Filed 9/10/26 Sandra W. v. Dreyer CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
SANDRA W., B340601
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 24CHRO00679)
RANDOLPH EUGENE DREYER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Amanda S. Park, Temporary Judge.
(Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
Shulman Bastian Friedman Bui & O’Dea and Franklin J.
Contreras, Jr. for Defendant and Appellant.
Sandra W., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Randolph Eugene Dreyer (Dreyer) appeals from a civil
harassment restraining order (restraining order) issued against
him to protect Sandra W. (Sandra).1 Dreyer contends that
substantial evidence does not support the restraining order, and
that Sandra did not establish a reasonable likelihood the
purported harassment would recur or clear and convincing
evidence of her emotional distress. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts
Dreyer hired Sandra as a personal organizer in 2017.
Sandra handled many aspects of Dreyer’s life, including his
shopping. Dreyer “came to trust [Sandra] more than anyone
else[.]”
In December 2022, Dreyer transferred $10,000 into an
account for Sandra. Sandra contends this was a gift, but Dreyer
claims it was a loan.
By August 2023, Sandra had stopped working for Dreyer.
Sandra alleged that “when [she] quit[,] [Dreyer] called [her] over
and over for days/hours[.]” Sandra alleged that Dreyer
“persistently contact[ed] [her] friends/family” and “began to email
threats to [her].”
In one email sent at 2:39 a.m. on April 2, 2024, Dreyer
wrote: “I am reporting you to the authorities . . . . All of your
clients should beware of your manipulative, seductive behavior.
You stole from me. You interfered with my personal life. You are
1 Per California Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(5), we initially
refer to the person protected in this civil harassment proceeding
by her first name and last initial, and thereafter by her first
name only. No disrespect is intended.
2
a menace. I will not let you get away with what you have done.”
Dreyer also wrote that Sandra “conned [him] out of $10,000” and
“participated in a horrifying assault on [his] life and financial
well-being[.]”
On April 17, 2024, Dreyer left Sandra a voicemail saying
“[y]ou stole from me.” Five days later, he left another voicemail
saying, “[d]o you really want to fuck with me? Sandra, I’m
putting you in prison.”
Sandra further alleged that Dreyer threatened her
livelihood by contacting her clients via email. For example,
Sandra alleged that Dreyer forwarded his email of April 2, 2024,
at 2:39 a.m. to one of her clients.
Sandra alleged that as a result of Dreyer’s harassment
campaign, she suffered emotional distress. She was also
“concerned” that Dreyer’s “extremely disparaging comments”
would “cost [her] [her] professional career[.]”
II. Procedural History
On April 9, 2024, Sandra sought a restraining order
against Dreyer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
527.6.2
Dreyer filed two oppositions, including a declaration that
he “ha[d] not [engaged] and will not engage in . . . a course of
conduct . . . intended to . . . harass[]” Sandra. Dreyer also
averred that he would “refrain from attempting to contact or
communicate with [Sandra] directly or indirectly through third
parties.”
2 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
3
On July 9, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Sandra’s
petition.3 The court heard testimony from Sandra, who presented
the court with a packet of evidence, including the April 17 and 22
voicemails from Dreyer, which were played in court. Dreyer did
not attend the hearing due to his health. His counsel, who did
attend, cross-examined Sandra and presented argument on
Dreyer’s behalf.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued a
one-year restraining order against Dreyer. The court explained
that “the tone of the words used [by Dreyer] and the e-mails sent
is not just asking for money that was loaned or stolen from him to
be returned, they are words designed to alarm, annoy, and
harass” Sandra. The court concluded that Sandra “ha[d] met the
burden of proof and good cause exists to issue the restraining
order[.]” The restraining order expired on July 9, 2025.4
Dreyer timely appealed.
3 The hearing was twice continued, once at Sandra’s request
and once on the trial court’s own motion.
4 We exercise our discretion to consider the merits of this
arguably moot appeal because “[a]pplying a strict standard of
mootness . . . would effectively deprive persons affected by
injunctions of limited duration from obtaining any judicial
review.” (Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners’ Assn. (1989)
207 Cal.App.3d 719, 728; see also In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
266, 282 [“Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their
‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute”].)
4
DISCUSSION
I. Relevant Law
Section 527.6 “provid[es] expedited injunctive relief to
victims of harassment. [Citation.]” (Brekke v. Wills (2005)
125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412.) A person who has suffered
harassment may obtain a restraining order if, after a hearing, a
trial court finds clear and convincing evidence of unlawful
harassment. (§ 527.6, subds. (a)(1), (i).) “The ‘ “ ‘[c]lear and
convincing’ ” ’ standard ‘ “requires a finding of high probability” ’
of unlawful harassment. [Citation.]” (E.G. v. M.L. (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 688, 698 (E.G.).)
The statutory definition of harassment includes “a knowing
and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that
seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, . . . that serves
no legitimate purpose[,] . . . . would cause a reasonable person to
suffer substantial emotional distress, and . . . actually cause[s]
substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” (§ 527.6,
subd. (b)(3).) A course of conduct can include “making harassing
telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing
correspondence to an individual by any means, including . . .
email[.]” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).)
II. Standards of Review
We review the trial court’s factual findings (express and
implied) in granting a civil harassment restraining order for
substantial evidence. (E.G., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 699.)
Because the trial court must make its finding of unlawful
harassment under the clear and convincing evidence standard of
proof (§ 527.6, subd. (i)), “the question before the appellate court
is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence
from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly
5
probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 989, 1011 (O.B.).)
“When conducting our review, we must ‘not reweigh the
evidence itself’ [citation], but must instead ‘view the record in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give
appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated
the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and
drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.’ [Citation.]
Whether the facts, supported by substantial evidence and
construed most favorably in the petitioner’s favor, are legally
sufficient to constitute civil harassment under section 527.6 is a
‘ “question[ ] of law subject to de novo review.” ’ [Citations.]”
(E.G., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 699.)
III. Analysis
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion
that Sandra needed protection from Dreyer’s harassment.
Sandra presented evidence that Dreyer sent her several
harassing emails and voicemails over a three-week period in
April 2024. And she testified that this was not the first time
Dreyer had behaved this way; when Sandra quit working for him
eight months earlier, he “called [her] over and over for
days/hours[.]” These incidents constitute “a knowing and willful
course of conduct” directed at Sandra which “seriously alarm[ed],
annoy[ed], or harasse[d]” her, warranting a restraining order.
(§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)
Dreyer raises four arguments against this conclusion.
First, he contends that his emails and voicemails do not
constitute harassment because they served a legitimate
purpose—namely, the recovery of money and property he
believed Sandra was improperly withholding. But after listening
6
to Dreyer’s voicemails and evaluating their tone, the trial court
found that he went beyond “just asking for money that was
loaned or stolen from him to be returned” and used “words
designed to alarm, annoy, and harass” Sandra. On appeal, we
must “give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may
have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in
the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the
evidence.” (E.G., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 699; see also
Heidi S. v. David H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1163 [“[t]he trial
judge, having heard the evidence, observed the witnesses, their
demeanor, attitude, [and] candor or lack of candor, is best
qualified to pass upon and determine the factual issues presented
by their testimony”].) Regardless, we cannot review the
voicemails because they are not part of the record.5 We thus
defer to the trial court’s characterization of Dreyer’s voicemails,
and we independently conclude that his communications rose to
the level of harassment. (E.G., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 699.)
5 These voicemails were not admitted into evidence. Dreyer’s
trial counsel did not raise the issue at the restraining order
hearing. Dreyer’s trial counsel requested a second hearing, in
part to ensure that evidence had been properly admitted so he
would have a clear record for this appeal. Although counsel
asked the trial court to mark and receive several exhibits, he
again failed to raise any issue with the voicemails. And Dreyer
does not challenge the voicemails on appeal. Therefore, he has
forfeited any evidentiary challenge to the voicemails. (Baskin v.
Hughes Realty, Inc. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 184, 197, fn. 6 [“an
appellant forfeits the right to attack error by expressly or
impliedly agreeing at trial to the procedure”]; Moore v. Shaw
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 182, 200, fn. 10 [“an appellant’s failure to
raise an issue in its opening brief waives the issue on appeal”].)
7
Second, Dreyer argues that the restraining order falls
outside the bounds of the civil harassment statute, as Sandra’s
petition primarily sought to protect her professional reputation
and stop Dreyer from speaking to her other clients. Section 527.6
“focuses ‘narrowly’ on ‘interpersonal conflict’ ” between the
petitioner and the harassing party (Luo v. Volokh (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 1312, 1323); the statute should not be used as a
proxy vehicle for other tort claims. But while Sandra’s petition
may have been overbroad, it also contained a valid harassment
claim. The trial court appropriately focused on the narrow issue
of the parties’ interpersonal conflict, denied Sandra’s request to
enjoin Dreyer from speaking publicly or personally to Sandra’s
other clients, and tailored the restraining order to the aims of the
civil harassment statute.
Third, Dreyer contends that Sandra failed to establish a
reasonable probability that he “would repeat or continue any of
his [harassing] conduct[,]” especially in light of his declaration
testimony that he would no longer attempt “ ‘to contact or
communicate with’ ” Sandra.
A restraining order, like other injunctions, “is authorized
only when it appears that wrongful acts are likely to recur.”
(Russell v. Douvan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 399, 402.) A party’s
express representation that he will abstain from future contact
can provide evidence that harassing conduct is unlikely to recur.
(Scripps Health v. Marin (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 324, 336 (Scripps
Health).) However, we infer from the trial court’s findings that it
did not credit Dreyer’s declaration.6 (E.G., supra, 105
Cal.App.5th at p. 699 [we must “give appropriate deference to
6 Dreyer did not testify at the hearing, so the trial court had
no opportunity to evaluate his credibility directly.
8
how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of
witnesses”].) Here, Dreyer’s promise to stop harassing Sandra
was preceded by his conviction that he “ha[d] not . . . engage[d]
[in] a course of conduct that was intended to or had the purpose
of harassing” Sandra. The trial court could well have concluded
that Dreyer’s inability or unwillingness to recognize that he had
crossed the line in the past made it unlikely that he would be
able to recognize and abstain from harassing conduct in the
future. (See In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197
[“One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge”].)
The trial court’s determination is also supported by other
facts in the record suggesting the likelihood of recurrent
harassment, including Dreyer’s prior history of harassing Sandra
via phone, the ongoing dispute between them regarding the
$10,000 gift or loan, and the tone of the voicemails. (Contra
Scripps Health, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 336 [no evidence of
likely recurrence when, among other things, there had been no
prior acts of harassment and circumstances made it unlikely that
the parties would have future contact].) Because the voicemails
are not part of the record, we defer to the trial court’s
characterization of their tone.
Finally, Dreyer argues that Sandra did not prove she
suffered substantial emotional distress by clear and convincing
evidence. Not so. A trial court may infer substantial emotional
distress from the nature of the harassing conduct. (Ensworth v.
Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1110–1111, disapproved of
on another ground by O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1010, fn. 7.)
More important, after receiving Sandra’s in-person testimony and
evaluating her credibility, the trial court concluded that she had
suffered “emotional harm” and “stress” sufficient to issue the
9
restraining order. “Inferences may be drawn . . . from the
demeanor of witnesses and their manner of testifying.” (E.G.,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 704–705; see also In re Marriage of
F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 119 [“ ‘The testimony of
one witness, even that of a party, may constitute substantial
evidence’ ”].) We will not second guess that determination on
appeal. (O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1008 [we “may not insert
[our] own views regarding the credibility of witnesses in place of
the assessments conveyed by the judgment”].)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent Sandra W. is entitled to
her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
GOORVITCH, J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
RICHARDSON, J.
10