Filed 7/1/26 Seo v. Park CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
YOUNGJIN SEO,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G065581
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2019-01050002)
YUNG KI PARK et al., OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Sheila Recio, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Andrew Kim and Andrew Kim for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Lee Anav Chung White Kim Ruger & Richter and Jay J. Chung
for Defendant and Respondent Yung Ki Park.
Jaz and Peter F. Jazayeri for Defendant and Respondent SC&P
Resources, Inc.
* * *
Appellant Youngjin Seo appeals the trial court’s dismissal
without prejudice of his action against respondents SC&P Resources, Inc.
(SC&P) and Yung Ki Park. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Seo a continuance and in dismissing the action pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure1 sections 583.410 and 583.420 based on delay in
prosecution. We therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTS
In February 2019, Seo, a founding shareholder of respondent
SC&P, a closely held corporation, sued SC&P and its chief executive officer
and majority shareholder, Yung Ki Park. Seo’s complaint alleged SC&P and
Park worked together to steal his shares in SC&P. In November 2022, Seo
filed the operative fifth amended complaint.
In December 2019, SC&P filed a cross-complaint. On February
25, 2025, SC&P, dismissed the cross-complaint except for the third and
fourth causes of action seeking declaratory relief. The parties agreed to
resolve the declaratory relief claims by way of motion on May 16, 2025.
The lawsuit was pending for more than six years, and trial was
continued at least nine times. In September 2024, the parties stipulated that
there would be no further trial continuances. On January 6, 2025, the court
called the case for jury trial. Seo requested a continuance to obtain counsel
because he had discharged his attorney the previous month. The court
1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2
continued the jury trial to February 25, 2025 to allow Seo time to find new
counsel. The court also set an order to show cause regarding dismissal based
on failure to prosecute under sections 583.410 and 583.420, and failure to
have counsel for Seo’s derivative claims brought on behalf of the corporation.
On February 14, 2025, Seo filed a “Response for Trial Briefing”
which requested a continuance of seven months. Seo requested a continuance
because there was “no way” that he, as a self-represented party, could
prosecute his causes of action or defend against the cross-claims.
On February 25, 2025, the court again called the case for jury
trial. Seo requested a continuance of five to seven months to find another
attorney. The court noted that granting such a continuance would put the
case beyond the mandatory dismissal statute. The court then dismissed the
fifth amended complaint without prejudice pursuant to sections 583.410 and
583.420 and set a hearing on the cross-complaint’s declaratory relief causes of
action for May 16, 2025.
On May 16, 2025, Seo appeared with a specially appearing
attorney. Seo requested a continuance of the hearing on the cross-complaint,
which the trial court denied. The court granted the relief requested as to the
third and fourth causes action in the cross-complaint and ordered the “Cross-
Complainant to prepare and serve a proposed judgment.”
At the time Seo filed his notice of appeal on May 23, 2025, the
trial court had not yet entered judgment on the fifth amended complaint or
the cross-complaint. On June 24, 2025, the court entered judgment on the
cross-complaint. On January 5, 2026, after briefing in the instant case was
complete, the court entered an amended judgment dismissing the fifth
amended complaint without prejudice, as well as entered judgment in favor of
SC&P on its claims for declaratory relief.
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DISCUSSION
I.
PREMATURE APPEAL
Here, Seo filed the appeal prior to entry of judgment on the
complaint and cross-complaint. On July 10, 2025, Seo filed a motion to
proceed with a prematurely filed appeal. Respondents filed a joint opposition
to the motion, as well as a request for judicial notice; Seo filed a reply. As
noted above, the trial court entered an amended judgment on January 5,
2026. On February 27, 2026, Seo filed a motion for leave to file a tardy reply
brief. The amended judgment entered on January 5, 2026, was attached to
Seo’s proposed reply brief. On March 16, 2026, respondents filed a joint
opposition to the motion. 2
A notice of appeal filed before entry of judgment but after its
rendition is valid and is treated as filed immediately after entry of the
judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, 3 rule 8.104(d)(1); In re Marriage of
Zimmerman (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, 906 [notice of appeal filed after
minute order but before entry of signed written order treated as filed
immediately after entry of written order].)
Here, because the notice of appeal was filed after rendition of
judgment on February 25 and May 16, 2025, Seo’s notice of appeal was valid,
2 We hereby grant Seo’s motion for leave to file a tardy reply
brief. However, we remind appellate counsel of his professional responsibility
to the court and to his client to promptly comply with filing deadlines and
note that in the future the court might not entertain a similarly tardy filing.
The clerk’s office is instructed to file Seo’s reply brief. The amended judgment
filed on January 5, 2026, is hereby deemed to be part of the appellate record.
3 All further references to a rule are to the California Rules of
Court.
4
and we treat the appeal as filed immediately after entry of the judgment on
January 5, 2026, pursuant to rule 8.104(d)(1).4
II.
DENIAL OF REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE AND DISMISSAL
FOR DELAY IN PROSECUTION
Seo argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
request for a continuance of trial and then later dismissing the fifth amended
complaint pursuant to sections 583.410 and 583.420. We disagree.
A. Legal Standard
1. Continuance
Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389,
states, “A motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. [Citation.] However, ‘“[t]he trial judge must exercise his discretion
with due regard to all interests involved, and the refusal of a continuance
which has the practical effect of denying the applicant a fair hearing is
reversible error. [Citations.]”’ [Citation.] [¶] ‘Judges are faced with opposing
responsibilities when continuances . . . . are sought. On the one hand, they
are mandated by the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act [citation] to actively
assume and maintain control over the pace of litigation. On the other hand,
they must abide by the guiding principle of deciding cases on their merits
rather than on procedural deficiencies. [Citation.] Such decisions must be
made in an atmosphere of substantial justice. When the two policies collide
head-on, the strong public policy favoring disposition on the merits outweighs
the competing policy favoring judicial efficiency.’” (Id. at p. 1395.)
4 Accordingly, we deny as unnecessary Seo’s motion for leave to
file a premature appeal.
5
“To ensure the prompt disposition of civil cases, the dates
assigned for a trial are firm. All parties and their counsel must regard the
date set for trial as certain.” (Rule 3.1332(a) [“continuances of trials are
disfavored”], rule 3.1332(c).)
An affirmative showing of good cause under the standards is
required (rule 3.1332(c) & (d)) and must be made by ex parte application or
by formal noticed motion with supporting declarations (rule 3.1332(b)). The
motion must be made “as soon as reasonably practical once the necessity for a
continuance is discovered.” (Rule 3.1332(b)).
2. Dismissal for Failure To Prosecute
“The court may in its discretion dismiss an action for delay in
prosecution pursuant to this article on its own motion . . . if to do so appears
to the court appropriate under the circumstances of the case.” (§ 583.410,
subd. (a).) “The court may not dismiss an action pursuant to this article for
delay in prosecution except after one of the following conditions has occurred:
[¶] . . . [¶] (2) The action is not brought to trial within the following times: [¶]
(A) Three years after the action is commenced against the defendant unless
otherwise prescribed by rule under subparagraph (B). [¶] (B) Two years after
the action is commenced against the defendant if the Judicial Council by
rule . . . so prescribes . . . .” (§ 583.420, subd. (a)(2).)
The Judicial Council prescribed rule 3.1340(a), which provides:
“The court on its own motion . . . may dismiss an action under . . . sections
583.410–583.430 for delay in prosecution if the action has not been brought to
trial or conditionally settled within two years after the action was
commenced against the defendant.” Because that rule prescribes a two-year
period, as authorized by section 583.420, subdivision (a)(2)(B), the controlling
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period is two years. (Franklin Capital Corp. v. Wilson (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th
187, 214, fn. 30.)
Section 583.420 and other dismissal-for-delay statutes serve a
dual purpose. First, these statutes were enacted to discourage stale claims
and promote justice and to prevent loss of evidence and witnesses. Second,
they were designed to compel reasonable diligence in the prosecution of
actions, thereby expediting the administration of justice. Balanced against
these considerations is the strong public policy in favor of disposing of
litigation on the merits rather than on procedural grounds. (See Roach v.
Lewis (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1182–1183.)
“‘However, it is now well established that the policy [of preferring
to dispose litigation on the merits] only comes into play when a plaintiff
makes a showing of some excusable delay.’ [Citation.] [¶] ‘A reviewing court
may not reverse a trial court’s order granting dismissal for dilatory
prosecution unless the plaintiff meets the burden of establishing manifest
abuse of discretion resulting in a miscarriage of justice. [Citations.] An
appellate court may not substitute its own discretion for that of the trial
court and must uphold the dismissal order if the trial court has not abused its
discretion.’” (Van Keulen v. Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. (2008) 162
Cal.App.4th 122, 131.)
B. Discussion
Seo has failed to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion
in denying his request for continuance and in dismissing the fifth amended
complaint.5 As noted, the action was pending for more than six years, trial
5 The minutes from February 25, 2025 indicate that the trial
court dismissed the derivative claims (eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of
action) based on Seo’s self-representation status. The reporter’s transcript
7
had been continued at least nine times, and the parties had stipulated in
September 2024 that there would be no further trial continuances. Seo signed
a substitution of counsel and replaced himself as counsel on December 10,
2024, less than one month prior to the January 6, 2025 trial call. During this
trial call, Seo, using a certified interpreter, represented he needed “time to
obtain counsel.” The court granted Seo another continuance until
February 25, 2025, to give him the opportunity to obtain counsel. On
February 25, Seo appeared for trial as a self-represented party and used the
assistance of a certified interpreter. Despite the continuance from January 6
to February 25, 2025, Seo had still not obtained counsel by the time of the
trial call and order to show cause hearing. Instead, Seo sought an additional
five to seven month continuance. Seo explained that he needed time to save
money to pay an attorney, and that he had a “psychological issue from the
doctor.”
Although Seo’s request for a continuance did not strictly comply
with the requirements of rule 3.1332, defendants did not object to Seo’s
request for a continuance based on noncompliance with rule 3.1332. Rather
than directly ruling on Seo’s request for a continuance, the trial court ruled,
“The plaintiff has indicated that he needs many months, which would put the
matter well beyond the mandatory dismissal statute. [¶] It’s set today for the
court’s discretionary statute and it appears to me that I should exercise that
indicates the court intended to dismiss those causes of action because a self-
represented individual could not assert those claims. In our review of the
record, the court dismissed all of the causes of action contained in the fifth
amended complaint based on its dismissal pursuant to the order to show
cause under sections 583.410 and 583.420. Therefore, we direct our analysis
as to whether the court abused its discretion in dismissing the fifth amended
complaint pursuant to sections 583.410 and 583.420.
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discretion because nothing will change. And it’s been a long time. So . . . [¶]
And continuing it sounds like it would prejudice the parties. So, I’m going to
go ahead and dismiss the 5th Amended Complaint pursuant to the Order to
Show Cause.”
We find that the trial court acted within its discretion to refuse
another continuance, particularly an extension of five to seven months. On
January 6, 2025, the court had previously continued the trial to accommodate
Seo’s request for more time to obtain an attorney. Seo did not have an
attorney on February 25, 2025, and the record from that date does not
indicate how Seo’s psychological issue impacted his ability to proceed. Seo did
not provide any other good cause for a continuance. Thus, the court acted
within its discretion in denying Seo’s request to continue the trial.
Similarly, Seo has failed to meet his burden to establish an abuse
of discretion by the trial court in dismissing the action for failure to
prosecute. As noted, the action was pending for more than six years, trial had
been continued multiple times, and the parties had stipulated in September
2024 that there would be no further trial continuances.
The trial court had issued an order to show cause as to why the
action should not be dismissed for violation of sections 583.410 and 583.420.
At the hearing, the court correctly noted that Seo’s request for another
continuance of five to seven months would violate the mandatory dismissal
provision of section 583.310.6 On February 25, 2025, Seo was not ready to
proceed with trial as shown by his request to continue. Despite multiple trial
6 Seo filed the suit on February 7, 2019. The case was stayed from
September 21, 2020 through January 19, 2022, due to an appeal regarding a
special motion to strike. The deadline to try the case under section 583.310
was therefore June 5, 2025.
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continuances and a stipulation on September 23, 2024, that the parties would
not stipulate “to request another trial continuance,” Seo was still not ready
for trial. Seo had not hired an attorney for the February 25th hearing and
was unable to reliably represent when an attorney would be ready to try the
case. Further, an attorney did not appear with Seo to provide the court with a
reasonable estimate as to the time necessary for the attorney to prepare. The
court could have reasonably found that Seo did not provide reliable
information as to when an attorney could be ready to try the case. When the
court stated, “nothing will change,” it is reasonable to infer that the court
reasonably found that it was unlikely that Seo would be ready for trial in five
to seven months. Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion in
dismissing the case because Seo had not acted with reasonable diligence in
prosecuting his action on the fifth amended complaint. We cannot say the
court abused its discretion in dismissing Seo’s fifth amended complaint under
these circumstances.
III.
SEO’S SELF-REPRESENTATION STATUS
Seo’s reply brief asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
in dismissing the fifth amended complaint because of Seo’s lack of legal
understanding and that it would take an attorney more than a month to
prepare for trial. The reply concedes that the time to bring Seo’s action to
trial expired in June of 2025 under the mandatory dismissal provision.
Petrosyan v. Prince Corp. (2013) 223 Cal.App.4th 587 states,
“Although self-represented litigants are not entitled to special treatment,
they are entitled to the same treatment as a represented party. This case
demonstrates the challenges presented to a conscientious trial judge when
faced with self-represented litigants who simply do not understand the basic
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rules of civil litigation. ‘Trial judges must acknowledge that in propria
persona litigants often do not have an attorney's level of knowledge about the
legal system and are more prone to misunderstanding the court's
requirements.’ [Citation.] When one party has counsel and the other does not,
the trial court ‘should monitor to ensure the in propria persona litigant is not
inadvertently misled, either by the represented party or by the
court. . . . [S]pecial care should be used to make sure that verbal instructions
given in court and written notices are clear and understandable by a
layperson. This is the essence of equal and fair treatment, and it is not only
important to serve the ends of justice, but to maintain public confidence in
the judicial system.’” (Id. at p. 594.)
We recognize Seo was self-represented and using the assistance
of a certified court interpreter at the hearings on January 6, 2025 and
February 25, 2025. On January 6, the trial court expressly set an order to
show cause hearing regarding dismissal under sections 583.410 and 583.420.
On February 25, the court recognized Seo’s self-representation status and
indicated that he was “held to the same restrictive procedural rules as an
attorney.” Seo acknowledged he was “entitled to the same but no greater
consideration than other litigants and attorneys.” At the February 25th
hearing, Seo explained his reasons for requesting a continuance; the court
acknowledged reviewing his “Response for Trial Briefing” before the hearing.
Seo was responsive to the court’s questions and explained his reasons for
requesting a continuance. Based on this record, we cannot find that the court
or respondents were misleading or confusing in their communications with
Seo.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to recover
their costs on appeal.
SCHWARM, J.*
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
DELANEY, J.
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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