SANTA CLARA v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA Part-II
<script src="http://www.google-analytics.com/urchin.js" type="text/javascript"> </script> <script type="text/javascript"> _uacct = "UA-1698443-1"; urchinTracker(); </script> <html ><br /> <head><br /> <title>SANTA CLARA v</title><br /> </head><br /> <body><br /> <div><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/><b >SANTA CLARA</b><b<br /> > v. SUPERIOR<br /> COURT OF SANTA</b><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>Filed 7/26/10<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/><b >IN THE SUPREME COURT OF </b><b<br /> >CALIFORNIA</b><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA et al., )<br /> <br/> )<br /> <br/> Petitioners, )<br /> <br/> ) S163681<br /> <br/> v. )<br /> <br/> ) Ct.App.<br /> 6<br /> <br/>THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA ) No. H031540<br /> <br/>CLARA COUNTY, )<br /> <br/> ) Santa Clara County<br /> <br/> Respondent; ) Super. Ct. No.<br /> CV 788657<br /> <br/> )<br /> <br/>ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY )<br /> <br/>et al., )<br /> <br/> )<br /> <br/> Real Parties in Interest. )<br /> <br/>__________________________ )<u></u><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/><b >STORY CONTINUE <br /> FROM PART I….</b><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>Our opinion in <i >Clancy</i><br /> recognized that the interests invoked in that case were akin to the vital<br /> interests implicated in a criminal prosecution, and thus invocation of the<br /> disqualification rules applicable to criminal prosecutors was justified. And if those rules are found to be equally<br /> applicable in the case now before us, disqualification of the private attorneys<br /> hired to assist the public entities similarly would be required.<br /> <br/>As explained below, however, to the extent our<br /> decision in <i >Clancy </i>suggested that<br /> public-nuisance prosecutions <i >always</i><br /> invoke the same constitutional and institutional interests present in a<br /> criminal case, our analysis was unnecessarily broad and failed to take into<br /> account the wide spectrum of cases that fall within the public-nuisance<br /> rubric. In the present case, both the<br /> types of remedies sought and the types of interests implicated differ<br /> significantly from those involved in <i >Clancy</i><br /> and, accordingly, invocation of the strict rules requiring the automatic<br /> disqualification of criminal prosecutors is unwarranted. <br /> <br/>The broad spectrum of public-nuisance law may implicate<br /> both civil and criminal liability.<sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup> Indeed, public-nuisance actions vary widely,<br /> as evidenced by Penal Code section 370, which broadly defines a public nuisance<br /> as â€