervasive forum
contacts, it is nonetheless proper to subject the defendant to the forum state’s jurisdiction
in connection with a particular controversy. (ViaView, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 209.)
Specific jurisdiction hinges on the “ ‘ “relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation.” ’ ” (Rivelli, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 392.) A nonresident
defendant may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of California courts when (1) the
defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits, thereby invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the controversy is related to or arises out of
the defendant’s forum-related contacts; and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction
would comport with notions of fair play and substantial justice. (Ibid.; accord, Hardell v.
Vanzyl (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 960, 969.)
“ ‘The purposeful availment inquiry … focuses on the defendant’s intentionality.
[Citation.] This prong is only satisfied when the defendant purposefully and voluntarily
directs his activities toward the forum so that he should expect, by virtue of the benefit he
receives, to be subject to the court’s jurisdiction based on’ his contacts with the forum.”
21
(Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269.) The second prong of the test
requires a “ ‘ “substantial nexus or connection” ’ ” between the forum-related conduct
and the specific claims at issue. (Rivelli, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 400.)
Finally, once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established
minimum contacts with the forum state, courts consider other factors to determine
whether the exercise of in personam jurisdiction would comport with fair play and
substantial justice. (Vons Companies, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 476; Kulko v. Superior
Court (1978) 436 U.S. 84, 92.) Courts may evaluate the burden on the defendant of
appearing in the forum, the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial
system’s interest in an efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the
several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. (Vons Companies, at
p. 476; see Belmont Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 281, 286.)
When a nonresident defendant challenges a trial court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that all necessary jurisdictional criteria are met. (Jewish Defense Organization,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1055.) If the plaintiff meets this
burden, it is then up to the defendant to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction
would be unreasonable. (Ibid.)
When the jurisdictional facts are not conflicting, the issue of whether the
defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction is a legal question subject to de novo review.
(ViaView, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 210.) When the facts are conflicting, we accept the
trial court’s resolution of factual issues, draw all reasonable inferences in support of the
trial court’s order, and review the trial court’s factual determinations for substantial
evidence. (Ibid.) Even then, the ultimate question of whether jurisdiction is fair and
reasonable under the circumstances is a legal determination subject to our independent
review. (Ibid.)
22
2. Standard of Review
The parties disagree about which standard governs our review. Stevenson
contends the jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and therefore the issue of whether
Schultz is subject to personal jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewed de novo. Schultz
contends the family law court’s ruling was based on a credibility determination,
triggering substantial evidence review.
Stevenson has the better argument. The sole jurisdictional fact relied upon by
Stevenson is that Schultz availed himself of the privileges and protections of California
laws by filing the partition action. Because that fact is undisputed, the question of
whether the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction is a legal determination
warranting independent review. (ViaView, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 210.)
3. Briefing Deficiencies
We begin by noting the deficiencies in Stevenson’s appellate briefs that have
hindered our review. They include a failure to provide an adequate “summary of the
significant facts limited to matters in the record;” to support each point “by argument
and, if possible, by citation of authority;” and to “[s]upport any reference to a matter in
the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter
appears.” 10 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C), (a)(2)(C).) These are not
mere technical requirements, but important rules of appellate procedure designed to
alleviate the burden on the court by requiring litigants to present their cause
systematically, so that the court may ascertain what errors the appellant is claiming were
made and whether such errors were prejudicial. (See Opdyk v. California Horse Racing
Bd. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830, fn. 4.)
10 These principles apply regardless of whether the party is self-represented or not.
(Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.)
23
Even worse, some of the quotations and case citations in Stevenson’s opening
brief appear to have been fabricated or hallucinated by artificial intelligence. For
example, in her opening brief, Stevenson cites In re Marriage of Holman (1982)
134 Cal.App.3d 538 and In re Marriage of Awad (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 510, for the
proposition that a foreign divorce decree does not divest California of jurisdiction to
make findings on property division and support where the foreign judgment did not
adjudicate those issues. Neither case exists.
Similarly, Stevenson quotes In re Marriage of Aron (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1086
as stating that: “ ‘By initiating a proceeding in a California court, a party has
purposefully availed himself or herself of the protection and benefits of the laws of this
state and is thereby subject to personal jurisdiction in California.’ ” No such statement
appears in that decision.
It is a fundamental duty of attorneys and self-represented parties “to read the legal
authorities they cite in appellate briefs or any other court filings to determine that the
authorities stand for the propositions for which they are cited.” (Noland v. Land of the
Free, L.P. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 426, 445.) Relying on fabricated legal authority is an
abuse of the adversary system and sanctionable conduct. (Ibid.; People v. Alvarez (2025)
114 Cal.App.5th 1115, 1119-1120.)
We have the discretion to disregard a brief that does not conform with California
Rules of Court, rule 8.204. (See Hernandez v. Vitamin Shoppe Industries, Inc. (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1453; Wentworth v. Regents of University of California (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 580, 596.) Nevertheless, we decline to do so here.11 Stevenson’s brief
11 We also decline to sanction Stevenson for including false cites/quotes in her brief,
but we admonish her for failing to review the quotations and citations in her brief. In
addition, we shall review her brief with heightened scrutiny and disregard any claims that
are premised on fabricated legal authority. (See In re Domestic Partnership of Torres
Campos & Munoz (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1112, 1124-1126.)
24
was sufficient to put Schultz on notice of her arguments, and Schultz had an opportunity
to fully respond to those arguments in its opposing brief. Stevenson’s brief generally
conveys her position that Schultz is subject to the specific jurisdiction of California
courts because he filed the partition action in California. We do not find the inadequacies
in Stevenson’s briefing to be fatal to her appeal. Accordingly, we will exercise our
discretion to address her contentions on the merits.
4. Analysis
“ ‘Perhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate law is that the judgment [or
order] challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to
affirmatively demonstrate error.’ ” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567,
1573; Ruelas v. Superior Court (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 374, 383; Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) This burden requires more than a mere assertion that
the judgment or order is wrong. (Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009)
177 Cal.App.4th 771, 799.) To demonstrate error, the appellant must present meaningful
analysis, supported by citations to authority and facts in the record, explaining the claim
of error. (Saltonstall v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 549, 587-588; Hodjat
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 10; In re S.C.
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408; see Berger v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 989, 1007.) Conclusory claims of error will fail. (In re S.C., supra, at
p. 408.)
Here, Stevenson has failed to carry her burden of showing that the trial court erred
in finding no personal jurisdiction over Schultz. Her contention is that Schultz impliedly
consented to specific personal jurisdiction in California by filing the partition action in
this state. However, the only case cited to support this contention is In re Marriage of
Aron, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, to which she attributes the sweeping rule that by
25
initiating a proceeding in California, a party thereby becomes subject to personal
jurisdiction in California.
The holding in In re Marriage of Aron is not so broad. Aron holds that when a
nonresident plaintiff commences an action in a California court, the plaintiff submits to
the court’s jurisdiction on any cross-complaint filed by the defendant in that action. (In
re Marriage of Aron, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 1095.) In other words, by voluntarily
initiating an action in our courts, the plaintiff impliedly consents to rendition of judgment
against it for all purposes relating to the subject matter of the action. (Id. at pp. 1095-
1096.) In re Marriage of Aron does not hold that when a nonresident plaintiff files suit in
California that party is deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction in any action in
that forum, as would be true if the party were subject to general jurisdiction.
When an appellant asserts a point but fails to support it with reasoned argument
and citations to authority, the reviewing court may treat the point as forfeited and pass it
without consideration. (Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th
857, 862; City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286-287.) We are
not required to search the record for error (Nwosu v. Uba, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1246) and we are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them. (In re
Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.) Applying these rules,
we conclude that Stevenson has failed to meet her burden to show that Schultz, by filing
the partition action, has impliedly consented to jurisdiction regarding Stevenson’s claims
for child custody, spousal support, and division of marital property.
As an alternative ground for affirmance, we also are not persuaded that the family
law court had jurisdiction to entertain Stevenson’s claims for spousal support and
division of property in the context of a DVRO proceeding where (1) the parties are no
longer married and (2) the request for a restraining order already had been denied by the
court. (Fam. Code, §§ 6340-3641; see Fam. Code, § 6220; cf. Fam. Code, §§ 2330, 2550,
26
2556, 4330, 4336) Thus, for these reasons, we affirm the order dismissing Stevenson’s
claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.
B. Forum Non Conveniens
Our decision to affirm the family law court’s ruling finding no personal
jurisdiction renders it unnecessary for us to consider the alternative basis for the family
law court’s ruling, i.e., that California is an inconvenient forum.
DISPOSITION
The appeal of the order denying the motion to set aside the default in Case No.
CU0000128 is dismissed. The interlocutory judgment in Case No. CU0000128 is
affirmed, without prejudice to Stevenson’s right to challenge the future allocation of
proceeds. The order denying Stevenson’s request for relief in the family law court
proceeding (Case No. FL001430) is affirmed. Schultz shall recover his costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)
\s\
KRAUSE, Acting P. J.
We concur:
\s\
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
\s\
MESIWALA, J.
27