Filed 9/9/26 SM 10000 Property v. Chakchay CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
SM 10000 PROPERTY, LLC, B350752
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. 24SMCV03946)
MICHEL CHAKCHAY, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Elaine W. Mandel and David W. Swift,
Judges. Dismissed in part and affirmed in part.
Lorber, Greenfield, and Olsen, Thomas F. Olsen and Daniel
E. Ishu, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Office of Kevin P. Hermansen and Kevin Hermansen;
Law Office of Ben Gharagozli and Ben Gharagozli, for
Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff and appellant SM 10000 Property, LLC (landlord)
filed an unlawful detainer action against defendants and
respondents Michel Chakchay, Georgio Chakchay, and Maya
Haider (collectively, tenants).1 After a bench trial, the trial court
entered judgment in favor of tenants, and several months later
granted tenants’ post-judgment motion for attorney fees.
Landlord then filed a single notice of appeal as to both the
judgment and the attorney fee award. We dismiss as untimely
the portion of landlord’s appeal challenging the judgment, and we
affirm the attorney fee award.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 14, 2024, landlord filed an unlawful detainer
complaint, naming tenants as defendants. The complaint sought
possession of a specified unit at 10000 Santa Monica Boulevard
in Los Angeles, California, as well as damages and an award of
reasonable attorney fees. Landlord checked the box on the form
complaint stating that “A written agreement between the parties
provides for attorney fees.” The complaint attached a copy of the
lease agreement between Michel and landlord. The lease
agreement identified Georgio and Maya as “Minor Resident(s)
and/or Other Occupants.” It also included an attorney fee
1 The complaint also named Samantha Rayner as a
defendant, but because that name does not appear in the
judgment or post-judgment order on appeal, we do not include
her as a party in our discussion. Also, because two of the
defendants share the same last name, we will refer to all three
defendants by first name, with no disrespect to the parties
intended.
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provision stating: “In the event of any litigation to enforce this
Lease, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its
reasonable attorneys’ fees, not to exceed a total of Fifty thousand
dollars ($50,000.00), and additionally, its costs of litigation.”
Tenants’ answer asserted a general denial and various
affirmative defenses, including defective service of the 3-day
Notice to Pay or Quit. The answer sought an award of costs,
including reasonable attorney fees.2
The trial court conducted a one-day bench trial on
March 24, 2025, and took the matter under submission. A
minute order dated March 25, 2025, found that service of the 3-
day Notice to Pay or Quit was not proper under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1162, subdivision (a)(3),3 but rejected several
other affirmative defenses argued at trial. The minute order
announced judgment in favor of tenants and directed tenants’
attorney to prepare a proposed judgment and serve it on
landlord’s counsel for review, prior to submitting it to the court
for signature. Judgment was entered on May 6, 2025, against
landlord and in favor of tenants.
After judgment was entered, tenants filed a motion for
attorney’s fees on May 28, 2025, seeking $50,000, the maximum
amount of attorney fees recoverable under the lease agreement’s
attorney fee clause. Landlord filed an opposition, arguing that
2 For some reason, the copy of tenants’ answer included in
the clerk’s transcript is missing a large amount of text, but our
characterization of the answer, based on the visible text, is not an
area of dispute between the parties.
3 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise stated.
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because Michel was the only signatory to the lease, only he could
recover attorney fees. Landlord also argued that tenants’ counsel
had engaged in block billing, placing distinct tasks under
combined time entries, and that the trial court should
significantly reduce the amount of fees awarded for the block
billed time entries. Tenants filed a reply brief countering
landlord’s arguments.
On September 29, 2025, the court granted tenants’ motion,
awarding attorney fees in the amount of $50,000, and ordering
that the May 6, 2025 judgment be interlineated to include those
fees.
On October 28, 2025, landlord filed a notice of appeal. The
notice stated that landlord was appealing from a judgment after
court trial, and described the date of the judgment or order as
follows: “May 6, 2025, Motion for Attorney Fees held
September 29, 2025.”
DISCUSSION
A. Timeliness of Landlord’s Appeal
Tenants filed a motion to dismiss landlord’s appeal,
arguing that the appeal of the judgment was untimely under
California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(A), because landlord’s
notice of appeal was filed on October 28, 2025, more than 60 days
after the court clerk served a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment
on all parties. The motion to dismiss included a motion to
augment the appellate record with a copy of the clerk’s certificate
of mailing, showing that the judgment was served by mail on
May 6, 2025. Landlord did not address the timeliness of its
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appeal of the judgment in its opening brief, nor did it file any
opposition to tenants’ motion to dismiss the appeal. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.54(c) [“failure to oppose a motion may be
deemed a consent to the granting of the motion”].)
In its reply brief, landlord argues that because the
judgment left a blank for an attorney fee award, it was not a final
judgment. We reject landlord’s argument. The trial court’s order
on September 29, 2025, granting tenants’ motion for attorney fees
and directing the judgment to be interlineated to incorporate the
fee award did not restart the time to appeal from the May 6, 2025
judgment. An amended judgment that merely adds costs and
attorney fees is not substantially changed and the time to appeal
the original judgment is not affected. (Torres v. City of San Diego
(2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 214, 222; Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice
Guide: Civil Appeals & Writs (The Rutter Group 2026) § 3:56.3.)
“[I]t makes sense to conclude that a separately appealable order
after final judgment does not substantially modify the judgment
itself for purposes of computing the time in which to file a notice
of appeal. Any problem the parties might have with the
amendment can be pursued through a separate appeal of the
postjudgment order.” (Dakota Payphone, LLC v. Alcaraz (2011)
192 Cal.App.4th 493, 505 [describing Torres as following cases
holding postjudgment awards of attorney fees and costs are
separately appealable matters that do not restart the clock on
time to appeal judgment]; cf. Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v.
McMullin (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 982, 1010 [dismissing appeal of
postjudgment order awarding attorney fees and costs because the
order was separately appealable and was not listed in notice of
appeal of judgment as an order appealed].)
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We grant tenants’ motion to augment, and we also grant in
part their motion to dismiss, as to the judgment only. Because
the notice of appeal was filed less than 60 days after the trial
court granted tenants’ post-judgment motion for attorney fees, we
proceed to consider the merits of that portion of landlord’s appeal.
B. Attorney Fee Award
Landlord contends the trial court erred when it granted
tenants’ motion for attorney fees and seeks a reversal with
directions on remand for the trial court to conduct a new lodestar
analysis, reducing the claimed amount for block billing,
duplicative work, and “other deficiencies identified by [landlord.]”
Landlord makes two distinct contentions of error. First, it
contends that because Michel was the only signatory to the lease
agreement, Maya and Georgio cannot recover contractual
attorney fees. Second, landlord argues that the trial court erred
when it ignored landlord’s objections to specific block-billed,
vague, or duplicative entries by tenants’ counsel.
“ ‘ “On review of an award of attorney fees after trial, the
normal standard of review is abuse of discretion. However, de
novo review of such a trial court order is warranted where the
determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney
fees and costs in this context have been satisfied amounts to
statutory construction and a question of law.” ’ [Citation.] In
other words, ‘it is a discretionary trial court decision on the
propriety or amount of statutory attorney fees to be awarded, but
a determination of the legal basis for an attorney fee award is a
question of law to be reviewed de novo.’ ” (Mountain Air
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Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th
744, 751 (Mountain Air).)
“ ‘A party may not recover attorney fees unless expressly
authorized by statute or contract. [Citations.] In the absence of a
statute authorizing the recovery of attorney fees, the parties may
agree on whether and how to allocate attorney fees. [Citation.]
They may agree the prevailing party will be awarded all the
attorney fees incurred in any litigation between them, limit the
recovery of fees only to claims arising from certain transactions
or events, or award them only on certain types of claims. The
parties may agree to award attorney fees on claims sounding in
both contract and tort.’ (Brown Bark III, L.P. v. Haver (2013) 219
Cal.App.4th 809, 818 (Brown Bark).)” (Hom v. Petrou (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 459, 464 (Hom).)
Section 1033.5 specifies that costs recoverable under
section 1032 include attorney fees when authorized by contract,
statute, or law. (§ 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(A)–(C); Santisas v.
Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606 (Santisas) [costs allowable
under section 1032 include attorney fees “only when the party
entitled to costs has a legal basis, independent of the cost
statutes and grounded in an agreement, statute, or other law,
upon which to claim recovery of attorney fees”].) “If a contractual
attorney fee provision is phrased broadly enough . . . it may
support an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in an
action alleging both contract and tort claims: ‘[P]arties may
validly agree that the prevailing party will be awarded attorney
fees incurred in any litigation between themselves, whether such
litigation sounds in tort or in contract.’ ” (Santisas, supra, 17
Cal.4th at p. 608; see also Mountain Air, supra, 3 Cal.5th at
p. 751.)
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Here, the contract provided: “In the event of any litigation
to enforce this Lease, the prevailing party shall be entitled to
recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees, not to exceed a total of
Fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00), and additionally, its costs of
litigation.” Landlord contends without any supporting authority
that “The ‘prevailing party’ under a contractual fee provision
must be a party to the contract.” A “prevailing party” is defined
in statute as including “the party with a net monetary recovery, a
defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant
where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a
defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief
against that defendant.” (§ 1032, subd. (a)(4), italics added.)
Georgio and Maya were named as defendants in the unlawful
detainer action, and although they were not signatories on the
lease, they were named in the lease as occupants of the premises,
permitting them to seek attorney fees as third party
beneficiaries. (Hom, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. at
pp. 471−472.) In addition, to the extent that an unlawful
detainer action may sound in either contract or tort (Mitchell
Land & Improvement Co. v. Ristorante Ferrantelli, Inc. (2007)
158 Cal.App.4th 479, 486–487), there is no “per se rule barring
nonsignatories from collecting attorney’s fees on tort claims
under a contractual fees provision.” (Hom, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 467–470.)
Next, landlord argues that the trial court erroneously
ignored its objections to tenants’ attorneys’ billing entries, where
landlord made a general argument that tenants’ attorneys had
improperly engaged in block-billing, and then listed four pages of
entries, with an introductory paragraph arguing that the entries
were vague because they identified more than one activity, such
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as preparing for and attending a hearing. Having reviewed the
entries, we find no prejudicial error. Tenants’ motion for attorney
fees identified 134.5 hours of attorney time at an hourly rate of
$550, for a total of $73,865 in attorney fees. Even if there were
40 hours of excessive or improper time, which is not apparent
from the record, the trial court would still have a basis to award
the contractual limit of $50,000 in fees. The fee award was well
within the trial court’s discretion.
DISPOSITION
The appeal by plaintiff and appellant SM 10000 Property,
LLC of the judgment entered on May 6, 2025, is dismissed. The
court’s September 29, 2025 order granting attorney fees to
defendants and respondents Michel Chakchay, Georgio
Chakchay, and Maya Haider is affirmed, and those same
defendants are awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
BAKER, J.
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