SANTA CLARA v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA Part-I
<script src="http://www.google-analytics.com/urchin.js" type="text/javascript"> </script> <script type="text/javascript"> _uacct = "UA-1698443-1"; urchinTracker(); </script> <html ><br /> <head><br /> <link rel=Preview href="S163681%20PART%20I_files/preview.wmf"><br /> <title>SANTA CLARA v</title><br /> </head><br /> <body><br /> <div><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/><b >SANTA CLARA v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA</b><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>Filed 7/26/10<br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/><b >IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA</b><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA et al., )<br /> <br/> )<br /> <br/> Petitioners, )<br /> <br/> ) S163681<br /> <br/> v. )<br /> <br/> ) Ct.App. 6<br /> <br/>THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA ) No. H031540<br /> <br/>CLARA COUNTY, )<br /> <br/> ) Santa Clara County<br /> <br/> Respondent; ) Super. Ct. No. CV 788657<br /> <br/> )<br /> <br/>ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY )<br /> <br/>et al., )<br /> <br/> )<br /> <br/> Real Parties in Interest. )<br /> <br/>__________________________ )<u></u><br /> <br/> <br /> <br/>A group of public entities<br /> composed of various California counties and cities (collectively referred to as<br /> the public entities) are prosecuting a public-nuisance<br /> action against numerous businesses that manufactured lead paint<br /> (collectively referred to as defendants). <br /> The public entities are represented both by their own government<br /> attorneys and by several private law firms. <br /> The private law firms are retained by the public entities on a<br /> contingent-fee basis. After summary<br /> judgment was granted in favor of defendants on various tort causes of action<br /> initially advanced by the public entities, the complaint eventually was amended<br /> to leave the public-nuisance action as the sole claim, and abatement as the<br /> sole remedy.<br /> <br/>Defendants moved to bar the public entities from<br /> compensating their privately retained counsel by means of contingent fees. The superior court, relying upon this court's<br /> decision in <i >People ex rel. Clancy v.<br /> Superior Court </i>(1985) 39 Cal.3d 740 (<i >Clancy</i>),<br /> ordered the public entities barred from compensating their private counsel by<br /> means of any contingent-fee agreement, reasoning that under <i<br /> >Clancy</i>, all attorneys prosecuting<br /> public-nuisance actions must be â€