SNATCHKO v. WESTFIELD LLC PART - III
<script src="http://www.google-analytics.com/urchin.js" type="text/javascript"> </script> <script type="text/javascript"> _uacct = "UA-1698443-1"; urchinTracker(); </script> <html ><br /> <head><br /> <title>SNATCHKO v</title><br /> </head><br /> <body><br /> <div><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/><b >SNATCHKO v. </b><b<br /> >WESTFIELD</b><b<br /> > LLC</b><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>Filed 8/11/10<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/><u>CERTIFIED<br /> FOR PUBLICATION</u><br /> <br/><u> </u><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>IN THE COURT OF<br /> APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA<br /> <br/>THIRD APPELLATE<br /> DISTRICT<br /> <br/>(Placer)<br /> <br/>----<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <table class=MsoNormalTable border=0 cellspacing=0 cellpadding=0<br /> ><br /> <tr ><br /> <td width=394 valign=top ><br /> <br/>MATTHEW SNATCHKO,<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> Plaintiff and Appellant,<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> v.<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>WESTFIELD<br /> LLC et al.,<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> Defendants and Respondents.<br /> <br/> <br /> </td><br /> <td width=262 valign=top ><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>C059985<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>(Super.<br /> Ct. No. SCV20641)<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> </td><br /> </tr><br /> </table><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/><b >STORY CONTINUE <br /> FROM PART II….</b><br /> <br/><b > </b><br /> <br/>Again, we turn to the Supreme Court's opinion in <i<br /> >Fashion</i><i<br /> > </i><i<br /> >Valley</i><i<br /> >. </i> (42 Cal.4th 850.) The shopping mall in <i >Fashion Valley </i>argued boycotts could be prohibited for the same<br /> reason solicitation of funds can be prohibited (<i >id. </i>at p. 867), relying heavily on <i >H-CHH Associates v. Citizens for Representative Government </i>(1987)<br /> 193 Cal.App.3d 1193, 1203 (<i >H-CHH</i>), a<br /> case which upheld a shopping center's prohibition of solicitation of funds from<br /> patrons because it interfered with the normal character and function of the<br /> shopping mall. (<i >Fashion Valley, supra, </i>at p. 868.) <br /> The Supreme Court expressly rejected <i >H-CHH<br /> </i>to the extent it suggested speech may be prohibited if it interferes with<br /> the shopping mall's business by competing with the mall's merchants. (<i >Ibid.</i>) Similarly here, the prohibition or<br /> restriction of noncommercial speech unrelated to the mall cannot be justified<br /> simply because it might interfere with the merchandising interests of the mall<br /> and its tenants.<sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup><br /> <br/> Nor does the case of <i<br /> >Union</i><i<br /> > of Needletrades,<br /> Industrial & Textile Employees v. Superior Court </i>(1997) 56<br /> Cal.App.4th 996 (<i >UNITE</i>) persuade us<br /> otherwise. In that case the court upheld<br /> regulations of several shopping malls, which defendants contend are<br /> substantially the same as Westfield's<br /> Rules. The union in <i >UNITE </i>sought access to six malls to picket and distribute leaflets<br /> in an effort to publicize its labor dispute with a particular store. (<i >Id.</i><br /> at p. 1001.) The union was denied access<br /> to the malls because it failed to submit completed applications for access to<br /> five of the six malls and refused an offered alternate location for its<br /> activity upon application to the sixth mall. <br /> (<i >Ibid.</i>) The union filed suit alleging the malls<br /> adopted and enforced â€