Filed 7/20/26 Shropshire v. Ocean Avenue CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
JAMES W. SHROPSHIRE, B348491
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No.
23SMCV04094)
OCEAN AVENUE, LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lisa K. Sepe-Wiesenfeld, Judge. Affirmed.
Deldar Legal, P. David Cienfuegos and Mona Deldar for
plaintiff and appellant.
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Rachel T. Velilla;
Professional Law Corporation, Matthew D. Kanin for defendant
and respondent.
_______________________________________
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 474, a plaintiff who
is ignorant of a defendant’s identity may designate the defendant
in a complaint by a fictitious name (typically, as a “Doe”), and
subsequently amend the pleading to state the defendant’s true
name when the plaintiff later discovers it.1 If the plaintiff seeks
to name a defendant under section 474 after the statute of
limitations has lapsed, the amendment will relate back to the
filing of the original complaint, but only if the plaintiff was
genuinely ignorant of the facts establishing a cause of action
against the party to be substituted for a Doe defendant.
The sole issue in this case is whether the plaintiff was
ignorant of the facts giving rise to his claims against Ocean
Avenue, LLC (Ocean Avenue) before filing the Doe amendment,
which was undisputedly filed after the statute of limitations had
expired. The trial court found the plaintiff was not genuinely
ignorant of Ocean Avenue’s identity or its connection to the facts
alleged in the complaint. We conclude substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s findings and affirm.
BACKGROUND
On August 30, 2023, James W. Shropshire filed a complaint
against defendant DFO Management, LLC, DBA Fairmont
Miramar Hotel & Bungalows, and Does 1 to 50. The complaint
alleged Shropshire was assaulted by security personnel on or
about September 5 and 6, 2021, at the Fairmont Miramar Hotel
& Bungalows in Santa Monica. It alleged causes of action for,
negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault and
battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
1 Subsequent unspecified references to statutes are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
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Over a year-and-a-half before filing the complaint, on
October 21, 2021, Shropshire’s counsel sent a demand letter to
Ocean Avenue, which was addressed to Ocean Avenue’s corporate
office in Santa Monica. The letter alleged that “as many as six
(6) security personal [sic] working at The Bungalow Santa
Monica and/or Fairmont Miramar Hotel & Bungalows violently
assaulted and battered [Shropshire] while he was handcuffed and
restrained by your personnel at The Bungalows, on the Fairmont
Miramar Hotel property, and on the sidewalk of Wilshire Blvd.,
directly in front of the driveway and entrance to the Fairmont
Miramar Hotel.” The letter then directed Ocean Avenue to
“preserve any and all evidence” related to the incident and any
incident reports and complaint reports for a period of one year
prior to the incident. The letter also stated that Shropshire was
seeking medical treatment for his injuries and, therefore,
requested that Ocean Avenue “provide our office with any
applicable general liability and premises liability insurance
information within 10 business days.” Finally, the letter
concluded that “[f]ailure to provide the requested information
may result in a lawsuit filed against you.”
On June 21, 2024, after the two-year statute of limitations
had expired on his personal injury claims (see § 335.1),
Shropshire filed a Doe Amendment substituting Ocean Avenue
for Doe 1. Ocean Avenue moved to quash service of the summons
and complaint under sections 474 and 418.10, on the ground that
the Doe Amendment was barred by the statute of limitations and
Shropshire was not genuinely ignorant of Ocean Avenue’s
identity when he filed the initial complaint.
After a hearing, the trial court granted Ocean Avenue’s
motion. The court found Shropshire knew Ocean Avenue’s
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identity at the time of filing the complaint (and, as early as the
October 21, 2021, demand letter), and the demand letter made it
clear that Shropshire believed Ocean Avenue may be liable for
his alleged injuries. Based on these findings, the court concluded
the amended complaint did not relate back to the date the
original complaint was filed and thus was barred by the statute
of limitations.
The court entered judgment in favor of Ocean Avenue, and
Shropshire timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Shropshire contends the trial court erred by not applying
section 474’s relation-back doctrine because he was genuinely
and in good faith ignorant of Ocean Avenue’s involvement when
the complaint was filed. We review the trial court’s factual
findings to the contrary for substantial evidence. (See McClatchy
v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th
368, 373 (McClatchy).)
Section 474 provides, in relevant part: “When the plaintiff
is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in
the complaint,… and such defendant may be designated in any
pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is
discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended
accordingly.” For purposes of the statute of limitations, “[w]hen a
defendant is properly named under section 474, the amendment
relates back to the filing date of the original complaint.”
(McClatchy, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 371.) The relation-back
doctrine will only apply, however, “when the plaintiff is actually
ignorant of the facts establishing a cause of action against the
party to be substituted for a Doe defendant.” (Id. at 372.) “ ‘The
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question is whether [the plaintiff] knew or reasonably should
have known that he had a cause of action against [the
defendant].’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘Ignorance of the facts giving rise to a
cause of action is the ‘ignorance’ required by section 474, and the
pivotal question is, ‘ “did plaintiff know facts?’ ” not ‘did plaintiff
know or believe that [he] had a cause of action based on those
facts?’ ” (Ibid.)
“The omission of the defendant’s identity in the original
complaint must be real and not merely subterfuge for avoiding
the requirements of section 474.” (Woo v. Superior Court (1999)
75 Cal.App.4th 169, 177 (Woo).) If the plaintiff cannot meet the
identity ignorance requirement of section 474, a “new defendant
may not be added after the statute of limitations has expired
even if the new defendant cannot establish prejudice resulting
from the delay.” (Ibid.)
Applying these principles, we conclude substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s determination that when Shropshire
filed the original complaint, he was not ignorant of the facts
giving rise to his claims against Ocean Avenue. A month-and-a-
half after the alleged incident, and over a year-and-a-half before
filing the original complaint, Shropshire’s counsel sent a demand
letter to Ocean Avenue. Thus, it cannot be disputed that
Shropshire knew the existence of Ocean Avenue. The question
then becomes whether Shropshire “ ‘knew the identity of the
[entity] but was ignorant of the facts giving him a cause of action
against the [entity].” (Marasco v. Wadsworth (1978) 21 Cal.3d
82, 88 (Marasco).) As the trial court noted, the demand letter
sought preservation of evidence and insurance information based
on the incident alleged in the complaint and the letter “made
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clear that [Shropshire] believed [Ocean Avenue] may be liable, as
[Shropshire] made such an averment in the letter.”
On appeal, Shropshire claims the demand letter does not
show that he had knowledge of facts “making the defendant’s
liability probable.” But that is not the standard. Rather, as long
as Shropshire knew facts giving rise to a cause of action against
Ocean Avenue at the time he filed his original complaint, he is
precluded from adding Ocean Avenue as a defendant after the
statute of limitations has expired. Here, the demand letter
supports the trial court’s conclusion that Shropshire knew those
facts. The letter claimed Shropshire was “violently assaulted” by
Ocean Avenue’s personnel at The Bungalows on the Fairmont
Miramar Hotel property. And the facts alleged in the initial
complaint are identical to the allegations in the demand letter.
Shropshire therefore knew the facts that purportedly supported
his causes of action against Ocean Avenue, namely Ocean
Avenue’s ownership of the property and/or its employment of the
individuals allegedly involved in the assault.2
Shropshire’s attempt to distinguish Optical Surplus, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 776 (Optical Surplus), a
case relied on by the trial court in granting Ocean Avenue’s
motion, is unavailing. There, the plaintiff sued two named
defendants and several Doe defendants for interference with
contractual relations and other related causes of action. (Id. at p.
780.) More than four months before filing the complaint, the
plaintiff sent a letter to Optical Surplus, Inc. alleging, in
pertinent part: “ ‘Our client has learned that you have been
2 The grant deed, which the trial court judicially noticed,
confirms that Ocean Avenue has been the owner of the property
on which the incident allegedly occurred since 1999.
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actively engaged in the sale and solicitation of orders for the sale
of eyeglass frames manufactured by Metzler [ ] in the state of
California. This is in direct violation of our client’s rights and it
is actionable.’ ” (Id. at p. 781.) In response, Optical Surplus, Inc.
denied liability and thus, plaintiff “did not name [Optical
Surplus, Inc.] as a [d]efendant in the complaint.” (Ibid.)
After the statute of limitations expired, the plaintiff
amended the complaint pursuant to section 474, substituting
Optical Surplus, Inc. for Doe 1. (Optical Surplus, supra, 228
Cal.App.3d at p. 780.) The Court of Appeal concluded the
amendment did not relate back to the filing of the initial
complaint, reasoning the “demand letter clearly and
unequivocally indicated that [the plaintiff] knew not only
Optical’s identity but also its alleged ‘actionable’ activity.” (Id. at
p. 784.)
Shropshire claims that Optical Surplus is distinguishable
because the plaintiff’s “pre-suit letter identified the defendant’s
wrongful conduct and the [plaintiff] strategically chose not to
sue.” But here, too, the demand letter identified Ocean Avenue’s
wrongful conduct. That the record does not demonstrate why
Shropshire did not name Ocean Avenue in the original complaint
is of no consequence. The relevant inquiry is whether Shropshire
was ignorant of the facts giving him a cause of action against
Ocean Avenue. (Marasco, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 88.) For the
reasons discussed above, substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that Shropshire, like the plaintiff in Optical
Surplus, “knew everything he needed to know about [Ocean
Avenue] when he filed his original complaint.” (Optical Surplus,
supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 784.)
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We lastly reject Shopshire’s contention that Ocean Avenue
was required to show it was prejudiced by the untimely Doe
amendment. The trial court correctly concluded prejudice “is not
a requirement for a motion to quash” based on plaintiff’s lack of
identity ignorance as required by section 474. (See Woo, supra,
75 Cal.App.4th at p. 177 [“[I]f the identity ignorance requirement
of section 474 is not met, a new defendant may not be added after
the statute of limitations has expired even if the new defendant
cannot establish prejudice resulting from the delay”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
MORI, J.
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