Filed 6/30/26 SM 10000 Property v. Pecci CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
SM 10000 PROPERTY, LLC, B337813
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21SMCV02005)
v.
CRISTINA PECCI,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Edward B. Moreton, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Roger Franklin and Roger Franklin for
Defendant and Appellant.
Lorber, Greenfield, and Olsen, Thomas F. Olsen and Daniel
E. Ishu for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
Cristina Pecci, Justin Ligeri, and Ligeri’s company,
Cheyenne Brands LLC, rented a property from SM 10000
Property, LLC. Unbeknownst to Pecci, Ligeri forged Pecci’s name
to a lease renewal and remained in possession of the property
long after the end of the original lease term. SM 10000 Property
successfully sued for breach of contract, and Pecci appeals.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 2020, SM 10000 Property entered into a
one-year lease for a property in Los Angeles with Pecci, Ligeri,
and Cheyenne Brands. Pecci and Cheyenne Brands were listed
as the “Resident” and Ligeri was listed under “Minor Resident(s)
and/or Other Occupants,” but Pecci, Cheyenne Brands, and Ligeri
all signed the lease. The lease ran through January 24, 2021,
and it provided that following this termination date, the lease
would continue on a month-to-month basis.
Subsequently, a six-month lease renewal was prepared for
the property. Ligeri forged Pecci’s signature on the lease
renewal. Ligeri remained in possession of the property until
February 9, 2023, but failed to make full rental payments.
In December 2021, SM 10000 Property filed a complaint for
breach of contract against Pecci, Ligeri, and Cheyenne Brands.
With the court’s permission, in July 2022 SM 10000 Property
filed a first amended complaint changing the case from breach of
contract to unlawful detainer.
In November 2022, Ligeri and SM 10000 Property entered
into a stipulated agreement allowing Ligeri to remain at the
property until January 31, 2023. The parties agreed that in the
event Ligeri failed to fully vacate the property by that date, the
trial court could summarily issue an order of unlawful detainer
and award possession of the property to SM 10000 Property on an
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ex parte basis. Pecci was not a party to the agreement because
she did not claim a right of possession and alleged she never lived
at the property.
The stipulated agreement authorized SM 10000 Property to
seek to amend their complaint to state claims for damages
instead of unlawful detainer. On May 17, 2023, SM 10000
Property filed a second amended complaint asserting a breach of
contract claim against the three defendants.
A bench trial was conducted on December 11, 2023. Pecci
appeared and provided evidence and argument. Ligeri did not
appear at trial; Cheyenne Brands was in default and did not
appear. The trial court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and a statement of decision on February 9, 2024. The court found
the defendants had breached the lease by failing to pay rent and
other payments due, and it awarded damages under the lease as
well as prejudgment interest, all of which it designated as joint
and several. Pecci appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Validity of Lease Renewal
In the trial court Pecci’s argument was twofold. She
argued that the lease was superseded by the lease renewal. Then
she followed up by contending the lease renewal could not be
enforced against her because her signature had been forged, but
it could be enforced against Ligeri and Cheyenne Brands. The
trial court observed that Pecci provided no authority supporting
the principle that a forged document could be partially void; i.e.,
not enforceable against the person whose signature was forged
but enforceable against the other signatories. Citing Schiavon v.
Arnaudo Brothers (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 374, at pages 379–380
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(Schiavon) for the principle that a forged document is void ab
initio, the court concluded the forgery rendered the lease renewal
void in its entirety, and therefore the original lease controlled.
On appeal, Pecci again asserts the lease renewal was void
only as to herself. She argues Schiavon and Wutzke v. Bill Reid
Painting Service, Inc. (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 36 (Wutzke), which
states the same principle, are inapplicable because neither case
involved a lease or a contract. Pecci contends the principle that
forged documents are void ab initio only applies to instruments
through which an interest in real property is passed, and she
contends the lease renewal did not seek or pass any interest in
real property.
However, a lease conveys a real property interest to the
tenant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 481.203 [“ ‘Real property’ includes any
right in real property, including . . . a leasehold interest in real
property”]; 10 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2025)
§ 34:2 [tenant with lease has a real property interest in the
premises]; Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Santa Fe Pacific
Pipelines, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 134, 172 [“[a] lease is an
agreement that grants to the tenant the rights of exclusive
possession and use of real property for a specific period of time
and vests exclusive possession of the leasehold in the lessee
against all persons, including the owner of the fee. It creates an
estate in real property”].)
Pecci contrasts Schiavon and Wutzke with this case on the
ground that in those cases, the victim of the forgery sought to
have the forged deed declared void, while here, SM 10000
Property, “whose conduct allowed the forgery,” tried to “void the
Lease Renewal so that the victim of the forgery, Pecci, would
become a holdover tenant on the Original Lease and have a
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judgment entered against her.” This assertion is not supported
by factual or legal analysis or any citations to the record. The
“ ‘judgment is presumed to be correct, and it is appellant’s burden
to affirmatively show error. [Citation.] To demonstrate error,
appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by
citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that
support the claim of error. [Citations.] When a point is asserted
without argument and authority for the proposition, “it is deemed
to be without foundation and requires no discussion by the
reviewing court.” ’ ” (In re M.V. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 486, 518.)
II. Paragraph 31
The trial court noted in its ruling that Pecci had provided
no authority that a forged document could be partially void, only
against the party whose signature was forged. Pecci takes issue
with this statement, claiming paragraph 31 of both the lease and
the renewal, a severability clause, is the authority that supports
her view.
Paragraph 31 of both the lease and the renewal states, “If
any part of this Lease shall be in conflict with the law, that part
shall be void to the extent that it is in conflict, but shall not
invalidate this Lease or affect the validity or enforceability of any
other provision of this Lease.”
Pecci reasons that because forgery is in conflict with the
law, the “implication” of paragraph 31 is that the forgery “voids
the Lease Renewal only as to Pecci.” According to Pecci, this
paragraph “validates and confirms that the forged Lease Renewal
must only be void as to Pecci and that the forgery did not
invalidate the entire Lease Renewal or affect the validity or
enforceability.”
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Pecci fails to offer any reasoned argument or legal
authority in support of her view that a severability clause can
supersede California law providing that a forged document is
void ab initio and a nullity. (Schiavon, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 379–380; Wutzke, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 43.) Instead,
she makes a series of assertions—she raised paragraph 31 in her
trial brief but SM 10000 Property did not address its
“implication”; SM 10000 Property’s property manager did not
mention paragraph 31 in her trial testimony; and paragraph 31
was not mentioned in the trial court’s ruling. She then claims “a
plain reading” of the provision “validates Pecci’s argument that
the Lease Renewal is void only as to her.” These conclusory
arguments are inadequate to demonstrate error. “Appellants
must make sufficient arguments to establish trial court error,
‘[w]e will not develop [appellants’] argument for them.’ ” (Pacific
Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Placer (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th
634, 640.)
III. Judicial Estoppel
Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an
advantage by taking one position, then seeking a second
advantage by taking an incompatible position. (Regents of
University of California v. Superior Court (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th
383, 408.) It applies when “ ‘(1) the same party has taken two
positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial
administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in
asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position
or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally
inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of
ignorance, fraud or mistake.’ ” (Aguilar v. Lerner (2004)
32 Cal.4th 974, 986–987.)
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The trial court rejected Pecci’s argument that SM 10000
Property was precluded by the doctrine of judicial estoppel from
claiming the lease renewal was unenforceable. The court found
the third and fifth conditions for judicial estoppel were not met.
The court acknowledged that in earlier complaints, SM 10000
Property took the position that the lease renewal was
enforceable; however, the court found SM 10000 Property had not
been successful in asserting that position because the court had
never adopted it. Moreover, the court found SM 10000 Property
had taken the position that the lease renewal was enforceable as
a result of ignorance or mistake, because SM 10000 Property did
not know at the time it took that position that Pecci’s signature
on the lease renewal was forged.
Pecci argues the court erred by failing to apply judicial
estoppel. “ ‘[J]udicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, and its
application, even where all necessary elements are present, is
discretionary.’ ” (Miller v. Bank of America, N.A. (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 1, 9–10.) “ ‘The determination of whether
judicial estoppel can apply to the facts is a question of law
reviewed de novo, i.e., independently [citations], but the findings
of fact upon which the application of judicial estoppel is based are
reviewed under the substantial evidence standard of review.
[Citations.] [¶] Even if the necessary elements of judicial estoppel
are found, because judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine
[citations], whether it should be applied is a matter within the
discretion of the trial court. [Citations.] The exercise of
discretion for an equitable determination is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard.’ ” (Id. at p. 10.)
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“However convoluted the facts, or complex the issues, the
standard of review is the compass that guides the appellate court
to its decision. It defines and limits the course the court follows
in arriving at its destination. Deviations from the path . . . leave
writer and reader lost in the wilderness.” (People v. Jackson
(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1018.) Accordingly, “ ‘[a]rguments
should be tailored according to the applicable standard of
appellate review.’ [Citation.] Failure to acknowledge the proper
scope of review is a concession of a lack of merit.” (Sonic
Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011)
196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465.) Pecci’s entire opening brief fails to
comport with this rule. We have overlooked this deficiency where
possible, but Pecci’s disregard for the multiplicity of standards of
review in the judicial estoppel context has resulted in ineffective
arguments untethered to the analysis this court must perform
and insufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness.
“ ‘When an appellant fails to apply the appropriate standard of
review, the argument lacks legal force,’ and the appellant ‘fails to
show error in the judgment.’ ” (Symons Emergency Specialties v.
City of Riverside (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 583, 597.)
We note that although the heading of this portion of Pecci’s
appellate argument identifies the argument as one concerning
judicial estoppel, she repeatedly asserts that SM 10000 Property
made judicial admissions. The trial court ruled the doctrine of
judicial admission did not apply and that the original and first
amended complaints were superseded by the second amended
complaint. Pecci again fails to make a cognizable argument
tailored to the standard of review to demonstrate error. She
asserts the court and SM 10000 Property “miss[ed] the point that
the defense argued: The Lease Renewal is only void as to Pecci.
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See Paragraph 31. The Trial Court and [SM 10000 Property]
ignored Paragraph 31 and alleged, without explanation, new
facts inconsistent with the allegations of the earlier pleadings.”
This argument retreads issues already addressed about partial
voidness and the severability clause, makes an incomprehensible
claim that the trial court made factual allegations, fails to
identify any error in the trial court’s ruling that the doctrine of
judicial admissions did not apply, and presents no meaningful
legal analysis. Pecci has not demonstrated error.
We are unable to identify any other cognizable arguments
in this portion of Pecci’s brief. Many of her contentions are
presented in a manner more appropriate to advocacy before a
trial court making findings of facts and conclusions of law in the
first instance rather than to an appellate court; indeed, Pecci
repeatedly anticipates what “Respondent may argue” instead of
presenting arguments tailored to the standard of review to
demonstrate trial court error. “ ‘ “ ‘Instead of a fair and sincere
effort to show that the trial court was wrong, appellant’s brief is a
mere challenge to respondents to prove that the court was
right.’ ” ’ ” (Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th
1108, 1115–1116.) Additionally, many of Pecci’s factual
assertions are unsupported by references to the record, in
violation of California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C), which
requires litigants to “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the
record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record
where that matter appears.” “Statements of fact that are not
supported by references in the record are disregarded by the
reviewing court.” (McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th
937, 947 (McOwen).)
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IV. Holdover Tenancy
Pecci argues no holdover tenancy was ever created because
SM 10000 Property and Cheyenne Brands entered into the lease
renewal, which took effect immediately upon the termination of
the original lease. As discussed above, however, the trial court
ruled that the lease renewal was void ab initio, and Pecci has
failed to demonstrate any error in that ruling. As Pecci’s
holdover tenancy argument is premised on the lease renewal’s
validity, it presents no issues for this court to resolve.
V. Civil Code Section 3543
Civil Code section 3543 provides, “Where one of two
innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third, the person, by
whose negligence it happened, must be the sufferer.” Pecci
acknowledges SM 10000 Property was innocent of the forgery,
but she contends its negligent deviation from its e-mail policies
allowed Ligeri’s forgery of Pecci’s signature on the lease renewal
to occur, and therefore, SM 10000 Property must be the
“sufferer.”
The trial court rejected this argument, ruling,
“Pecci . . . argues that [SM 10000 Property] failed to follow its
internal procedures in requiring tenants who want to change
their email address to use their old email address to advise
Plaintiff of a new email address. The failure to follow this
procedure allowed Ligeri to supply a fake email address for Pecci,
which he then used to forge Pecci’s signature on the Lease
Renewal. But this internal procedure is not part of the lease,
which is a fully integrated contract. ‘The parol evidence rule
generally prohibits the introduction of any extrinsic evidence,
whether written or oral, to vary, alter or add to the terms of an
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integrated written instrument.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, [SM
10000 Property] had no contractual obligation to follow its
internal procedures. [¶] In any event, whether [SM 10000
Property] followed its entire procedure is immaterial as the same
result would follow. In the absence of the Lease Renewal, the
Original Lease would still control, and there would have been a
month-to-month tenancy.”
“Judgments and orders are presumed correct on appeal,
and the appellant bears the burden of overcoming that
presumption by affirmatively demonstrating reversible error.”
(Forrest v. Department of Corporations (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th
183, 194, disapproved in part on another ground as stated in
Shalant v. Girardi (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1164, 1172, fn. 3.) Pecci’s
argument on appeal does not acknowledge the trial court’s ruling
on this issue, much less demonstrate any respect in which it was
erroneous. Pecci has failed to meet her burden on appeal.
Pecci’s next two “arguments” consist of a heading followed
by the phrase, “See Exhibit 7.” This is insufficient to present an
issue for appellate review. (See In re M.V., supra,
109 Cal.App.5th at p. 518 [appellant must present meaningful
legal analysis supported by citations to authority and facts in the
record that support the claim of error; points asserted without
argument and supporting authority need not be discussed by the
reviewing court].)
VI. Mutual Assent
Pecci argues the trial court’s acceptance of a stipulation
between Ligeri and SM 10000 Property regarding when Ligeri
would surrender the property demonstrates there was mutual
assent and a valid lease renewal without Pecci as a tenant. She
disagrees with the court’s statement, made in the context of
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evaluating whether judicial estoppel applied, that the court did
not adopt any position on the lease renewal when it accepted a
stipulation between Ligeri and SM 10000 Property over when
Ligeri would vacate the premises.
Pecci argues the court “issue[d] the ‘Order of unlawful
detainer’ based upon the Lease Renewal and therefore adopted
the Lease Renewal as valid.” She describes the stipulation as “an
Order to Vacate based upon the Lease Renewal” and claims the
court signed “an Order based upon the Lease Renewal and
Stipulation.” She concludes that by this action, “the court
adopted the Lease Renewal as binding, with mutual assent, and
enforceable against the only tenant, Cheyenne Brands, and
Ligeri its guarantor.”
We conclude Pecci’s assertions are not supported by the
stipulation and order. The order was not an order of unlawful
detainer; rather it reflected that Ligeri and SM 10000 Property
had agreed upon a future date by which Ligeri and any other
occupants would vacate the property. The stipulation and order
mentioned unlawful detainer only as a consequence the parties
agreed upon to address the possibility that Ligeri would not
comply with the parties’ agreement: Ligeri stipulated that if he
and any other occupants did not vacate the property by the
agreed-upon date and time, the court could summarily issue an
order of unlawful detainer on an ex parte basis. Neither the
stipulation nor the order mentioned the lease renewal, nor did
the court state it was basing its order “upon the Lease Renewal
and Stipulation.” In the order pursuant to the stipulation, the
court made no findings concerning the lease renewal’s validity,
the presence or absence of mutual assent, or whether the lease
renewal could be enforced against Cheyenne Brands. Pecci has
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not demonstrated the trial court erred in concluding it had not
adopted any position on the lease renewal by accepting the
parties’ stipulation and signing the order executing it.
Pecci argues the trial court could not have accepted the
stipulation and issued an order to vacate based on a void lease,
and as the original lease was not before the trial court at the
time, the court’s acceptance of the stipulation and issuance of the
requested order “must have been based exclusively on a valid
Lease Renewal for the only tenant, Cheyenne Brands. There is
no other explanation.” But there is an obvious alternative
explanation: in signing the order, the court was executing two
parties’ agreement to partially resolve the litigation, not silently
making rulings on the merits. These parties had agreed on a way
to solve the case’s unlawful detainer issues, as well as a
prospective enforcement mechanism—as the court’s order noted,
the stipulation, if honored, mooted the issue of unlawful detainer.
No ruling on the validity of the lease renewal was requested or
required. Pecci has not demonstrated the court made any ruling
on the validity of the lease renewal by accepting the parties’
stipulation and signing their proposed order.
Pecci states she had filed an answer denying she had
signed the lease renewal three months before the order pursuant
to the stipulation was filed. This statement is not supported by
any citation to the record, and we disregard it. (McOwen, supra,
153 Cal.App.4th at p. 947.) She points out that the stipulation
stated she was not a signatory to the stipulation because she did
not claim a right of possession and alleged she never lived at the
property. She claims she could not sign the “Stipulation to the
Lease Renewal because she was never a party, tenant, or
signatory.” The stipulation regarding Ligeri’s move out is clearly
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not a stipulation to a lease renewal, and we are not aware of any
“Stipulation to the Lease Renewal” in the record, nor does Pecci
offer any citation to the record to allow us to locate such a
document. Pecci concludes, “The tenant and the landlord did
have mutual assent as the signatories.” This conclusory
assertion does not establish error in the court’s finding there was
no mutual assent to the renewal because Pecci did not agree to it.
Pecci alleges SM 10000 Property’s “alleged condition that
Pecci’s signature on the lease renewal was required was not in
either lease agreement and was contrary to the lease provisions.”
(Capitalization and boldface omitted.) We are at a loss to
understand how lease agreements that by their own terms are
between SM 10000 Property as landlord and Cheyenne Brands
and Pecci as the resident could possibly not require Pecci’s
signature or how requiring her signature could contradict lease
provisions, and Pecci’s presentation does not clarify or support
such a proposition.
Pecci acknowledges the testimony that Ligeri did not
financially qualify to rent the property without Pecci, but claims
the property manager testified “that neither the Original Lease
nor the Lease Renewal contained any such provision regarding
said requirement necessary to receive approval to become a
tenant at [the] apartment complex.” We disregard this factual
assertion because it is not supported by any citation to the record.
(McOwen, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 947.) Pecci sets forth the
integration clause of the lease and renewal, repeats her claim
that there was nothing in either document requiring her
signature as a tenant, notes that SM 10000 Property accepted
rent payments from Ligeri during what she describes as “the
period of the Lease Renewal,” claims SM 10000 Property
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admitted the validity of the renewal in its first amended
complaint, and alleges it evicted Ligeri and his company via the
stipulation. She concludes this “conduct supports the finding
that the Lease Renewal was both binding and enforceable with
the only tenant being Cheyenne Brands.” There was no finding,
however, that the renewal was binding and enforceable with
Cheyenne Brands as the only tenant. In this argument, Pecci
does not “show how [her assertions] apply to demonstrate error in
the trial court’s actions. ‘[F]ailure of an appellant in a civil action
to articulate any pertinent or intelligible legal argument in an
opening brief may, in the discretion of the court, be deemed an
abandonment of the appeal justifying dismissal.’ [Citation.]
Even if we do not deem the appeal abandoned, we find it lacks
merit.” (Flores v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation
(2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 199, 205.)
VII. Application of Funds
Pecci argues the residential ledger, Exhibit 7, demonstrates
that six payments by Ligeri, totaling $31,276.14, were
“unaccounted for” by SM 10000 Property. She also contends SM
10000 Property transferred the security deposit without her
permission to a lease renewal account. Other than noting that
the six payments are listed on Exhibit 7, Pecci provides no factual
or legal argument or citations to the record to support her claim
that funds were not accounted for or were transferred without
her permission. “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or
asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and
citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.” (Benach v.
County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.)
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Pecci next claims she “only asked the court to apply” the
allegedly unaccounted-for funds and the security deposit to the
lease account, and she complains the court did not do so despite
her request in her trial brief. She asserts the trial court held that
her “claim to the security deposit ‘should have been raised in a
compulsory cross-complaint.’ ” (Italics omitted.) She points out
that cross-complaints are not permitted in unlawful detainer
actions and claims she was not seeking affirmative relief or
asserting an affirmative defense. However, it is clear from the
trial court’s ruling that Pecci was arguing she was entitled to a
statutory penalty of up to twice the amount of the $26,400
security deposit pursuant to former Civil Code section 1950.5,
subdivision (g)(1). It is this claim that the court ruled should
have been, but was not, raised in a compulsory cross-complaint or
as an affirmative defense. Additionally, Pecci has not
demonstrated any relationship between the trial court’s ruling
that her claimed entitlement to a statutory penalty should have
been raised by cross-complaint and the alleged error that is the
topic of this section of her brief—the alleged failure to account for
$31,276.14 and the allegedly unauthorized transfer of security
deposit funds to a lease renewal account. Pecci has not
demonstrated error.
VIII. Former Civil Code Section 1950.5, Subdivision (g)(1)
Pecci argues that under former Civil Code section 1950.5,
subdivision (g)(1), “[w]ithin 21 days after the termination of the
Original Lease on January 24, 2021, [SM 10000 Property] was
statutorily required to give the tenants an itemized written
statement of the basis for the security, the amount received as
security, and the disposition of the security (i.e. how [SM 10000
Property] applied it to rent, repairs, or cleaning) and refund the
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balance if any.” She claims the operative complaint failed to
plead compliance with this law and no documentary evidence of
compliance was entered into evidence at trial, then presents two
paragraphs of factual and legal arguments that are supported by
only one general citation to a trial exhibit and no legal authority.
She concludes by stating that SM 10000 Property’s conduct “may
show a bad faith retention or claim and may subject [SM 10000
Property] to a penalty of up to twice the amount of the security
deposit,” asserting SM 10000 Property was required to justify its
conduct, and stating that “[i]t is up to the Trial Court, not Pecci,
to sanction [SM 10000 Property] the statutory penalty if the Trial
Court finds a bad faith retention or claim.”
Like much of Pecci’s briefing, this argument lacks
meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and
to facts in the record that support her claim. (See In re M.V.,
supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 518.) More fundamentally, however,
Pecci’s argument does not acknowledge, let alone demonstrate
error in, the trial court’s ruling that it could not properly consider
this argument because it was raised for the first time at trial
when it should have been raised by cross-complaint and
affirmative defense. Accordingly, Pecci has failed to establish
error. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that
a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and
the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the
record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.
[Citations.] ‘This is not only a general principle of appellate
practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of
reversible error.’ ” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
608--609.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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