Filed 10/5/26 Ruth v. Best CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
LYNNETA GAIL RUTH,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G065180
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2024-
01440011)
KIRAN BEST,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Ebrahim Baytieh, Judge. Affirmed.
Lynneta Gail Ruth, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Kiran Best, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Kiran Best appeals from an order granting Lynneta Ruth’s
request for an elder abuse restraining order against him. Best contends the
trial court erred in granting the restraining order. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Best began renting a room in Ruth and her husband’s home in
December 2023. After Ruth and Best had a disagreement about an internet
bill in October 2024, the relationship between the two soured. Soon
thereafter, Ruth issued Best a 30-day notice to evict. The relationship
continued to deteriorate to the point Ruth requested and obtained a
temporary elder abuse restraining order against Best in November 2024.
The following month, Ruth sought to extend the restraining order
for five years. The trial court held a hearing on Ruth’s request and heard
testimony from Ruth, Ruth’s husband, and Best. At the time of the hearing,
Ruth was 72 years old.
Ruth testified Best would continuously “say nasty things” to her
and her husband and threaten them. Best would also repeatedly record her
inside the home. On one occasion, Best knocked on Ruth’s bedroom door and
began recording her. Best told Ruth not to touch his stuff and to leave him
alone. In November 2024, Ruth was sitting in her living room when Best
came downstairs and began filming and cussing at her. As Best started to go
upstairs, Ruth followed him. She stopped at the landing on the stairs, raised
her hand, and told Best not to disrespect her. Best then hit her. Ruth called
the police but did not press charges.
Ruth’s husband testified Best would swear at Ruth and would
call her names. Ruth’s husband also testified Ruth was so afraid of Best that
she would not go upstairs, where Best’s room was, without her husband.
Ruth also avoided being alone in the home with Best.
Best testified on his own behalf and did not call any other
witnesses. He testified Ruth would follow him around the home and tell him
to get out of the house. Whenever Ruth or her husband spoke to him, Best
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would tell them to stop harassing him, leave him alone, and not touch his
stuff. Best admitted he “cursed” at Ruth several times but argued he did so
“proactively” and during arguments. Best also admitted he recorded Ruth
about 10 or 11 times in the home, and she would film him back. Best
explained he recorded Ruth to document her harassment towards him and
collect evidence for a civil case against her. On the occasion when Best
knocked on Ruth’s bedroom door and recorded her, he did so because she had
been “making a lot of banging noises” after she had given him the notice to
evict. Best admitted to “swat[ing]” Ruth’s hand out of his face during the
confrontation on the stairs. He stated he did so because Ruth was pointing
her finger about an inch from his eye. Best admitted Ruth was not touching
him.
Ultimately, the trial court determined the elder abuse restraining
order was warranted because Best had physically assaulted Ruth. The court
granted Ruth’s restraining order for five years.
Best timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
RULES GOVERNING APPELLATE REVIEW
Preliminarily, we note Best’s arguments are not adequately
supported by citations to the record, nor are they supported by citations to
relevant legal authorities.
“‘[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial
court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal
of the judgment. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘This means that an appellant must
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do more than assert error and leave it to the appellate court to search the
record and the law books to test his claim. The appellant must present an
adequate argument including citations to supporting authorities and to
relevant portions of the record.’” (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616,
619–620 (L.O.).)
It is not the appellate court’s “‘place to construct theories or
arguments to undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of
correctness.’ [Citation.] Nor [is it] ‘required to search the record on [its] own
seeking error.’” (L.O., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620.) Thus, “‘“[i]f a party
fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record, . . .
the argument [will be] deemed to have been waived.”’” (Ibid; Slone v. El
Centro Regional Medical Center (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1172 [“[A]n
appellant waives or forfeits contentions that are not supported by citations to
relevant portions of the record”].)
These procedural “rules apply both to parties represented by
counsel and self-represented parties. [Citation.] ‘A party proceeding in
propria persona “is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the
same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.”’”
(L.O., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620.)
Nevertheless, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits of
any decipherable argument relevant to the order being appealed.
II.
GOVERNING LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.031, an elder
(defined as a California resident 65 years of age or older) who has suffered
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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abuse may seek a protective order “enjoining a party from abusing,
intimidating, . . . harassing, telephoning, . . . contacting, either directly or
indirectly, by mail or otherwise, or coming within a specified distance of, or
disturbing the peace of, the petitioner.” (§§ 15657.03, subds. (a)(1) & (b)(5)(A),
15610.27.)
“‘Abuse of an elder’” includes “[p]hysical abuse, neglect,
abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with resulting
physical harm or pain or mental suffering.” (§ 15610.07, subd. (a)(1).)
“[U]nder section 15610.07, subdivision (a)(1), ‘treatment’ that is neither
physical abuse, neglect, abandonment, isolation nor abduction, can constitute
elder abuse if the treatment results in ‘physical harm or pain or mental
suffering.’” (Darrin v. Miller (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 450, 456.) “Mental
suffering” is defined as “fear, agitation, confusion, severe depression, or other
forms of serious emotional distress that is brought about by forms of
intimidating behavior, threats, [or] harassment.” (§ 15610.53.) Abuse of an
elder also includes financial abuse. (§§ 15610.07, subd. (a)(3), 15610.30, subd.
(a)(1).)
“Elder abuse protective orders are reviewed for abuse of
discretion, and the factual findings necessary to support such orders are
reviewed for substantial evidence.” (Herren v. George S. (2025) 109
Cal.App.5th 410, 427–28; accord, Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th
1131, 1137.) The trial court’s evidentiary rulings are also reviewed for abuse
of discretion. (Meeks v. Autozone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855, 861.) “The
trial court’s ‘discretion is only abused where there is a clear showing [it]
exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.’”
(Ibid.)
III.
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ANALYSIS
A. Evidentiary Issues
Best argues the trial court erroneously barred various evidence
and testimony. The court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. (See People v. Bradley (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 64, 87 [“courts have
broad discretion in admitting or excluding evidence”].) As discussed below,
Best has not shown any abuse of discretion here.
First, Best contends the trial court did not allow him to play his
video evidence. But he does not provide a record citation to support this
contention. The record shows Best told the court he had videos on a flash
drive. However, Best had failed to provide those videos to Ruth prior to the
hearing as required. The court provided a break during the hearing so Best
could show the videos to Ruth. We do not find anything in the record to
indicate Best subsequently attempted to introduce the videos into evidence.
Rather, the record shows only that he asked the court if there was “a way” to
have Ruth introduce a video she had shown him before the hearing. The court
explained to Best that Ruth was entitled to introduce only the evidence she
wanted. The court further explained that, if Best wanted Ruth to play a
specific video, he could ask her to do so. The record does not show Best ever
asked Ruth to play any of her videos. Best seemingly acknowledges he did not
do so and alleges the court “never [gave him] a chance” to ask Ruth to
introduce the videos he wanted played. However, the record shows the court
repeatedly asked Best if there was “anything else” he wanted to add when he
testified. The court also asked him if he had any other issues or concerns.
The record therefore shows the court offered Best many opportunities to
introduce Ruth’s videos.
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Second, Best asserts the trial court improperly excluded
testimony about the incident when Ruth called the police. He contends the
police call was relevant because it showed he swatted Ruth’s hand in self-
defense. The question Best asked when discussing the police call, however,
was not whether the police declined to press charges because he was acting in
self-defense. Instead, Best asked if the police refused to press charges
because “it’s a civil matter.” The question was thus unrelated to the matter at
issue during the hearing, i.e., whether Ruth suffered abuse.
Third, Best argues the trial court “made the determination” that
Ruth did not press charges because she was afraid of Best. We read the
record differently. The court actually stated Ruth was worried “that if she
pressed charges,” Best would “get more physical with her.” The court was not
making a “determination.” Rather, the court was reiterating Ruth’s answer to
Best’s question about what she was afraid Best would do if she pressed
charges.
Fourth, Best argues the trial court prevented him from
presenting testimony from Ruth’s son. The record shows Ruth, not Best,
attempted to have her son testify. The court determined the incident with
Ruth’s son was irrelevant. The record does not indicate Best ever asked the
court to have Ruth’s son testify. Instead, the record shows Best told the court
he did not want to call any witnesses other than himself.
B. Trial Procedure
Best contends he could not timely object or properly cross-
examine witnesses because of his autism diagnosis. Although we are
sympathetic to the difficulties all self-represented litigants often face in
attempting to navigate the intricacies of the legal system, our legal standards
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require that we apply the rules of practice and procedure equally to self-
represented litigants and represented litigants alike. (See Rappleyea v.
Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985 [a party’s election to act as his own
attorney does not entitle him to lenience as to the rules of practice and
procedure].) Notably, there was no request for accommodation based on the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.), and the
record shows the trial court exercised substantial patience with the parties
throughout the proceedings.
C. Judicial Bias
For the first time on appeal, Best seemingly alleges the trial
court exhibited bias against him. Because Best did not raise the issue of
judicial bias below, he has forfeited the issue on appeal. (People v.
Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1207 [“It is too late to raise the
[disqualification] issue for the first time on appeal”; see also Moulton Niguel
Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1218 [defendants “did
not preserve their claim of judicial bias for review because they did not object
to the alleged improprieties and never asked the judge to correct remarks
made or recuse himself”].)
Even if preserved, Best’s argument fails on the merits.
Arguments for reversal based on judicial bias generally are grounded in the
due process clause, “which sets an exceptionally stringent standard.”
(Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 589.) “It is
‘extraordinary’ for an appellate court to find judicial bias amounting to a due
process violation. [Citation.] The appellate court’s role is not to examine
whether the trial judge’s behavior left something to be desired, or whether
some comments would have been better left unsaid, but to determine whether
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the judge’s behavior was so prejudicial it denied the party a fair, as opposed
to a perfect, trial.” (Ibid.)
Best’s claims of bias are based on a single statement from the
trial court: “I have a clear understanding about what he meant about your
look.” This statement came after Best asked Ruth’s husband multiple
consecutive questions about her husband’s statement during direct
examination that Best’s “look” frightened him. Best asked Ruth’s husband to
clarify what he meant. Ruth’s husband explained that Best “had kind of an
appearance of just really frightening” him, and he was afraid because he was
an older man. Best then asked whether Ruth’s husband was talking about his
facial expression or physical appearance when talking about his “look.”
Ruth’s husband testified it was Best’s physical appearance that put “fear in
[his] heart.” Best then began to ask another question on the same subject.
The court stopped Best and explained it understood what Ruth’s husband
meant about Best’s look. The record thus shows the court’s comment clarified
to Best that he need not continue questioning Ruth’s husband on the same
issue because the court had heard testimony on it. (People v. Sturm (2006) 37
Cal.4th 1218, 1237 [court has a “statutory duty to control trial proceedings”
with a view to the “‘expeditious and effective ascertainment of the truth
regarding the matters involved’”].) Thus, Best’s contention of bias is
unsupported by the record.
D. Self-Defense
Best next seemingly argues the trial court erred in granting the
restraining order because his actions were done in self-defense. From our
review of the record, the court did not find Best’s self-defense argument
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credible. Specifically, the court determined Best was not acting in self-
defense when he swatted Ruth’s hand because Best could have continued
walking away from Ruth and towards his room. “[W]e defer to the trier of fact
on issues of credibility” (Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th
959, 968), and for good reason. “We review a cold record and, unlike a trial
court, have no opportunity to observe the appearance and demeanor of the
witnesses.” (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 199.) The court “had
the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the relevant witnesses . . . It is
not our role to interfere with the trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’
demeanor and credibility.” (In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808, 824.)
We therefore determine the court did not abuse its discretion in granting
Ruth’s request for an elder abuse restraining order.
E. Civil Remedies
Best argues Ruth’s actions were motivated by her desire to have
him move out of her home. The trial court acknowledged some of Ruth’s
behaviors may have been done because she wanted Best “out of her home.”
However, we agree with the court that those issues were irrelevant to the
elder abuse issue at hand. Any actions taken to improperly evict Best would
be relevant in a separate cause of action.
To the extent Best argues the restraining order is preventing him
from suing Ruth over the alleged wrongful eviction, he is incorrect. The
parties here did not litigate any portion of the eviction. Moreover, we find no
legal support for Best’s argument that he would be prohibited from bringing a
civil action against Ruth because of the restraining order.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Ruth is awarded her appellate costs.
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DELANEY, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOODING, J.
SCOTT, J.
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