Filed 8/14/26 Roushanzamir v. Hopkins CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
ALI ROUSHANZAMIR,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E085008
v. (Super.Ct.No. CVRI2400337)
DEANNA HOPKINS, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Eric A. Keen, Judge.
Affirmed.
Ali Roushanzamir, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
MBK Chapman, Jason K. Boss, and Jessica P. Grazul for Defendant and
Respondent.
In November 2024, the trial court imposed discovery sanctions of $5,787.50
against plaintiff and appellant Ali Roushanzamir, payable to defendant and respondent
Deanna Hopkins. Roushanzamir, representing himself on appeal as he did in the trial
court, asks that we vacate the sanctions order, which he views as “unlawful and
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arbitrary.” We affirm.
I. FACTS
In January 2024, Roushanzamir sued Hopkins and others. His initial complaint is
not in our record. His second amended complaint seeks damages for infringement of his
property rights under several theories, including private nuisance and negligence, and it
seeks to quiet title as to both his own property and alleged easements.
The discovery process was contentious, and the parties each accuse the other of
misconduct. On September 11, 2024, Hopkins filed three motions to compel, with one
seeking further responses to form and special interrogatories, another seeking further
responses to requests for admissions (RFAs), and a third seeking further responses to
requests for production of documents (RPDs). Each of the motions also sought monetary
sanctions. The motion regarding RPDs is the one underlying this appeal. It requested
sanctions of at least $5,787.50, representing her expenses in bringing the motion.
Hopkins argued Roushanzamir’s responses to her RPDs were due July 18, 2024,
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and were served late, on July 25, 2024. She also argued the late responses failed to
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Hopkins requested we take judicial notice of the notice of ruling for a later order
granting terminating sanctions and additional monetary sanctions against Roushanzamir,
as well as the notice of entry for the ensuing judgment. Roushanzamir opposed the
request. The documents are not necessary for the resolution of this appeal, so we deny
the motion.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
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On appeal, Hopkins says the responses were due July 22, 2024. Roushanzamir’s
July 25, 2024 responses were untimely either way.
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comply with section 2031.210, subdivision (a), in various respects, and there was no
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response at all to some of the requests. Hopkins characterized Roushanzamir’s
objections as “boilerplate general objections” lacking substantial justification. And she
said Roushanzamir refused to meet and confer about these deficiencies in any meaningful
way. Instead, he threatened to expand the litigation, for example by writing to her
counsel: “YOUR FIRM WILL NEED 100’S of ATTORNEYS TO DEAL WITH
WHATS COMING FOR YOU JASON. GTH.” Roushanzamir provided Hopkins no
specific explanation for why he disagreed with the substance of the meet and confer
letter. Instead, he emailed: “File whatever you want. I don’t agree with you in any
capacity.”
Roushanzamir claims that on September 6, 2024, he “filed further responses” to
Hopkins’s RPDs. The document he cites is, however, a copy of his original responses,
dated July 25, 2024.
Hopkins’s motion to compel asserts Roushanzamir had “failed to produce a single
document in response to the RPDs.” Late in the evening on September 10, 2024, the day
before the motion was filed, Roushanzamir served by email some documents described as
“Exhibits.” These documents were not Bates-stamped, however, and lacked any
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“A party to whom a document demand has been directed ‘shall respond
separately to each item or category of item by any of the following: [¶] (1) A statement
that the party will comply with the particular demand . . . . [¶] (2) A representation that
the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand . . . . [¶] [or] (3) An objection to the
particular demand . . . .’” (Pollock v. Superior Court (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1348, 1357,
quoting § 2031.210, subd. (a).)
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indication they were being served in response to the RPDs, let alone that they were
responsive to any particular request.
Roushanzamir filed a single opposition to Hopkins’s three motions to compel.
The title of the combined opposition referenced only the motion seeking further
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responses to interrogatories. It also included arguments relating to Hopkins’s motion to
compel regarding RFAs. It mentioned RPDs only in passing, and in conclusory terms
that address only his production of documents, not his written responses and objections:
“Since there is nothing left to compel—Plaintiff has already responded to the
Interrogatories and provided the requested documents—the Defendant’s motion is moot.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s responses and document production were made in good faith,
demonstrating compliance with the discovery process.”
The trial court issued a tentative ruling granting Hopkins’s motion to compel as to
the RPDs: “This motion is unopposed. Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request
for Production of Documents is granted in its entirety including the request for monetary
sanctions in the amount of $5,787.50 payable within 30 days of this order. Proposed
Order submitted has been signed and ordered filed.” Roushanzamir did not request oral
argument to contest the tentative ruling, which became the court’s ruling.
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“Ali Roushanzamir, Opposition to Defendant Deanna Hopkins’ Motion to
Compel Plaintiff Ali Roushanzamir’s Further Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set
One, and Special Interrogatories, Set One, and For an Award of Monetary Sanctions
Against Plaintiff In the Amount of $8,552.50.”
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II. DISCUSSION
Roushanzamir argues the sanctions order “is not supported by law or fact.” We
are not persuaded.
Interlocutory discovery orders are normally not appealable before a final judgment
is entered, but section 904.1 makes an exception for “an order directing payment of
monetary sanctions by a party . . . if the amount exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000).”
(§ 904.1, subd. (a)(12); see also Ellis v. Toshiba America Information Systems, Inc.
(2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 853, 868.) Thus, we have jurisdiction over this direct appeal of
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the trial court’s order imposing sanctions of $5,787.50.
We review trial court discovery rulings, including discovery sanctions orders, for
abuse of discretion. (Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare REIT, Inc.
(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 789 (Cornerstone).) The trial court has “broad discretion in
deciding whether to impose sanctions and in setting the amount of monetary sanctions.”
(Ibid.) “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court’s decision exceeded the
bounds of reason.” (Ibid.) A discovery ruling will be set aside “‘only when it has been
established that there was no legal justification for the order.’” (O&C Creditors Group,
LLC v. Stephens & Stephens XII, LLC (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 546, 561.)
Roushanzamir forfeited most of the arguments he now raises on appeal. He failed
to oppose Hopkins’s motion to compel regarding RPDs in the trial court. He points to the
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We dismissed Roushanzamir’s appeal as to two other monetary discovery
sanctions orders, issued the same date in granting Hopkins’s other two motions to
compel, that did not meet the $5,000 threshold for appealability.
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opposition that he filed. That document, however, hardly mentions RPDs, and it includes
no reasoned argument supported by legal authority as to why his responses to RPDs were
legally adequate. Contentions not raised in the trial court ordinarily will not be
considered on appeal. (City of Rocklin v. Legacy Family Adventures-Rocklin, LLC
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 713, 735 (Rocklin); see also Porterville Citizens for Responsible
Hillside Development v. City of Porterville (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 885, 912 [where “a
trial court announces a tentative decision, a party who failed to bring any deficiencies or
omissions therein to the trial court’s attention forfeits the right to raise such defects or
omissions on appeal”].)
On appeal, too, Roushanzamir dedicates little of his briefing to pertinent issues.
Nowhere is any argument supported by specific citations to the record and applicable
legal authority as to why his responses to Hopkins’s RPDs each were in fact adequate,
notwithstanding the deficiencies alleged in her motion to compel. He cites no basis in the
law for concluding that telling opposing counsel to go to hell (“GTH”) and “file whatever
you want,” in the absence of any specific, substantive response to the merits of opposing
counsel’s legal positions, might constitute what he claims were “reasonable efforts to
meet and confer in good faith.” His assertion that his discovery responses, including his
responses to the RPDs, were timely because the deadline was “reset” on July 30, 2024,
when the court granted him leave to file a second amended complaint, also lacks legal or
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logical support. He offers no explanation or authority as to why serving again the same
deficient written responses to RPDs, along with a belated production of some documents,
might moot a motion to compel. When an appellant asserts a point but fails to support it
with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we generally treat the point as
forfeited. (See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Powell (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 955,
973, fn. 8.) While we have discretion to excuse forfeiture, that discretion “‘“should be
exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue.”’” (Rocklin,
supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 735.) This is not such a case.
Roushanzamir’s repeated emphasis on his status as a self-represented litigant is
not entirely misplaced. Generally, California law holds self-represented litigants to the
same standard of knowledge of law and procedure as an attorney. (E.g., City of Los
Angeles v. Glair (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 813, 819 [“‘A litigant has a right to act as his
own attorney [citation] “but, in so doing, should be restricted to the same rules of
evidence and procedure as is required of those qualified to practice law before our courts;
otherwise, ignorance is unjustly rewarded”’”].) But in the context of monetary sanctions
for failure to respond appropriately to document requests, there is a statutory presumption
in favor of self-represented litigants. Section 2023.050, subdivision (a), requires
imposition of an additional $1,000 sanction for a party or attorney who fails to respond in
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Roushanzamir cites no case authority at all in support of the proposition. The
only statute he cites is section 2033.250, subdivision (a), which sets the deadline for
responding to RFAs, not RPDs, and says nothing about that deadline resetting upon filing
of an amended pleading, even for RFAs. To our knowledge, there is no authority
Roushanzamir could have cited for the proposition, because it is not the law. The time to
respond to RPDs runs from service of the request. (§ 2031.260, subd. (a).)
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good faith to a document request. But, “[f]or purposes of this section, there is a
rebuttable presumption that a natural person acted in good faith if that person was not
represented by an attorney in the action at the time the conduct that is sanctionable under
subdivision (a) occurred.” (§ 2023.050, subd. (e).)
The sanctions order here, however, does not include the additional $1,000 in
sanctions that subdivision (a) of section 2023.050 would require, if the court had found it
applied. Instead, it is limited to Hopkins’s expenses in bringing her motion to compel.
Such an award falls under section 2023.030, which authorizes the trial court to impose
sanctions on a party or the party’s attorney for “misuse of the discovery process.” These
sanctions may include requiring payment of “the reasonable expenses, including
attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.” (Id., subd. (a).) Misuse
of the discovery process includes “[f]ailing to respond or to submit to an authorized
method of discovery,” “[m]aking, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious
objection to discovery,” “[m]aking an evasive response to discovery,” and “[f]ailing to
confer or to attempt to confer . . . with an opposing party or attorney in a reasonable and
good faith attempt to resolve informally any dispute concerning discovery . . . .” (§
2023.010, subds. (d), (e), (f), (i).) Roushanzamir has failed to articulate any reasoned
argument, supported by specific citation to the record and applicable legal authority, why
his discovery responses and objections and his meet and confer emails with Hopkins’s
counsel would not fall within these categories, as the trial court found.
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Section 2023.030, subdivision (a), requires that “[i]f a monetary sanction is
authorized by any provision of this title, the court shall impose that sanction unless it
finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other
circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Doe v. United States
Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1434.) Substantial justification means
clearly reasonable justification that is well-grounded in both law and fact. (Id. at pp.
1434-1435.) The losing party has the burden of proving substantial justification. (Id. at
p. 1435.) We review the trial court’s implied finding that Roushanzamir misused the
discovery process without substantial justification for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.; see
Parker v. Wolters Kluwer United States, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 285, 294 [“The
court need not make an explicit finding the exception did not exist as this is implied in
the order awarding sanctions”].)
Applying this deferential standard of review, we may not disturb the trial court’s
ruling. The many legal deficiencies of Roushanzamir’s written responses and objections
to Hopkins’s RPDs and his production of responsive documents are reasonably viewed as
without substantial justification, even assuming he was acting in good faith. And his
uncivil and non-substantive responses to Hopkins’s attempts to meet and confer belie his
claim of attempting in good faith to resolve informally the parties’ discovery disputes.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions on Roushanzamir. (See,
e.g., Cornerstone, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 796 [trial court abused its discretion by
failing to award attorney fees incurred in seeking compliance with RPDs].)
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Roushanzamir asserts that the $5,787.50 in monetary sanctions imposed here “are
disproportionate and unjustified.” We understand that $5,787.50 may not be a trivial
amount of money for an individual, self-represented litigant. Nevertheless, it is a modest
amount in the civil litigation context, limited to Hopkins’s actual expenses in bringing the
motion to compel. We find nothing disproportionate or unjustified about the sanctions
here.
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s November 7, 2024, order imposing $5,787.50 in sanctions against
Roushanzamir, payable to Hopkins, is affirmed. Hopkins is awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
P. J.
FIELDS
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
J.
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