Filed 9/10/26 S.M. v. Lo CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
S.M.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A173917
v.
VICTOR H. LO, (San Francisco City & County
Super. Ct. No. FDV-25-818270)
Defendant and Appellant.
Victor Lo appeals a domestic violence restraining order issued under
the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, Family Code1 section 6200 et seq.
(DVPA) prohibiting him from contacting S.M. for a period of one year. On
appeal, he contends that (1) the order is not supported by substantial
evidence; (2) the court erred by denying him an opportunity to cross-examine
S.M. and by improperly excluding his proffered evidence; and (3) the order
includes relief that was not litigated at the hearing.
Because the restraining order expired on May 9, 2026 and nothing in
the record suggests that it was renewed, we asked the parties to submit
supplemental briefing addressing whether this appeal is moot, and if so,
whether an applicable exception nonetheless warrants the court’s exercise of
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
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discretion to consider the issues raised in the opening brief. Having
considered Lo’s submission, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
BACKGROUND
On March 19, 2025, S.M. filed a request for a domestic violence
restraining order against Lo, whom he dated for about two years.2 S.M.’s
request named himself and his husband as protected parties and alleged that
between late-February and mid-March 2025, S.M. received numerous phone
calls from Lo bullying him and that Lo had distributed “pornographic
pictures and videos” of him to people on Facebook and via email. His request
also alleged that in August 2023, Lo had physically and verbally assaulted
him and his husband in their apartment. The court issued a temporary
restraining order the same day.
A hearing on the request was held on May 9. S.M. and Lo were the
only witnesses. Among other things, S.M. testified that on March 18, 2025,
he saw an email from Lo to S.M.’s husband which included “an Apple link” to
an online photo album in which Lo had “posted . . . [his] pornographic
pictures and videos.” S.M. also received a message from Lo indicating that
Lo was going to post “some of [S.M.’s] stuff” on Lo’s social media accounts as
well. Lo acknowledged that he “did share images with [S.M.’s husband], not
with the intent of causing [S.M.] harm, but it was at the request of [S.M.’s
husband] to protect him. [¶] The images that I shared with him in this
iCloud-encrypted folder was a one-to-one-person share.” Lo denied posting
anything on social media.
2 Lo’s request that this court take judicial notice of the register of
actions and S.M.’s request for domestic violence restraining order is denied as
unnecessary. The documents are already contained in the Clerk’s Transcript
before this court.
2
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that Lo’s admission
that he emailed images of S.M. to a third party was sufficient to support
issuance of the restraining order. The court did not see the need for a three-
or five-year order, however, so it issued only a one-year order.
The order prohibited Lo from contacting or abusing S.M. but not his
husband. The order prohibited Lo from possessing any firearms or
ammunition; distributing or disseminating “any images, photographs, videos,
audio recordings or other depictions of [S.M.]”; making any email addresses
with [S.M.’s] name in them; and sending “i-calendar invitations,
[P]lay[S]tation friend requests or any social media requests” to S.M.
DISCUSSION
Lo concedes that the restraining order has expired and was not
renewed. Generally, “ ‘[i]f relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if
the relief granted expires before an appeal can be heard, then an appeal by
the adverse party is moot.’ ” (City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013)
215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1079.) “An appeal from an expired order is not moot,
however, if it ‘could have consequences for [a party] in . . . future court
proceedings.’ ” (Cardona v. Soto (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 141, 148 [a case
becomes moot “ ‘ “when the decision of the reviewing court ‘can have no
practical impact’ ” ’ ”]; San Diego Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S. (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 550, 564 [“An appeal from an expired restraining order is not
moot if it could have collateral consequences in future proceedings”].)
Lo contends that the appeal is not moot because the challenged order
carries “continuing legal consequences.” He argues, among other things, that
the expired restraining order can be relied on in “any subsequent restraining-
order request” and would “operate[] as a predicate in future proceedings
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between these parties.” He suggests that, “[g]iven the parties’ documented
adversarial history, that prospect is concrete rather than hypothetical.”
A finding of domestic violence may under certain circumstances impact
future domestic violence proceedings. (See In re Cassandra B. (2004)
125 Cal.App.4th 199, 209 [challenge to domestic violence restraining order
was not moot because under section 6306 and Welfare and Institutions Code
section 213.5, a court is required to consider whether there have been any
prior restraining orders against a person before issuing a subsequent
restraining order against the same person]; § 6306, subd. (b)(1) [“Before
deciding whether to issue an order under this part . . ., the court shall
consider . . . a prior restraining order”].) However, the possibility that the
expired restraining order at issue in this case will have a practical impact in
future proceedings is too speculative to avoid mootness. (In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 278 [speculative future harm is insufficient to avoid
mootness].) Lo has not established any real likelihood of future DVPA
proceedings involving these parties. Their relationship was relatively short.
They were not legally married. They had no children. Accordingly, on this
record the appeal is moot.3
Lo’s summary arguments that we should consider his appeal even if
moot because it raises issues “capable of repetition, yet evading review” and
because the issues raised are of broad public importance are without merit.
Lo’s arguments on appeal concern the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the order, some evidentiary points, and whether certain restrictions were
3 Although Lo suggests that there are “at least three continuing
consequences,” he only identifies one possible continuing consequence of the
order. His remaining arguments merely restate the arguments made in the
opening brief that the order was issued without sufficient evidence of abuse
and that the relief granted exceeds that which was litigated.
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properly imposed under the order. These issues are not reasonably capable of
recurring in any future proceeding. Moreover, the issues presented are
particular to his case, do not go to fundamental jurisdiction, and are not novel
questions of unsettled law. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion
to address the merits of the case.4
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. S.M. shall recover his costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
GOLDMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
GORDON, J.*
4 Lo requested oral argument in response to a notice sent by this court’s
clerk, as a matter of course, when the appeal was fully briefed. A party’s
right to oral argument, however, exists only in an appeal considered on the
merits and decided by written opinion. (See Moles v. Regents of University of
California (1982) 32 Cal.3d 867, 871; accord, Lewis v. Superior Court (1999)
19 Cal.4th 1232, 1254.) Because we dismiss the appeal without reaching the
merits, Lo does not have a right to oral argument, and we consider it
unnecessary to our procedural dismissal of this appeal.
* Judge of the Superior Court of California, City and County of San
Francisco, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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