Filed 8/25/26 Royer v. Los Rios Community College Dist. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
TINA ROYER, C103281
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 34-2021-
v. 00295849-CU-OE-GDS)
LOS RIOS COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT,
Defendant and Respondent.
This case comes back to us a second time, following a remand to the trial court to
take further action on a special motion to strike filed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.16 (hereafter section 425.16 or the anti-SLAPP statute).1
Tina Royer sued her employer, the Los Rios Community College District (the
District), for invasion of privacy and also asserted several causes of action alleging
violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et
seq.), including harassment and discrimination on the basis of race or religion, retaliation
for reporting harassment and discrimination, and failure to reasonably accommodate a
disability. The District filed a special motion to strike, also known as an anti-SLAPP
motion. In particular, it moved to strike the entirety of the causes of action for invasion
1 The acronym SLAPP stands for “strategic lawsuits against public participation.”
(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 85 & fn. 1.)
1
of privacy and harassment, and portions of the causes of action for discrimination,
retaliation, and failure to prevent harassment. The trial court granted the motion as to the
discrimination cause of action and denied it as to the other causes of action, and the
District appealed.
We reversed the trial court’s order as to the cause of action for harassment, finding
Royer did not establish a probability of prevailing on that claim. We also reversed the
order as to the cause of action for invasion of privacy, finding the trial court erred in
finding it did not arise out of protected activity, and we remanded the case to the trial
court to determine whether Royer established a probability of prevailing. In all other
respects, we affirmed the order. (Royer v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (Mar. 5,
2024, C096484) [nonpub. opn.].)
On remand, the trial court found Royer did not establish a probability of prevailing
on her invasion of privacy claim and thus granted the District’s motion to strike that
claim. Royer appeals, and we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
As alleged in the complaint, Royer was a tenured professor with the District who
worked at Folsom Lake College and was the chair of the English department. Josh
Fernandez was an English professor at Folsom Lake College. Royer is Caucasian,
Christian, married to a Christian minister, and active in her church, and she alleged,
“[h]er Christian background and conservative views are known to her colleagues” at
Folsom Lake College. Fernandez is Hispanic and is affiliated with Antifa, which Royer
characterized as a “domestic terrorist organization.” According to Royer, Fernandez had
2 We take the facts from the allegations in the complaint and the evidence filed in
support of and opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion. (See § 425.16, subd. (b)(2) [when
ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, the court “shall consider the pleadings, and supporting
and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based”].)
2
a history of conducting targeted harassment campaigns against those who do not share his
views, and he harassed her based on her race and her religion. She complained to the
District about Fernandez’s conduct, but it failed to take steps to stop the harassment, and
it retaliated against her. And when she asked to work remotely in order to avoid
Fernandez and as a reasonable accommodation for a disability, the District told her, “the
accommodation did not work for them,” and they removed some of her responsibilities,
which resulted “in a loss of pay.”
As relevant here, Royer also alleged she submitted a “Discrimination Complaint”
or a “Claim” to the District, and the District published that claim on its website in
advance of the board meeting at which it would be discussed, and it is the publication of
this claim that forms the basis of her cause of action for invasion of privacy. The claim
contained Royer’s home address and information about the medical diagnosis on which
her failure to accommodate claim was based. She alleged that, almost immediately after
the claim and her address were published, her home and church became the subject of
targeted harassment by “[s]trangers” who “[met] the profile” of Antifa members. She
alleged these strangers parked in her driveway; shone their lights into her house at night;
drove up and down her street and parked across from her house; openly stood in front of
her house for extended periods of time; and took photographs of her house and her
family. She also alleged someone shot out a window of a car parked in her driveway and
she found a “horror film mask” hanging in a tree on her property. Royer and her family
felt so threatened that they temporarily relocated so they could install security monitoring
equipment and they considered moving. She also alleged that people contacted her after
the claim was published and “asked questions about her medical condition.”
Based on these allegations, Royer sued the District for invasion of privacy (among
other things), and the District filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing the cause of action
arose from protected activity and Royer could not establish a probability of prevailing.
The evidence in support of and opposition to the motion showed the following.
3
When she submitted her claim, Royer utilized the District’s “Discrimination
Complaint Form,” which is a one-page fill-in-the-blank form that asks for the
complainant’s name, address, phone number, and e-mail, as well as specific information
about the complaint. Royer stated she “very specifically typed” on the form that it “was
both a claim form, as well as my Discrimination Complaint, … as it was my
understanding that I could do so without submitting duplicate documents.” As can be
seen on the form itself, immediately beneath the words “Discrimination Complaint Form”
Royer typed, “and Government Tort Claim (Gov’t Code Sections 905, et seq.).”
Government Code section 905 et seq. are part of the Government Claims Act, which we
will discuss in more detail below.3 On the form, Royer provided her address and checked
boxes signifying she alleged discrimination based on “Physical or Mental Disability,”
among other things.
Royer attached a three-page document to the form captioned, “Attachment to
Discrimination Complaint Form and Government Tort Claim.” The attachment stated,
“This is an attachment to the Los Rios Community College District Discrimination
Complaint and is intended to provide facts concerning incidents causing damage to the
Claimant. This is also submitted as and is also intended to be … Notice of a Government
Tort Claim pursuant to Cal. Government Code §§800-996.6 [i.e., the Government Claims
Act].” The attachment contained a narrative description of Royer’s complaints that is
3 The Government Claims Act used to be referred to as the Tort Claims Act, but in
City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 741, our Supreme Court found
“that ‘Government Claims Act’ is a more appropriate short title,” and the Legislature
subsequently amended Government Code section 810 to adopt that title. Because earlier
cases continue to be cited, however, it is still sometimes referred to as the Tort Claims
Act or the Government Tort Claims Act (see, e.g., Tindall v. County of Nevada (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 78, 86; O.B. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th
930, 933), and we note Royer and the District generally refer to Royer’s claim as a
“Government Tort Claim” or a “Tort Claim.”
4
similar to the allegations made in this lawsuit. The attachment also stated Royer was “a
qualified individual with a disability under California law,” and it briefly described the
medical diagnosis underlying her disability. We will refer to the form and the three-page
attachment collectively as the “claim.”
Royer stated that when she met with District administrators concerning her
complaints, she was told her “Discrimination Complaint was strictly confidential and …
the information [she] provided to the District would be kept confidential.”4 (Underlining
omitted.) She also stated this promise of confidentiality was “important to [her] because
[she] had to reveal my disability status.”
Jacob Knapp, who was the District’s associate vice chancellor of human resources
at the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit, referred to Royer’s claim as a
“Government Tort Claim” or a “Tort Claim,” and he provided the following information
about such claims: “Prior to and during 2019, the District had a standard practice of
placing Government Tort Claims on an agenda for consideration by the District’s Board
in open session at an upcoming Board meeting. It was also the District’s standard
practice to include agenda materials with the agenda. These items were generally posted
online. [¶] … Consistent with its standard practice, the District placed [Royer’s] Tort
Claim on the agenda for consideration by the District’s Board in open session at its
November 13, 2019 Board meeting. Also consistent with the District’s standard practice,
a copy of the Tort Claim was included with the agenda materials.” Royer’s claim was
thus among the agenda materials that were posted on the District’s website in advance of
the board meeting.
Royer stated that shortly after the claim was posted, she received a call from a
professor who worked at another college and “was shocked to learn from her that my
4 Royer does not state she was told a claim submitted pursuant to the Government
Claims Act would be kept confidential.
5
claim had been published without redacting my medical information or my
address/private contact information.” She stated she thereafter “received multiple
telephone calls, both positive and negative, regarding my claims. My colleagues
throughout the District asked me questions about my medical condition as well as
questions about my harassment and discrimination claims against the District. I was
mortified.”
Royer also stated that “within days of [the District] publishing my home address,”
she began being stalked and harassed at her home and her church by “[s]trangers”
meeting the profile of Antifa protagonists. In addition to repeating the allegations in the
complaint, she also provided additional details about the harassment, including that she
observed individuals sitting outside her church taking photographs of the license plates of
parishioners’ cars, and in January 2020, her church was broken into and ransacked.
As noted above, the trial court initially denied the motion to strike the invasion of
privacy cause of action, finding it did not arise from protected activity, the District
appealed, and we reversed, finding the claim did arise from protected activity. We
remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Royer established a probability
of prevailing.
On remand, the trial court found Royer did not establish a probability of prevailing
on her invasion of privacy cause of action for two separate reasons. First, it found that
although Royer had a legally protected privacy interest in both her address and her
medical diagnosis, she did not have a reasonable expectation that they would be kept
private once she included them in a government tort claim filed as a precursor to
6
litigation.5 Second, it found the District’s publication of the claim was absolutely
privileged pursuant to Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). The trial court thus granted
the special motion to strike the invasion of privacy cause of action, and this appeal
followed. (§ 425.16, subd. (i) [“An order granting or denying a special motion to strike
shall be appealable”].)
DISCUSSION
I
Anti-SLAPP Principles and Standard of Review
Section 425.16 is a procedural device for weeding out certain “meritless claims” at
the early stages of litigation. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384, italics omitted.)
It provides, “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution … shall be subject to a special motion to
strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Courts
frequently refer to acts in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech as
“protected activity.” (See Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995,
1009; Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057,
1062.) Protected activity includes any statement or writing made in an “official
proceeding authorized by law” or in connection with an issue under consideration or
review in such a proceeding. (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)
Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion “requires the court to engage in a two-step”
process. (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) At the
5 The elements of a cause of action for invasion of privacy are “(1) a legally
protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances;
and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” (Hill v.
National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 39-40.)
7
first step, the defendant has the burden of establishing the challenged claim arises from
protected activity. (Id. at p. 61.) In order to determine whether the defendant has met its
burden, the court must “identify the activity” by the defendant on which the challenged
claim rests and then determine whether “that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP
statute.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884.) The court
“must ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant
supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability’ ” and must “evaluate
whether the defendant has shown any of these actions fall within one or more of the four
protected categories of ‘ “act[s]” ’ protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Ibid., italics
omitted.) “If the acts alleged in support of the plaintiff’s claim are of the sort protected
by the anti-SLAPP statute,” then the claim arises from protected activity, and the court
proceeds to the second step. (Id. at p. 887.)
At the second step, the plaintiff has the burden of “establish[ing] that there is a
probability [it] will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The plaintiff’s burden
is not heavy, and it “need only establish that [its] claim has ‘minimal merit’ [citation] to
avoid being stricken as a SLAPP.” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006)
39 Cal.4th 260, 291.) In order to meet its burden, “the plaintiff must show both that the
claim is legally sufficient and there is admissible evidence that, if credited, would be
sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.” (McGarry v. University of San Diego (2007)
154 Cal.App.4th 97, 108.) As relevant here, however, a long line of authority holds, “ ‘A
plaintiff cannot establish a probability of prevailing if [a] privilege precludes a
defendant’s liability on the claims.’ ” (Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP
(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 793, 814; see also Laker v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 745, 769 [“If the challenged action falls within [a]
privilege, the trial court should grant an anti-SLAPP motion to strike”]; Contreras v.
Dowling (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 394, 415 [plaintiff “cannot establish a probability of
prevailing if [a] privilege precludes [defendant’s] liability on her claim”]; Flatley v.
8
Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 323 [“The … privilege is … relevant to the second step in
the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must
overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing”].)
“We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion.” (Park v.
Board of Trustees of California State University, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.) Although
our review is de novo, “[t]he usual rules of appellate review apply: A trial court’s
judgment is presumed correct, and the appellant bears the burden to demonstrate the trial
court committed an error justifying reversal.” (Semaan v. Mosier (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th
460, 468; see also Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657,
708 [“even on de novo review” “the trial court’s judgment is presumed correct, and the
burden is on the Appellants to demonstrate reversible error”].) It is thus Royer’s burden
to show the trial court erred in granting the anti-SLAPP motion.
II
Analysis
Royer’s invasion of privacy cause of action is based on the District’s publication
of her claim on its website without redacting her home address and medical information
and the harm that befell her as a result. In our prior decision, we found the District’s
publication of her claim fell within the anti-SLAPP statute’s definition of protected
activity because it was a statement or writing made in an “official proceeding authorized
by law” or in connection with an issue under consideration or review in such a
proceeding. (§ 425.16, subd. (e).) Despite our ruling, much of Royer’s argument
concerns whether her invasion of privacy claims arises out of protected activity. We
have already decided that issue and Royer gives us no reason to revisit it. As the District
accurately notes, this appeal concerns a narrow issue — namely, whether Royer
demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the merits of her invasion of privacy claim.
As to that narrow issue, we agree with the trial court’s finding that publishing her claim
9
was absolutely privileged by Civil Code section 47, and Royer thus cannot establish a
probability of prevailing.6
A. Civil Code section 47
Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 47(b)), provides, “A
privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] … [¶] (b) In any (1) legislative
proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by
law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law and
reviewable” by writ of mandate. Although most cases discussing section 47(b) deal with
the so-called litigation privilege for publications made in a judicial proceeding, here we
are concerned with the privilege for publications made in an official proceeding
authorized by law. We note, however, that case law applying the privilege “to judicial
proceedings is applicable with equal force to other official proceedings authorized by
law.” (Frisk v. Merrihew (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 319, 324.)
The privilege created by section 47(b) is “absolute; it applies … regardless
whether the communication was made with malice or the intent to harm. [Citation.] Put
another way, application of the privilege does not depend on the publisher’s ‘motives,
morals, ethics or intent.’ ” (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 913; see
also California Physicians’ Service v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1321, 1330
[privilege applies even if publication is made “in bad faith” or “for inappropriate
purpose”]; Rader v. Thrasher (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 883, 887 [“ ‘Publications made in
the course of a[n official] proceeding are absolutely privileged … [citations] even though
they are made with actual malice’ ” (italics omitted)].) And again: “Civil Code section
6 We thus need not, and do not, discuss the trial court’s alternative finding that
Royer could not establish a probability of prevailing because she did not have a
reasonable expectation her address and medical diagnosis would be kept private once she
included them in a government claim.
10
47, subdivision (b) provides absolute immunity for publications and statements made in
an ‘official proceeding authorized by law.’ ” (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Powell
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 955, 971; see also King v. Borges (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 27, 32
[communications made in an “ ‘official proceeding authorized by law’ and thus within
the ambit of Civil Code section 47 … would be absolutely privileged”].) The privilege
applies to any publication that “ ‘has a reasonable relation to the [official proceeding] and
is permitted by law.’ ” (Frank Pisano & Associates v. Taggart (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 1,
25.) “Although originally applied only to defamation actions, the privilege has been
extended to any communication, not just a publication, having ‘some relation’ to a[n
official] proceeding, and to all torts other than malicious prosecution.” (Kashian, at
p. 913, italics omitted.) The privilege thus “immunize[s] defendants from tort liability
based on theories of” “invasion of privacy.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205,
215; see also Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355, 364 [“the privilege will defeat claims
of invasion of privacy”].)
The anti-SLAPP statute and section 47(b) both use the same phrase — “official
proceeding authorized by law” — and we interpret the phrase analogously in both
statutes. (See Doe v. San Diego-Imperial Council (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 301, 313-315
[interpreting phrase “favorable conclusion” used in two different statutes the same way];
Lee v. Fick (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 89, 96 [noting “the ‘official proceeding[s]’ provision
of [the anti-SLAPP statute] has language parallel to that contained in the ‘official
proceeding[s]’ provision of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b),” and by finding
alleged libel was privileged under § 47, the court also “implicitly found that both prongs
of the two-part analysis required by [the anti-SLAPP statute] had been satisfied”].) In
our prior decision, we found the District’s publication of Royer’s claim on its website
was a statement or writing made in an “official proceeding authorized by law” within the
meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute. For the same reasons, we find it was also a
11
publication in an “official proceeding authorized by law” within the meaning of section
47(b).
An “official” proceeding has been defined as a “governmental” proceeding
(Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1377), and school
districts are governmental entities (see Department of Finance v. Commission on State
Mandates (2003) 30 Cal.4th 727, 751, fn. 20). And as we noted in our prior decision, the
phrase “official proceeding authorized by law” includes “proceedings required by
statute.” (Laker v. Board of Trustees of California State University, supra,
32 Cal.App.5th at p. 764.) Here, there are two statutes that are relevant to our analysis of
the privilege: the Government Claims Act and the Ralph M. Brown Act. We discuss
both statutes in the next section.
B. The Government Claims Act and the Ralph M. Brown Act
The Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.) “require[s], as a condition
precedent to bringing suit for ‘money or damages’ against a … public entity, the timely
presentation to the defendant of a written claim and the rejection of that claim in whole or
in part” by the public entity. (Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983)
147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1078, italics omitted; see also Gov. Code, § 945.4 [“no suit for
money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which
a claim is required to be presented … until a written claim therefor has been presented to
the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been
rejected by the board”].) The purpose of this so-called claim presentation requirement “is
to provide notice to the public entity that a valid claim may exist and that litigation ‘may
ensue’ if it is not resolved. [Citation.] The point of the requirements is … to permit the
public entity to avoid litigation by enabling it to conduct an early investigation and
consider the benefits of settling a claim.” (Alliance Financial v. City and County of San
Francisco (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 635, 647, italics omitted; see also City of Stockton v.
Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 744 [purpose of claim presentation requirement is
12
“facilitating the investigation of disputes and their settlement without trial if
appropriate”].) The Government Claims Act applies to claims against community college
districts. (Oregon State University v. Superior Court (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1186,
fn. 7; Loehr, at pp. 1078-1079.) Thus, anyone who wants to sue a community college
district for money or damages must comply with the act’s claim presentation
requirements.7
The Government Claims Act contains detailed claim presentation procedures.
Among other things, a claim must be in writing and must include the claimant’s address
and a description of “the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted.”
(Gov. Code, § 910, subds. (a), (c).) The claim must be presented to the public entity not
later than six months after its accrual. (Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a).) There are
procedures for seeking leave to present a late claim (Gov. Code, §§ 911.4, 911.6), and if
the public entity denies an application to present a late claim, there are procedures for
petitioning the court for an order relieving the petitioner from the claim presentation
requirements (Gov. Code, §§ 945.4, 946.6). The public entity’s “governing body” or
“board” must act on the claim within specified time limits by rejecting, allowing, or
settling it in whole or in part, and if it fails to act within those time limits the claim is
deemed rejected. (Gov. Code, §§ 900.2, 912.4, 912.6.) Once a claim is rejected, the
claimant generally has six months to commence a lawsuit against the public entity. (Gov.
Code, § 945.6, subd. (a); Cavey v. Tualla (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 310, 329-330.) Finally,
the lawsuit “is subject to dismissal if it alleges a factual basis for recovery which is not
7 In her lawsuit, Royer asserted six causes of action alleging violations of FEHA.
FEHA actions “are not subject to the claim-presentation requirements of the
[Government] Claims Act.” (Snipes v. City of Bakersfield (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 861,
863, italics added.) Royer thus did not have to submit a government claim in order to
bring suit on her FEHA causes of action.
13
‘fairly reflected’ in the government claim.” (Hernandez v. City of Stockton (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 1222, 1231.)
We conclude the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation procedures
constitute an official proceeding authorized by law within the meaning of section 47(b).
(See, e.g., Lemke v. Sutter Roseville Medical Center (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1292, 1299
[“The absolute privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), encompasses
communications made to instigate an official investigation and in connection with the
investigation once commenced”]; Walker v. Kiousis (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1439
[filing and investigation of citizen’s complaint against peace officer is official proceeding
authorized by law for purposes of § 47].) Moreover, the claim “itself is part of the
official proceeding[].” (Lee v. Fick, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 97; see also Brody v.
Montalbano (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 725, 732 [“communications to an official agency,
which are designed to induce the agency to initiate action, are as much a part of the
‘official proceeding’ as communications made after the agency commences
proceedings”].)
As noted, the Ralph M. Brown Act (the Brown Act) (Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq.)
is also relevant to our analysis. Its stated purpose is to ensure that public entities
deliberate and act “openly.” (Gov. Code, § 54950.) To effectuate this purpose it
provides, “All meetings of the legislative body of a local agency shall be open and public
… except as otherwise provided by this chapter.” (Gov. Code, § 54953, subd. (a).) A
“ ‘meeting’ ” includes “any congregation of a majority of the members of a legislative
body … to hear, discuss, deliberate, or take action on any item that is within the subject
matter jurisdiction of the legislative body.” (Gov. Code, § 54952.2, subd. (a).) A “ ‘local
agency’ ” includes a “school district” (Gov. Code, § 54951) and a “ ‘legislative body’ ”
includes the “board” of a local agency (Gov. Code, § 54952). The District’s board is thus
a legislative body within the meaning of the Brown Act, and when it hears, discusses,
deliberates or acts on a matter within its jurisdiction, it must generally do so in a meeting
14
that is open to the public.8 And because acting on claims presented pursuant to the
Government Claims Act is a matter within the subject matter jurisdiction of the board
(see Gov. Code, § 912.4, subd. (a) [“The board shall act on a claim”]), that also means
the board is required by the Brown Act to hear, discuss, deliberate, and act on such
claims at a public meeting.
The Brown Act also provides, “At least 72 hours before a regular meeting, the
legislative body … shall post an agenda” on its “internet website” that “shall contain a
brief general description of each item of business to be transacted or discussed at the
meeting, including items to be discussed in closed session.” (Gov. Code, § 54954.2,
subd. (a)(1), (a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(A).) And it provides, “Any person may request that … a
copy of all the documents constituting the agenda packet … of any meeting of a
legislative body be mailed to that person,” and, “If a local agency has an internet website,
the legislative body or its designee shall email a copy of, or website link to, the … copy
of all the documents constituting the agenda packet if the person requests that the item or
items be delivered by email.” (Gov. Code, § 54954.1, italics added.) If the legislative
body is required to provide a “website link” to “all of the documents constituting the
agenda packet” upon request, we find it is implicitly permitted to post those documents
on the local agency’s website even absent such a request.
The Brown Act also permits (but does not require) a legislative body to hold a
closed session “based on advice of its legal counsel, … to confer with, or receive advice
from, its legal counsel regarding pending litigation when discussion in open session
concerning those matters would prejudice the position of the local agency in the
8 We note Education Code section 72121 reiterates that “all meetings of the
governing board of any community college district shall be open to the public, and all
actions authorized or required by law of the governing board shall be taken at the
meetings.”
15
litigation.” (Gov. Code, § 54956.9, subd. (a), italics added.) Litigation is considered
pending upon “receipt of a claim pursuant to the Government Claims Act.” (Gov. Code,
§ 54954.9, sub. (e)(3); see also id., subd. (d)(2).) Importantly, however, even if the
legislative body holds a closed session to discuss a government claim, the “claim … shall
be available for public inspection.” (Gov. Code, § 54956.9, subd. (e)(3), italics added.)
This provision “expressly acknowledges the availability of the [Government] Claims Act
claims themselves for public inspection.” (Poway Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court
(1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1503.)
We thus find the entire claims presentation process outlined in the Government
Claims Act, and the consideration of that claim at a public meeting as required by the
Brown Act and the publication of the claim in advance of that meeting, is part of an
official proceeding authorized by law within the meaning of section 47(b). (See, e.g.,
Frisk v. Merrihew, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at p. 324 [“school board meeting” “may be duly
classified as official proceedings authorized by law within the purview of section 47”].)
C. The official proceeding privilege defeats Royer’s invasion of privacy cause of action
Again, section 47(b) provides, “A privileged publication … is one made: [¶] …
In any … official proceeding authorized by law,” and case law teaches this privilege is
“absolute” and applies regardless of “malice or the intent to harm” (Kashian v. Harriman,
supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 913) and “will defeat claims of invasion of privacy” (Ribas v.
Clark, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 364). Applying the plain language of the statute as
interpreted by case law to the facts of this case, we find the District’s publication of
Royer’s claim was absolutely privileged, and she thus cannot establish a probability of
prevailing on the merits of her invasion of privacy cause of action. (See Dziubla v.
Piazza (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 140, 154-155 (Dziubla) [even if “plaintiffs could probably
show minimal merit as to most of their claims,” “they could not overcome … the
litigation privilege,” and the privilege thus “disposes of [those] claims in the second part
of the anti-SLAPP analysis”].)
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Royer does not mention section 47(b) in her briefs, other than to note in passing
that the trial court found it applied.9 This failure to address section 47(b) is potentially
fatal to her appeal because, as noted above, even though our review is de novo, it is still
Royer’s burden to show the trial court erred in finding the District’s publication of
Royer’s claim was absolutely privileged. (See Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th
344, 368 [“One cannot simply say the court erred, and leave it up to the appellate court to
figure out why”].) By failing to address the trial court’s finding, she fails to meet her
burden of showing the trial court erred in granting the anti-SLAPP motion. (See New
Plumbing Contractors, Inc. v. Edwards, Sooy & Byron (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 799, 802
[appellant “never addresses” the particular issue and thus “fails to carry the appellant’s
burden of affirmatively demonstrating error”].) Nonetheless, we will briefly explain why
we find the trial court did not err in concluding the publication was absolutely privileged.
The privilege applies when the publication at issue has some “logical relation” to
the official proceeding and it is lost “only when the matter is so palpably irrelevant to the
subject matter that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety.”
(Cayley v. Nunn (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 300, 303, 304.) Put another way, “Even when a
document broadly relates to [an official proceeding], it may contain unrelated parts that
do not find shelter in the privilege. When communications are ‘substantially extraneous’
to the [official] proceedings, there are ‘reasonable limits’ on the application of the
privilege.” (Dziubla, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 156.) We conclude the publication of
Royer’s claim had a logical relation to the official proceeding and was not so
9 Royer only addresses whether the trial court erred in finding she had no reasonable
expectation of privacy under the circumstances. As noted above, we need not address
this issue, because even if we were to find Royer had a reasonable expectation of privacy
and thus might have been able to establish the elements of a cause of action for invasion
of privacy, the privilege would still defeat the claim.
17
substantially extraneous or palpably irrelevant that no reasonable person could doubt its
irrelevancy or impropriety.
As discussed above, the District’s board was required to consider Royer’s claim at
a meeting that was open to the public unless it met the requirements for holding a closed
session to discuss pending litigation, and even if it held a closed session to discuss the
claim, the claim itself had to be made available for public inspection. (Gov. Code,
§ 54956.9, subds (a), (e)(3).) Moreover, the board’s standard practice was to discuss
government claims in open session, and the District’s standard practice was to post on its
website both the agenda and agenda materials for upcoming board meetings and to
include government claims in the agenda materials. And although the District may not
have been required to post (or publish) the agenda materials on its website, it was
implicitly permitted to do so. (See Gov. Code, § 54954.1.) Publishing Royer’s claim
was thus neither “palpably irrelevant” (Cayley v. Nunn, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 304)
nor “ ‘substantially extraneous’ ” (Dziubla, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 156) to the
official proceeding at which the claim would be discussed and/or decided.
In this regard, we find it appropriate to analogize Royer’s claim to a complaint in a
judicial proceeding: Just as filing a government claim institutes an official proceeding
authorized by law (i.e., the claim presentation process required by the Government
Claims Act), filing a complaint institutes a judicial proceeding. It is well established that
filing a complaint or other pleadings and papers in a judicial proceeding is absolutely
privileged pursuant to section 47(b). (See Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1195
[privilege applies to “filing the complaint and subsequent pleadings in the litigation”];
Holland v. Jones (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 378, 382 [defamatory statements in a
declaration filed in a marital dissolution proceeding were absolutely privileged];
Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 770 [“Pleadings and process in a case
are generally viewed as privileged communications”]; Sacramento Brewing Co. v.
Desmond, Miller & Desmond (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1086 [“ ‘a publication made
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in the course of a judicial proceeding is absolutely privileged’ ”]; California Physicians’
Service v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330 [“Defensive pleading,
including the assertion of affirmative defenses, is communication protected by the
absolute litigation privilege”]; Frank Pisano & Associates v. Taggart, supra,
29 Cal.App.3d at p. 24 [privilege applies “ ‘to the pleadings, the oral or written evidence,
[and] to publications in open court or in briefs or affidavits’ ”]; Baker v. Littman (1956)
138 Cal.App.2d 510, 514, fn * [“Respondent’s conduct … consisted only of the filing of
a civil action. Such a publication is absolutely privileged”].) And if the filing or
publication of a complaint is absolutely privileged, then, by analogy, so is the publication
of a government claim.
That leaves Royer’s argument that the District should have redacted her private
information before publishing the claim. Although we are not unsympathetic to this
argument, it would be difficult to maintain the absolute nature of the privilege while at
the same time allowing a plaintiff to go through an otherwise privileged publication line-
by-line and parse out private information from public information, because allowing a
plaintiff to do so risks turning an absolute privilege into a conditional privilege.
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the test is not whether the publication contains
private information; the test is whether the publication bears a “ ‘reasonable relation’ ” to
the official proceeding or is “ ‘substantially extraneous’ ” to it. (Dziubla, supra,
59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 155, 156.) We find the challenged portion of the publication bears
a reasonable relation to the official proceeding.
The Government Claims Act requires a claimant to include his or her address on
the claim. (Gov. Code, § 910, subd. (a).) It also requires the claimant to include a
description of the “circumstances … which gave rise to the claim asserted.” (Gov. Code,
§ 910, subd. (c).) For a failure to accommodate claim, including a description of the
circumstances giving rise to the claim could include identifying the medical condition for
which an accommodation was sought. At a minimum, Royer’s medical condition was
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“directly relevant” to her claim. (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 839,
842 [because “plaintiff haled defendants into court and accused them of causing her
various mental and emotional ailments,” her “present mental and emotional condition is
directly relevant to her claim”].) Because the Government Claims Act required Royer to
provide her address and permitted her to identify her medical condition, we cannot say
that publishing this information (i.e., by failing to redact it) is either palpably irrelevant or
bears no logical relation to the official proceeding.10
Royer may disagree, because she states, “Much akin to having to redact social
security numbers prior to submitting papers on the court docket, [the District] should
have redacted [her] confidential private information” before publishing her claim. She
does not cite any legal authority to support this statement, and we find the analogy is not
apt for two reasons. First, although rule 1.201 of the California Rules of Court does
generally require that social security numbers and financial account numbers be redacted
“from all pleadings and other papers filed in the court’s public file,” it does not require
10 We note that although the Government Claims Act “does require a claimant to
provide some potentially private information, generally, one who submits a tort claim has
no reasonable expectation of privacy.” (Poway Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court,
supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505; see also Register Div. of Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v.
County of Orange (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 893, 902 [by asserting personal injury claim,
claimant “placed his alleged physical injuries, and medical records substantiating the
same, in issue,” and “by voluntarily submitting these records to the County for the
purpose of reaching a settlement on his claim, [he] tacitly waived any expectation of
privacy regarding these medical records”]; Vinson v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.3d at
pp. 839, 842 [plaintiff who accused defendants “of causing her various mental and
emotional ailments” “waived her right to privacy in this respect”].)
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the redaction of addresses or medical information.11 And second, just because social
security numbers must be redacted in court filings does not necessarily mean the failure
to do so would give rise to a cause of action for invasion of privacy. Although we have
found no California cases discussing this issue, there are out-of-state cases that hold the
litigation privilege defeats an invasion of privacy claim based on the inclusion of a
person’s social security number in court papers. In Finnerty v. State Bank & Trust Co.
(2009) 301 Ga.App. 569 [687 S.E.2d 842], for example, the plaintiff bank sued the
defendant for defaulting on a promissory note. The bank included the note as an exhibit
to the complaint, and the note contained the defendant’s unredacted social security
number. The defendant filed a counterclaim for invasion of privacy, and the bank moved
for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion and the appellate court
affirmed, holding, “such invasion of privacy claims are barred because the pleadings filed
in this case, including the exhibits, are privileged.”12 (687 S.E.2d at p. 843.) It also
rejected the defendant’s argument that his social security number was not pertinent or
material to the relief sought and thus was not privileged, explaining, “this argument
misses the mark. Clearly, the note was ‘pertinent and material’ to [the bank’s] lawsuit to
collect damages after [the defendant] defaulted on the note. While the better practice
would have been to redact [the defendant’s] social security number in the note, the fact
11 The rule provides, “To protect personal privacy and other legitimate interests,
parties and their attorneys must not include, or must redact where inclusion is necessary,
the following identifiers from all pleadings and other papers filed in the court’s public
file, whether filed in paper or electronic form, unless otherwise provided by law or
ordered by the court: [¶] (1) Social security numbers. … [¶] (2) Financial account
numbers.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.201(a).)
12 Georgia’s version of the litigation privilege states, “ ‘All charges, allegations, and
averments contained in regular pleadings filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, which
are pertinent and material to the relief sought, whether legally sufficient to obtain it or
not, are privileged.’ ” (Finnerty v. State Bank & Trust Co., supra, 687 S.E.2d at p. 843,
quoting GA. Code Ann. § 51-5-8.)
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remains that the note was pertinent and material to the case and was legitimately filed.”
(Ibid.; see also Johnson v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd. (Ill.Ct.App. 2014) 7 N.E.3d 52, 56
[upholding dismissal of invasion of privacy claim based on allegation the defendant
attached documents to final pretrial order that contained the plaintiff’s social security
number because “the absolute litigation privilege applies to plaintiff’s invasion of privacy
claim”]; Vanginderen v. Cornell Univ. (S.D.Cal. Jan. 6, 2009, 08cv736 BTM(JMA))
2009 U.S.Dist. Lexis 303, *12-*14 [holding litigation privilege defeats invasion of
privacy claim based on act of filing reply brief that contained previously sealed court
records].) So, too, in this case.
DISPOSITION
The order granting the anti-SLAPP motion as to the invasion of privacy claim is
affirmed. The District shall recover its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.278(a)(1), (2).)
/s/
EARL, P. J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, J.
/s/
KRAUSE, J.
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