Filed 6/29/26 Sassoon v. D’Amato CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
SOLOMON ARON SASSOON, B345307
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STRO03892)
v.
ANTHONY D’AMATO, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Melanie Ochoa, Judge. Affirmed.
Tamer Law Corp. and Steven Michael Tamer for Defendant
and Appellant.
David Marco Weber for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
Solomon Aron Sassoon obtained a two-year restraining
order protecting Sassoon, his parents, and his siblings from
Anthony D’Amato, Jr. About a month after the court issued the
restraining order, D’Amato sought to vacate it on the ground that
Sassoon did not properly serve him with the restraining order
petition. The trial court denied D’Amato’s motion, finding that
service was proper and D’Amato lacked credibility when he
denied receiving service.
On appeal, D’Amato repeats his argument that Sassoon
did not serve him with the petition for a restraining order.
D’Amato’s argument fails to apply the relevant statute, Code of
Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivision (m), which permits
alternate service of a petition for a civil restraining order,
temporary restraining order, and notice of hearing of the petition
when, as here, the defendant was attempting to evade service.1
Relying on the premise he was not properly served, D’Amato cites
sections 473, subdivisions (b) and (d) and 473.5 to argue that the
trial court had to grant his motion to set aside the restraining
order. Because his premise is incorrect, the remainder of
D’Amato’s arguments fail. D’Amato also attempts to raise
evidentiary issues for the first time on appeal. We do not
consider these issues because he failed to raise them below and
thus has failed to preserve them for our review. We affirm.
1Undesignated statutory citations are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2
BACKGROUND
1. Sassoon requests a civil harassment restraining
order
On June 4, 2024, Sassoon petitioned for a civil harassment
restraining order seeking protection from Anthony D’Amato, Jr.2
Sassoon also sought to protect his parents and siblings.
Specifically Sassoon requested the court order D’Amato to “[s]top
posting comments about me, my mother, my family work places,
names and places associated with their work and locations, stop
calling CPS and 911 to harass me and my family, stop threating
to rape my mother, not to threaten to have someone else to follow
me or my family members, not to talk about my family on his
social media.” Sassoon represented that D’Amato drove by him
on May 31, 2024 and made recent threats on D’Amato’s YouTube
channel.
On the same day, the court granted a temporary
restraining order prohibiting D’Amato from harassing or
contacting Sassoon or his parents and siblings.
2. The court permits Sassoon to use alternate service
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527,
subdivision (m)(2)
On July 15, 2024, Sassoon’s registered process server,
Sarah Linn, filed a declaration of due diligence and a request for
alternate service. Linn declared she had been serving documents
since 1985. She had access to a search platform available to
2 Sassoon’s mother represented him as a guardian ad litem
in the trial court.
3
registered process servers and she used it to locate D’Amato at a
residence in Woodland Hills.
On July 10, 2024, Linn tried to serve D’Amato at that
residence; she rang the doorbell and received no response. On
July 11, 2024, Linn heard D’Amato on his YouTube Channel live
stream to 7.8 thousand people and mention the temporary
restraining order and his efforts to avoid service. D’Amato
stated, “ ‘[T]hey will never serve me, what have they got an old
address from 3-5 years ago?’ ” In “Live Chatter,”3 D’Amato
stated, “[H]e does not accept e-service and [n]o they cannot serve
me by publication.”
On July 11, 2024, Linn made a second service attempt at
the Woodland Hills residence. She learned D’Amato no longer
lived there. On July 12, 2024, Linn attempted to serve D’Amato
at a location she believed was D’Amato’s mother’s address but
learned that address was no longer current.
Exhibits attached to Linn’s declaration showed a
screenshot from ZeroDarkTony4 stating, “Btw I will never show
up in court. [¶] I don’t have to[.] [¶] It will be dismissed after
my lawyer files a motion. [¶] I already have the case number
and doc images[.] [¶] 24STR0****[.] [¶] They filled out the
document without putting my address in, so I will call my
attorney and we will take appropriate steps.”
3 The record does not indicate what “Live Chatter” is.
4Linn represented that D’Amato is known as
“ZeroDarkTony” on the YouTube Channel. According to Linn,
ZeroDarkTony is D’Amato’s pseudonym.
4
Linn obtained two other addresses for D’Amato but one was
a “torn down former USPS Station” and the other, a “Commercial
Mail Receiving Agency.”
Another screen shot attached to Linn’s declaration from
ZeroDarkTony states, “WILLIAM has less than 24 hours to serve
these retaliatory and perjurious papers. Best thing you can do is
throw them in the garbage OR, there will be civil filings against
Solomon’s mother and her homeowners [sic] insurance that
covers Solomon and we have more than enough evidence.” (The
reference to William is unclear.)
Still another screen shot from ZeroDarkTony states, “I
don’t know what planet these Reddit legal eagles live on but even
if these smooth brains do eventually serve me this will be
dismissed.”
There were videos attached to Linn’s declaration that
are not included in our record on appeal. According to an
attachment to Linn’s declaration, the videos showed D’Amato
speaking about Linn “serving him.”
On July 19, 2024, the court authorized service of the
petition for a restraining order, notice of court hearing, and
temporary restraining order by posting on D’Amato’s YouTube
channel or on his Twitter account.
3. July 25, 2024 proof of service
Process server Linn declared under penalty of perjury that
she served the request for civil harassment order, temporary
restraining order, and notice of hearing on July 19, 2024. She
served D’Amato through his X account (formerly Twitter) and at
his X address @ZeroDarkTony. She also e-mailed the request for
civil harassment to D’Amato’s e-mail [email protected].
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According to Linn, “[A]fter service DEFENDANT posted [a]
remark acknowledging service of the Civil Harassment Order.”
On August 5, 2024, Linn filed another declaration.
According to Linn, after serving D’Amato via his X account,
D’Amato had been “streaming hours of” threats against the
judge, the process server, Sassoon, and his mother. Linn
represented additional video showed D’Amato acknowledging
sending Los Angeles Police and fire personnel to Sassoon’s home.
D’Amato also stated in the video that “no courtroom will ever see
me.” (Boldface & italics omitted.)
The proof of service indicated Linn served D’Amato via his
X account at his X address @ZeroDarkTony on July 19, 2024.
4. After a hearing, the court issues a two-year civil
harassment order
On August 16, 2024, the trial court ordered for a period of
two years D’Amato must not harass, intimidate, molest, attack,
strike, stalk, threaten, assault (sexually or otherwise), hit[,]
abuse, destroy personal property of, or disturb the peace of the
person.” The order prohibited D’Amato from contacting Sassoon
or his parents and siblings or making false calls to law
enforcement or first responders or discussing them on his
YouTube channel. The court further ordered D’Amato stay
100 yards away from the protected persons’ home, workplace,
vehicle, or school.
On August 18, 2024, Linn served the final restraining order
on D’Amato through his X account, by “private message,” and by
posting a message on D’Amato’s e-mail account at
[email protected].
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5. D’Amato moved to set aside the civil harassment
order
On September 3, 2024, D’Amato moved to set aside a
“default” and “default judgment.” D’Amato asserted he did not
receive service of the petition for a restraining order and that he
could not have been served by Twitter because he blocked
Sassoon from his Twitter account. D’Amato requested relief
pursuant to sections 473, subdivision (b) and 473.5. The
memorandum of points and authorities in support of his motion
also referred to section 473, subdivision (d).
In the memorandum of points and authorities, D’Amato’s
attorney “admitted fault” and indicated a “responsive pleading”
was attached. Counsel stated, “Defendant’s Attorney has
admitted his mistakes which occurred during the ransomware
attacks on the LASC Website and Attorney Portal.” No
responsive pleading was attached and there was no declaration
from D’Amato’s attorney admitting fault or explaining the
relevance of the “ransomware attacks.”
In his memorandum of points and authorities, D’Amato
also argued, “Twitter is not a means of proper service” and he
blocked Sassoon from his Twitter account. His argument that
Twitter is not a proper means of service did not include any
citation to, or analysis of section 527, subdivision (m)(2).
In a declaration, D’Amato represented he was never served
with the request for a restraining order. He stated, “I was
surprised that my default was taken because I had never been
served with the Request for Restraining Order in the instant
matter. My default was not taken due to my avoiding service or
inexcusable neglect.” D’Amato added that he had an
unidentified, meritorious defense. In another declaration,
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D’Amato averred, “Petitioner’s Proof of Service indicates service
was accomplished by Twitter. More than six (6) months ago, I
blocked Petitioner from my Twitter account. So, Petitioner is
unable to send me any messages, or contact me by any means
whatsoever, when using Twitter.” D’Amato did not deny that his
e-mail was [email protected] or that his X address was
@ZeroDarkTony.
6. Hearing on D’Amato’s motion to vacate the
restraining order
The trial court held a hearing on D’Amato’s request to
vacate the civil restraining order. D’Amato’s counsel argued a
restraining order cannot be served by social media. D’Amato’s
counsel did not reference section 527, subdivision (m).
The court rejected that argument because D’Amato’s
authority predated the enactment of section 527, subdivision (m).
The court explained it granted alternate service because “[a]t the
time that the request was made, Mr. D’Amato had already . . .
stated on his own Twitter account that he would never show up
in court and his attorney was going to get it dismissed. He even
posted the case number and said that he had the document
images. [¶] And Mr. Sassoon went through extensive attempts
to find a physical address for the respondent and attempted
service at those addresses. . . . [T]here was evidence also
presented that the respondent stated on his YouTube c[hannel]
that petitioner had an old address and that was not his current
address and he was not going to get served.”
The court further explained alternate service was
reasonably calculated to provide notice because it was made on
the same social media channels D’Amato used to harass Sassoon.
The court found the evidence showed D’Amato “being well aware
8
of this case existing and affirmatively choosing not to participate
despite having been served [by] methods that were authorized by
the court.”
Counsel for D’Amato stated D’Amato blocked the process
server from posting to his Twitter account and therefore did not
receive anything from the process server. When the court asked
D’Amato at the hearing for the name of the process server he
blocked, D’Amato said, “I don’t know specifically the name . . . .”
The court found, “Mr. D’Amato not only had notice of this
proceeding before he was even served in the manner authorized
on social media, but he specifically stated he would not
participate in the proceedings.” “I do not find Mr. D’Amato’s
testimony credible that he had preemptively blocked this paid
process server from communicating with him online . . . .”
“[T]here’s also statements made by Mr. D’Amato immediately
after the time in which he was served referring to the—
proceeding.”
The court denied D’Amato’s motion to set aside the
restraining order.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, D’Amato argues pursuant to sections 473,
subdivisions (b) and (d) and 473.5 that the court had to set aside
the civil harassment order. His arguments on appeal rely on the
premise that he was not properly served, a premise we reject.
D’Amato also raises evidentiary objections that we do not
consider because he has not demonstrated he preserved them for
our review.
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A. Service Pursuant to Section 527.6, Subdivision (m)
Was Proper
Section 527.6 governs civil harassment orders. Subdivision
(m) provides: “(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), upon the
filing of a petition under this section, the respondent shall be
personally served with a copy of the petition, temporary
restraining order, if any, and notice of hearing of the petition.
Service shall be made at least five days before the hearing. The
court may for good cause, on motion of the petitioner or on its
own motion, shorten the time for service on the respondent. [¶]
(2) If the court determines at the hearing that, after a diligent
effort, the petitioner has been unable to accomplish personal
service, and that there is reason to believe that the respondent is
evading service or cannot be located, then the court may specify
another method of service that is reasonably calculated to give
actual notice to the respondent and may prescribe the manner in
which proof of service shall be made.”
We review for substantial evidence the trial court’s finding
that Sassoon made a diligent effort to locate and serve D’Amato.
(Yu v. Pozniak-Rice (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1135, 1143.) We
consider whether the record contains “declarations stating
‘probative facts’ [citation] based on personal knowledge and
demonstrating a thorough investigation designed to learn the
respondent’s whereabouts.” (Id. at p. 1144.) When we review the
factual basis of a trial court’s order for substantial evidence,
“findings of fact are liberally construed to support the judgment
or order and we consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in
support of the findings. [Citation.] . . . ‘It is not our role as a
reviewing court to reweigh the evidence or to assess witness
10
credibility. [Citation.] . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Powell v. Tagami (2018)
26 Cal.App.5th 219, 231.)
D’Amato has forfeited his challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence. He failed to summarize the evidence in the light most
favorable to Sassoon. A challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence requires the appellant to summarize the evidence in the
light most favorable to the judgment. (Boeken v. Philip Morris,
Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1667.)
Even were we to reach the merits, substantial evidence
shows Sassoon made a diligent effort to locate and serve D’Amato
prior to the court’s order permitting alternative service. Linn’s
declaration evidences a thorough investigation designed to learn
D’Amato’s whereabouts, including resort to platform available to
registered process servers. Linn located D’Amato’s last known
address, went there twice, and tried to serve him at the address
of his mother’s house. There was also substantial evidence
D’Amato was trying to avoid service, including by his boasting he
could not be found.
D’Amato asserts, “[T]here was no evidence that all
reasonable methods of personal or substitute service had been
exhausted before resorting” to alternate service under
section 527, subdivision (m). The statute requires “a diligent
effort” not the “exhaust[ion]” of all reasonable methods. (§ 527.6,
subd. (m)(2)).
Finally, D’Amato asserts, without citation to the record,
“[a]uthorizing service by posting on YouTube and Twitter failed
to ensure notice ‘reasonably calculated’ to apprise Appellant, and
the record shows [he] disputed receipt.” Although in his
declaration D’Amato disputed receipt of service, this court
does not reweigh credibility. (Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney
11
Canada, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 613, 622 [appellate courts
“do not reweigh evidence or reassess the credibility of
witnesses”].) The trial court found that the alternate service
provided actual notice. The court expressly rejected D’Amato’s
credibility when he asserted he had blocked the process server
from his X (formerly Twitter) account. The record supports the
trial court’s finding that D’Amato received actual notice given
Linn attached to her declarations D’Amato’s posts referring to the
lawsuit. Additionally, after service, D’Amato threatened the
process server, supporting the inference that he was aware of the
service. D’Amato’s regular use of X as shown by attachments to
Linn’s declarations supports the conclusion that service at his X
account was reasonably calculated to apprise D’Amato of
Sassoon’s request for a restraining order.
B. D’Amato Does Not Show He Was Entitled to Relief
Pursuant to Section 473, Subdivision (b)
D’Amato argues that the trial court was required to set
aside the default under section 473, subdivision (b). That statute
allows a trial court to “upon any terms as may be just, relieve a
party or the party’s legal representative from a judgment,
dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against the party
through the party’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.” The statute requires “[a]pplication for this relief shall
be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading
proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not
be granted . . . .” (§ 473, subd. (b).)
Given that this case does not involve a default judgment,
we assume D’Amato is arguing the trial court was required to set
aside the civil harassment order. According to D’Amato, he
“demonstrated surprise.” D’Amato’s statement that he was
12
surprised ignores the trial court’s express findings. To repeat,
the court found, “Mr. D’Amato not only had notice of this
proceeding before he was even served in the manner authorized
on social media, but he specifically stated he would not
participate in the proceedings.” “[T]here’s also statements made
by Mr. D’Amato immediately after the time in which he was
served referring to the — proceeding.” This court does not
reweigh the trial court’s credibility determinations. (Johnson v.
Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc., supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 622
[appellate courts “do not reweigh evidence or reassess the
credibility of witnesses”].)
Second, under section 473, subdivision (b) D’Amato’s failure
to file a responsive pleading requires that his motion “shall not be
granted.” (§ 473, subd. (b).) For this additional reason, D’Amato
has failed to demonstrate error.
C. D’Amato Does Not Show He Was Entitled to Relief
Pursuant to Section 473, Subdivision (d)
Section 473, subdivision (d) provides: “The court may, upon
motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical
mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to
the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either
party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment
or order.” D’Amato argues pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 473, subdivision (d) that the trial court should have set
aside the default judgment because it was void for improper
service.
As we have explained, ante, there was no default judgment
and the request for a civil restraining order, temporary
restraining order and, notice of the hearing were properly served
13
pursuant to section 527, subdivision (m). (See Discussion, part A,
ante.)
D. D’Amato Does Not Show He Was Entitled to Relief
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 473.5
D’Amato argues because he stated in a declaration that he
had no actual notice of the proceedings, the trial court should
have set aside the default pursuant to section 473.5.
Section 473.5 provides in pertinent part: “(a) When service of a
summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to
defend the action and a default or default judgment has been
entered against the party in the action, the party may serve and
file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment
and for leave to defend the action.” (§ 473.5, subd. (a).)
“(c) Upon a finding by the court that the motion was made
within the period permitted by subdivision (a) and that the
party’s lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not
caused by the party’s avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect,
it may set aside the default or default judgment on whatever
terms as may be just and allow the party to defend the action.”
(§ 473.5, subd. (c).)
D’Amato’s reliance on section 473.5 is misplaced. First, he
cites no authority that this statute applies to a civil harassment
order notwithstanding subdivision (a) references only to a default
or default judgment. Second, the trial court expressly found
D’Amato had actual notice and was attempting to avoid service.
D’Amato’s assertion that “[t]he trial court failed to properly
weigh the evidence and determine whether Appellant’s lack of
actual notice was due to avoidance of service or inexcusable
neglect” cannot be reconciled with the trial court’s express
findings.
14
E. D’Amato Has Not Preserved His Evidentiary
Challenges
D’Amato argues on appeal the trial court “erred in
accepting and relying on testimony from petitioner and his
guardian ad litem regarding service without requiring proper
authentication or foundation.” (Boldface & capitalization
omitted.) D’Amato also asserts the process server’s “conclusions
about his awareness of the proceedings” were not based on
personal knowledge. “It is well settled by statute and case
authority that the failure to object, even to otherwise
inadmissible evidence, waives the defect.” (Haskell v. Carli
(1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 124, 129; see Orozco v. WPV San Jose,
LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 375, 397 [“ ‘[i]t is hornbook law that a
timely and specific objection is required to prevent the
consideration of certain evidence’ ”].) Evidence Code section 353
prevents setting aside a decision based on the erroneous
admission of evidence unless “[t]here appears of record an
objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the evidence that
was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific
ground of the objection or motion . . . .” (Evid. Code, § 353,
subd. (a).) There was no such objection here.
15
DISPOSITION
The order denying Anthony D’Amato, Jr.’s motion to vacate
the civil restraining order is affirmed. Solomon Aron Sassoon is
entitled to costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
16