Filed 9/28/26 Schupbach v. So. Cal. Regional Rail Authority CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
MATTHEW SCHUPBACH, B344932
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STCV30545)
v.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
REGIONAL RAIL AUTHORITY et
al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura A. Seigle, Judge. Affirmed.
Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky, Schneider Wallace
Cottrell Kim, Jason H. Kim, Bradley R. Fagnani and John J.
Nestico for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Southern California Regional Rail Authority, Geoffrey P.
Forgione; Meyers Nave, Jenny L. Riggs and Margaret W.
Rosequist for Defendants and Respondents Southern California
Regional Rail Authority and Board of Directors of the Southern
California Regional Rail Authority.
Mayer Brown, John Nadolenco, Andrew J. Demko and
Elisabeth M. Anderson for Defendant and Respondent
MissionSquare Retirement.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Plaintiff Matthew Schupbach is a participant in a public
employee retirement plan maintained by the Southern California
Regional Rail Authority (SCRRA). He sued SCRRA, its board of
directors, and a third party for breach of fiduciary duty and
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, contending that he
and other plan members paid excessive plan management fees.
The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers, finding that
plaintiff failed to state either claim because the public entities
were immune from suit. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate error,
and thus we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Complaint.
Defendant SCRRA is a joint powers authority that operates
the Metrolink rail service. SCRRA maintains a deferred
compensation plan, known as the Southern California Regional
Rail Authority 457 Deferred Compensation Plan (the Plan), for
the benefit of its employees. SCRRA’s board of directors (Board),
also a defendant, manages the Plan pursuant to Article XVI,
2
section 17 of the California Constitution (section 17), which
provides that the boards of public pension or retirement plans
have “plenary authority and fiduciary responsibility for
investment of moneys and administration of” those plans.”
The Board retained defendant MissionSquare Retirement
(MissionSquare) to provide recordkeeping and administrative
services. MissionSquare also offered Plan participants its own
branded investment options.
Plaintiff, a Plan participant, filed the present putative class
action against SCRRA, the Board, and MissionSquare in
December 2023, and filed the operative first amended complaint
(FAC) on behalf of himself and Plan participants and
beneficiaries in July 2024. The FAC alleged that MissionSquare
does not charge an explicit fee for its administrative services, but
instead adds “grossly excessive” fees to each of its branded funds.
As against SCRRA and the Board, the complaint alleged
breach of fiduciary duties pursuant to section 17 by failing to
control MissionSquare’s excessive administrative fees (first cause
of action). As against MissionSquare, the complaint alleged
aiding and abetting the Board’s breach of fiduciary duty—
namely, that MissionSquare “devised, promoted, and maintained
the pricing scheme that resulted in the Plan and participants
paying excessive and unreasonable compensation for Plan
administrative services and excessive investment management
fees for minimal or non-existent services, knowing that the
SCRRA Board of Directors was failing to adequately investigate
or monitor MissionSquare’s compensation” (second cause of
action).
The complaint sought a judgment requiring SCRRA and
the Board to “[r]estore participants’ accounts to the value they
3
would have had [if SCRRA and the Board had] prudently and
diligently negotiated reasonable fees,” to seek restitution against
MissionSquare, and to engage a new Plan administrator, develop
an investment policy statement, and engage a third-party
consultant. As against MissionSquare, the complaint sought a
judgment ordering restitution of excessive fees and disgorgement
of profits.
II. Demurrers.
SCRRA and the Board (collectively, SCRRA defendants)
demurred to the first cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.
The SCRRA defendants asserted that under the Government
Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.; the Act),1 there is no
common law tort liability for public entities in California; such
liability is wholly statutory. Plaintiff did not allege a proper
statutory basis for his breach of fiduciary duty claim because
there is no private right of action under section 17, and although
public entities are liable under the Act for injuries resulting from
their employees’ nondiscretionary acts or omissions within the
scope of employment, the Board’s actions alleged to create
liability resulted from their discretionary exercise of fiduciary
duties under section 17. The SCCRA defendants further asserted
that plaintiff failed to timely present a prelitigation damages
claim as required by section 911.2, the FAC failed to adequately
state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, and any amendment
would be futile. The SCRRA defendants thus asked the court to
1 Except for references to section 17, all subsequent
undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.
4
sustain their demurrer to the first cause of action without leave
to amend.
MissionSquare demurred to the second cause of action. It
asserted that to properly plead a cause of action for aiding and
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiff had to allege specific
facts showing that MissionSquare knew that the Board was
breaching its fiduciary duties and substantially assisted or
encouraged that breach. MissionSquare urged that plaintiff
failed to plead that it had actual knowledge of any breach of
fiduciary duty and, in any event, he failed to state a claim against
the Board for breach of fiduciary duty.
Plaintiff opposed both demurrers. In opposition to the
SCRRA defendants’ demurrer, plaintiff asserted that the Act did
not bar his breach of fiduciary duty claim because it sounded in
contract, not tort, sought only equitable remedies, and did not
arise out of the Board’s exercise of discretion. Alternatively,
plaintiff urged that he was not required to demonstrate a
statutory basis for his claim because section 17 is self-executing;
claims for breach of fiduciary duty arising under the California
Constitution trump any immunities created by statute; claims for
benefits due under a public retirement system are expressly
exempt from the statutory claims presentation requirement; and
the FAC adequately pled a cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty.
In opposition to MissionSquare’s demurrer, plaintiff
contended that the complaint properly pled MissionSquare’s
knowledge of SCRRA’s breach of fiduciary duty by inference or
circumstantial evidence, and even if his allegations failed to
allege aiding and abetting, they stated a claim for knowing
5
participation in a breach of fiduciary duty under common law
trust principles.
The trial court sustained both demurrers without leave to
amend. It noted, first, that a public entity is not liable for
common law torts, and thus tort liability against a public entity
must be authorized by statute. Section 17 does not expressly
create an exception to that rule or a private right of action for
monetary relief. To the contrary, as the Court of Appeal noted in
Krolikowski v. San Diego City Employees’ Retirement System
(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 537, 553–554 (Krolikowski), section 17
“ ‘says nothing about creating liability for money damages
against public pension plan members in instances when such
liability would otherwise be barred by statutory governmental
immunity.’ ”
Second, the court rejected plaintiff’s contention that he was
seeking only equitable remedies, not damages, and so the Act’s
immunity provisions did not apply. Instead, the court concluded
that the FAC requested monetary relief by seeking restoration of
Plan participants’ accounts to the value they would have had
absent the allegedly excessive administrative fees, restitution for
all excessive compensation paid to MissionSquare, and
disgorgement of profits.
Third, the court rejected as “baseless” plaintiff’s contention
that section 17 is “ ‘effectively’ a contract,” and thus the Act did
not apply because plaintiff was actually suing for breach of
contract. The court explained: “The [complaint] does not allege
the elements of a breach of contract cause of action; it alleges
breach of fiduciary duty, and it seeks remedies not available for
breach of contract. . . . Plaintiff cites no law that a breach of
6
fiduciary duty cause of action is actually a contract, and not a
tort, claim. The law is clear—breach of fiduciary duty is a tort.”
The trial court therefore concluded that the FAC did not
allege a statutory basis for the breach of fiduciary duty claim.
And, because the FAC did not satisfy the statutory requirements
for stating a breach of fiduciary duty claim against SCRRA, it
also failed to state a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary duty. Finally, plaintiff did not show that he could
amend the complaint to remedy these defects. The trial court
thus sustained the demurrers without leave to amend as to all
defendants.
The trial court entered judgments of dismissal on
January 3, 2025. Plaintiff timely appealed.2
DISCUSSION
I. Legal standards.
A. Standard of review.
Because this appeal was taken from a judgment following
an order sustaining a demurrer and involves questions of
statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. (Stone v.
2 Plaintiff filed a single notice of appeal, purportedly from a
judgment entered on January 7, 2025. No judgment was entered
on January 7; instead, the trial court entered two judgments of
dismissal on January 3, although notice of entry of the judgment
in favor of MissionSquare was served on January 7. Nonetheless,
because “ ‘ “it is reasonably clear what [the] appellant was trying
to appeal from” ’ ” and defendants “ ‘ “could not possibly have
been misled or prejudiced” ’ ” (K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School
Dist. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 875, 882), we will construe the notice of
appeal to be from the judgments entered January 3, 2025.
7
Alameda Health System (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1040, 1052; Levy v.
City and County of San Francisco (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 997,
1012.) We therefore exercise our independent judgment about
whether the complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law.
(Stearn v. County of San Bernardino (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 434,
439–440.)3
B. The Act.
Enacted in 1963, the Act abolished common law tort
liability and immunity for public entities, replacing them with
“ ‘a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the liabilities and
immunities of public entities and public employees for torts.’ ”
(Leon v. County of Riverside (2023) 14 Cal.5th 910, 918 (Leon).)
The Act provides that public entities are liable for torts only as
specifically authorized by statute or by the state or federal
Constitutions. (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899; § 815.)
The Act then authorizes suits against public entities and
public employers under the following circumstances. First, if a
3 Our review of an order denying leave to amend a complaint
is for abuse of discretion. (E.g., Nichols v. Alghannam (2026)
118 Cal.App.5th 726, 743.) However, “ ‘[t]o satisfy that burden on
appeal, a plaintiff “must show in what manner he can amend his
complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect
of his pleading.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 743–744.) If the appellant fails to
seek leave to amend or to demonstrate the viability of new causes
of action, “ ‘there is no basis for finding the trial court abused its
discretion when it sustained the demurrer without leave to
amend.’ ” (Id. at p. 744.) Because plaintiff has not suggested
that he can amend to state a cause of action against any
defendant, we will not address the issue.
8
public entity is under a “mandatory duty” that is designed to
protect against a particular kind of injury, the entity is liable for
an injury of that kind if it is caused by the entity’s failure to
discharge its duty with reasonable diligence. (§ 815.6.) Second, a
public entity is vicariously liable for injuries proximately caused
by its employees in the course of their employment, but is
immune from liability when the employee is immune. (§ 815.2,
subds. (a), (b); Leon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 918.) Third, public
employees are liable for injuries caused by their acts or omissions
to the same extent as private persons, unless the act or omission
“was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in [the
employee], whether or not such discretion be abused.” (§§ 820,
820.2; Leon, at p. 918.) These rules do not “ ‘ “expand the rights
of plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities [or employees],
but [instead] confine potential governmental liability to rigidly
delineated circumstances: immunity is waived only if the various
requirements of the [A]ct are satisfied.” ’ ” (Caldwell v. Montoya
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 985 (Caldwell).)
C. Section 17.
Section 17 was adopted by the voters in 1984 and amended
in 1992. Prior to section 17’s adoption, the state Constitution
limited the kinds of stocks that public pension and retirement
systems could purchase and hold. The 1984 amendment
eliminated these restrictions, but imposed fiduciary duties on
public pension managers. (Ballot Pamp., Primary Election
(June 5, 1084) Legislative Analyst analysis, p. 24.) The 1992
amendment gave public pension boards complete administrative
control of the system’s assets and required each board to give
highest priority to providing benefits to members and their
9
beneficiaries. (Ballot Pamp., General Election (November 3,
1992) Legislative Analyst analysis, p. 37.)
II. Plaintiff’s claim against the SCRRA defendants.
Plaintiff contends that the SCRRA defendants are liable for
the Board’s alleged breaches of fiduciary duty because section 17
creates a private right of action that trumps the Act’s immunity
provisions. Alternatively, plaintiff urges that the Board has a
“mandatory duty” under section 17 to protect against losses by
Plan members; his damages resulted from nondiscretionary
actions by Board members, for which the SCRRA defendants are
vicariously liable; and he seeks only equitable remedies, which
are not subject to the Act. Each of these claim lacks merit.
A. Section 17 does not create a private right of
action that trumps the Act’s immunity
provisions.
Plaintiff’s primary contention on appeal is that section 17
creates a private right of action that trumps the Act’s immunity
provisions. That is, he urges that by adopting section 17, the
voters intended to carve out an exception to the Act by making
public employee retirement boards subject to suit for violations of
section 17. Plaintiff therefore contends that allowing his suit
against the SCRRA defendants to proceed is consistent with both
the Act and section 17’s plain language.
Before we address the central arguments, we pause to note
what appears to be plaintiff’s animating contention, which is that
there can be no right without an obligation: here, that it makes
no sense to have a fiduciary duty without the ability of the duty’s
beneficiary to enforce it. The liability must be, plaintiff suggests,
“attendant” on the duty; liability must be automatic. In other
10
words, plaintiff says, if there were no consequences to a breach of
the duty, the creation of a duty would be pointless , a result that
Section 17 could not have contemplated. This is of a piece with
plaintiff’s argument that the “common law” recognized that
liability must follow duty.
Our response is, first, that the Legislature was empowered
to set aside common law liability and replace it with the Act. But
more directly to plaintiff’s apparent conviction that liability must
follow duty, as night follows day, we note that suits for violations
of mandatory duties can indeed be pursued under the Act, as well
as claims for “injunctive, specific or declaratory relief.” (Canova
v. Trustees of Imperial Irrig. Dist. Employee Pension Plan (2007)
150 Cal. App. 4th 1487, 1493.) There are remedies.
These matters are discussed in detail below.
We begin with Caldwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th 972, in which
the Supreme Court discussed the interplay between the Act and
subsequent enactments creating new duties applicable to public
employees. There, a school superintendent sued the school
board’s members for race and age discrimination in violation of
the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; § 12900 et seq.).
The trial court concluded that the school board members were
immune under the Act for their discretionary actions and
sustained the demurrer. On appeal, the superintendent noted
that although section 820.2 generally creates immunity for public
employees’ discretionary acts, that immunity applies “ ‘[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by statute.’ ” (Caldwell, at p. 984, quoting
§ 820.2, italics added.) The superintendent contended that FEHA
“otherwise provided,” and thus the board members were not
immune from suit.
11
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order
sustaining the demurrer. The court noted that in adopting the
Act, the Legislature expressly intended that the Act’s specific
immunities would prevail over general rules of actionable duty.
Thus, “where the immunity provided by [the Act] would
otherwise apply, that immunity cannot be abrogated by a statute
which simply imposes a general legal duty or liability on persons,
including public employees. Such a statute may indeed render
the employee liable for his violations unless a specific immunity
applies, but it does not remove the immunity. This further effect
can only be achieved by a clear indication of legislative intent
that statutory immunity is withheld or withdrawn in the
particular case.” (Caldwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 986.) The
court concluded that FEHA “does not meet this test” because
while it prohibits employment discrimination by public and
private employers, it “contains no indicia of an additional intent
that individual public officials or employees may be sued despite
a specific statutory immunity that would otherwise apply in a
particular case.” (Id. at p. 986, italics added.) Thus, FEHA does
“does not abrogate [the Act’s] specific grant of immunity to public
employees for their discretionary acts.” (Ibid.)
In so concluding, the court rejected the superintendent’s
contention that its holding would undermine FEHA’s goal of
eliminating invidious discrimination. The court explained:
“Because plaintiff can cite no clear indication of legislative intent
that FEHA suits should prevail over specific personal immunities
provided by [the Act], he is left with the argument that
section 820.2, by its own terms, withholds such immunity
whenever the theory of liability asserted in the lawsuit derives
from ‘statute.’ However, such a construction of section 820.2
12
would conflate the separate barriers of duty and immunity.
Moreover, it would lead to the anomalous conclusion that
discretionary act immunity protects a public employee against all
common law suits, however fundamental, but has no such effect
against any statutory cause of action, however mundane. As we
have suggested, that does not appear to be the purpose of [the
Act].” (Caldwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 987.)
The Court of Appeal applied Caldwell’s analysis in the
context of a section 17 claim in Krolikowski, supra,
24 Cal.App.5th 537. There, two members of SDCERS, a public
employee retirement plan, sued the plan under a variety of
theories, including breach of fiduciary duty in violation of
section 17, after SDCERS discovered an error in calculating the
members’ monthly pension benefits and took steps to recoup past
overpayments. (Id. at p. 543.) The trial court sustained
SDCERS’s demurrer to the fiduciary duty claim, and the Court of
Appeal affirmed. (Id. at pp. 547–549.) It explained that although
section 17 provides that members of a public pension board have
fiduciary duties to plan members, section 17 “says nothing about
creating liability for money damages against public pension plan
members in instances when such liability would otherwise be
barred by statutory governmental immunity.” (Id. at p. 553.) For
the same reason, the court concluded that section 17 does not
trump the Act under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy
because there is no conflict between section 17 and the Act’s
immunity provisions. The court explained that section 17
imposes fiduciary duties on public pension board members, but it
does not expressly provide that plan members have the right to
recover monetary damages for breach of those duties.
Accordingly, “no constitutional provision is trumped when
13
Government Claims Act immunity is applied to bar liability for
monetary damages based on the SDCERS Board members’
alleged breach of fiduciary duty.” (Id. at p. 554.)
The court noted that there are instances, such as in suits
for inverse condemnation, where a constitutional provision
specifically provides for a monetary remedy against a public
entity, thus trumping any immunity under the Act. (Krolisowski,
supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 554 [“Indeed, the legislative
committee comments to Government Code section 815, which sets
forth the general rule of immunity for public entities,
acknowledges that in some instances, such as inverse
condemnation, constitutional provisions will trump Government
Claims Act immunity”].) In the case before the court, however,
“because the constitutional provisions at issue do not expressly
create a monetary remedy for breach of fiduciary duty against
public pension board members, this is not a case where the
Constitution requires liability and therefore trumps the
Government Claims Act immunity provisions.” (Ibid.)
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that
section 17 expressly exempts breach of fiduciary duty claims from
the Act’s immunity provisions because it includes the phrase
“[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of law or this
Constitution to the contrary.” The court found that the plaintiffs’
contention “takes the phrase out of context,” explaining: “The full
phrase provides that ‘[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of
law or this Constitution to the contrary, the retirement board of a
public pension or retirement system shall have plenary authority
and fiduciary responsibility for investment of moneys and
administration of the system, subject to all of the following . . . .’
(Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 17.) Nothing in this phrase
14
communicates an intent to create a constitutional monetary
damages claim against public pension board members or to
abrogate Government Claims Act immunity. Instead, the phrase
is directed at the scope of a public pension board’s authority to
invest and manage pension system funds.” (Krolikowski, supra,
24 Cal.App.5th at p. 555.)
A similar conclusion was reached in Nasrawi v. Buck
Consultants LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 328 (Nasrawi). There,
beneficiaries of a public employee retirement fund sued the
retirement association responsible for managing the fund for
breach of fiduciary duties in violation of section 17. (Id. at
p. 341.) The plaintiffs contended that the association was not
immune from suit under the Act because the complaint alleged a
constitutionally based duty. (Ibid.) The court disagreed,
explaining: “Plaintiffs’ argument ignores case law holding that
the existence of a duty ‘ “is only a threshold issue, beyond which
remain the immunity barriers.” ’ [Citations.] Undoubtedly, the
board owes fiduciary duties under section 17, but whether it is
immune from alleged violations of those duties is a separate
question. And, contrary to plaintiffs’ view, the immunity
question is not answered by the mere fact that the Constitution is
the source of the duties at issue.” (Ibid.)
We agree with Krolikowski and Nasrawi that section 17
does not trump the Act’s immunity provisions. Under the
framework established by Caldwell, the mere imposition of a
duty on public employees does not abrogate the Act’s immunity
provisions. Instead, those provisions are overcome only “by a
clear indication of legislative intent that statutory immunity is
withheld or withdrawn in the particular case.” (Caldwell, supra,
10 Cal.4th at p. 986.) By its plain language, section 17 imposes a
15
duty on public employee retirement boards—to exercise “sole and
exclusive fiduciary responsibility over the assets of the public
pension or retirement system”—but it does not provide that
boards or their members may be sued for a breach of that duty.
(§ 17.) To the contrary, section 17 says nothing about the
creation of a right of action or a damages remedy. (Ibid.) Under
Caldwell, therefore, section 17 does not create an exception to the
Act’s immunity provisions.
Plaintiff urges us to reject Krolikowski’s analysis for a
number of reasons, including that section 17 was adopted after
the Act’s passage and imposed new legal obligations on public
retirement plan boards. Having imposed these obligations,
plaintiff urges, the voters did not have to explicitly authorize a
private right of action enforcing section 17—instead, it was
enough “simply to create the duty.” To do otherwise, he says,
would “effectively nullif[y] Section 17” by “impos[ing] substantial
fiduciary duties on fiduciaries of public pension funds but without
creating any accountability.” But as we have said, the Supreme
Court rejected a nearly identical contention in Caldwell, which
plaintiff does not address.
Plaintiff also suggests that Krolikowski reached the wrong
result because it ignored the principle that constitutional
provisions are “self-executing.” Not so. Constitutional provisions
are “self-executing” if they are “ ‘of a statutory character’ ” and
may be enforced by the courts without the passage of additional
legislation. (Bring Back the Kern v. City of Bakersfield (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 322, 348,review granted July 16, 2025,
S290840.) But as the SCRRA defendants correctly note, the “self-
executing” terminology has no relevance here because the
question before us is not whether section 17 is effective without
16
the enactment of additional legislation, but rather whether it
carves out an exception to the Act’s immunity provisions. The
answer to that question does not depend on whether section 17 is
self-executing—it unquestionably is—but rather on whether it
expressly sets forth both a duty and liability for breach of that
duty. (See Katzberg v. Regents of the University of California
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 300, 307 [whether constitutional provision is
self-executing is not relevant to whether violation of the provision
gives rise to a damages remedy].)
Next, plaintiff urges that because section 17 imposes
fiduciary duties on board members “ ‘notwithstanding any other
provisions of law or this Constitution to the contrary’ ” (§ 17), it
expresses the voters’ intention that section 17’s fiduciary duties
should prevail over any competing statutory immunities. We
agree with Krolikowski that this contention takes the relevant
words out of context. As Krolikowski noted, the clause
“[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of law or this
Constitution” modifies the phrase that follows—“the retirement
board of a public pension or retirement system shall have plenary
authority and fiduciary responsibility of investment of moneys
and administration of the system.” (Krolikowski, supra,
24 Cal.App.5th at p. 555.) Nothing in this phrase communicates
an intent to create a constitutional monetary damages claim
against public pension board members or to abrogate immunity
under the Act. (Ibid.)
Plaintiff suggests that Los Angeles County Employees
Retirement Assn. v. County of Los Angeles (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
1167, revd. (2026) 20 Cal.5th 292 (LACERA), interpreted the
“notwithstanding any other provision of law” clause of section 17
differently than Krolikowski did, and he urges us to adopt
17
LACERA’s interpretation and reject Krolikowski’s. The
California Supreme Court recently reversed the Court of Appeal’s
opinion in LACERA, and the opinion therefore is no longer good
law. (Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association v.
County of Los Angeles, supra, 20 Cal.5th 292.)
Plaintiff also contends that our interpretation of section 17
should be guided by the statements in the 1984 Voter
Information Guide that plan fiduciaries would be personally
liable for breaches of fiduciary duty. It is true, as plaintiff
suggests, that under some circumstances we may turn to
extrinsic sources such as ballot summaries and arguments for
insight into the voters’ intent. (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 321.) But reference to those materials is
appropriate only if the statutory text “ ‘is ambiguous and
supports multiple interpretations.’ ” (Ibid.) Absent ambiguity,
“ ‘we presume that the voters intend the meaning apparent on
the face of an initiative measure [citation] and the court may not
add to the statute or rewrite it to conform to an assumed intent
that is not apparent in its language.’ ” (Professional Engineers in
California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1016, 1037).
There is no such ambiguity here because nothing in section 17’s
plain language suggests that boards may be held liable for
breaches of fiduciary duty.
Finally, plaintiff contends that his interpretation is
consistent with a 1988 Attorney General opinion concluding that
a public employee board was not permitted to self-insure against
its members’ liability for breach of fiduciary duty. (71
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 129 (1988).) We are unpersuaded. The
Attorney General opinion was issued before the adoption of
section 17 in its current form and addressed a different question
18
than the one before us—namely, whether a public employee
retirement board was legally permitted to self-insure. While the
Attorney General opinion assumed that board members could be
liable for breaches of fiduciary duty under section 17, it did not
decide the issue. (See People v. Evans (2008) 44 Cal.4th 590, 599
[opinion is authoritative only “ ‘ “for the points actually involved
and actually decided” ’ ”].) Nor did it consider whether a public
entity (as distinct from Board members personally) are liable
under section 17.
For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that section 17
does not trump the Act’s immunity provisions. We therefore now
turn to the plaintiff’s contention that the SCRRA defendants are
liable under the Act itself.
B. The SCCRA defendants are not subject to suit
under section 815.6 for violation of a
“mandatory duty.”
Section 815.6 of the Act provides that if a public entity is
under a “mandatory duty” imposed by an enactment designed to
protect against a particular kind of injury, the public entity is
liable for an injury proximately caused by the entity’s failure to
discharge its duty with reasonable diligence. Plaintiff asserts
that the SCCRA defendants are liable under section 815.6
because “[t]here can be no dispute that Section 17 imposes
mandatory duties on the retirement boards of public pension
funds and their board members, which are expressly designed to
protect the financial interests of participants and beneficiaries of
those retirement funds.”
We disagree. Mandatory duties are those that are
“ ‘ “manifestly ministerial, because they amount only to obedience
to orders which leave the officer no choice.” ’ ” (Danielson v.
19
County of Humboldt (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1, 13–14, quoting
Ortega v. Sacramento County Dept. of Health & Human Services
(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 713, 728.) On the other hand, “ ‘the duty
of a public entity is not mandatory if it is debatable whether the
duty was adequately fulfilled.’ ” (Id. at p. 14.)
In San Mateo Union High School Dist. v. County of San
Mateo (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 418, 429 (San Mateo Union), the
court considered whether a county and its treasurer could be held
liable for imprudently investing county funds under section 815.6
and sections of the Government Code providing that the county
treasurer “ ‘shall act’ ” according to the prudent investor standard
when investing or managing funds. (San Mateo Union,
at p. 426.) The plaintiffs contended that the statute’s use of the
term “shall” imposed a mandatory duty to comply with the
prudent investor standard for purposes of section 815.6 liability.
(San Mateo Union, at p. 428.) The court disagreed, explaining
that the statutory obligation to act as a prudent investor “while
stated in mandatory language, is quite general. The statutes do
not command specific acts designed to achieve compliance with
the prudent investor standard.” (Id. at pp. 429–430.) Instead,
“[t]he manner in which the required standard of the prudent
investor is to be attained entails the exercise of extensive
discretion that is not in the least specified by the statutes or any
accompanying implementing measures.” (Ibid.) The court thus
concluded that section 815.6 did not subject the defendants to
liability for violating the prudent investor standards. (San Mateo
Union, at p. 432.)
The present case is analogous to San Mateo Union. As in
that case, although section 17 contains mandatory language—
“shall have” and “shall discharge”—it does not require any
20
particular actions by retirement boards. Instead, it directs
retirement boards to exercise “fiduciary responsibility” over plan
assets and to “discharge their duties with respect to the system
with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a
like capacity and familiar with these matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.”
(§ 17, subd. (c).) Because this statutory directive requires the
exercise of significant discretion, alleged violations of section 17
do not subject retirement boards to liability under section 815.6.
C. Plaintiff forfeited the contention that the
Board is not entitled to discretionary act
immunity under sections 815.2 and 820.2.
Section 815.2 provides that public entities are vicariously
liable for injuries caused by their employees in the course of their
employment, but are immune from liability when the employee is
immune; and section 820.2 provides that public employees are
not liable for injuries caused by discretionary acts or omissions.
Thus, the SCRRA defendants can be liable under these sections
only if plaintiff’s alleged injuries were caused by Board members’
nondiscretionary acts.
Plaintiff does not address the SCRRA defendants’
immunity under sections 815.2 and 820.2 in his opening brief.
Instead, he discusses these sections for the first time in his reply
brief, asserting that the mandatory duty imposed on fiduciaries
by section 17 does not involve the exercise of discretion, and thus
neither the Board nor SCRRA are immune from suit under
sections 815.2 and 820.2.
We may treat as forfeited any point that an appellant
raises for the first time in a reply brief. “ ‘ “Obvious
21
considerations of fairness in argument demand that the appellant
present all of his points in the opening brief. To withhold a point
until the closing brief would deprive the respondent of his
opportunity to answer it or require the effort and delay of an
additional brief by permission. Hence the rule is that points
raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered,
unless good reason is shown for failure to present them
before. . . . [Citations.]” ’ ” (Doe v. California Dept. of Justice
(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1115, italics added.) Plaintiff has
made no showing as to why he could not have raised this issue in
his opening brief, and thus it is forfeited.
D. Plaintiff’s fiduciary duty claim seeks monetary
damages, and thus it is within the scope of the
Act.
Plaintiff contends finally that his fiduciary duty claim is
not barred by the Act because he seeks only equitable remedies,
which he urges are not subject to the Act under O’Neal v.
Stanislaus County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2017)
8 Cal.App.5th 1184 (O’Neal). The SCRRA defendants disagree,
suggesting that the relief plaintiff seeks—namely, restoration of
value, restitution of compensation, disgorgement—constitute
monetary relief subject to the Act, and O’Neal does not hold to
the contrary.4
4 It is not entirely clear whether plaintiff’s contention relates
the Act’s claim-filing requirements or immunity provisions (or
both). Since we conclude that plaintiff’s claims are for “money or
damages” within the meaning of the Act, we need not resolve this
issue.
22
Plaintiff is mistaken in his assumption that the application
of the Act depends on whether damages can be characterized as
“equitable” or not. With a few exceptions not pertinent here, the
Act applies to all claims for “money or damages.” (§ 905.) So for
example, most claims for restitution, which might be thought of
as “equitable,” are subject to the Act. (E.g., City of Stockton v.
Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 742–743; City of Los
Angeles v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 422, 430.)
The Act does not apply to actions seeking nonpecuniary remedies,
“ ‘such as those seeking injunctive, specific or declaratory relief.’ ”
(Canova v. Trustees of Imperial Irrigation Dist. Employee Pension
Plan (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1493). The remedy sought
here is pecuniary, so the Act applies.
O’Neal does not stand for the proposition that equitable
remedies are not subject to the Act; in fact, the O’Neal defendants
did not assert that their actions were immune from suit under
the Act, and thus the Court of Appeal did not consider that issue.
(See B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 11
[“ ‘ “cases are not authority for propositions not considered” ’ ”].)
In any event, the remedies sought by the O’Neal plaintiffs were
very different than those plaintiff seeks here. In O’Neal, the
plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring the board to unwind
certain transfers between funds the board controlled, not
payment of money directly to the plaintiffs. (O’Neal, supra,
8 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1195–1196, 1220 & fn. 8.) But here, plaintiff
expressly seeks a judgment requiring the SCRRA defendants to
“[r]estore participants’ accounts to the value they would have had
[if SCRRA and the Board had] prudently and diligently
negotiated reasonable fees . . . to . . . administer the Plan.” In
other words, plaintiff is asking the court to order payments
23
directly to plan participants, a remedy that courts have held
subject to the Act. (See, e.g., Hart v. Alameda County (1999)
76 Cal.App.4th 766, 778, 780 [plaintiffs’ claim for return of jury
deposits was subject to the Act because a suit “for ‘money or
damages’ includes all actions where the plaintiff is seeking
monetary relief”], italics added; Lozada v. City and County of
San Francisco (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1162 [“The claim
presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act does not
apply solely to claims for compensatory ‘damages,’ but to ‘all
claims for money’ (§ 905), as well”], italics added.)
Plaintiff also contends that his case is analogous to a claim
for reinstatement and back pay, which the court in Harris v.
State Personnel Bd. (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 639, 645, disapproved
on other grounds in Coleman v. Department of Personnel
Administration (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1102, 1123, fn. 8, held was not
subject to the Act’s claim presentation requirement. In Harris,
the court concluded that the plaintiff could seek backpay even
though he had not filed a government claim because the claims
requirement expressly excludes contract actions, and the
employees’ suit sought contract damages. (Harris, at p. 643.)
The present case, in contrast, manifestly seeks a tort remedy.
Plaintiff contends finally that his suit is exempt from the
Act under section 905, subdivision (f), which excludes from the
claim filing requirement claims “for money or benefits under any
public retirement or pension system.” But the case plaintiff cites
in support, Dalton v. East Bay Mun. Utility Dist. (1993)
18 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1573 (Dalton), holds to the contrary.
Dalton considered whether former municipal employees who
were participants in a public employee retirement system could
file an action for breach of fiduciary duty and denial of equal
24
protection without first filing a government claim pursuant to
section 905. The Court of Appeal held the employees could not,
explaining: “The legislative history of section 905 indicates the
scope of the enumerated exceptions to filing claims was intended
to be extremely limited. . . . [¶] Consequently, commentators
have construed the section 905 exceptions as essentially
nontortious claims ‘for which some other adequate claims
procedure has already been devised or for which the procedural
protection of the Tort Claims Act is believed to be unnecessary.’
[Citation.] [¶] The instant action is not such a case. Plaintiffs
are basically alleging tortious wrongdoing by defendants. They
do not seek money due to them under the terms of the existing
pension system; rather, they claim defendants treated them
unfairly in administrating the system . . . . Consequently, we
conclude plaintiffs were required to file a claim pursuant to
section 905.” (Id. at pp. 1573–1574.)
As in Dalton, plaintiff here does not seek money due to him
under the terms of an existing retirement system, but instead
seeks a tort remedy for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty. In
other words, plaintiff does not seek to enforce a contract, but
instead seeks to impose an extra-contractual remedy.
E. Conclusion.
For all the foregoing reasons, plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that the trial court erred by sustaining the SCRRA
defendants’ demurrer. We therefore affirm the judgment of
dismissal against the SCRRA defendants.
III. Plaintiff’s claim against MissionSquare.
The trial court found that because plaintiff failed to state a
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against the SCRRA
25
defendants, it necessarily also failed to state a cause of action
against MissionSquare for aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary duty. Plaintiff asserts that this conclusion is incorrect
as a matter of law, citing two cases in support. Neither is
persuasive.
In Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney,
Inc. (2000) 530 U.S. 238, 241, the United States Supreme Court
held that the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) authorizes a participant in an ERISA plan to
bring a civil action against nonfiduciary “ ‘party in interest.’ ”
The court’s analysis in Harris was based on the language of
particular provisions of ERISA, which have no apparent analog
in section 17. Additionally, Harris did not consider the question
before us—whether a third party may be liable for aiding and
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty by a fiduciary who is itself
immune from suit. Harris is not relevant to our analysis.
Nasrawi, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th 328, also does not assist
plaintiff. The Nasrawi plaintiffs, beneficiaries of a public
employee retirement fund, brought two separate suits against the
retirement fund. In the first suit, the trial court sustained the
association’s demurrer to the causes of action for breaches of
fiduciary duty, and the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that
plaintiffs had adequately pled causes of action for declaratory
relief. (Id. at p. 334 & fn. 4.) In the second suit, the plaintiffs
sought damages against the retirement association for breach of
fiduciary duty, and also sought damages against the fund’s
actuaries for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. (Id. at
p. 332.) The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiffs’ complaint
adequately alleged a claim against the actuaries for aiding and
26
abetting breach of fiduciary duty, but that the association was
immune from liability for monetary damages. (Id. at p. 344.)
The Nasrawi’s court’s analysis does not suggest that the
trial court here erred in sustaining MissionSquare’s demurrer.
Although Nasrawi held that the association was not liable for
damages, the earlier appellate decision had already found that
the plaintiffs could pursue injunctive relief in connection with
their breach of fiduciary duty claim. Nasrawi thus does not
suggest that an aiding and abetting claim is viable even in the
absence of an underlying breach of fiduciary duty claim.
Although our review of an order sustaining a demurrer is
de novo, “it remains the burden of the plaintiff/appellant ‘to show
. . . that the demurrer was sustained erroneously.’ ” (Eghtesad v.
State Farm General Ins. Co. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 406, 411; see
also Y.P. v. Wells Fargo Company (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 1069,
1079 [appellant “must affirmatively demonstrate that the
demurrer was sustained erroneously”].) Plaintiff’s citations to
Harris and Nasrawi manifestly fail to meet this burden. We
therefore affirm the judgment of dismissal against
MissionSquare.
27
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed. Respondents are awarded
their appellate costs.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
KARNOW, J.*
We concur:
ADAMS, P. J.
HANASONO, J.
* Retired Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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